Nations in Transit 720 YUGOSLAVIA Polity: Economy: Population: PPP (USD): Capital: Ethnic Groups: Size of private sector as % of GDP (1998): Presidential-parliamentary Mixed statist 10,600,000 2,300 Belgrade Serbian (63 percent), Albanian (14 percent), Montenegrin (6 percent), Hungarian (4 percent), other (13 percent) 40 NATIONS IN TRANSIT SCORES Democratization Rule of Law Economic Liberalization 1997 1998 1999-2000.na 4.90 5.50.na.na 6.00.na 4.83 5.33 KEY ANNUAL INDICATORS 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 GDP per capita (USD) Real GDP growth (% change on previous year) Inflation rate Exports (USD millions) Imports (USD millions) Foreign Direct Investment (USD millions) Unemployment rate Life Expectancy (years) 1443.0 1484.0 1487.0 1018.0 1087.0 1123.0 911.0-28.0 6.5 6.0 4.3 7.4 2.6-19.3 na na 71.8 90.5 23.2 30.4 42.0 na 1500.0 1400.0 1800.0 2700.0 2900.0 1500.0 na 1900.0 2400.0 4100.0 4800.0 4800.0 3300.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 na na 24.0 23.9 24.7 26.1 25.6 27.2 na 72.6 72.6 72.6 na na 72.8 74.9 FREEDOM IN THE WORLD RATINGS, 1989-2000 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 Political Rights Civil Liberties Status 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 PF PF NF PF NF NF NF NF NF NF PF
Introduction Since Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the formation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in April 1992, their common state has had a precarious existence. Formed in the midst of the wars in the neighboring former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and claiming to be the sole legal successor to the previous Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the FRY since its creation has been plagued by a host of problems. International economic sanctions, war in neighboring states involving ethnic brethren, considerable domestic political opposition to Slobodan Milosevic s rule, disagreements between the two federal partners, and unrest in the formerly autonomous Yugoslav province of Kosovo have all made the third Yugoslavia an inherently unstable entity. The FRY has not held free and fair elections since its establishment in 1992, and members of independent political parties face frequent harassment by the authorities. The government limits various civil liberties, including freedoms of the press and religion, and the judiciary is largely controlled by Milosevic s regime. In 1997, a new leader in Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, emerged to provide the most significant challenge to Milosevic s rule in the country that had yet emerged, and under Djukanovic, Montenegro has slowly pursued a strategy of disassociating itself from the Milosevic regime, if not from the Yugoslav federation itself. Meanwhile, in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began an uprising against Serbian control in the province in 1997. Economically, citizens of the FRY have experienced a precipitous drop in their living standards since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia; according to some estimates, average per capita GDP in the FRY in 1999 was one third of its 1989 level. Wars and international economic isolation have played a significant role in the economic downturn, as has the Milosevic regime s consistent refusal to engage in meaningful economic reform. Much of the regime s strategy for maintaining power in such unfavorable circumstances has revolved around distributing control over stateowned companies to political allies and allowing a large black market to flourish. NATO s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia itself has been estimated to have done some $30-40 billion worth of damage to the FRY s economic infrastructure. International concern over the fighting in Kosovo continued to grow throughout 1998, culminating in March 1999 with NATO s attacks on the FRY. The settlement that ended the conflict in June 1999 effectively, in practice if not in theory, removed Kosovo from Belgrade s legal control. Although the agreement recognized Yugoslavia s continuing territorial claim to sovereignty over Kosovo, the practical day-to-day administration of the province was turned over to a UN-led civilian administration. In the immediate aftermath of the Yugoslav army s withdrawal, Albanian attacks against Serbs, Roma, Turks, and other minorities in Kosovo led to a new round of forced expulsions of over 100,000 people. By mid-1999, the FRY had effectively disintegrated into three distinct political entities: Kosovo, under NATO/UN control, Montenegro, where Djukanovic was maintaining a precarious peace amongst rival elements in Montenegrin society, and Serbia (together with the FRY s other autonomous province, Vojvodina), where Milosevic was fully in charge. Despite the disastrous results of the Kosovo conflict, the Serbian opposition was unable to launch a serious campaign against the regime, partly due to infighting amongst its leaders, and