ELITE AND MASS ATTITUDES ON HOW THE UK AND ITS PARTS ARE GOVERNED DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

BRIEFING ELITE AND MASS ATTITUDES ON HOW THE UK AND ITS PARTS ARE GOVERNED DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE Lindsay Paterson, Jan Eichhorn, Daniel Kenealy, Richard Parry & Alexandra Remond MARCH 2015 WWW.AOG.ED.AC.UK

Democratic engagement with the process of constitutional change This briefing summarises evidence that our survey gives about citizens engagement with the political process. The main attention is on their interest in the debate about constitutional change in the UK. The focus here is not on their preferences for the ways in which the UK is governed, but rather on whether they have thought about the question, with whom they have discussed it, and what sort of action they have taken, or might take, in connection with the debate. The briefing looks particularly at differences and similarities in these respects among England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, and also examines whether there are differences according to sex, age, educational level, sense of al identity, and religion. 1 Intention to vote As a preliminary, we look at the more general question of whether people are engaged with the political process. Table 1 shows the percentage of people who said they were certain to vote in the 2010 election for the UK Parliament. 2 In each part of the UK, a higher percentage of older people than of younger people say that they are certain to vote: thus, overall, around twice as many (82%) of people aged 65 or older are certain that they will vote than are people aged 18-19 (42%) or 20-24 (39%). Table 1 Certain to vote, by and age 18-19 20-24 25-44 45-64 65 or older All ages England 34 38 51 70 80 63 Scotland 65 57 66 81 88 76 Northern Ireland 42 60 74 55 Wales 28 56 70 82 64 UK 42 39 54 72 82 65 Shows percentage choosing point 10 on an 11-point scale of likelihood to vote in 2015 UK General Election. Restricted to those eligible to vote. For sample sizes, see Table A1. sample size less than 30. But almost as striking as that trend is the much higher percentages in Scotland than elsewhere, especially for younger ages 65% for 18-19-year-olds and 57% for people aged 20-24. There is a clear though weaker Scottish difference at all ages. It seems likely that these intentions reflect the very high level of voting in the referendum on Scottish independence in September 2014 (which attracted a turnout of 84.7%). In particular, the high level of intention among 18-19-year-olds in Scotland here may reflect the reduction of the voting age to 16 in the referendum, and the 1 Details of the sample sizes corresponding to all the tables in this Briefing are available in the appendix of this briefing. 2 The question was: Please think of a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, how likely is it that you will vote in the 2015 general election? 1

resulting interest in politics among that age group. The referendum may thus have had a lasting effect on people s engagement with the political process, despite scepticism about any such legacy among some of the elites who were interviewed by the project. 3 In contrast to age, although there was a sex difference in the proportion who said they were certain to vote (62% of women and 69% of men), there was no variation in that difference among the areas of the UK. Scottish distinctiveness is found at all levels of education, as Table 2 shows. In each area, the proportion who are certain to vote is less among people with lower levels of education than among people with a university degree, although the gradient is much shallower than with age. In Scotland, however, even the education group that is least likely to say that they are certain to vote those with only lower education have a proportion (69%) that is close to the intention among graduates in the other three areas. Once again, this may be a legacy of the referendum debate, in which not only was turnout high but so also was the level of engagement in debate: that process was itself educational for a very large number of citizens. Table 2 Certain to vote, by and highest educational attainment Degree Higher education below degree Upper Lower England 65 75 57 60 62 Scotland 80 78 72 69 76 Northern Ireland 60 56 55 47 49 Wales 70 72 59 63 59 UK 69 74 60 61 64 Low or none Shows percentage choosing point 10 on an 11-point scale of likelihood to vote in 2015 UK General Election. Restricted to those eligible to vote. For sample sizes, see Table A2. In Scotland, those who feel more Scottish as opposed to have a higher proportion intending to vote, as shown in Table 3, where the proportion who are certain that they will vote is 79% among those who feel exclusively Scottish ( Scottish not ), but 67% among those who feel the opposite ( not Scottish ). In England, the pattern is U-shaped, with greatest certainty among those who are English not or not English. In Wales and Northern Ireland there is evidence that the gradient is the other way round from that in Scotland, with the group of people towards the end of the spectrum having a somewhat higher proportion who are certain that they will vote than people who are exclusively Welsh or Northern Irish. These contrasts suggest that the politicisation of Scottish al identity in Scotland during the referendum may now be having a legacy in the propensity to vote in an election that may, in its aftermath, raise further questions about Scotland s 3 See Briefing on Scotland, and Briefing on the Smith Commission. 2

