Humanitarian Interventions in Complex Societies A comparative study of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia Interventions

Humanitarian Interventions in Complex Societies A comparative study of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia Interventions Sabri Tahir 2017-02-24 Uppsala University, spring 2017 Department of Government Bachelor thesis: 15 Credits Word count: 13 999 Pages: 40

Abstract This thesis examines and compares the humanitarian interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Somalia. The purpose of this study is to examine if the presence of strong tribal structures within a nation can increase the risk of terrorist activities, and subsequently contribute to a failed state following a humanitarian intervention. By applying a theory on tribes and critical terrorism studies, this thesis argues that policymakers might underestimate the significance of tribal structure within a state, before intervening. With Mills method of concomitant variation, this thesis has examined and compared the leadership, interventions, radical presence, and tribal structures of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia. This thesis has also examined if interventions can increase radicalism. The result from the analysis shows us that the presence of strong tribal structures can increase the terrorist activities and subsequently contribute to a failed state. Humanitarian intervention can further lengthen the weak state apparatus if the external actors neglect of the local structures of a state. Key words: Fragile states, Humanitarian intervention, Kosovo, Libya, Policymaking, Radicalism, Somalia, Tribes 1

Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 3 1.1 Purpose of Study and Research Question... 4 1.2 Central definitions... 5 2. Previous Research and Theory... 7 2.1 Previous research on Humanitarian Intervention... 7 2.2 Critical Terrorism Studies... 8 2.3 Tribes the First and Forever Form... 10 3. Methodology... 13 3.1 Case of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia... 13 3.2 Qualitative study... 13 3.3 Research design... 14 3.4 Material and Source Criticism... 15 3.5 Delimitations... 16 4. Analysis... 17 4.1 Libya... 17 4.1.1 Leadership... 17 4.1.2. Humanitarian intervention 2011... 17 4.1.3 Libya s tribal structure... 19 4.1.4 Terrorist presence in Libya... 20 4.2 Somalia... 21 4.2.1 Leadership... 21 4.2.2 Humanitarian intervention 1992... 21 4.2.3 Somalia s tribal structure... 22 4.2.4 Terrorist presence in Somalia... 23 4.3 Kosovo... 23 4.3.1 Leadership... 23 4.3.2 Humanitarian Intervention 1999... 24 4.3.3 Kosovo s tribal structure... 25 4.3.4 Terrorist presence in Kosovo... 25 4.4 U.N and U.S policy on Somalia Intervention... 26 4.5 U.S and NATO policy on Libya Intervention... 28 4.6 NATO and UN policy on Kosovo Intervention... 30 4.7 Can interventions increase radicalism?... 31 5. Conclusion... 35 6. References... 36 2

1. Introduction Since the Cold War ending in the 1990s, several democratic states attitudes shifted, from previously placing importance to national sovereignty, to a more humanitarian norm within the international community. 1 Since the actualization of humanitarian intervention is relatively new in context to its uncertain legal and political status, it is difficult to comprehend the aim and possibilities of a foreign approach in sovereign states. With this said, it is quite justified that the concept of humanitarian intervention and its methods are highly debated by scholars, politicians and organisations. These last couple of decades, we have been observing an increase of humanitarian interventions such as the interventions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, Iraq, Rwanda and Somalia. All of these interventions have been subjected to different kinds of controversies, whether it is a critique from a sovereign, normative or legal point of view. Among the intervened states that I have mentioned, Kosovo, Libya and Somalia are in particular interest for political scientists. The interventions in Libya and Somalia have been declared as insufficient whilst the intervention in Kosovo has been hailed as rather successful in comparison. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia after years of dictatorship with President Siad Barre, witnessed a total collapse of the state apparatus which until this day is not operating in a positive manner. As nations all over the world followed the Libyan uprising in 2011 against President Muammar al-qaddafi and his regime, NATO began their military operations in the area. President al-qaddafi was later captured and killed in October 20 by rebel groups during 2011 and Libya was declared as liberated three days after his death. 2 In Kosovo, a NATO military operation in 1999 made the Serbian government withdraw their military forces in Kosovo, enabling a declaration of independence 9 years later. The new state has after the independence a high percentage of unemployment and possesses a fragile economy. 3 With the emergence of radical groups in Somalia and Libya such as al-shabab, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and al-qaida, it is arguable whether the methods of humanitarian intervention has succeeded in their efforts of establishing a stable society. 1 Bellamy & Wheeler, 2005, Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics, p.2 2 BBC Africa, 16/11-2015, Libya profile - Timeline 3 CIA, The World Factbook, Kosovo 3

1.1 Purpose of Study and Research Question The main military conflict between Kosovo and Serbia ended with the NATO intervention in 1999, but Serbia has yet to recognize Kosovo as an official state. 4 The conflicts in Libya and Somalia are unresolved and have remained so years after being intervened by foreign actors. 5 The intersection of tribalism and radicalism is of particular interest in this thesis, because research has shown that tribal groups tend to be more loyal to their own tribe or clan, than to the state. 6 This can hypothetically be to the extremist group s satisfaction, as it can be more comfortable to intrude in states where certain groups do not recognize the same loyalty to the nation as can be perceived in regular states. In a state where the lack of rule of law exists, weaknesses in state apparatus and ungoverned areas are evident and a space room of radical groups could increase. 7 If humanitarian interventions prolong these shortcomings, strong clan and tribe systems could somehow be the explaining variable of the increasing presence of radical groups and weak governance in such states. Humanitarian intervention intends to decrease the violation of human rights in a state, where such a state is incompetent to protect its citizens. 8 My main objective is to examine if strong tribal structures can be the cause of radical terrorist presence and later contributing to a state collapse, after an external intervention. Therefore, my research question will be posed as follows; Can the presence of strong tribal structures within a nation increase the risk of terrorist activities, and subsequently contribute to a failed state following a humanitarian intervention? My intention is therefore to examine and compare the interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Somalia by using a historical-analytical approach. Furthermore, I will investigate and compare how the tribal structures in Kosovo, Libya and Somalia are composed, as it can be one of strongest factors that further destabilized the states after being intervened. I will also examine the terrorist presence in these states, which could differ in accordance to how strong the tribe systems there are within the states. My claim is that it is fundamental to understand how strong the tribal structure is within the state, and that is why I am briefly analysing if the policymakers 4 Ibid 5 Engel, Andrew, 2014, Libya as a Failed State: Causes, Consequences, Options, p.1 6 Scahill, Jeremy, 2011, The Nation: Blowback in Somalia, How US proxy wars helped create a militant Islamist threat. 7 Taspinar, Ömer, 2009, Fighting Radicalism, not Terrorism : Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined, p. 78 8 Simons, Penelope, 2005, Centre for World Dialogue From Intervention to Prevention: The Emerging Duty to Protect 4

involve the local population after an intervention. Depending on how strong a state s tribal structures are, the less appealing it would be for the tribe to involve itself in rebuilding their state, as the most important is the tribe itself, and not the state. By looking into various reports and articles regarding the humanitarian interventions in these three cases and applying theories on tribe societies and the critical terrorism studies, we can clarify the level of tribal structure as the possible explaining variable to the states status today. By viewing the tribal structures of the states as important components, we might find the answer concerning the uncertain outcome of intervening in states with complex social societies. 1.2 Central definitions I will attempt to explain the central definitions that are of crucial importance for this thesis. There is some difficulty, in a satisfactory way, to define the meaning of humanitarian intervention, since there is no general and clear agreement of the definition. According to Allan Buchanan, humanitarian intervention is often defined as an entrenchment of a state s sovereignty by foreign or external actors. He also defines that the definition of humanitarian intervention is restricted to the use of force, as distinguished from economic sanctions. 9 With this proclamation, humanitarian intervention can be described as a form of foreign actors using military force by states whose aims are to prevent critical violations of human rights, without the authorization of the state where the intervention is applied. 10 Another central definition in this thesis is local structure. For my objective, local structure will be defined as an administrative body which control certain areas in which they function as national governments. 11 A third central definition to apprehend the study is radicalism. In political science, the term political radicalism, or simply radicalism, is generally viewed to characterize certain individuals, groups or political parties that have the objectives to excessively change existing practices, social movements or central institutions. 12 The fourth definition that will simplify the context of this study is tribal society. The general characteristics of tribal societies are limited or somewhat temporal in their political and social relations. Tribes usually share the same ideological view in the matter of moral and 9 Buchanan, Allan, 1999, The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, p. 71 10 Holzgrefe & Keohane, 2003, Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, p. 18 11 Business Dictionary, Local government 12 Dictionary of American History, 2003, Radicals and Radicalism, Encyclopedia.com. 5