partly due to the fact that an impoverished, demoralized population was unable and/or unwilling to risk civil war in Serbia itself. Democratization POLITICAL PROCESS 5.50/7 1. When did national legislative elections occur? Were they free and fair? How were they judged by domestic and international election monitoring organizations? Who composes the government? In April 1992, Serbian and Montenegrin delegates in what was left of the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) adopted a constitution for a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), composed of Serbia and her two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, and Montenegro. The FRY was proclaimed on April 27, 1992, and in May 1992 elections were held for a body to succeed the SFRY s Federal Assembly. The new FRY constitution yugoslavia 721
Nations in Transit 722 created a bicameral Federal Assembly. The upper house is the forty-member Chamber of Republics in which Montenegro and Serbia have equal representation. The republican assemblies elect their respective members to the federal Chamber of Republics. Delegates to the 138-member Chamber of Citizens are elected according to a complex formula in which 108 delegates are assigned to Serbia and thirty to Montenegro. In each case, some delegates are popularly elected (in Serbia, 54; in Montenegro, 24) while the remainder are elected according to constituency majorities. Delegates in both chambers serve four-year terms. Elections for the Federal Assembly were held in November 1996. An alliance composed of the ruling Socijalisticka Partija Srbije (the Socialist Party of Serbia, or SPS), the Jugoslovenska Udruzena Levica (the Yugoslav United Left, or YUL), and Nova Demokratija (New Democracy, or ND) won a plurality of 64 seats in the 138- member Chamber of Citizens. The SPS s sister party in Montenegro, the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore, DPSCG) won an additional 20 seats. The three main opposition parties in the Zajedno (Together) coalition (the Democratic Party, the Serbian Renewal Movement, or SPO, and the Civic Alliance) won 22 seats, while the main right-wing nationalist opposition party, the Srpska Radikalna Stranka (the Serbian Radical Party, or SRS) won 16 seats. The two republics each have popularly-elected, unicameral assemblies, with delegates serving four-year terms. The Serbian Assembly (Skupstina Srbije) has 250 seats. Delegates are elected according to a proportionalrepresentation system, although the Serbian government was in 1999 considering the adoption of a firstpast-the-poll system, which would favor Milosevic s SPS. In the December 1993 elections for the Serbian Skupstina, the SPS won 123 seats; a multiparty opposition movement, the Demokratski Pokret Srbije (the Democratic Movement of Serbia, or DEPOS) won 45; the SRS won 39; the Democratic Party 29; the Democratic Party of Serbia 7; the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians 5; and a Sandzak-Moslem- Kosovo Albanian coalition, the Party of Democratic Action/Democratic Party of Albanians won 2. Two leading opposition parties, Zoran Djindjic s Democratic Party and Vesna Pesic s Civic Alliance, boycotted the latest elections for the Serbian Skupstina in September 1997. Milosevic s ruling left-wing coalition lost its governing majority, gaining only 110 seats. The SRS, on the other hand, significantly increased its share of power, gaining 82 seats. Vuk Draskovic s SPO also improved its standing, winning 45 seats in the Skupstina. Other smaller parties, including one representing Vojvodina Hungarians and another representing Sandzak Muslims, shared the remaining 13 seats. Serbian politics took a turn to the nationalist right in March 1998, when the SRS president, Vojislav Seselj, was named deputy prime minister in the new Serbian government. In January 1999, what could loosely be called a government of national unity was formed when Vuk Draskovic joined the federal government as a deputy prime minister. Four of his fellow SPO members were also given ministerial positions. Draskovic s tenure in government was cut short, however, when he was purged in April 1999 after criticizing Milosevic s policies during the NATO intervention in the Kosovo conflict. In the November 1996 elections for the 71-seat Montenegrin Assembly (Skupstina Crne Gore), the ruling DPSCG won 45 seats; the Liberal Alliance 19; the Party of Democratic Action 3; the Democratic Alliance of Montenegro, 2; and the Democratic Union of Albanians 2. In 1997, the DPSCG split into two factions, one supporting the pro-milosevic Montenegrin president, Momir Bulatovic, and the other supporting Milo Djukanovic, another leading DPSCG member who favored greater autonomy for Montenegro within the Yugoslav federation. In the most recent elections to the Montenegrin Parliament, held in May 1998, the Djukanovic-led coalition Za Bolji Zivot ( For a Better Life ) won 42 seats, Bulatovic s Socialist People s Party of Montenegro won 29 seats, the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro, 5, and the Democratic Union of Albanians, 1 seat. In contrast to elections held in Serbia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereafter, the OSCE), has deemed elections held in Montenegro to be free and fair. The Kosovo Albanian population consistently boycotted Serbian and Yugoslav elections from 1989 on. In 1990, Serbian authorities had promulgated a new republican constitution that rescinded the broad autonomy Serbia s two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, had enjoyed since 1974. Albanian delegates in the Kosovo Assembly responded by declaring Kosovo a constituent republic in Yugoslavia (but independent
