STUDENT 2 PS 235 Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Effect on Interstate Relationships We make war that we may live in Peace. -Aristotle A lot of controversy has been made over the dispersion of weapons of mass destruction and how it affects the world we live in. Some side with Aristotle, stating that having advanced military technology will deter other nations from engaging in war by showing them the destructive capabilities of weapons today. Two nations who both have WMD would vaporize each other in a fight, forcing both to come to more diplomatic resolutions (Jervis, 2002). Others completely disagree and believe reciprocity for wrong actions have no effect on those that do wrong, and that it will just lead to an arms race that will engulf the world (Bailey, Smith, 1972; Mohan, 1986). How the dispersion and availability of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) affects interstate relationships is the topic this paper discusses. Does a wider availability of WMD actually decrease the probability of conflict between two states? The theory of deterrence has proven false many times over in the past, but with modern times and WMD now being capable of destroying countries in an instant, new form deterrence has arrived, nuclear deterrence, and it is this new form, and how it impacts inter-state relations that this paper will investigate. A state with advanced military capabilities also has deterrence. Deterrence is the theory that if a country knows another is powerful, they will be deterred from attacking you. To have what is called Nuclear Deterrence the state is using the same principle but with WMD. The difference of the two is the high risk situation that one causes and the other does not. It can easily
be guessed, that relationships between states that both have WMD are taken much more seriously than between nations that do not, and it is easy to see that nations who both have WMD never go to direct war with each other, while states without have engaged in many conflicts with their neighbors. This paper argues that more advanced, nuclear militaries will lead to a larger understanding and accepted belief of the MAD theory, and more positive inter-state relationships, meaning a more peaceful and democratic approach to solving conflicting issues. This paper will look at the literature on the subjects of nuclear deterrence and discuss an ongoing relationship between two states that have always been in turmoil and how their relationship has changed over time as one gained nuclear capabilities, and then how the relationship changed as they both gained these capabilities. The two nations in question are India and Pakistan. The Forms of Nuclear Deterrence War is not favorable. It is economically detrimental to both the loser and the winner (Hobbs, 1979), so if by going to war all a state is doing is hurting itself and really gaining nothing, one can argue that the best course of action is to avoid wars at all cost, and the easiest way to do this is through deterrence. Deterrence can be measured in three different ways, the credibility of weapon, the capability of the weapon, and the communication capabilities that states have (Mohan, 1986). In our day and age, communication between states has never been simpler. Every state knows what is going on with its neighbors, and most likely they even know what is happening half way around the world. The capability of the nuclear bomb is of the highest status of destructiveness that any weapon can achieve, and that capability and repeated testing gives the nuclear bomb all the credibility it needs. Nuclear deterrence by definition is the by far the most
powerful form of deterrence there is and in a sense is a different form of deterrence, a more serious one with a higher sense of importance and danger involved, giving it extra deterrent capabilities. The literature reviewed here describes different types of nuclear deterrence and the effect the authors believe they will have on interstate relations. After the development of the Atomic bomb the United States realized just how much power they held with this new weapon, but the method they used was having a Nuclear Monopoly or Nuclear Superiority. Think of two states on the verge of war. Wouldn t it be rational for the state with all the nuclear ability to go ahead and initiate the war with the state with no nuclear capability, knowing that the enemy would have no chance to win? One could see how powerful this type of deterrence could be on an enemy. With no hope of victory, surely the weaker state would never even attempt to get into a war with a state it knows it cannot defeat, theoretically meaning more peaceful and diplomatic relations will be sought after by the weaker state. The other method that has been looked at has been nuclear abolition, or the total destruction of all nuclear weapons. This is not really a form of deterrence but actually a form of abolishing it. This technique looks at how the world would be with no nuclear technology left in the world. The argument here is that if all nuclear weaponry is gone, then if the relations between two states becomes negative and war like, they at least cannot destroy each other completely in a nuclear war. This also seems to be a very effective plan as it theoretically makes the topic of nuclear deterrence and WMDs a mute point (Art, 1985). The third method of nuclear deterrence is Nuclear Equality. If two states go to war with each other, when one state is surely about to be overcome by the enemy, any rational state would of course use their last chance of survival and launch a nuclear weapon. And in the case of two
states going to war, one decides to use WMDs at the very start, they would have to expect a full salvo of return fire from their enemy. This brings up the question of who would be the first to move? In both cases the answer would be no one. Both scenarios would lead to nuclear war, one that couldn t be won, also known as Mutual Assured Destruction (Kull, 1983). It would be impossible to avoid being destroyed, so it calls for states acting in a much more diplomatic way (Deshpande, 1998). An example of Nuclear Equality is the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. They at first tried Nuclear Superiority, where the Soviets ended up feeling threatened and that sent both states into an arms race that, had it gone differently, could have caused the world s first nuclear war. It was only when they equalized in strength that concessions were made, hotlines were provided, and diplomatic steps were taken to prevent further escalation (McDonough, 2005). On evaluating this literature there in one problem that is evident, and that is that the authors are talking of nuclear deterrence just as if it were regular military deterrence. Nuclear deterrence puts a different mentality into the minds of those that are affronted with it. With regular military deterrence there is not so much for a state to overcome. At the moment they may be the weaker state, but consider Germany after World War 1, they were down for many years but eventually rose again more powerful than ever before. Nuclear weapons alter this form of deterrence. When a state is deterred by nuclear might, it is seen as a colossal thing to overcome, almost as if they will be under the thumb of the more powerful state for centuries to come. Every state values its sovereignty, and if they believe they may be forced to do the bidding of another state for and untold period of time, the ability to deter a state becomes much more complicated than simply over powering the enemy.