religious beliefs and are custom to a self-sufficient way of operating, which is not generally absorbed in a modern day society. The term clan is actually a sub-group of a tribe, but will be used synonymously in this thesis. 13 Another definition to understand this thesis is failed state which briefly means a state with a vacuum of authority and no central governance, for example a nation with sub-state actors controlling territories. Lastly, the term fragile state will be used as weak state with weak central governance. 14 13 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, Tribal Society, Encyclopedia.com 14 Rotberg, Robert, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, p. 9 6

2. Previous Research and Theory 2.1 Previous research on Humanitarian Intervention Despite being a relatively new phenomenon in the history of international relations, humanitarian intervention is well researched and scrutinized through different theories and schools of thought. Since the 1990s, there have been several cases to cover. During the beginning of that decade, following the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, humanitarian interventions in these states resulted in massive criticism. Jennifer Welsh claims that the insufficiency and delay by avoiding decisive procedures when engaging in humanitarian intervention makes it difficult to get an ideal outcome of the operation, as occurred in Bosnia and Rwanda, which resulted in genocide with approximately 800, 000 Rwandan vis-à-vis 8,000 Bosnians being massacred. 15 Also, there is previous research that shows that humanitarian intervention can be counterproductive and increase terrorist activities in states after being intervened. 16 After the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11 in 2001, various reports and dissertations have been written about humanitarian intervention. Several debates sparked after 9/11 and the strategy of former president Bush s was to pursue the war on terror, with the engagement of interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The military intervention in Iraq created a normative discussion of the invasions legitimacy due to the American decision-making without an acceptance of the UN Security Council. 17 Regarding the cases of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia interventions, numerous reports are and have been contributing to their research. Chester A. Crocker, an American diplomat who served as an Assistant of State for African Affairs, published a report in 1995 concerning the U.S and U.N intervention in Somalia and declared that regardless of the general assumptions, the military intervention was not a failure. He claimed that the intervention and the exit went well and much had been accomplished in a humanitarian term, with the prevention of a large tragedy. Crocker also holds the opinion that the intervention helped large parts of the state of Somalia to be free of violence, and that the intervention left it better off than we found it. 18 15 Welsh, Jennifer, 2006, Humanitarian Interventions and International Relations, p. 92 16 Choi, Seung-Wang, 2011, Does U.S. Military Intervention Reduce or Increase Terrorism?, p.3,7-8 17 Weiss, Thomas,2006 R2P after 9/11 and The World Summit, p. 7-9 18 Crocker, A. Chester, 1995, Foreign Affairs; The Lessons of Somalia Not everything went wrong 7

With the Arab Spring evolving with many thousand protesters, the Libyan state came to the media s attention and has since then been a widely debated, but perhaps now relatively neglected due to the Syrian crisis. The US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Admiral James, have published an article in Foreign Affairs in which they stated that the intervention in Libya was successful. Both Daalder and James has hailed the intervention as an ideal intervention and that NATO successfully shielded hundreds of thousands of civilians, thus helping the rebels to overthrow Muammar al-qaddafi and minimizing collateral wreckage. 19 In his book, Taylor B. Seyholt, an associate professor from the University of Pittsburgh, stated that the intervention in Kosovo was somewhat successful by NATO and the international community. The NATO ended the Serbian aggression but could however, according to Seyholt, not stop the displacement of several of thousands Albanians in Kosovo. 20 2.2 Critical Terrorism Studies As traditional terrorism studies emphasize on the threat that is posed by militant extremist groups, such as al-shabab in Somalia and ISIL in Libya, one might presuppose that these kinds of threats are new elaborations, and should be counteracted by military actors, like humanitarian interventions. However, this theory argues that such military power show the opposite results and is inefficient. Critical terrorism scholars argue that military interventions have proven to be counter-productive and have further regionalized and internationalized conflicts, such as al- Shabab s relations with al-qaida. By using the historical context of the radical presence within the context of local structures such as the tribal structure, policymakers would have more understanding of the emergence of radical groups. 21 The international community stumbled upon the increasing fractions of extremist groups in some intervened states, thus initiating a debate whether the traditional terrorism strategies increases the problems, and further intensifies terrorism in the regions. As a critique to the traditional concept of terrorism studies, a new approach developed to explore more sustainable perceptions in the research field. While the concept of critical studies began to emerge after the Cold War s ending, a prevailing discontent on the traditional realist approach manifested, concerning realism s emphasis on states, as realists believe they are the most important agents in international 19 Daalder & Stavridis, 2012, Foreign Affairs: NATO s Victory in Libya The Right Way to Run an Intervention, p. 2-3 20 Seyholt B. Taylor, 2008, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, p. 271 21 Solomon, Hussein, 2015, Critical Terrorism Studies and Its Implications for Africa, p. 226 8

politics. Critics have argued that just because the state apparatus is considered secured, does not mean that the security of the state s inhabitants are being taken into account. 22 This description is especially accurate in developing countries whereas the security of states or regimes is often obtained at the expense of the inhabitant s security. New strategies that have developed are now placing emphasis on the state apparatus and placing importance on the core elements of the states, societies and regional communities, which generally embodies the people. Following the 9/11 attacks, scholar s criticism began to escalate regarding traditional terrorism studies and it s militaristic and state-centric perspective. International Relations scholar Barry Buzan has for instance argued that the output of US military remained predominately focused on meeting traditional challenges from other states, whereas extremist groups such as al-qaida operates in over 60 states. 23 As far as simplifying the term critical terrorism studies, it is categorized to be critique of the present discourse on terrorism studies by scholars and policy-makers and their state-centric emphasis. The main focus from the traditional scholars is on the radical groups themselves, but not the structures and history of the state. Instead, critical terrorism studies utilize other disciplines such as history to in a broader way analyse radicalism s emergence. 24 While scholars of critical terrorism studies differ in some opinions, the main consensus lays in a disapproval concerning the classic tradition of terrorism discourses. Lee Jarvis argued that much of the terrorism discourses we had been witnessing did not have sufficient historical context in their approach. Jarvis further elaborates this by expressing how much of the historical context that was ignored, such as the fact that states had effectively been agents of terrorism, and in some sense a more destructive actor than a non-state actor. 25 One example is how after 9/11, history was especially ignored, when new scholars came forth, in which they regarded the phenomena of terrorism as something new. They seemed to believe that the terrorist attacks on America happened solely without the actor s reminiscence of previous occurrences were the U.S was highly involved. 26 To understand the cases of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia, one should explore the local structures of the both states. Since these states have a complex social structure, it is important to understand the core elements of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia by using a historical-analytical 22 Solomon, Hussein, 2015, Critical Terrorism Studies and Its Implications for Africa, p. 221 23 Solomon, Hussein, 2015, Critical Terrorism Studies and Its Implications for Africa, p. 221-222 24 Ibid, p.223, 226 25 Solomon, Hussein, 2015, Critical Terrorism Studies and Its Implications for Africa, p. 223-224 26 Palgrave, The Study of Terrorism, p.16 9

