Similar documents
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st meeting, on 24 September 2009

Implications of South Asian Nuclear Developments for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Nuclear dynamics in South Asia

Critical Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Energy and Proliferation in the Middle East Robert Einhorn

The Nuclear Crescent

China-Pakistan Nuclear Relation after the Cold War. and Its International Implications. Zhang Jiegen. Institute of International Studies

Interviews. Interview With Ambasssador Gregory L. Schulte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the In. Agency

Institute for Science and International Security

Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program: An Assessment

Implications of the Indo-US Growing Nuclear Nexus on the Regional Geopolitics

EXISTING AND EMERGING LEGAL APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR COUNTER-PROLIFERATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*

THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

GR132 Non-proliferation: current lessons from Iran and North Korea

Documents & Reports. The Impact of the U.S.-India Deal on the Nonproliferation Regime

and note with satisfaction that stocks of nuclear weapons are now at far lower levels than at anytime in the past half-century. Our individual contrib

Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Non-proliferation and regional security

Bernard Laponche April 29, 2016

Scott D. Sagan Stanford University Herzliya Conference, Herzliya, Israel,

THE FUTURE OF THEI NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP MARK HIBBSI

Israel s Strategic Flexibility

2007 CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE. top ten results

PRESS RELEASE Civilian Uses of Nuclear Energy in Pakistan: Opportunities and Prospects 27 December 2016

Prepared Testimony by. Ashley J. Tellis Senior Associate Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. to the

India-Specific Safeguards Agreement

THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDEN S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND ITEMS

GOING STRAIGHT, BUT SOMEWHAT LATE: CHINA AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Summary of Policy Recommendations

CRS Report for Congress

Pakistan China Nuclear Cooperation

STATEMENT. H.E. Ms. Laila Freivalds Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

F or many years, those concerned

International Seminar: Countering Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism. Small Hall, Russian State Duma September 27, 2007

Re: Appeal and Questions regarding the Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December [on the report of the First Committee (A/70/460)]

MODEL DRAFT RESOLUTION

How the Pakistan Military Learned to Love the Bomb

The Risks of Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the Role of Congress

Arms Control Today. The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: Taking Stock

Lessons from the Agreed Framework with North Korea and Implications for Iran: A Japanese view

29 th ISODARCO Winter Course Nuclear Governance in a Changing World

Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis A Review of Policies and Proposals 2006

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates,

Chapter 18 The Israeli National Perspective on Nuclear Non-proliferation

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Arab Republic

DECISIONS AND RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE 1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE

Can We Stop Proliferation?

Conflict on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea and the Nuclear Threat Student Readings. North Korean soldiers look south across the DMZ.

IAEA 51 General Conference General Statement by Norway

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2010 Review Conference New York, 4 28 May 2010

U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

ACT: Are you speaking of getting a consensus document as was done at the last Review Conference?

NORTH KOREA: WHERE NEXT FOR THE NUCLEAR TALKS?

Nuclear Trade Controls

Secretary of State Saudabayev, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

Reconstructing Sino-US Cooperation over North Korea Nuclear Issue. Presentation for CIIS Conference August 18-21, 2013, Changchun, China

Role of the non-proliferation regime in preventing non-state nuclear proliferation

THE REVISED NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP GUIDELINES: A EUROPEAN UNION PERSPECTIVE

Desiring to cooperate in the development, use and control of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 3 May 2010

March The RCA should not be granted an unlimited extension there should be no blank cheque.

Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer

BETELLE AN-11 AGREEMENT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC91 BANGLADESH

Agreement signed at Washington June 30, 1980; Entered into force December 30, With agreed minute.

UNSC 1540 Next Steps to Seize the Opportunity

The Erosion of the NPT

"The Nuclear Threat: Basics and New Trends" John Burroughs Executive Director Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York (

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. [on the report of the First Committee (A/58/462)]

TOWARD A NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP POLICY FOR STATES NOT PARTY TO THE NPT

"Status and prospects of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation from a German perspective"

of the NPT review conference

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - EU Statement

North Korea and the NPT

Unjamming the FM(C)T

Union of Concerned of Concerned Scientists Press Conference on the North Korean Missile Crisis. April 20, 2017

Understanding Beijing s Policy on the Iranian Nuclear Issue

Iran Resolution Elements

Prepared Testimony by. Ashley J. Tellis Senior Associate Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. to the. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

THE NPT Assessing the Past, Building the Future

U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress

2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FINAL DOCUMENT

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database. IAEA General Conference Statements Contributed on Behalf of NAM Thematic Summary

In his message to Congress in October of 1945 President Truman observed that The release of atomic energy constitutes a new force too revolutionary

ESPANA INTERVENCION DEL MINISTRO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES Y DE COOPERACION EXCMO. SENOR DON MIGUEL ANGEL MORATINOS

CHAPTER 3 NUCLEAR 1914: THE NEXT BIG WORRY. Henry D. Sokolski

Article 1. Article 2. Article 3

The Politics of Iran's Nuclear Program

Lawrence Bender Producer. Lucy Walker Director. A letter from the filmmakers

The IAEA and Iran s nuclear programme Entirely legitimate or clandestine intent?