constitutional future. It could be that both sides in the referendum debate see the 2015 election as a means of sustaining the argument, since they were almost equally likely to say that they are certain to vote: 81% of those who voted Yes to independence say that they are certain to vote, but the proportion among those who voted No was also very high, at 77%. (The proportion among those who did not vote in the referendum is, not surprisingly, very small just 9%.) Nation not Table 3 Certain to vote, by and al identity* Nation more than Equally and more than not England 69 63 60 66 68 58 Scotland 79 75 77 73 67 74 Northern Ireland 51 60 54 65 61 36 Wales 60 63 65 65 65 80 UK 70 67 64 67 66 62 * For example, in England Nation not refers to people who feel English not. Neither nor Shows percentage choosing point 10 on an 11-point scale of likelihood to vote in 2015 UK General Election. Restricted to those eligible to vote. For sample sizes, see Table A3. Political action The survey asked people whether they had ever undertaken four kinds of political action signed a petition, written to a member of the UK Parliament, taken part in a boycott, or gone on a demonstration. To summarise the results, we simplify the responses into whether people had done at least one of these things. The results are in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Table 4 shows that the sex difference varied by area: in England and Scotland there was not reliable evidence of any difference whereas in Wales and Northern Ireland a higher proportion of women than of men had undertaken one of these political actions. Table 4 Taken part in any political action, by and sex Male England 56 57 Scotland 64 62 Northern Ireland 53 63 Wales 57 61 UK 58 59 Female Shows percentage saying they had done at least one of signing a petition, writing to an MP, taking part in a boycott, or taking part in a demonstration For sample sizes, see Table A4. 3

The relationship of political action to age (Table 5) is U-shaped in England and Scotland with higher proportions at younger and older ages than in the middle. At the youngest ages, there was a clearly higher level of action in Scotland than elsewhere 71% compared to an average of 53% at age 18-19, and 54% compared to 43% at ages 20-24. This suggests a particularly abiding effect of the referendum on young people which goes beyond mere voting, not a possibility that was imagined by the elites who were interviewed by the project. 4 There was no reliable evidence of any difference among areas at the older age groups. Table 5 Taken part in any political action, by and age 18-19 20-24 25-44 45-64 65 or older All ages England 47 41 48 63 68 56 Scotland 71 54 60 67 63 63 Northern Ireland 49 65 67 57 Wales 41 53 65 65 59 UK 53 43 52 64 67 58 Shows percentage saying they had done at least one of signing a petition, writing to an MP, taking part in a boycott, or taking part in a demonstration For sample sizes, see Table A5. sample size less than 30. As with the intention to vote, the relationship of political action to al identity is not the same in each part of the UK (Table 6). Table 6 Taken part in any political action, by and al identity Nation not Nation more than Equally and more than not England 59 60 56 60 54 50 Scotland 67 64 62 62 61 63 Northern Ireland 50 59 58 68 55 60 Wales 55 63 58 61 59 68 UK 60 62 57 62 57 57 *For example, in England Nation not refers to people who feel English not. Neither nor Shows percentage saying they had done at least one of signing a petition, writing to an MP, taking part in a boycott, or taking part in a demonstration For sample sizes, see Table A7. In Scotland, the higher proportions who have undertaken political actions are among those groups towards the Scottish rather than end of the scale of al identity. In Wales, there is tendency in the opposite direction: 50% of people who felt Welsh not had taken some political action, in contrast to 55% of those who 4 See Briefing on Scotland. 4

