Parliament Kicks Out s Again: A multi-imensional power struggle Author : Thomas Ruttig Publishe: 19 November 2016 Downloae: 4 September 2018 Downloa URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/parliament-kicks-out-ministers-again-a-multi-imensional-powerstruggle/?format=pf The Afghan parliament s lower house has sacke seven ministers in a new wave of interpellations (estizah). It is not clear who instigate the estizah motions, MPs themselves or Palace intrigue, or who will come out as the winner (the presient has tol the ministers to stay in their posts an calle on the Supreme Court to reverse the MPs ecisions). But the affair shows that the long-staning conflict between the two camps within the government is far from over. The estizah affair is compoune by aitional rifts within the Jamiat party an the long-staning conflict between the executive an parliament. Thomas Ruttig (with input from Ehsan Qaane an Salima Ahmai) looke into the various levels of conflicts an conclues that another painful process of appointments an wrangling over them coul be restarte, further bogging own the government. [This article has been correcte on 21 November 2016 on the forthcoming buget-relate 1 / 10
proceeings in both houses of parliament in the last part of the text.] Seven ministers vote off The Wolesi Jirga, the Afghan parliament s lower house, vote seven members of the cabinet out of office last week. MPs scrutinise 16 ministers in five sessions hel every ay, an unusual although not unique pace of work (a 17th minister who was on the original list ha alreay resigne for genuine health reasons an was exempte). Usually, the Wolesi Jirga only convenes on Saturays, Monays an Wenesays an struggles to reach a quorum (see AAN analysis here an here), but for these sessions over 200 out of the current 235 MPs participate in each one. The proceure is calle estizah (interpellation) an the power of the MPs to eliver such motions to call ministers to account is enshrine in the constitution. Use of that power, however, has often prove etrimental to government; it has regularly interrupte both the work of the cabinet an parliament itself (which coul have evote its time to more urgent legislative matters). For the National Unity Government (NUG), which took a painstaking two years to establish a full cabinet that finally complete in June 2016, this is the secon estizah roun this year. The previous motion, against the women s affairs minister, Delbar Nazari, in July 2016, faile. The government ha also manage to get its security minister caniates through parliament relatively smoothly, in April an June 2016, an it ha looke as if MPs ha become tire of toppling ministers prematurely, it seems now. Officially, this time the MPs calle those ministers to account who ha not been able to spen more than 70 per cent of their ministries evelopment buget for the financial year of 1394 (2015). (Afghanistan s buget consists of two parts, the buget for running costs an the evelopment buget for all other projects an investments.) This was not a first: in 2013, uring the last year of Presient Hame Karzai s era, 11 ministers came uner estizah for the same reason. However, this time the ministers were vote out of office for this reason (in 2013 all survive). The threshol was ifferent this time: while in 2013, all ministers that ha spent 50 per cent or less of their evelopment bugets were summone, this was now increase to 70 per cent. (1) On the evening of 12 November, after the first estizah session, in which all three ministers were vote off - Salahuin Rabbani for Foreign Affairs, Mahmu Balegh for Public Works an Nasrin Oryakhel for Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs an Disable - the government intervene for the first time. The presient an the Chief Executive invite the MPs to sen a elegation to iscuss the situation an suggeste that they suspen the summoning of the ministers. The MPs accepte the invitation but ecline to postpone the estizah sessions. The presient then calle an emergency cabinet meeting on 14 November 2016 an turne to the Supreme Court with a query as to the legality of the estizah (see here, here an here). In 2007, then Presient Karzai ha aske the court for a similar jugment, after parliament ha fire his foreign minister Rangin Dafar Spanta after he ha unable to block the eportation of a 2 / 10