approach. The societies are often called tribal or clan societies, and have had a large impact on how the states operate, especially during times of weak governmental form. This is why I have chosen to adopt a theory on tribes to understand how such societies work and heeding Jarvis call of bringing history into the picture. 2.3 Tribes the First and Forever Form David Ronfeldt composed a theoretical framework in order to understand social evolution and how societies work. He focuses on the tribal structures in states to see what lies behind governance of the societies to this date. The tribal structures that we can see today have same preceding problems, such as hierarchical institutional forms and problem of power. In a tribal society, the inhabitant s compliance to new forms depends primarily on the nature of the tribes and these variations shape states differently. Nevertheless, in a state where a deeply-rooted tribe structure is represented, great difficulty occurs in dealing with promoting advancement from the previous traditional ways. As we can see in the world s troublesome locations, for instance in Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East, some societies are ineffective because of their tribal and clan structures, therefore renders it difficult to establish a strong state apparatus. 27 As the policymakers of the United States generally have the assumptions that a civilization is more advanced with political democracy and market economies, this is a problem with foreign policy. 28 The problem for policymakers is on how to encourage tribal societies in Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East to revive and deal with ethnic conflicts in states where no functioning state structure is visible. Some argue that tribes can be qualified as societies, and therefore tied to certain land. 29 David Ronfeldt further analyses tribes as a group with absent hierarchical structures in contrast to what we usually recognize in states, with highly decentralized structures. As tribalism previously was examined due to its historical context, recent wars and conflict in the world elevated a desired understanding of tribal structures, thus becoming a global trend to understand these communities and its effects on different conflicts. Ronfeldt also clarifies that a remarkable amount of conflicts during these decades encompasses citizens who have seen the dissolution of central governments and ended up in a tribal reaction such as in the Balkans. When a state with a strong tribe history sees its governmental system fall apart, citizens of the state presumably go back to its tribal or clannish dynamics, and increasingly polarize the state. The effects of decentralization will mostly lead to inhabitants 27 Ronfeldt, David, 2006, In Search of How Societies Work - Tribes The First and Forever Form., p. 5 28 Ronfeldt, David, 2006, In Search of How Societies Work - Tribes The First and Forever Form., p. 7 29 Ibid, p.13 10

wanting to establish so called clan-states, and being reluctant to functioning nation-state. For this reason, history shows that damaged nation-states where such a dynamic is present tend to reveal a harmful tribal- and clan system. 30 The fundamental character traits of clans or tribes are respect, honour and dignity. An insult or damage to these kinds of vital attributes will very likely cause great disorder and a desire for revenge, especially in conflict areas that have been in unstable circumstances. With this declaration, Western policymakers should focus on a state s social structure before advancing in different processes, and while tribal structures do not always have a negative impact, it could worsen certain ongoing scenarios. As some parts of the world still have a strong tribal structure, especially in Africa and the Middle East, policymakers are in some sense underestimating or overlooking its significance, as strong tribal structures can have tremendous effects on the states. In conclusion, it will take more than a strong military capability of the West to intercept and interrupt these kinds of scenarios. 31 In accordance with Critical Terrorism Studies, I believe that traditional terrorism studies that we have witnessed during this time can further increase problems in the region. The policymaker s state-centric and military perspective has not fully worked in many states; hence it is a problem for further interventions in Africa the Balkans and the Middle East as it could also lead to damaging backlashes in the future. This theory is also relevant due to the regionalization of the conflicts in Kosovo, Libya and Somalia, as scholars believe that military interventions are counter-productive. 32 In addition to these points, scholars of Critical Terrorism Studies also discuss how discourses of terrorism usually ignore the historical context of a state. 33 This is why I think the theory of Tribes The First and Forever Form will be relevant to understand how tribal societies, such as Kosovo, Libya and Somalia, and how they function. They are compatible in a way that one can deeper understand the problem of humanitarian intervention. I agree with the fact that the historical context of a nation should unconditionally be examined before interventions, to not have a further escalation of violence afterwards. If we do not understand the essence of historical context when preparing for intervention, the outgrowth will result in not understanding the core problem when interventions eventually fail to reach an ideal outcome. Local structures and theories on tribes and critical terrorism 30 Ibid, p. 30, 53-63 31 Ibid, p. 72-77, 80-81 32 Solomon, Hussein, 2015, Critical Terrorism Studies and Its Implications for Africa, p. 226, 232 33 Ibid, p. 226 11

studies can be of great advantage. Ronfeldt argues that foreign actors and policymakers tend to underestimate the tribal societies and its effect on states, as the Wests military capabilities are insufficient to these regions. When we use both theories, we can from a different angle understand how complex societies is operating and if we do not use both theories, we might be excluding a component that help us to understand the interventions outcome in Kosovo, Libya and Somalia. With these theories are applied, I believe that this thesis can help to explain the humanitarian interventions difficulty of implementing a strong state, especially in regard to strong tribal societies. 12

3. Methodology 3.1 Case of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia As researchers must have speculated in how the development of future interventions will emerge, my beliefs lay in the fact that humanitarian interventions may underestimate the effect of the local structure and this may very well be problematic in further policymaking. My claim is that that the actors maybe are missing the point of the local structures. As previous research shows, understanding the local structure is of great importance. 34 If it is not deliberated by the external actors before their engagement, the argument lays in the fact that interventions can lead to future collapse and backlashing of intervened states. 35 By neglecting the fact that the intervened states of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia are states with a certain level of tribal structures, the history of states can repeat itself when foreign actors decides to intervene in states who have a complex local structure as well. To harmlessly imply that quick military interventions will solve the one problem, can eventually create other problems, such as a weak state, when not understanding how social structures such as tribes, clans and different groups operate within the state border. As previously stated, the three cases I have chosen to study are the interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Somalia. The reason behind my selection of cases is that they share several similar historical and present characteristics. These states have been exposed to external intervention by Western actors. Kosovo, Libya and Somalia are also Muslim dominant countries, and have a considerable tribe structure within their borders. Another similarity between these states is that they have been ruled by authoritarian rulers; Siad Barre in Somalia, Muammar al-qaddafi in Libya and Slobodan Milošević in Kosovo. 3.2 Qualitative study In this thesis, my ambition is to apply a qualitative strategy which emphasizes on discourse, rather than quantifying data. By primarily analysing Kosovo, Libya and Somalia s governmental background and tribal structure as well as the radical presence in both states; I will further analyse policy maker s discourse, in accordance with qualitative methods and the importance of apprehending human actions. 36 In my thesis about Kosovo, Libya and Somalia, 34 Ronfeldt, David, 2006, In Search of How Societies Work - Tribes The First and Forever Form., p. 81 35 Kuperman, Alan, 2013, Belfer Center Policy Brief, Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene, p.1-2 36 Eriksson, Bengt, Nationalencyklopedin: Kvalitativ Metod 13

this will have great significance due to the importance of understanding the context of both the intervened and the intervening actors. 37 In accordance with different approaches in a qualitative study, I will in this thesis use an inductive approach. An inductive approach is used when a researcher wants to draw a generalizable conclusion of the observation one has conducted. To simplify the steps of an inductive approach is when a researcher begins a study with a scientific research question and then continues with hypothetic explanation of a problem. The researcher is then collecting data and analysing one or several cases. Lastly, depending on if there is diverging case or not, the hypothesis is confirmed. The process of induction has also a deductive element with generally derive a theoretical framework which is subjected to empirical scrutiny. 38 3.3 Research design This thesis is a comparative study on the Kosovo, Libya and Somalia interventions. A comparative study predicts that we use similar methods on different two or more varying cases. The reason why scientists apply comparative studies in both qualitative and quantitative is the simple fact that a comparative study will enhance our understanding of a certain phenomenon. In my thesis the phenomena will be the different outcome of these three states, even though they share similarities. By comparing two or more cases, the researcher may be able to describe under which conditions a theory is insufficient. Comparative studies also have the advantage of implementing ideas which are relevant for generating a theory. 39 The design of this thesis will be one of the five methods of induction which were described by the English philosopher John Stuart Mill. The method I will be using in this thesis, which is termed the method of concomitant variation, is best described by John Stuart Mill in A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive when he states that Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation (1882, p. 495-496). When we can see a change in the cause and the effect varies with the change, the explaining variable would be the cause of the variation of effects. According to Mills, when two or more 37 Bryman, Alan, 2011, Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder, p. 359-363 38 Ibid, p. 26, 511-512 39 Ibid, p. 80-83 14