Nuclear Equality and its affect on Interstate Relations Two of the three theories previously described did not take into account the alteration that nuclear weapons impose on deterrence, and due to that they have some serious faults. One does not take into account the sense of urgency a state will have if it is faced with eternal over empowerment by another state, and the other is just seen as a naïve gesture. The idea that eradicating nuclear technology off the face of the earth has been agreed upon by many experts and scientists to be foolish and futile. The technology to create an atomic or nuclear weapon cannot be un-invented, and because of that the knowledge to build one cannot be erased. It is safe to say that in some place in the world the technology and means to create a nuclear weapon will always exist, and could even fall into the hands of a terrorist organization (Art, 1985). Another problem that this idea raises is how could anyone be sure that a state will comply with these demands? This brings us back to a common prisoner s dilemma. The Nash Equilibrium says that both sides will always defect, and in the case of a state having to choose to destroy its nuclear arsenal or keep it in secret, the obvious defection would be to keep their nuclear technology. The third problem with this idea is that if it actually works, will this in fact increase the probability that states will act in a more diplomatic and peaceful way when faced with conflict? In fact the number of major wars in our recent past has significantly decreased since the invention of the atomic bomb. Based on evidence found by Bailey and Smith (1972), deterrence and reciprocity for not being deterred has never worked very well in the past, even when the offender knows what could happen to him for breaking the law. A few very good examples of this can be seen in all of human history. Whenever there are two powerful states on equal terms, or even if one is slightly weaker, both have always vied for complete power over others with no interference. Napoleon and the Napoleonic Wars, Germany and Japan in World
War one and two, Spain and England in the Anglo-Spanish war. All of these are examples of states that should have been deterred from fighting, but were not, without the alteration of nuclear power on deterrence, states with equal or almost equal power will still fight despite of it. Based on the evidence just provided, it should be safe to say that the theory of Nuclear Superiority should be the key needed to make deterrence work and conflict resolution more peacefully accomplished. Whereas with nuclear eradication, it is the lapse of the nuclear alteration that causes the theory to fail, it is because the alteration is present that the superiority theory fails. Based on an article written by McDonough (2005), a state that sees itself as unequal will want to try to become just as powerful as those on top, so that it too may become a world leader. This will lead to a devastating arms race that could potentially end catastrophically. A state with no nuclear capabilities faced with being controlled by another state with those capabilities will fight no matter what. With basic military deterrence, like the kind used in the wars mentioned earlier, a state could overcome that in a few short years. But the ability to create nuclear weapons is a heavily guarded secret and an elite club, and it is that seemingly unachievable feat that is the nuclear alteration on deterrence. When faced with being a puppet or being attacked by nuclear weapons, a state will most likely take their chances with destruction, and this can be explained by the fact that each state wants to keep its sovereignty. Being controlled by another state is in essence losing your sovereignty and free will. An excellent example of this is the struggle between Pakistan and India. India and Pakistan have been at war for years, and in 1965 when they India started its nuclear program, Pakistan, facing sure destruction, still continued to challenge India in conflicts like the 1965 war and the 1971 war, therefore proving that military superiority is not effective on deterring weaker states.