huge number of Afghan refugees from Iran; the court eclare the parliamentary ecision invali an Spanta continue in his job. It can be safely assume that Ghani is hoping for a similar outcome. The cabinet meeting was attene by both the presient an chief executive, the latter after a long absence ue to isagreements with Ghani. The presient instructe the ismisse ministers to continue their work until the Supreme Court s verict. As a result, starting on 13 November 2016, the votes in Parliament were taken in the absence of the ministers concerne. s who lost the votes of confience: Salahuin Rabbani, Foreign Affairs (12 November); nominate by Abullah Mahmu Balegh, Public Works, (12 November), nominate by Ghani Nasrin Oryakhel, Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs an Disable (12 November), nominate by Ghani Assaullah Hanif Balkhi, Eucation (13 November), nominate by Abullah Muhammaullah Batash, Transport an Civil Aviation (13 November), nominate by Ghani Faria Moman Higher Eucation (14 November), nominate by Ghani Abul Razeq Wahii, Telecommunication (15 November), nominate by Abullah s who secure the votes of confience: Eklil Hakimi, Finance (13 November), nominate by Ghani Saye Saat Mansur Naeri, Urban Development (14 November), nominate by Ghani Abul Basir Anwar, Justice (14 November), nominate by Abullah Assaullah Zamir, Agriculture (15 November), nominate by Ghani Salamat Azimi, Counter-Narcotics (15 November), nominate by Ghani Ali Ahma Usmani, Water an Energy (15 November), nominate by Abullah Saye Hussain Alemi Balkhi, Refugees (16 November), nominate by Abullah Abul Sattar Mura, Economy (16 November), nominate by Abullah Firuzuin Firuz, Public Health (16 November), nominate by Abullah (For the exact numbers of votes, see the annex.) The pressure of the presiency seems to have worke at least partially: the number of the ministers vote out by parliament ecline over the week; in the last estizah session, on 16 November, all three ministers survive. The most important estizah victim in the Dr Abullah camp was foreign minister Salahuin Rabbani, as he is also the current leaer of Jamiat-e Islami. Jamiat is one of the most powerful parties in the country. It is also the main support base for the presient s partner in the National Unity Government, Chief Executive Dr Abullah, (although there were always some Jamiat leaers who were less than enthusiastic in their support). Salahuin Rabbani has hel the 3 / 10
Jamiat lea ever since the assassination of his father, former presient Borhanuin Rabbani, in 2011, although still officially in an interim role. Apart from these seven ministers, there is an aitional nee to fin three other ones: Borer an tribes minister Gulab Mangal has just been appointe governor of Nangarhar province, Information an culture minister Abul Bari Jehani steppe own for health reasons an the Ministry of Mines an Petroleum is currently being run by the former eputy minister, Ghazal Habibyar-Safi, after the previous minister, Dau Shah Saba resigne in March 2016. Development buget expeniture as a criterion Formally it makes sense to measure the performance of cabinet members by looking at the spening of their evelopment bugets, as one yarstick. With the ivision of the buget of Afghanistan s government institutions, the spening of the evelopment buget, which is fe both by omestic an external sources, reflects how much money ministries an similar institutions invest in their real work, for example, in expaning services for the population in the provinces. (The other part of the buget covers salaries an other running costs only.) Spening figures, though, are a quantitative an possibly over-simplifie criterion, as they o not reflect the quality, usefulness or effectiveness of what the money has been spent on. The iscussions uring the estizah sessions also i not constitute systematic performance evaluations of the ministers by the MPs, which coul have been one even in the ministers absence. As in former years, ministers who i atten the session cast oubt on the figures use by the MPs. For example, foreign minister Rabbani claime albeit in vain that his ministry ha in reality spent 73 per cent of its evelopment buget (which woul have safeguare him from estizah). Whether or not expeniture of evelopment bugets is a fair or accurate way to measure ministers performances, it can be assume that other criteria influence MPs ecisions. The usually outspoken Kabul MP Ramazan Basharost, a former planning minister, inicate that bribes ha been hane out to vote or not vote for particular ministers. When he urge fellow- MPs to stop exchanging money, his wors also inicate that there were both givers an takers among them. A pro-ghani MP tol AAN that the presient himself ha encourage MPs to vote own ministers who i not spen their evelopment buget an ha even propose a threshol of 80 per cent. As always, these accusations are ifficult to pin own (although AAN has trie). If buget spening ha been the MPs point, Basharost argue, then all ministers below the 70 per cent threshol shoul have been fire, without exception. The multiimensional power-struggle behin the estizah It is not clear who instigate the estizah motions MPs themselves or Palace intrigue. There are strong rumours in Kabul that the presient was planning a cabinet reshuffle anyway an that a caucus of MPs ha intervene on his behalf to engineer it through the Wolesi Jirga. But it was clear that various conflict lines converge over the past week an influence the outcome of the 4 / 10