of Serbia), to which Serbian authorities responded by dissolving the Kosovo Assembly. In May 1992, Kosovo Albanians held elections for a new assembly, and elected Ibrahim Rugova president of the self-declared Republic of Kosovo. Serbian authorities immediately declared the elections illegal. However, the Kosovo Albanian s state remained unrecognized by the international community. On March 22, 1998, Kosovo Albanians again held elections for their self-declared parliament and presidency. Despite a boycott of the elections by several smaller Albanian parties, Rugova was again overwhelmingly elected president. 2. When did presidential elections occur? Were they free and fair? The Federal Assembly elects the Yugoslav president, who must obtain the approval of both Montenegrin and Serbian delegates. The Yugoslav president, in turn, nominates the federal prime minister. According to the FRY constitution, the federal president and the federal prime minister cannot be from the same republic, and the federal president is limited to only one fouryear term. The first FRY president was Dobrica Cosic, a well-known Serbian writer and dissident during the Titoist period. In June 1993 Cosic was ousted by Milosevic and replaced by Zoran Lilic, a Milosevic protégé with no independent authority. Since Milosevic himself was constitutionally prohibited from serving a third consecutive term as Serbian president, he took over Lilic s position as Yugoslav president in July 1997. At the same time, Milosevic s party also proposed constitutional changes so that the Yugoslav president would henceforth be popularly elected. This was widely seen as a precautionary move, given Milosevic s increasing unpopularity in Montenegro. According to the FRY Constitution, the Yugoslav presidency is a largely ceremonial post. In reality, however, Milosevic s control over the SPS and various state security organs makes him by far the most powerful man in the country. The president of Serbia is popularly elected. Slobodan Milosevic won the first multi-party elections in December 1990, and was re-elected in December 1992. In 1997, the SPS nominated Zoran Lilic (see above) as its candidate for the Serbian presidency. After failing to win in the first two rounds in September and October, Lilic was replaced by Milan Milutinovic as the SPS candidate. The primary opponent to both Lilic and Milutinovic was the SRS leader, Vojislav Seselj. In a fourth round of elections in December 1997, Milutinovic beat Seselj amidst widespread rumors of ballot stuffing to assure a 50 percent turnout. Little complaint was heard from the international community, however, because Milutinovic was felt to be an infinitely more acceptable figure than the more nationalist Seselj. The President of Montenegro is also popularly elected. Milo Djukanovic, the former Montenegrin Prime Minister who broke with Milosevic and his Montenegrin loyalists during the Serbian opposition protests in the winter of 96/97, was elected president of Montenegro in multi-party elections in October 1997. Djukanovic s victory was disputed by his opponent and predecessor as president of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic, who accused the Djukanovic camp of widespread vote fraud. Despite rumors that Bulatovic was planning a coup and that Milosevic wanted to impose a state of emergency in Montenegro, strong international support for Djukanovic helped keep him in office, and the confrontation between Djukanovic and Milosevic, and between Montenegro and Serbia, continued. None of the elections held in Yugoslavia over the past several years, whether at the national, republican, or municipal levels, can be considered to have been free and fair. Regarding the several rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia in the latter half of 1997, for instance, an OSCE report noted that the overall election process in the Republic of Serbia is fundamentally flawed, and the US State Department has claimed that in practice citizens cannot exercise the right to change their government. Opposition parties are routinely denied access to state-owned media (see below), and the Milosevic regime manipulates the electoral process in numerous ways. 3. Is the electoral system multiparty-based? Are there at least two viable political parties functioning at all levels of government? Yugoslavia s system is multi-party based. The FRY Constitution guarantees citizens freedom of political association (Article 41). At the federal Yugoslav, republican, and municipal levels several parties compete in elections and participate in government. The actual power and influence of the various parties varies significantly. The SPS, for instance, by virtue of yugoslavia 723