phenomena follow each other in their diversification, the correlation is there and may be the logical evidence that A is the cause of B. 40 In this thesis, this research design will be applied in my interest in whether or not the strong tribal structure in an intervened state can be the cause of a radical terrorist presence and subsequently contribute to a failed state. 3.4 Material and Source Criticism For this thesis, my main sources will be secondary data. Secondary data is information which is collected and accessible. When researchers are collecting secondary material, they are not fully aware of the purpose of the collecting data which has generally not been collected by the researcher himself. My arguments for using secondary data are that most of the information which is accessible tends to be of high quality with established methods. Another argument for using these kinds of data is the increasing possibilities of making cross-cultural analysis of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia in this time of globalization. 41 When using secondary data, I must emphasize the fact that information can be updated and is not stagnant. New data can constantly be updated whereas the possibility of the information s dissolution increases. I am fully aware of the reality that secondary data is available for entire societies which mean that anyone with insufficient knowledge can formulate incorrect information. However, this does not necessarily mean that the information is not correct, but the author must take this into consideration during this thesis. 42 To use relevant information, my thesis will be based upon material from reports regarding the humanitarian interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Somalia, such as congress reports and the discourse from researchers who have scrutinized the NATO, UN, and the U.S interventions. Additionally, literature, journals and scientific reports concerning the humanitarian interventions in these countries will be a great value for analysing the empirical assignment. To fully understand different outcome of these interventions, I will use literature to understand and compare the tribal structure, the terrorist presence and former leadership of Kosovo, Libya and Somalia. Lastly, a table from OECD report on states fragility will be of importance when summarizing and comparing the level of fragility between these studied states. 40 Mill, John Stuart, 1882, A System Of Logic, Ratiocinative And Inductive, p. 495-498 41 Ibid, p. 302 42 Flowerdew & Martin, 2005, Methods, A guide for students doing a research project, p. 57-59, 68 15

3.5 Delimitations Humanitarian intervention is a broad subject and there is plenty of research regarding interventions, thus making it reasonable to delimitate my thesis. Many states have been intervened and examined through different approaches, but the states I have chosen to examine are Kosovo, Libya and Somalia. The reasons for examining Kosovo, Libya and Somalia are primarily based on the limitation of time to conduct this thesis, but also the many similarities within the states. Kosovo, Libya and Somalia share similar historical background with a complex tribe society and an authoritarian governmental rule. The states also share a common experience in such that they have been invaded by military actions of foreign actors. Despite these similar characteristics, I claim that this thesis can prove to find significant differences by examining and comparing the selected variables. To simplify my delimitation, my thesis will be focused on the interventions of Somalia 1992, Kosovo 1999 and Libya 2011. I am fully aware that there are many factors or course of events that may help to understand the outcome of three nations, and my intention is not to exclude different variables that can explain a failed state as it impossible in this duration of time and data collection to analyse every component that can demonstrate all the underlying factors of these kinds of situations. I know and understand that there are many explanations to why a state succeeds or fails in establishing a strong state apparatus or not, after an intervention. The differences in culture, economy and colonial heritage between these states are not something I deny exists. My purpose of this study is not denying other important factors regarding these intervened states. However, I strongly believe that a strong tribal structure can be an important factor when scrutinizing a state s stability and further development after an external intervention. The very essence of a functioning state is a majority of its population believing in an idea of solidarity within a nation s border. The common identity which is uniting the population within a nation is not applicable in the same way regarding strong tribal societies. The clan is the most important aspect in states with strong tribal structures, and the nationalistic views and thoughts of a common culture, economy, and culture heritage, should logically not be as important in these particular nations, as it would be in cases with no tribal structures. Hopefully, my empirical reasoning through this thesis will prove that the tribal structure and its eventual strength within a nation can be of significant importance. 16

4. Analysis 4.1 Libya 4.1.1 Leadership During the year 1969, a coalition of Libyan military leaders led by Muammar al-qaddafi, were able to take several important institutions which lead to the abolishment of the Libyan monarchy. This coup d état would thereafter generate an over 40 year old long dictatorship under al-qaddafi with many consequences ahead. Whilst taking Libya under his control, Colonel al-qaddafi developed an alternative for the US and Soviet capitalist or communist order, the Third Universal Theory. With the mixture of Socialist and Islamic cherishment, this would lead to a drastic reorganization with the political and economic sphere of the Libyan nation. 43 When mentioning the name of Muammar al-qaddafi, the word controversial has been uttered countless times. During his long presidency and dominion in Libya, Al-Qaddafi had in a roundabout way politically seized Libya for more than 40 years by establishing his own philosophy and methods regarding Libya s foreign and domestic judicious. With different levels of governance by Muammar al-qaddafis authoritarian rule with his closest companions, most observers regarded the political system of Libya as undemocratic and autocratic. For instance, since the coup d état of al-qaddafi in the late 60s, opposition groups had systematically been persecuted by establishing special courts to convict and punish nonconformists. Several situations concerning assassinations by the Libyan intelligence services were reported and the supervisions of opposition groups were conducted to frighten people s interest in rising against the authoritative rule of Muammar al-qaddafi. 44 4.1.2. Humanitarian intervention 2011 In the middle of March 2011, the United Nations issued the confirmation of a military intervention to begin in Libya as the Council considered the escalated violence in the state disastrous. The ignition of the intervention in Libya was due to the severe clashes between Muammar al-qaddafis governmental forces and opposition groups who started to become fatigued of al-qaddafi s long time rule. After the United Nations approval of military 43 Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011, Libya: Background and U.S. Relations, p. 4-5 44 Ibid, p.16-19 17

intervention, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) set out a plan to intervene by authorizing a no-fly zone and targeting government forces with airstrikes. Following seven months of struggle, the Libyan opposition groups managed to take control over most of the state which led to the capturing and killing of Muammar al-qaddafi. Earlier in 2011, the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and later Egypt would subsequently set up the rise of the Libyan people. With many ongoing protest around the country, the brusque response of Muammar al-qaddafi in which he responded by shooting at the protestors would lead to thousands of casualties. Considering the massive attacks on civilians, the peaceful protestors would later turn into armed opposition groups and progressed by overtaking the control of half of Libya. Al-Qaddafi and his government forces would thereafter intensify the attacks on civilians and bomb residential areas without any restrictions. With the help of NATO, the opposition groups would later end the 40-plus year s dictatorship of al-qaddafi and eventually the conflict. 45 As the aim of the NATO intervention in Libya was to protect the civilians, according to Kuperman, it is interesting to examine the long-term benefit for the Libyan population. After al-qaddafis death and the end of the authorisation government, democratic elections were held in mid-july 2012. However, the democratically elected prime minister was unsuccessful in keeping his new position as he was forced to step down, which resulted in regional battles. The opposition groups have also been accused of killing, detaining and torturing thousands of suspected pro al-qaddafi supporters. There has also been an increase of racial violence in which the inhabitants from Tawerga have protested against the burning and looting of various homes and shops owned by black people. Human Rights Watch reported these kinds of abuses from anti-qaddafi forces and called it a crime against humanity, and contrary to what some might believe, racial and ethnic violence was uncommon to be heard of under the rule of Muammar al-qaddafi. During this era of post-intervention Libya, most researchers have found the security and democratization process as troublesome. The newly elected government from 2012 were incapable of controlling the many rebel groups that emerged during the revolution, which resulted in many clashes between different tribal groups, and the increasing presence of terrorist groups. As radical extremist groups were restrained during the rule of Muammar al-qaddafi, the NATO backed revolution made it possible to emerge as one of the strongest rebel groups. 45 Kuperman, Alan, 2013, A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO s Military Campaign, p. 105-107 18