estizah sessions. First, the estizah motions represent a new roun of the on-going power struggle within the NUG. Ostensibly, Ghani an Abullah ha ene their conflict before the Brussels onor conference. For a long time before that, the NUG ha presente an unappealing image of isunity which was harming its chances of securing ongoing foreign funing. Harmonisation was achieve, but only on the surface. The unerlying problem remaine unsolve: Abullah s sie complains about Ghani s management style an tenency to micromanage, versus the Ghani camp s view that Abullah an his team block reform. Ghani, so one theory wente, wante to break out of the impasse by reshuffling his cabinet an weakening Abullah. Ghani was, reportely, particularly unhappy with both foreign minister Rabbani an refugee minister Alemi Balkhi. Both ha refuse to sign (see here an here) the government s eal with the European Union on the return both voluntary an involuntary of rejecte Afghan asylum seekers, on which a number of western governments ha mae the continuation of evelopment ai before the Brussels conference tacitly conitional. The unhappiness was not one-sie: Rabbani ha oppose the presient s appointment of relatives an allies into key ambassaorial positions. These inclue Ghani's uncle Qayum Kuchai as ambassaor to Moscow, former finance minister Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal, to Pakistan an, particularly, Ahma Yusuf Nuristani as ambassaor to Spain, a post hel for many years by the long-time aie to late commaner Ahma Shah Massu, Massu Khalili, who was retiring. Appointing Nuristani meant replacing not just an ally, but a close frien of Abullah with someone from the opposing camp (who ha moreover been in charge of the Inepenent Election Commission uring the bitterly-ispute 2014 presiential elections). After these complaints, an MP tol AAN, Ghani ha aske Rabbani to resign, who ha refuse an sai that he ha come from the Abullah camp an the presient coul not ask him to vacate his post. Sources close to the presiential palace an foreign minister Rabbani have tol AAN they ha the impression that the presient was trying to push Abullah asie in favour of acting Balkh governor, Atta Muhamma Nur. (The New York Times picke up the same rumours, rea here, although it also reporte that a presiential avisor ha rejecte the rumours.) The reshuffle, if it happene, woul represent a realignment of the Ghani camp with a ifferent faction within Jamiat, rather than a complete rop of the party. (Playing one Jamiat faction against the other woul be similar to former presient Karzai s approach; AAN analysis here.) The same sources, spoke about Ghani s esire to have nine ministers reshuffle; this was also reflecte in some Afghan meia, incluing in Sarkhat aily, which is consiere close to National Security Avisor Hanif Atmar, on 13 November. In this context, Presient Ghani might not have been unhappy about parliament voting some ministers out of office. Seconly, the two camps in the government are also competing in parliament to muster majorities, particularly so they can secure votes of confience for ministers an other appointees they support, for example uring estizah sessions. Parliament also has the power to 5 / 10
elay laws an, by that, important political projects, as the on-going ebate on the electoral law emonstrates. This is further complicate in a house without formal party-base factions, where MPs can switch sies easily. While Abullah s Jamiat party has a relatively stable foothol in the Wolesi Jirga although nothing close to a majority, the presient has even less guarantee influence, as he lacks an organise power base (such as a party or a movement) of his own. Over the past two years, the presient an his allies particularly Atmar have worke among MPs to convince a number of them to cooperate with the Palace an to establish what amounts to an informal, propresiential caucus in the Wolesi Jirga. On 14 November 2016, a group of at least 16 MPs (3) collecte signatures an aske the speaker of the house to postpone the estizah sessions an urge their fellow MPs to vote for in favour of their proposal. They are ethnically an politically mixe, incluing both Jamiatis an members of Hezb-e Islami. The most active MPs inclue Nazir Ahma Ahmazai, who is from the presient s tribe in the southeast, as well as a southern, western an another southeastern: Lalai Hamizai, Muhamma Saleh an Kamal Nasir Osuli. Furthermore, there is Haji Almas, an influential former Hezb-turne Jamiat commaner from Parwan province, who is a Tajik an, for now, in the presient s camp. But this