are not Welsh and 68% of those who are more than Welsh. The tendency is similar but less pronounced in Northern Ireland, and in England there is no consistent pattern. Once more, these contrasts with Scotland may be a legacy of the politicisation of al identity during the referendum debates in 2014. Satisfaction with democracy Despite the differences in political engagement among age groups and among the parts of the UK, there is little such variation in how satisfied people are with democracy in Britain. 5 Table 7 shows that satisfaction is at a low level in all four areas, ranging from 17% in Northern Ireland to 25% in England. These proportions hardly varied by age. Notably, therefore, despite the experience of the referendum debate and the very high turnout there, Scotland does not have a high level of satisfaction (just 21%). That percentage was particularly low among those who voted for the losing side (14% among Yes voters), but it was not very high among those who had won (31% among No voters). One-off events such as a referendum, however much interest they may stimulate, may not affect people s attitude to the system. Moreover, in the light of evidence noted above on high levels of participation, the results in this table show that participation and satisfaction with democracy are not the same thing, despite a belief by some of the elites who were interviewed for the project that a healthy democracy is indicated by high levels of participation. 6 Table 7 Satisfaction with democracy, by and age 18-19 20-24 25-44 45-64 65 or older All ages England 26 30 29 21 22 25 Scotland 21 25 24 20 22 22 Northern Ireland 16 17 21 17 Wales 20 18 15 21 18 UK 24 26 25 20 22 23 Shows percentage saying very satisfied or rather satisfied with democracy in Britain. For sample sizes, see Table A5. sample size less than 30. Men and women in Scotland and Wales share the disgruntlement, as Table 8 shows, but women in England and, particularly, Northern Ireland are less satisfied than men there. 5 The question wording was: On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, rather dissatisfied or very dissatisfied satisfied with the way democracy is developing in Britain?, and there was a 5-point response scale from very satisfied to very dissatisfied. 6 See Briefing on Scotland. 5

Table 8 Satisfaction with democracy, by and sex Female Male England 21 29 Scotland 21 23 Northern Ireland 12 22 Wales 18 18 UK 20 26 Shows percentage saying very satisfied or rather satisfied with democracy in Britain. For sample sizes, see Table A4. The tendency in Scotland for the group of people who feel more Scottish to have a higher percentage inclined to vote and to take political action is reversed in the levels of satisfaction with democracy, as Table 9 shows. Whereas the small group who feel more than Scottish has 39% satisfaction, the proportion is only one third of that among people who feel exclusively Scottish. There is nothing analogous in Wales or England. But there is a slight tendency in the same direction in Northern Ireland, partly (but not wholly) because Catholics are even less satisfied (at 12%) than Protestants (17%) or people with no religion (also 17%). Table 9 Satisfaction with democracy, by and al identity Nation not Nation more than Equally and more than not England 23 29 24 27 29 25 Scotland 13 21 25 39 28 27 Northern Ireland 15 12 16 27 26 11 Wales 17 12 20 21 19 16 UK 19 23 23 28 25 22 Shows percentage saying very satisfied or rather satisfied with democracy in Britain. *For example, in England Nation not refers to people who feel English not. For sample sizes, see Table A7. Neither nor Political information and understanding One feature of the Scottish referendum was that people became used to searching out political information. Table 10 suggests that this may have left a legacy. It is based on a survey question that asked where respondents had obtained news about politics in the UK during the last three months (offering the options shown in the table), and thus was deliberately about the period since the referendum. The table shows that the proportion in Scotland who consulted each of the named sources was higher than elsewhere. Nevertheless, one striking feature is how important quite old news sources still are: despite the internet, the most common source in each area was, by far, the television, and newspapers were at a very similar level to online news. The new social media were far behind, used by one fifth of people in England, 6

Wales and Northern Ireland, and even in Scotland used by only one third, despite the massive online debate during the referendum. Newspapers Table 10 Sources of political information, by Online news Social Television Radio Political media * parties England 48 46 21 65 29 14 Scotland 54 56 31 72 31 20 Northern Ireland 48 49 22 71 34 8 Wales 45 47 20 66 28 13 UK 49 49 23 67 30 14 * Exemplified in the survey question as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram. For sample sizes, see margin of Table A5. Despite much debate, many people still find that politics seems too complicated for them to understand. We heard from some of our elites that the level of awareness of devolution and new powers, whether in Scotland or other parts of the UK, was quite low and that, in their experience, many voters struggled to understand the complexities of developments in this area. The survey asked people the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really make sense of it all. The proportions agreeing to at least some extent are shown in Table 11, where it can be seen that, overall, around one half of people agree. Even in Scotland, after two years of debate leading to the referendum, the proportion was not much less than a half (44%). Table 11 Politics too complicated by and al identity Nation not Nation more than Equally and more than not Neither nor England 47 50 51 43 41 40 48 Scotland 42 46 45 34 43 42 44 Northern Ireland 58 58 56 58 56 31 56 Wales 50 57 52 41 47 49 50 UK 47 50 51 42 45 44 48 Shows percentage who strongly agree or agree that sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me cannot really make sense of it at all. *For example, in England Nation not refers to people who feel English not. For sample sizes, see Table A7. All The table also shows that there was some variation on this respect by al identity, except in Scotland: elsewhere, there is a weak tendency for people who feel less to be more likely to say that politics is too complicated. However, that 7