Nations in Transit 724 its control over the state security forces, the most important mass media, and the most important segments of the economy, has a disproportionate share of power at all levels of government. Nevertheless, over the course of the past few years, the SPS has lost its exclusive control of government institutions, and has been increasingly forced to form coalitions with opposition parties. 4. How many parties have been legalized? Have any parties been banned or declared illegal? As of 1995, there were approximately 200 parties functioning at the federal and republican levels. Many of these, however, were small parties with little or no infrastructure or coherent political platform. Article 42 of the FRY constitution forbids any political parties/organizations that advocate the violent overthrow of the constitutional order. In the fall of 1997, Serbian officials prevented a party representing Muslims in the Sandzak, Sandzak-Dr. Lasim Ljajic, from forming an electoral coalition with the Kosovobased Democratic Reform Party of Muslims. 5. What proportion of the population belongs to political parties? What proportion of party membership is made up of women? Exact figures on political party membership are difficult to come by because many parties are reluctant to release such data. Within Serbia itself, if one excludes the Kosovo Albanian population (which has been boycotting elections since 1990), and Hungarians in Vojvodina (who vote for their own ethnically based parties), the Serbian electorate can be divided into four segments. The first consists of those who abstain from voting altogether. The second consists of SPS/YUL voters. The third consists of SRS supporters. The fourth segment votes for the rest of the opposition parties, such as the SPO, the DS, the GSS, etc. The SPS claims a membership of approximately 600,000, making it by far the largest political party in Yugoslavia. Nova Demokratija claims to have 40,000 members. Official membership figures, however, do not generally reflect a party s overall level of popular support. Such information is better determined by analyzing voting results since 1990. Public support for Milosevic s SPS, for instance, has declined considerably over the past eight years; in the 1990 elections, the SPS gained over 2,300,000 votes, while in the 1997 elections, this number fell to 1,200,000. Vuk Draskovic s SPO has consistently won between 700,000 and one million votes over the past eight years. Support for Vojislav Seselj s SRS also fluctuates considerably; in the elections between 1990 and 1997 the SRS gained anywhere between 600,000 and 1,038,000. Reliable figures for Montenegrin political parties are also difficult to obtain. Of Montenegro s approximately 450,000 registered voters, however, it is generally assumed that most Montenegrins who identify themselves more as Serbs, or favor close ties with Serbia, vote for Momir Bulatovic s wing of the DPS- CG. Milo Djukanovic s recent electoral successes, on the other hand, are due to the votes his faction of the DPS-CG has received from Albanians, Croats, and Muslims in Montenegro, along with that segment of the Orthodox population that has traditionally favored Montenegrin independence. No information is available for the percentage of women registered in political parties. Legally, there are no restrictions on women s participation in politics, and women are active in political organizations; nevertheless, they are underrepresented in party and governmental offices, holding by one estimate less than 10 percent of the ministerial level positions in the Serbian and Federal governments. 6. What has been the trend of voter turnout at the municipal, provincial, and national levels in recent years? What are the data related to female voter participation? Voter turnout throughout the former Yugoslavia was traditionally high. In the 1990 elections, well over 70 percent of the eligible electorate turned out. In more recent elections there have been signs of voter fatigue. Due to the boycott of the September 1997 Serbian elections, for instance, many observers questioned the Republican Electoral Commission s claim that 62 percent of the electorate had turned out. In subsequent runoff elections for the Serbian presidency voter turnout hovered at or below the 50 percent level. In the October 1997 presidential elections in Montenegro, voter turnout was approximately 73 percent. Information regarding female voter turnout is unavailable.