That finally brings us to the theory of how, in a nuclear world, do you get conflicting nations to negotiate in a more peaceful and diplomatic manner. The hypothesis is this: Hypothesis: If two states are equal in nuclear power, then this will cause nuclear deterrence to be effective, forcing two conflicting states to work in more peaceful ways to avoid war. Nuclear Equality is the only way to balance out the effects that nuclear alteration has on deterrence. Two states that are on equal ground, and know that by starting a war there is no way to avoid mutual assured destruction, will of course be rational and work to find an alternative to fighting. There are two examples of this; one is the evident decrease in wars since the creation of atomic bombs. Not only have wars become rarer, but the ferocity that was World War 2 has never been seen again, meaning wars are becoming less and less devastating. The second is the decrease in conflict between India and Pakistan since Pakistan started its nuclear program in 1972. Many peace talks and summits were created, and even a meeting was made to attempt to resolve all issues between the countries. Though there have been a few moments near the brink, full out war has not come to these two nations since both developed nuclear technology. Measuring the Effects of Nuclear Equality on Interstate Relations The hypothesis can be tested by looking at the level of fatalities, the hostility level, and the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) the states of Pakistan and India had during three levels of nuclear equality during the cold war (1947-1989). The relationship this study could looking at is a prime example because for years these countries have been at war. In 1974, during the Cold War, India gained nuclear capabilities while Pakistan was left without. It was not until 1986 that Pakistan also obtained these weapons. This unique circumstance would allow us to test relationship overtime, going from both states with no nuclear capabilities, to one state having them, to both having them.
The Independent variable in this test would be one states level of nuclear equality in relation to another. According to the hypothesis the level of nuclear equality between states is what causes them to act positively or negatively in mutual conflict, therefore in order to test that conflict resolution style, nuclear equality must be measured. This can be done using three levels. Level one would represent the time period from 1947-1973, and would represent the time that neither of the states in question had nuclear capabilities. Level two would represent the time period from 1974-1986, the time period that only India had nuclear capabilities. Finally level three would represent the time period from 1986-1989, the time that both Pakistan and India had nuclear capabilities. This would allow us to use our three levels of analysis on the dependent variable and see their change throughout the three levels of nuclear equality. The dependant variable in the test would be how the states of Pakistan and India solved their mutual disputes. This variable will be looked at over all three levels of nuclear equality that the states had, and would be measured by the hostility level, fatality level, and number of MID s that the states had throughout those three levels (Jones, Daniel M, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, 1996). These three units of analysis will allow us to see the measure how often and how explosive Pakistan and India s disputes were and allow us to see if they decrease once the third level of nuclear equality is reached. The first unit of analysis could be the hostility level, and this describes the level of hostility and tension between the states of Pakistan and India. If my hypothesis is to be supported, I could make a graph with time on the x-axis and hostility level on the Y axis. I could then plot the level of hostility over time. I would expect level one of nuclear equality the hostility level is fairly high a majority of the time. Starting with level two in 1973 the hostility level should plummets to zero, and then it should rise again in 1980 due to Pakistan not willing
to stay the weaker state. Finally at the very beginning of level three in 1986 the hostility level should plummet and stay down. The next unit of analysis would be the fatality level, and this describes the mutual level of people who were killed during disputes between the two states. Like the hostility level, the fatality level should hold true to the hypothesis and for similar reasons. For a majority of level one of nuclear equality the fatality level should be fairly elevated, and at the beginning of level two in 1974 the levels should decrease. Later in the 1980 s the level should increase once again, showing that India s nuclear superiority is not keeping disputes from happening. It is only in 1986, the beginning of level three, that we should see the fatality level drop off and stay a zero. The final unit of analysis could be the number of MIDs Pakistan and India had during the three levels of nuclear equality. Like the other two graphs, this one should hold the same trends. For a majority of level one the number of MIDs should be exceptionally high, and beginning at level two, just like the other two graphs, the level of MIDs should plummet to zero. Once again these levels should rise beginning in the 1980 s and plummet at the beginning of level three in 1986. All three of the graphs explained above would hopefully all agree with the hypothesis. They would show that level one in nuclear equality is the most aggressive when it came to disputes between the two states. They would show that while nuclear superiority for India did bring peace for some time, they alteration of deterrence by nuclear weapons forced Pakistan to either act or stay weak in comparison. The graphs would also show that the levels in all three categories spiked in the early 1980 s and only lowered again at the start of level three in 1986.
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