group faile in parts of their task, illustrating that the presient is still far away from commaning a reliable support base in the Wolesi Jirga. The ebate about whether an when to hol estizah sessions also reflects a continuation of the rocky relations between the executive an legislative branches of government, a legacy of the Karzai years (AAN analysis here), an attempts by parliament to assert itself as an inepenent boy vis-à-vis the presiency. Inner-Jamiati intrigues Thirly, jostling over the still vacant leaership in Jamiat has influence the balance between the Ghani an the Abullah camp in the NUG. Atta who leas Jamiat in the country s populous north an large parts of the northeast an who became hea of the party s Executive Council, replacing Ahma Zia Massu, in 2013 is sai to aspire to the overall leaership of the party, wishing to wrest it away from its traitional leaers. They have traitionally been, on the military sie, Panjshiris (Ahma Shah Massu an his commaners) an, on the political sie, Baakhshis (Rabbani an son). Abullah belongs to the Panjshiri faction. A number of MPs thought to be close to Atta incluing Assaullah Sharifi an Farha Azimi, both from Balkh ha been campaigning against the younger Rabbani an for close Ghani ally Eklil Hakimi (currently finance minister), AAN was tol by sources close to the governor. This woul, if true, have been part of a qui-pro-quo between Ghani s an Atta s supporters. An MP who aske not to be name, tol AAN that a person ha come to him before the voting process starte an aske me to give a vote of no-confience to Rabbani an later calle me to [tell me to] give a vote of confience to Hakimi. 6 / 10
Atta rejecte these reports in a statement release on his Facebook page on 12 November 2016, conemning the MPs for their wrong ecision on Rabbani an assuring Jamiat he woul o everything to keep their leaer in his ministerial position. Earlier, on 2 November, he ha confirme though that he was engage in negotiations with Presient Ghani (which he sai Abullah was aware of), but calle claims in the Afghan meia that he was about to leave his position in the north incorrect. There have been long staning rumours that he aspires to a cabinet post, as a staging post for a possible run in the 2019 presiential election (alreay in 2014, he trie to assume the role of king maker, see AAN analysis here). Atta's strategy coul be to try to weaken Abullah an replace him as Ghani s key Tajik ally. Bringing in new allies? The other rumour in Kabul is that Ghani wants to create space for ministers from Hezb-e Islami, after a peace treaty was conclue with its leaer in late September. The eal may well have mae such rewars necessary, although nothing official has been sai. Hezb is the traitional competitor of Jamiat, although the mutual tensions ease in 2014 when the then leaer of Hezb s legalise, non-insurgent wing, Abul Hai Arghaniwal, supporte Abullah (an lost his cabinet post when Ghani won) an Abullah chose as his running mate, former Hezb-e Islami intelligence chief Khan Muhamma. The party is alreay represente in government apart from Khan there are, for example, two cabinet ministers but not, of course, from within its insurgent wing. Both Hezbi ministers remaine in their positions: Justice Anwar won his vote, while rural Development Nasir Ahma Durrani was not summone. Ghani might even seek to placate his preecessor Karzai by making some of his allies minister. Karzai, over many months, has become one of the major critics of the NUG, pushing for a Loya Jirga to ecie the fate of the government an in particular the future of the position of chief executive, an regularly commenting on current events in ways seen as critical of the government. A partial rapprochement, bolstere by cabinet posts, coul take some steam out of that uneasy relationship (more on this in a forthcoming AAN ispatch). A mixe outcome Politically, the outcome of the week-long estizah sessions was mixe. In terms of numbers, the presient an his camp (incluing for example, Vice Presient s Dostum s Jombesh party) lost four ministers: Balegh, Batash, Oryakhel an Moman. Abullah lost three: Rabbani, Assaullah Balkhi an Wahii. (2) However, in terms of clout, Ghani s key ally, finance minister Hakimi, was save from sacking (Abullah has reportely long wante his nephew, currently eputy minister of finance, Muhamma Mustafa Mastur, for this job), while the Abullah camp lost Rabbani (foreign affairs). Mura (economy), another key Jamiati, i survive, however. EU countries will also have notice with interest that refugee minister Alemi Balkhi nominate by the Abullah camp, but more of an inepenent survive. He has proven a ifficult partner in talks on migration issues an one not always agreeing with the presient. 7 / 10