Since then, many Western diplomats and organizations have evacuated from Libya intimidated of being attacked, as the US consulate was attacked by extremist militias in September 2012. 46 4.1.3 Libya s tribal structure Over 90% of the Libyan inhabitants consider themselves Arab or mix of and Berber and Arab. In Libya, the tribes or Qabai l is a form of social association which illustrates the ordinary reflectiveness and behaviour of Libyan population. The tribal society in Libya consists of solid ethics such as kinship solidarity. They also share common values and have established organizations as these foundations has great significance for the tribal society, for instance Urf which is the customary law of tribal people in Libya. The attachment for the tribal society differs. In some middle-class neighbourhoods in Tripoli and Benghazi, tribalism which first signified a complete way of life, have nowadays been more subtle, but engaging in familypolitics is still implemented by the educated and prosperous inhabitants. In other areas such as North Eastern Libya, the tribal structure embodies inhabitant s whole life. During the rule of Muammar al-qaddafi the system of power was enhanced by his companions and relatives from the Qadafha tribe along with the biggest tribe in Libya (Warfalla) and Magarha. These tribes were important parts of local and regional politics. 47 Since the Libyan revolution and NATO intervention in 2011, many conflicts escalated into tribal and local battles all across Libya. Because of the interim government s failure to disarm the anti-qaddafi forces and rebel groups, a further escalation of violence was inevitable. The rebel groups tended to maintain loyalty towards the tribes rather than the nation-state. Tribal feuds are not a new phenomenon in Libya and have existed for many hundred years, but as al- Qaddafi favoured certain tribes during his reign, the tribal groups which were opposed to the dictatorship, started to retaliate against regime-friendly groups and tribes. 48 As the increasing rivalry emerged after the revolution and intervention, thousands of people have been abused or resettled as tribal groups such as the Tebu and Tuareg tribes had over a yearlong battle against each other in the southern parts of Libya. The two tribes finally signed an agreement of ceasefire during November 2015 claiming that external intervention and foreign approaches was the incentives which intensified the rivalry. Despite this, tribal and 46 Ibid, p. 125-127 47 Varvelli, Arturo, 2013, The Role of Tribal Dynamics in the Libyan Future, p. 6 48 Stocker, Valerie, 2013, Deutsche Welle: Tribal feuds, local conflicts engulf Libya 19

ethnic problems have increased since the removal of Muammar al-qaddafi and continue to be an aggravation for Libya and may lead to an entirely failed state. 49 4.1.4 Terrorist presence in Libya A report from Hans-Jakob Schindler and Gerard van Bohemen was submitted to the United Nations Security Council in order to scrutinize threats of terrorism in Libya. In the North African state, there has been a presence of various groups linked to al-qaida. One of them is ISIL or Daesh who view the Libyan nation as a potential stronghold, due to Libya s geographical position between Africa, the Middle East and Europe. 50 As the political and security deficiency have been prevailing since the poor strength of Libya s state apparatus, the nation has been viewed as a potential territory for ISIL to operate for fighters who cannot reach Syria and Iraq. A high official from ISIL, Abu al-mughirah al-qahtani, has expressed the importance of Libya because of the state s location and resources, and favourable because the deserts reach to other African states. 51 ISIL has declared being operative in many cities in Libya such as Tripoli, Misrata and Tubruq, as well as controlling certain neighbourhoods in Derna, Benghazi and areas along the seacoast. Today, ISIL fighters are restricted in further expansion in a quick way due to their limited number of representatives but will likely attempt to form alliances with other groups to achieve plans of expanding in Libya. It should be noted that despite the limited expansion in Libya today, it does not necessarily indicate that ISIL will not grow in the region; rather the risk of ISIL s territorial expansions remains possible. The issue of foreign fighters is not a new phenomenon in Libya, but since the humanitarian intervention and regime change in 2011, Libya has become a safe haven for terrorist fighters to train for the upcoming journey to Iraq and Syria, with many Libyan fighters later re-establishing themselves in Libya. 52 49 Al Jazeera, 2015, War & Conflict: Rival Libyan tribes sign ceasefire deal in Doha 50 The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant will be abbreviated as ISIL. The term Daesh is often used to enrage ISIL members due to the similarity of the Arabic word Daes, which means 'one who sows discord'. 51 Schindler & Van Bohemen, 2015, United Nations Security Council: resolution 2214 concerning the terrorism threat in Libya posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, p. 7 52 Schindler & Van Bohemen, 2015, United Nations Security Council: resolution 2214 concerning the terrorism threat in Libya posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, p. 11-14 20

4.2 Somalia 4.2.1 Leadership After the assassination of Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke who was elected by the National Assembly in Somalia, a General by the name of Siad Barre would soon lead a military coup joined with his companions, and eventually become the president of the Somali state. After the establishment of Barre s rule, he later ordered the Supremacy Revolutionary Council to govern and possess all executive and legislation power to the Council, in which he was the main leader. President Barre decision to annul the Somali constitution made room for a new political form that he called scientific socialism which would link Somalia with the Soviet Union. By using his new political system, Siad Barre nationalized land, water and banks and spread the profit to his own tribe. By being supporters to the regime in the Soviet Union, Siad Barre and his regime earned military and development aid from the Soviet Union. This changed later when the Soviet Union would terminate the deal because of Somalia s conflict with another close ally of the Soviet Union, Ethiopia. 53 During Barre s reign, the national government in Somalia was solely for his and his supporter s profit. Somalia as a state had one of the lowest food accumulations in the world and in 1991 Barre s government collapsed. After the state collapse of Somalia, warlords engaged in a civil war between rival groups, as they were fully determined to establish a new state apparatus. To this day Somalia has yet to succeed in adopting a representative rule and has failed to organize unification among Somalia s different tribal groups. 54 4.2.2 Humanitarian intervention 1992 During 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross alerted that 95 percent of the inhabitants in Somalia were insufficiently nourished and the threat of severe famine emerged, with over 300,000 deaths during that year. Whilst Somalia was reacting to the critical time of starvation, the United States launched an operation in order to hand out aid relief by air. The operation resulted in something of a failure as the supplies regularly got into the hands of militias and not the civilian population. A month after the failed air supply operation, over five hundred peace keepers from the United Nations were deployed to help and strengthen the 53 Kimeyni et al., 2010, Reconstituting Africa s Failed States: The Case of Somalia, p. 1349-1350 54 Powell et al., 2008, Somalia after state collapse: Chaos or improvement? p. 659 21

existing UN operation (UNOSOM I). Despite the reinforcement, it was still insufficient and the operators could merely observe the starvation and turmoil. 55 The U.S military intervention was initiated through two stages. The first stage initiated during the end of 1992 when former President George H.W Bush contributed by giving the UN operations military and logistical aid which was largely a success. The main goal was to secure the shipment of humanitarian aid to local population, especially in the southern parts of Somalia where the starvation was highly apparent. Later next year the second stage called UNOSOM II initiated and was entitled with more mandate, as organizing the attempt of putting the end to the conflict between tribes and also reinstating Somalia s political institutions. Escalations further increased in Somalia during this period of time when militias began to attack UN convoys, which afterwards led to battle between U.S forces and local militant groups. These aftermaths resulted in 18 U.S soldiers and hundreds of Somalis dead and the withdrawal of U.S forces, which summarized the military intervention as a failure. 56 4.2.3 Somalia s tribal structure The social and political structure of Somalia particularly consists of tribal families and clans which are divided into different sub-clans. The leaders of these families tend to be the elderly and bond through councils. During his period of reign, Siad Barre tried to dismantle the clan system of Somalia but his government was later overthrown in 1991. 57 Following the collapse of the Somali state and Barre s withdrawal, great conflicts have emerged between rival clans, and have further intensified due to droughts in the state. The tribe society in Somalia have been an extensive trial for humanitarian organizations, as clans usually operate on their own and have a certain way of method when it comes to politics. 58 In Somalia, there are four main clans; Hawiye, Darood, Dir and Rahanweyn. These clans possess control over certain areas in the state, and some such as the Rahanweyn clan have established their own military troops. The clans in Somalia have a great importance as they are considered to be the main authorities when it comes to security and law and have had an even greater importance since the state collapse in the 1990s. When it comes to regulations, traditional tribes operate within the fundamental traditions as revenge killings and blood money 55 Johnson, Dominic, 2006, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics p. 207-208 56 Ibid, p.208-209 57 Ahmed & Green, 1999, The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland, p. 114 58 Drumtra, Jeff, 2014, Internal Displacement in Somalia, p. 8, 17-18 22