turns out to be due to different levels of education: people who feel more tend to have higher levels of education, and probably because of that to have lower proportions saying that politics is too complex. Political discussion The UK is not an apolitical place, as Table 12 shows, based on a question about discussion in the past three months. People discuss how the UK is governed with many others: only a minority of about one third discussed it with no-one, family being the most common forum. The effect of the referendum in Scotland is clear, since the percentage who report some such discussion is 80% (86% among people who voted Yes in the referendum, and 77% among those who voted No). The reference period for the question was the last three months, and so the high percentages for Scotland are not a description of the referendum debate itself: they are probably a legacy of the referendum, again contrary to the expectation of some elites. 7 Table 12 With whom discussed how the UK is governed, by No-one Family Friends People at work or fellow students England 36 39 31 14 1 Scotland 20 62 54 29 2 Northern Ireland 40 39 27 16 1 Wales 38 43 32 13 1 UK 33 45 36 17 1 The reference period for the discussion is the last three months. For sample sizes, see margin of Table A5. Other Specifically on the constitution, people are willing to spend more time talking about it: see Table 13. A sizeable minority of around 40% in all parts of the UK would like more such debate, and even about one third of people with low levels of education would like that, too. Of the other options offered in the question, only about 20% said that too much time had been spent discussing the issue; a further 20% thought that about enough time had been spend on it (and about 20% had no view). Even in Scotland, where a great deal of time has been devoted to the question in recent years, only a minority (21%) felt that too much debate had taken place. It seems that many kinds of citizen have come to believe that the question of how the UK is governed is worth considering at length. As expanded further in other briefings, people across the UK want to discuss constitutional issues: they care, even though the constitution might not be top of their immediate policy interests. This is at odds with the views expressed by many of the elites. Many saw the timetable for the Smith Commission as appropriate and necessary to maintain the momentum from the referendum. Similarly, in parts of England elites we spoke to about devolution suggested that it would be difficult to engage the public in discussion of how the UK is governed. 7 See Briefing on Scotland. 8

Table 13 Too little time has been spent debating how the UK is governed, by and highest educational attainment Degree Higher education below degree Upper Lower Low or none England 40 48 32 35 31 36 Scotland 42 44 47 32 41 42 Northern Ireland 41 41 33 31 38 37 Wales 43 38 40 38 35 40 UK 41 44 36 35 34 38 Restricted to those eligible to vote. For sample sizes, see Table A6. All Despite the willingness to engage in debate, however, there was not a widespread sense that the constitution matters to the respondent individually, as Table 14 shows. Outside Scotland, only about a quarter think that it matters. In Scotland, the proportion is 37%, and there is something of a gradient relating to how Scottish people felt: 46% of the most Scottish felt this way. In Northern Ireland, the percentage was similar for Catholics (21%) and Protestants (25%). Table 14 How much the respondent would be affected by changes in how the UK is governed, by and al identity Nation not Nation more than Equally and more than not Neither nor England 28 26 25 32 30 30 27 Scotland 46 37 32 32 37 35 37 Northern Ireland 28 13 25 38 19 18 24 Wales 31 22 31 15 20 25 26 UK 34 28 27 29 27 29 29 Shows percentage who reply a great deal or quite a lot. *For example, in England Nation not refers to people who feel English not. For sample sizes, see Table A7. All There was also not a widespread sense that ordinary people could have much of an influence on the outcome of any debates about how the UK is governed. Table 15 shows that, even in Scotland where so many people turned out in the referendum, only 25% thought that ordinary people would have an influence. That was much the same regardless of how people voted in the referendum (26% among Yes voters, 23% among No voters). The main influence was seen to be political parties (around three quarters) and the UK Parliament (also around three quarters). Except in Scotland, the only other group to be reported as having an influence is business (55% overall). In Scotland, the Scottish Parliament is also at that level. The 9

assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland were felt to be influential by respectively 28% and 42% of people there, a figure that in Northern Ireland did not vary by religion. Our elite interviews revealed that much of what is happening in the UK at present regarding changes in the way we are governed is taking place with minimal, or superficial, public consultation. Some of the elites that we interviewed, who are directly part of these processes, were highly critical of the failure to open up discussion and to allow citizens a greater voice. Politicians in the UK Parliament Table 15 Able to influence debate about how the UK is governed, by Politicians in respondent s devolved Parliament or Assembly Politicians in respondent s council Political parties Campaign groups Trade unions Businesses England 76-32 73 33 39 56 21 Scotland 79 57 27 75 34 37 56 25 Northern Ireland 74 28 21 70 29 32 53 17 Wales 78 42 21 71 28 35 53 17 UK 77-28 73 32 37 55 21 Shows percentage who reply able to influence greatly or able to influence somewhat. For sample sizes, see margin of Table A5. Ordinary people Conclusions The main points to emerge from this analysis are: Levels of political engagement in Scotland are higher than in the rest of the UK. This is probably a legacy of the very high level of engagement with the independence referendum in 2014. People in Scotland are very interested in the question of how the UK is governed, and in this, too, they differ from people in other parts of the UK. Though young people are generally less engaged with politics than older people, there is much less of a difference in Scotland than elsewhere. Likewise, the tendency for better-educated people to be more engaged than the less well-educated is weaker in Scotland than elsewhere. However, throughout the UK including in Scotland there are only low levels of satisfaction with democracy and not very much faith that ordinary people can influence how the UK is governed. 10

Appendix: Tables of sample sizes Table A1 Sample sizes: and age (eligible to vote only) 18-19 20-24 25-44 45-64 65 or older All ages England 288 193 1054 1241 732 3508 Scotland 141 63 442 499 333 1478 Northern Ireland 7 23 142 237 92 501 Wales 19 45 337 428 280 1109 UK 455 324 1975 2405 1437 6596 Table A2 Sample sizes: and highest educational attainment (eligible to vote only) degree higher education below degree Upper Lower Low or none England 1039 313 887 682 474 Scotland 512 209 361 169 176 Northern Ireland 175 55 106 95 55 Wales 350 101 248 220 147 UK 2076 678 1602 1166 852 Table A3 Sample sizes: and al identity (eligible to vote only) Nation not Nation more than Equally and more than not England 630 527 1620 272 277 100 Scotland 368 366 486 79 123 45 Northern Ireland 78 60 201 54 66 36 Wales 179 181 358 98 242 47 UK 1255 1134 2665 503 708 228 Neither nor 11

Table A4 Sample sizes: and sex Female Male England 2027 2000 Scotland 846 784 Northern Ireland 326 285 Wales 635 576 UK 3834 3645 Table A5 Sample sizes: and age 18-19 20-24 25-44 45-64 65 or older All ages England 466 270 1260 1288 743 4027 Scotland 160 93 522 515 340 1630 Northern Ireland 14 31 199 271 96 611 Wales 28 61 393 444 285 1211 UK 668 455 2374 2518 1464 7479 Table A6 Sample sizes: and highest educational attainment degree higher education below degree Upper Lower Low or none England 1187 338 1041 768 546 Scotland 568 219 393 183 197 Northern Ireland 203 64 137 112 71 Wales 384 102 268 238 169 UK 2342 723 1839 1301 983 12

Nation not Table A7 Sample sizes: and al identity Nation more than Equally and more than not England 714 588 1782 313 308 184 Scotland 399 382 511 85 135 96 Northern Ireland 113 76 234 56 74 45 Wales 199 191 381 105 258 70 UK 1425 1237 2908 559 775 395 Neither nor Table A8 Sample sizes: selected religious groups in Northern Ireland Eligible to vote All Northern Ireland Protestant * 202 232 Catholic 120 165 * Protestant is defined by grouping the categories Methodist (26), Presbyterian (128) and other Christian (78), thus excluding Catholic and Anglican. 13

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