Next roun: the buget The ismissal of more Ghani allies than Abullah allies, an the lou protests by most MPs on the secon ay of the estizah sessions against the government s attempt to postpone them, mae it plain that the presient s work in parliament is not yet where he wants it to be. The circle of pro-presiential MPs still oes not comman a majority. The Abullah camp continues to have a lot of influence, but cannot comman a majority either. The mile groun vulnerable to political pressure an plain bribery is too wie, an it is too lucrative for MPs not to be there. The estizah sessions may have been a cunning plan that backfire. If the presient ha inee intene to reshuffle his cabinet, the estizah possibly came too early. Either way, whether the summonings came at his instigation or the MPs, parliament has again prove it is unpreictable an has its own will. The presient was left having to o amage control yet again. But even if the estizah ha been successful in getting ri of exactly those ministers he consiers in the way of his policies, the presient woul have alienate key partners in the NUG while possible new allies, such as Atta, woul have ha emans, too, incluing on appointments. An there woul again be no guarantee that the new people woul be more effective than those who are now in positions an who cooperate with the presient on his reform plans. The estizah motions have reveale what everyone suspecte, that the internal problems of the NUG are far from over. All the intrigues an rumours that were part an parcel of the latest evelopments even if the rumours were false create further mutual istrust, rather than enhance cooperation. The fragmente character of Afghan institutions (incluing not only the party-less parliament, but also parties such as Jamiat) results in unpreictability for all sies an continues to prouce mixe results. In the en, it is ifficult to juge who gains an who loses. Moreover, the ba relations between the executive an legislative branches in an overcentralise presiential system, part of the Karzai legacy, continues to stan in the way of smooth political work. There is more to come, an probably very soon. If overrule by the Supreme Court on behalf of the presient, an unhappy parliament might block the buget for the 1396 (2017) fiscal year which it has to vote on [over the] next week[s]. [The buget is currently with the Meshrano Jirga which has 15 ays to review it, then passes it on to the Wolesi Jirga that has another 30 ays for review after receiving it.] That has been threatene alreay by one MP, Zazai Watanost, speaking to AAN earlier this week (an publicly repeate by influential eastern MP Haji Qair). It will also be very time-consuming to again fill the vacant cabinet positions. Appointments have been the main bone of contention between Ghani an Abullah, an there is no reason to believe the two men will suenly be able to agree on new appointments without rancour or enless elay. Eite by Kate Clark 8 / 10
(1) The new threshol ha been set in the Wolesi Jirga s plenary session on 2 November 2016, after the representatives of its 15 permanent commissions faile to agree on one in a joint meeting in the secon half of October. Only four ministers escape estizah by spening more than 70 per cent of their evelopment bugets: of Commerce an Inustries, Humayun Rasa from Abullah s team; of Interior, Taj Mohamma Jahe from Abullah s team, who secure his position after the fiscal year in iscussion (1394/2015) ha ene; of Women Affairs, Delbar Nazari from Abullah s team; an the of Haj an Enowments, Faiz Muhamma Usmani. The Ministry of Defense oes not have a evelopment buget. (2) Out of the women ministers, Oryakhel an Moman were vote out, but Salamat Azimi, the Jombesh-affiliate of Counter-Narcotics survive. Usually, women are particularly vulnerable to votes of no confience. (3) This group of MPs inclue: Engineer Zikria, Nazir Ahma Ahmazai, Hashem Rahmani, Saheb Khan, Kamal Nasir Osuli, Eqbal Safi, Muhamma Reza Khoshak Watanost, Obaiullah Kalimzai, Masua Karokhi, Haji Almas Zahe, Munawar Shah Bahauri, Saleh Muhamma Saleh, Saye Muhamma Akhun, Qazi Abul Rahim, Lalai Hamizai an Haji Abul Maji. Annex: The estizah votes No. s Positive Negative Blank Invali Results Foreign 58 140 6 3 Dismisse 1 2 3 4 5 Labour an Social Affairs s Public Works Finance of Eucation of Transport 56 144 5 2 Dismisse 33 164 5 2 Dismisse 85 112 2 5 Remaine in his position 68 131 3 2 Dismisse 51 142 6 5 Dismisse 9 / 10
Powere by TCPDF (www.tcpf.org) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Urban Development Justice Higher Eucation Telecommunic ation Agriculture Counternarcotics Water an Energy of Refugees of Economy of Public Health 135 59 2 5 Remaine 95 101 1 4 Remaine 63 131 3 4 Dismisse 49 147 3 2 Dismisse 131 62 4 4 Remaine 72 114 9 6 Remaine 60 115 23 3 Remaine 105 90 3 3 Remaine 114 81 4 2 Remaine 170 28 2 1 Remaine 10 / 10