to name a few tribe obligations. As usually is occurring in traditional societies, weaker clans are often more vulnerable and tend to unite with stronger clans in order to get protection. 59 Today, inter-clan conflicts are more present in Somalia, and with many civilian casualties and are opening up for other more extremist actors to operate and gain control over Somali territories, as the conflict continues to cause suffering for the state s population. 60 4.2.4 Terrorist presence in Somalia After the collapse of Siad Barre s regime, several national settlements have attempted to form a new constitution but failed. For over 20 years the deficit of a national central arrangement has left Somalia in vacuity which would result in an increasing presence of negative Islamist interests. In the mid-90s courts by fundamental Islamic ruling emerged in order to supply the lack of national courts in Somalia. Thereafter, extremists were able to operate in Somalia, as the state s collapse made it easier for extremist groups to use Somalia as new platform of operating. One group who has succeeded in having a foothold in Somalia is al- Shabab which has embraced an extreme interpretation of Islam. 61 The main goals of al-shabab have been to mobilize local population by using bribes and recruiting members from the Somali diaspora. Al-Shabab is also heavily linked with al-qaida which later developed into a full allegiance to al-qaida in 2009. The group have continuously been engaging in terrorist attacks both in foreign and domestic regions, with more than 13 suicide attacks from 2006-2009. As Somalia s various clans are still battling each other for power in the state, the presence of al-shabab is strong and has possibly further extended the hazardous and destructive situation in the Somali region. 62 4.3 Kosovo 4.3.1 Leadership During the 1970s, when the Yugoslavian leader was Joseph Tito, Albanians in Kosovo began to receive more and more rights within the autonomous area of Serbia. By the year 1989, the situation would radically change when Slobodan Milošević was elected as the President of Serbia. From that point, a campaign was initiated to make Kosovo more Serbian. Newspapers in Albanian were forbidden and Albanian-speaking schools were shut down, and many 59 Gundel, Joakim, 2009, Clans in Somalia, p. 10-11, 18 60 Human Rights Watch, 2015, World Report 2015: Somalia 61 Ibrahim, Mohamed, 2010, Somalia and global terrorism: A growing connection, p.283-285 62 Ibid, p. 285-286 23

Albanians in high positions were forced to declare their allegiances towards the Serbian regime. As a response to the repressive politics of President Milošević, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK), Ibrahim Rugova formed parallel governance in order to liberate and establish a sovereign and independent state. 63 Ibrahim Rugova had been the President of the parallel state of Kosovo since 1992 and was seen as the founding father of Kosovar nationalism and dedicated his life to fulfil his dream of watching his Kosovo become and independent state. Ibrahim Rugova was also one of the prominent figures to provide testimony against Slobodan Milošević during the trial at the International Criminal Tribunal of the Yugoslavia. In March 2002, Ibrahim Rugova was elected President of Kosovo, a position he kept until his death in 2006. 64 4.3.2 Humanitarian Intervention 1999 In 1998 when Serbian forces intensified their operations in Albanian villages, the parliament of Kosovo reached out to NATO. Kosovo called for the alliance to intervene in the ongoing war in Kosovo. NATO wanted to warn the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, by launching a military exercise over Albanian space. Milošević declined to listen to any diplomatic efforts to stop the war thus enabling NATO to engage in air strikes against targets in Kosovo and Serbia. Milošević wanted therefore to retaliate and authorize Serbian forces to cleanse Kosovo of its Albanian population. An overwhelming amount of Albanians began to flee, and tried to seek refuge in neighbouring countries such as Albania and Montenegro. 65 NATO began its military operation in March 1999 and it lasted for 3 months, with the air strikes intensifying during that period. The bombs had been targeting territories in Kosovo and Serbia and made Serbian forces withdraw from Kosovo. In June 1999, the United Nations Resolution 1244 was adopted, and the war was over. 66 Today, Kosovo indeed has problems with developing to a successful state and should be seen as a fragile state, but not a failed one. 67 63 Utrikespolitiska institutionen, 2014, Säkerhetspolitik: Fördjupning Kosovo 64 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Ibrahim Rugova 65 Philips, David, 2012, Liberating Kosovo, Coercive Diplomacy and U.S intervention p. 92 & 107 66 Ibid, p.106-108 67 Montanaro, Lucia, 1999, The Kosovo Statebuilding Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested State, p. 5 24

4.3.3 Kosovo s tribal structure In Kosovo, the tribal structure is different compared to the structures of Libyan and Somali tribes. Within tribes in Kosovo, An eye for an eye, a life for a life, is the principles under which the tribes are operating. It means that if someone would offend or kill ones family member, the family must take their revenge against one member of the first offending part. Kosovo has been rooted in a tribal structure, with traditional law and customs called Kanun. The Kanun had been the cornerstone for Albanian people during the Ottoman Empire and the Yugoslav federation, and it still has a clear bearing for inhabitants in Kosovo. After the World War II, the president of the Yugoslav republic, Joseph Tito, sought to centralize the federation by separating tribes in Albania and Kosovo. Even after the war in Kosovo in 1999, the main focus of the Albanians in Kosovo was to be an independent and sovereign state. 68 The Kanun still has a role in modern day society in Kosovo, but the majority of the population hold these laws as the reason why Kosovo has a problem to develop into a modern state today, thus making the tribal structure weaker than the ones in Libya and Somalia as the majority don t believe in clannish politics. The family ties are still strong within a Kosovo Albanian family, and can sometimes function as the main provider for security. 69 4.3.4 Terrorist presence in Kosovo After the end of the conflict in 1999, radical clerks began to operate in Kosovo. The influence of radical Islam is very marginal in Kosovo, but it is not non-existent. Despite a few individuals who are being monitored, extremist organizations such as ISIL and al-nusra Front have no established foundation in Kosovo. Furthermore, they are not active in Kosovo. These kinds of movements have no support among a clear majority of the Kosovar population. In general, the population in Kosovo see themselves as nationalistic, rather than religious. 70 Kosovo is and has been a secular society, with the majority of the population adhering to Islam, without having strong religious beliefs. The fundamentalist way of thinking is a rather new phenomenon in Kosovo and has little presence within the state. 71 68 Ibid, p. 8-9 69 Janssens, Jelle, 2005, State-building in Kosovo. A plural policing perspective, p. 176-177 70 Migrationsverket, Lifos Temarapport, 2016, rekrytering av jihadister i Kosovo, p. 5-9 71 Ibid, p. 11 25