Ambassador Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein. Ronald Reagan Building - Washington DC

CENTRAL ASIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

Montessori Model United Nations. Distr.: Middle School Thirteenth Session Sept First Committee Disarmament and International Security

Iran s Nuclear Program: Tehran s Compliance with International Obligations

Ontario Model United Nations II. Disarmament and Security Council

NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.29

ATOMIC ENERGY. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 12950

The next use of nuclear weapons, if followed quickly by others, is nothing the

Group of Eight Declaration on Nonproliferation and Disarmament for 2012

U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress

Eighth United Nations-Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues

Transcription:

China, Pakistan, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-non-proliferation/ Recent evidence regarding China s involvement in Pakistan s nuclear program should provoke international scrutiny. By Rohan Joshi February 16, 2015 China s confirmation that it is involved in at least six nuclear power projects in Pakistan underscores long-standing concerns over both the manner in which both China and Pakistan have gone about engaging in nuclear commerce and the lack of transparency around China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation in general. The guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a 48-nation body that regulates the export of civilian nuclear technology, prohibit the export of such technology to states, like Pakistan, that have not adopted full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Yet over the last decade, China has accelerated nuclear commerce with Pakistan while contending that its actions are in compliance with NSG guidelines, an argument that is not entirely convincing. Today, China is not only a violator of global nuclear non-proliferation norms, but also presents the most convincing evidence of the non-proliferation regime s ineffectiveness. The pattern of its behavior on the nuclear front as it relates to Pakistan goes well beyond the scope of what may be construed as the state s legitimate ambition to be a leader in the supply of civilian nuclear technology. Some writers blame the 2005 U.S.-India nuclear agreement as having been a catalyst to China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. But this is a false proposition, since China s nuclear relationship with Pakistan, both military and civilian, precedes the U.S.-India nuclear deal by decades. Moreover, while the U.S.-India agreement was aimed at bringing India into the mainstream of nuclear commerce and global nonproliferation efforts, the China-Pakistan relationship is designed to operate effectively outside of the mainstream. As Ashley Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted in 2010, the Bush administration spent considerable energy from October 2005 until the final extraordinary plenary in September 2008 consulting with its NSG partners during 1 / 6

eight meetings over four years to finally secure the special waiver for India that exempted it from the constraining condition of full-scope safeguards. The current Sino-Pakistani nuclear transaction could not be more different. Pakistan s own interest in nuclear technology dates back to the 1960s. In March 1965, Pakistan s then-foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto declared in an interview with the Manchester Guardian that if India were to produce a nuclear weapon, Pakistan should have to eat grass and get one, or build one of our own. A few months prior to India s Smiling Buddha nuclear test in 1974, Bhutto met with top Pakistani scientists to begin work on a Pakistani nuclear device, codenamed Project 706. Bhutto enlisted the services of the now-infamous AQ Khan, who stole blueprints for centrifuge technology and contact information of vendors that sold centrifuge components from his employer, a research laboratory in the Netherlands. Back in Pakistan, AQ Khan began work on the development of Pakistan s indigenous uranium enrichment capability at a gas centrifuge facility in Kahuta, near Rawalpindi. The first signs of Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation emerged in 1977. U.S. government officials noted China s commitment to Pakistan to provide fuel services and that Chinese technicians visited at Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) to familiarize themselves with the operation of the reactor. By 1978, Khan was able to produce small quantities of enriched reactor-grade uranium at Kahuta. China s assistance ultimately proved to be pivotal in Pakistan s pursuit of the nuclear bomb. In 1982, according to AQ Khan, China provided Pakistan 50 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium, enough to make two nuclear bombs, as part of a broad-ranging, secret nuclear deal between Mao Zedong and Bhutto. The following year, China reportedly provided Pakistan the complete design for a 25 kt nuclear bomb. A State Department memo at the time concluded that China has provided assistance to Pakistan s program to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Over the past several years, China and Pakistan have maintained contacts in the nuclear field [w]e now believe cooperation has taken place in the area of fissile material production and possibly also nuclear weapons design. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act (1954) requires termination of U.S. nuclear exports if countries are determined by the president to be assisting non-nuclear weapons states in acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. Although successive U.S. administrations were aware of Pakistan and China s clandestine nuclear cooperation, they did not sufficiently press either China or Pakistan nor threaten to terminate nuclear 2 / 6