4.4 U.N and U.S policy on Somalia Intervention In 2005, David Armstrong composed a large report on the operations in Somalia by gathering information from United States Department of Defence and the leaders of the Joint Staff who worked under the Department of Defence. The report discusses the conditions and circumstances when U.S, with the UN, intervened into Somali territory. Before composing Somali policies, the Joint Staff recommended the U.S forces to be operating by humanitarian aid which would be followed by peace building efforts under the command of the U.N. Former General Powell and leaders from the Joint Staff argued that a united policy was a requirement, and without a strong state apparatus, Somalia would once again fall back under disastrous conditions. However, the aim for both the U.S and U.N would change over time and change the public opinion on intervening in Somalia. 72 During July 1992 the public opinion in America were devastated by the media s coverage of the ongoing drought in Somalia, making. President George H.W. Bush motivated to take action. President Bush was determined that the U.S should be playing a leading role in the Somali Intervention by protecting the food distribution and promoting peace-talks among the clans. With different levels of coordination, the U.S government began to assemble directors and generals to determine the policy of the intervention. As the Joint Staff with the Secretary of Defence prepared by gathering information about Somalia, the Deputy Assistant Secretary James Woods observed that many officers were eagerly enthusiastic of engaging in the Somali territory. One man who had a different point of view was Smith Hempstone whose knowledge of Africa was notable due to his appointment as U.S ambassador for neighbouring Kenya. He clarified that there was little reason to believe that a long-standing clan-conflict in Somalia would surrender to an outside intervention. 73 Hempstone s view of that an external intervention would not benefit the clan-conflict is compatible with the theory of Tribes The First and Forever Form and Ronfeldt s argument that there are some parts of the world where the tribal and clan-dynamics are highly integrated to the states societies. Somalia is one example of where the tribal system is very powerful and as Ronfeldt stated, policymakers tend to neglect the importance of powerful tribal structures which can have large impacts on the state. Both appear to agree that it takes more than strong military capacity of the West to intercept in states with strong tribal societies. 74 72 Poole, Walter, 2005, The Effort to Save Somalia, p.1-2 73 Ibid, p.7-8 74 Ronfeldt, David, 2006, In Search of How Societies Work - Tribes The First and Forever Form., p. 80-81 26

After the failure of delivering air-supplies by planes, the U.N were asked by the United States on what kind of help would be sufficient to advance the operation. The same year during November, President Bush and General Powell attended a meeting where both agreed that the situation in Somalia came to a point where a full intervention would be the best option to proceed. However General Powell did state that other consequences could follow if the U.S were persuaded to engage in Somalia. 75 The policy that first drove the U.S and U.N intervention was the danger of famine in Somalia, although former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had the objective of disarming all factions such as warlords and tribe leaders. This objective was from the beginning somewhat infeasible as Somali clans were dependent on arming its members since it was necessary to protect themselves from other clans. Basically, a number of heavy arms were confiscated by the U.N and U.S forces and food-supplies were able to reach predicted destinations, but clans and warlords still had an access to armoury and showed no excitement in yielding. 76 The objective of U.N would presumably not be approached if they had adequate knowledge of the clans and not underestimated the effects on how strong tribal structures operate in certain context. The theory of Critical terrorism studies argues as previously stated, that interventionists barely have a historic context in their approach and that much history was ignored. 77 The theory of Tribes asserts that policymakers have fundamental problems on how to encourage tribal groups of the Middle East and Africa to revive and deal with conflicts in states with no functioning state apparatus. The objectives of the United Nations and Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali have, in accordance with Ronfeldt s theory, been exposed of having these problems. Ronfeldt also explains that when states with a strong tribal history witness a governmental form fall, the inhabitants generally return to its tribal dynamics and further polarize the state, thus making it even more difficult for U.S and U.N operations to confiscate arms from the clans and the warlords as the state of Somalia had no functioning government since the fall of Siad Barre. 78 The mission of the Somalia intervention changed, from previously focusing on the famine issues, to expanding the operations which included the mission of rebuilding state institutions. The reasons for the expanding operations was largely based on televised images of U.S forces 75 Poole, Walter, 2005, The Effort to Save Somalia, p.19 76 Ibid, p.1-2 77 Solomon, Hussein, 2015, Critical Terrorism Studies and Its Implications for Africa, p. 223-224 78 Ronfeldt, David, 2006, In Search of How Societies Work - Tribes The First and Forever Form, p. 72-77, 80-81 27

and their conflict with opposing Somali groups and General Mohamed Aideed which led to several U.S casualties. The warlord became the focus of U.S and U.N attention and both the organization and the U.S entrenched into the depth of Somali politics, as they expected that kind of entrenchment. Clarke & Herbst wondered how anyone could believe that a force with 30.000 troops would not intervene in Somali politics. Former President Bush wanted to get the troops out quickly and the American leaders did in some way avoid considering the logical problem that would follow of an intervention. 79 Thereafter, Clarke and Herbst points to how American policymakers were overly optimistic concerning the presumptions that Somalia s problems would dissolve within a few weeks, which made it obvious that they didn t have a proper solution and probably lacked the understanding of the complexity of the Somali state. 80 Barbara Conry, a foreign policy analyst at Cato Institute, argued that a military intervention in regional conflicts is thoughtless. She believed that U.S military interventions should not be an option and regional conflicts would not be ended by external actors, and could eventually be counter-productive. The fact that forces such as in Somalia usually engage in guerrilla warfare and other strategies is something that U.S and other Western nations are not suited for, even with their high technological military capabilities. 81 To summarize, as the theory of Tribes and Critical Terrorist Studies argues, that military interventions can have an opposite effect without a historical context and can further regionalize the conflict, and that it will take more than strong 82 83 military capability to interrupt such conflicts as we have seen in Somalia. 4.5 U.S and NATO policy on Libya Intervention Christopher Blanchard, a research manager, prepared a report in 2011 to members of the Congress, in order for them to understand the key players view and potential consequences of a military intervention concerning the conflict in Libya. In March 2011, former President Barack Obama stated that U.S policy was to engage with a military intervention if Muammar al-qaddafi did not cease the advancement of his troops to Benghazi, pointing out that these terms were non-negotiable. According to President Obama, the aim of the U.S policy was to protect innocent civilians and holding Muammar al-qaddafi and his government responsible. A few days later, President Obama declared to the U.S Congress that the U.S military troops 79 Clarke & Herbst, 1996, Foreign Affairs: Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention 80 Ibid 81 Conry, Barbara, 1994, Policy Analysis: The Futility of U.S. Intervention in Regional Conflicts 82 Solomon, Hussein, 2015, Critical Terrorism Studies and Its Implications for Africa, p. 226 83 Ronfeldt, David, 2006, In Search of How Societies Work - Tribes The First and Forever Form, p 80-81 28

were set to launch a military operation in Libya, arguing that it would hinder a humanitarian disaster. 84 After one week of U.S operational command, NATO declared that they would act as a main authoritative power of all military operations in Libya. In similarity with the U.S policy, the objective for NATO and Former Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen was to protect the civilian population from violations by Muammar al-qaddafi s regime, and later overthrow his ruling government. By counterterrorism and maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea, NATO s goals was to intercept shipments with illegal weapons, which additionally led to include NATO airstrikes on alleged regime forces. 85 As can be read from the policies, the significance consists largely of al-qaddafi s regime and the desire of overthrowing his rule. NATO and the U.S have to some extent neglected the core essence of a state, its inhabitants. Critical Terrorism Studies argues that securing the state does not necessarily imply the fact that security would be accessible to the state s inhabitants. 86 Furthermore, the fall of both dictatorships in Libya and Somalia have in this context not been 87 88 able to secure inhabitants considerably. Horace Campbell holds the view that the NATO operation in Libya became counterproductive and argues that the withdrawal of external military forces will in the future be more problematic. He also asserts that NATO support for a democratic transition was relatively tame, arguing that the rival groups lacked enough willingness of taking on the obligation to hold a legitimate election, thus remarking that the war in Libya is far from over. 89 Regarding the historical context and the presence of tribalism, NATO and U.S policy appears to lack in the understanding of the tribes and their significance, as the U.S policymakers did with the Somali clans. Vladimir Socor pointed out that the Western coalition intervened in Libya with one week of knowledge in regard to the local structure in Libya. Furthermore, Socor stated that NATO was unprepared and blindsided by the complex tribal society in Libya, in which he also recalled the similarity of when NATO intervened in Afghanistan and the uncertainty in whether the coalition examined the local structures thoroughly or not. 90 84 Blanchard, Christopher, 2011, Congressional Research Service: Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy, p.8 85 Ibid, p.17-18 86 Solomon, Hussein, 2015, Critical Terrorism Studies and Its Implications for Africa, p. 221 87 Adow, Mohammed, 2008, CNN: Somalia clashes 'the worst since 1991 88 Fetouri, Mustafa, 2015, Al Monitor: Four years after Gadhafi, is Libya better off? 89 Campbell, Horace, 2012, NATO S Failure in Libya: Lessons for Africa, p.142 90 Socor, Vladimir, 2011, The Jamestown Foundation, Under NATO s Flag: an Interim Assessment of the Mission in Libya 29