commerce with China. China, for its part, continued to stringently deny any role in providing assistance to the Pakistani nuclear program. At a state dinner in Washington, D.C., Premier Zhao Ziyang declared, We do not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons. But by 1985, Pakistan s Kahuta facility, as a result of technical assistance from China, had successfully been able to produce the quantities of highly-enriched uranium needed to build a nuclear bomb. For the first time since discovering Pakistan s nuclear ambitions and China s illegal assistance, the U.S. government refused to certify that Pakistan had not assembled a nuclear device in 1990, which resulted in the suspension of U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan per the Pressler Amendment. U.S. pressure, however, did little to constrain Chinese assistance to Pakistan s nuclear program, even as China moved toward becoming a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In January 1992, barely two months before it acceded to the NPT, China announced the construction of a nuclear power plant in Pakistan. Concerns that Chinese safeguards were not tough enough to prevent a diversion of nuclear resources to Pakistan s nuclear weapons program resulted in the U.S. issuing a demarche to China. China s appetite for proliferation remained undiminished even after it acceded to the NPT. In 1995, it allegedly sold Pakistan 5,000 ring magnets needed for high-speed gas centrifuges, while a U.S. intelligence report in 1997 held that China was the single most important supplier of equipment and technology for weapons of mass destruction in the world. China s civil nuclear trade commitments with Pakistan have gained considerable momentum since Pakistan s nuclear tests in May 1998. The China-Pakistan Power Plant Corporation s Chashma-1 and Chashma-2 power reactors, which were under item-specific IAEA safeguards, were held not to be in violation of NSG guidelines as they were pre-existing commitments and thus grandfathered in at the time of China s induction into the NSG in 2004. However, China then entered into agreements in 2009 for the construction of two new 340 MW power plants (Chashma-3 and Chashma-4). There have since been reports of undertakings for the construction of additional plants in Chashma and Karachi. Some in Pakistan have argued that these commitments date back to a 1986 agreement with China on cooperation in construction and operation 3 / 6

of nuclear reactors for an initial period of 30 years, and thus not in violation of NSG guidelines. This spurious argument, if accepted, implies that China can continue to commit to any number of additional nuclear projects in Pakistan without any repercussions. It is another matter that the actual text of the so-called 1986 agreement remains unreleased and shrouded in mystery, thereby preventing the international community from validating Chinese and Pakistani representations. China has demonstrated remarkable consistency over four decades in acting in ways that undermine with impunity the global non-proliferation regime. Its nuclear deals with Pakistan both military and civilian were conceived and executed in secrecy. The recent news articles now confirm that China remains committed to a long-term nuclear relationship with Pakistan under its own terms. This is a pattern of behavior that is unlikely to change without the application of sustained international pressure to bring China into compliance with the commitments it has undertaken. http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-confirms-pakistan-nuclear-projects/ China Confirms Pakistan Nuclear Projects Top official confirms extent of the growing Sino-Pakistan nuclear link. By Prashanth Parameswaran February 10, 2015 1.7k 124 2 5 1.8k Shares 65 Comments 4 / 6

A Chinese official publicly confirmed Monday that Beijing is involved in at least six nuclear power projects in Pakistan and is likely to export more to the country, media reports said. In a press conference in Beijing, Wang Xiaotao, the vice-minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, said China has assisted in building six nuclear reactors in Pakistan with a total installed capacity of 3.4 million kilowatts. Wang, who was unveiling plans for new guidelines for Chinese exports in the nuclear sector, also said that Beijing was keen to provide further exports to countries, which would presumably include Pakistan given previous reports and trends. The Sino-Pakistan nuclear link has been well-known even though some specifics are often shrouded in secrecy. This is reportedly the first time that a top official has publicly admitted to such a scale of China s cooperation with Pakistan. Revelations about the growing Sino-Pakistan nuclear axis comes amid continuing concerns expressed by some that ongoing cooperation is occurring without the sanction of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which helps supervise the export of global civilian nuclear technology. China is a member of the NSG and existing regulations prohibit members from exporting such technology nations like Pakistan which do not adopt full-scale safeguards. China declared the first two reactors it already agreed to construct for Pakistan the Chashma-1 and Chashma 2 at the time it joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, with the expectation that no new deals would follow. But in 2010, the China National Nuclear Cooperation announced it would export technology for two new reactors, Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 because it argued rather controversially that these projects were already grandfathered in under previous agreements rather than being fresh proposals. News of other deals has since followed, including a November 2013 announcement that China would help build two reactors in Karachi and a January 2014 report about talks on three other reactors, which The Diplomat reported on here. Pakistani officials say this is part of broader plans to produce around 8,800 megawatts of electricity from nuclear power by 2030 and overcome crippling power shortages that plague the nation. Pakistan has also previously sought to secure an exception within the NSG which would allow it to conduct nuclear commerce freely with 5 / 6

suppliers. India had received one with U.S. support in 2008 and New Delhi is now seeking membership in the NSG. Both India and Pakistan are not members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 6 / 6