Professor Jerzy Deren, who worked close with NATO, also commented on the fact that the organization should ponder to apply new policies in order to counter complex conditions in war-torn states. He claims that to have deeper knowledge about tribal societies, and to learn about the procedures which can lead to a better understanding of tribal groups, will ultimately increase the possibility of accomplishing legitimate efforts of state-building. According to Deren, strong tribal groups are hesitant of complying with laws and policies, which has resulted in the lack of interest concerning the central political power. The main goal for strong tribal groups are loyalty and security within the own tribe, which make NATO s western policies neglectful regarding the internal conflicts. 91 This matter is especially accurate during period of an external intervention, when the central government lacks any authority. As the theory of Tribes acknowledges, when a state with strong tribal societies sees their governmental system fall apart, the groups will generally tend to go back to their tribal dynamics, and further polarize the state. 92 4.6 NATO and UN policy on Kosovo Intervention During the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NATO used armed military forces for the first time since start of the alliance. The operation which was called Operation Allied Force started a debate among scholars and politicians. The question was if an external actor could violate a state s sovereignty, in order to stop violation of its population. The operation was launched during March 1999 and had several goals to frighten the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. The most important objectives during the campaign were to force Slobodan Milošević to withdraw Serbian military from Kosovo and stop the killings of Kosovo Albanians. The intervention was successful and Serbian military were forced to accept NATO s demands. 93 According to Jens Stillhoff Sörensen, an associate professor from Gothenburg University, the intervention in Kosovo was controversial in the sense regarding the peacebuilding efforts. Sörensen also argues that the essence of establishing a state is to acknowledge the local structures of the state. Sörensen further elaborates and clarifies that the central point in 91 Deren, Jerzy, 2015, Atlantic Community, Counterinsurgency and Tribal Politics 92 Ronfeldt, David, 2006, In Search of How Societies Work, Tribes The First and Forever Form, p.62 93 Roberts, Adam, 1999, NATO S Humanitarian War over Kosovo, p. 102-103 30

analysing an intervention is to analyse how the structures in Kosovo was affected by the operation. 94 After the NATO operation ended in June 1999, UNMIK (United Nation Mission in Kosovo), was established to obtain control over the territory of Kosovo. The head of UNMIK, Bernard Kouchner had a mission to create sustainable governance in Kosovo. In order to succeed that mission, interim and transitional council were established with representatives from the UN, Albanians, Serbs and various political and religious leaders. The downfall of UNMIK and its policies began in 2003 and the Albanians in Kosovo and representatives from the UN saw no other option than Kosovo to declare its independence. On February 1998, Kosovo were recognized as a sovereign state by the U.S and about two thirds of the EU. 95 The difference between the Libya and Somalia intervention and the intervention in Kosovo seems to be clear. UNMIK (even though the mission had negative effects), knew the importance of the local structures as all ethnic, religious and political groups had a role after the end of the NATO operation. This also reveals that the tribal society in Kosovo is not strong as it is in Somalia and Libya as the Albanians in Kosovo had nationalistic incentives. Strong tribal societies, as described before, are mostly loyal to the tribe, and not the nation. 96 In this thesis I have argued that external actors have underestimated a tribe s role in a society. Even though the tribal society is not as strong in Kosovo as it is in Libya and Somalia, it is present. The UNMIK started rather directly after the NATO operation in Kosovo, and the Kosovar population could not go back to their tribal dynamics, as it usually does after being intervened. 97 The tribal structure during the war in Kosovo was not important as the main objective of the Albanians in Kosovo was to be unified and to fight for independence. As described earlier in this section, is that all the different groups of Kosovo were represented through different councils and were participating in unifying Kosovo. 4.7 Can interventions increase radicalism? Since the emergence of U.S and U.N military operations in Somalia 1992, and the deaths of U.N and U.S troops, followed by the failure of capturing responsible actors such as warlord Aideed resulted in several months of deadly clashes. The outcome produced considerable failures for U.S policy and U.N operations, as the U.S withdrawal and Somalis increased 94 Chandler, David, 2013, Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding, p. 269-274 95 Ibid, p. 274-276 96 Scahill, Jeremy, 2011, The Nation: Blowback in Somalia, How US proxy wars helped create a militant Islamistthreat. 97 Ronfeldt, David, 2006, In Search of How Societies Work - Tribes The First and Forever Form., p. 30, 53-63 31

scepticism manifested how U.S and U.N involvement was inefficient in Somalia. As the continuing vacuum of power was apparent in the state, Islamic courts began to be established in Somalia and gained a legitimate status of control. However, after an Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, backed by the U.S, a further intensifying of anti-americanism developed in the country which therefore led jihadists support the radical group al-shabab, thus increased their capabilities in Somalia. 98 As collapsed states are fruitful areas for terrorism, the threat is a problem not only for the Somalia and the U.S, but to the whole world and the U.S efforts to interrupt these types of scenarios have been counterproductive. As the Obama administration adopted similar policies from the previous government leaders, the failure of gaining support in Somalia is evident. U.S policy should be scrutinized according to Bruton, as they are incapable of managing the increasing presence and power of extremist groups in Somalia. Efforts of military operations and U.S involvement in anti-western areas such as Somalia can only strengthen the extremist group s power which would have severe potential consequences in the region. Inefficiency of external actors is a threat as they can intensify and increase the conflict, thus a radicalization of the population would emerge and extremist groups such as al-qaida could strengthen their position in states comparative to Somalia. 99 According to Alan Kuperman, as some praised the NATO intervention in Libya of being a success, instead he argues that NATO s objective was not only to protect the civilian population, but rather to overthrow al-qaddafi and his regime despite the potential repercussions for the Libyan population. In his policy brief of NATO s operations in Libya, Kuperman deliberates on how the intervention backlashed by increasing the period of the Libyan Civil War, therefore provoking humanitarian misery and Islamic radicalism in the state. The post-war Libya saw rebel groups kill and expel alleged al-qaddafi-supporters, mostly the black population of Tawerga, as few ethnic and racial conflicts emerged during al-qaddafis period of rule. As radical Islamist groups were restrained during al-qaddafis reign, they would during the war be a major actor against the government, and subsequently refusing to demobilize and fall under a governmental power in Libya. With the lack of security in a postwar state such as Libya and Somalia, strong leaders are understandably desired. 100 98 Ibrahim, Mohamed, 2010, Somalia and global terrorism: A growing connection? p. 288-289 99 Burton, Bronwyn, 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, Somalia, a New Approach, p.2-5 100 Kuperman, Alan, 2013, Belfer Center Policy Brief, Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene, p.1-2 32

To sum up, Kaperman claims that the NATO intervention may indirectly be beneficial for Libya in the future, but that during this period, the regional stability and the lack of security is making Libya suffer. If this is a model intervention, as some U.S leaders have claimed it to be, then this is a model of failure. 101 Professor Seung-Whan Choi from the University of Illinois conducted a study in which he found that military interventions by the U.S from 1970-2005 are increasing terrorist attacks and casualties. The study demonstrates how U.S military interventions tend to be counterproductive as they allow terrorist groups to benefit from the unsteady political situations of the intervened states. As the local population with strong structures view external intervention as a sign of violation, they will likely become more positive of extremist methods to engage in the conflict. Terrorism is often the most logical tool in situations as external military intervention can create a more hostile condition, as we have seen in Libya and Somalia. 102 Source: OECD 2015 101 Bosco, David, 2013 Foreign Policy, Did NATO Intervention Make Libya s War Bloodier? 102 Choi, Seung-Wang, 2011, Does U.S. Military Intervention Reduce or Increase Terrorism?, p.3,7-8 33