CIVIL SOCIETY 5.25/7 1. How many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have come into existence since 1988? What is the number of charitable/nonprofit organizations? Are there locally led efforts to increase philanthropy and volunteerism? What proportion of the population is active in private voluntary activity (from polling data)? What are some of the major women s nongovernmental organizations and what is the size of their membership? Hundreds of organizations have been formed since 1988, although the exact number and the size of their memberships are difficult to determine. NGOs in the FRY are still officially registered as social organizations or associations of citizens in accord with the terms used during the socialist period. According to the Federal Statistics Office, in 1994 there were 18,937 registered social organizations and 1,349 registered associations of citizens. All of these, however, had originated during the socialist period. Since 1991, observers believe another 500 have been formed, the most numerous being ecological and humanitarian organizations, followed by human rights oriented NGOs. In 1991, a very vocal Belgrade-based Center for Anti- War Action emerged, and a Humanitarian Law Center was also founded. There are also Helsinki Committees active in Belgrade, Pristina, and the Sandzak. The Helsinki Committees in Belgrade and Pristina often collaborate in monitoring the human rights situation in Kosovo. The Serbian Orthodox Church is active in providing charitable assistance to refugees and the poor. In Kosovo, a predominantly-serbian organization of citizens known as the Serb Resistance Movement has organized to protest the Milosevic regime s policies in that province. The Students Club in Belgrade and the Independent Union of Students in Kosovo have also played prominent roles over the past several years. Several environmental and women s rights groups are also active; among the latter, some prominent ones are the Belgrade-based Women in Black, Krajina and Tara, Tera, Woman (an association of single mothers), and the Pristina-based League of Albanian Women and Mikya. An interesting development in early 1999 was the rise of so-called Citizens Parliaments in various parts of Serbia. The organizational center of this movement was in the town of Cacak. Spokespersons for the Citizens Parliaments claimed that their primary goal was the protection of civil rights, but their spontaneous emergence was in part a reaction to what was widely perceived to be an ineffectual, discredited opposition. Most of these movements, in fact, intentionally avoided developing ties with existing opposition parties. 2. What is the legal and regulatory environment for NGOs (i.e. ease of registration, legal rights, government regulation, taxation, procurement, and access-to-information issues)? To what extent is NGO activism focused on improving the legal and regulatory environment? Although legal provisions for registering NGOs are relatively liberal at the Federal level, politically active NGOs often have to confront various forms of governmental harassment. By virtue of being able to cause problems for businesses, the government can discourage corporate/business support for the NGO community. Humanitarian assistance is tax exempt, according to current tax laws, only if it is distributed through the Red Cross or the Office of the Serbian Refugee Commissioner. Revenue used to support programs and core administrative costs are not subject to taxation. Laws on citizen s associations at the republican and Federal levels have not been brought into conformity with the republican and Federal constitutions, and there is no legal framework for international NGOs; consequently, all find themselves in various forms of legal limbo. The operating environment for NGOs in Yugoslavia fluctuates according to the international situation. In 1997, there was a mild improvement in the position of NGOs in Serbia proper, as some observers noted that the Milosevic regime allowed more foreigners affiliated with international NGOs to enter the country. International monitoring groups claimed that in general, they were free to conduct their activities. On the other hand, domestic NGOs have charged that the government was illegally obstructing their activities. For instance, a Belgrade-based NGO which monitors elections (CeSID, the Center for Free Elections and Democracy) in November 1997 claimed that the government had denied them the right to monitor the presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia in September. In subsequent legal proceedings initiated by CeSID, the Serbian Supreme Court upheld the government s refusal to allow CeSID a role in elections monitoring. International NGOs have also re- yugoslavia 725
Nations in Transit 726 ported unacceptably long delays in getting visas for their personnel. In Montenegro, the government has promoted more open and liberal policies towards NGOs. 3. What is the organizational capacity of NGOs? Do management structures clearly delineate authority and responsibility? Is information available on NGO management issues in the native language? Is there a core of experienced practitioners/trainers to serve as consultants or mentors to less developed organizations? Despite the large number of NGOs and citizens association that are on the books, only about a dozen Belgrade-based NGOs have well-defined missions, established reputations, loyal donors, and defined sets of activities. This core group consist primarily of human rights, anti-war, and women s NGOs. However, a new generation of NGOs has grown up in cities outside of Belgrade. An NGO support center, the Belgradebased Center for the Development of the Not-for-Profit Sector, provides some legal assistance to NGOs, consultation services, and issues a directory of NGOs in the country. There is also a local cadre of activists who can teach NGO management skills. Nevertheless, observers believe that more specialized training is needed for activists and members in NGO management, budgeting, fundraising, etc. New NGOs also frequently lack office space and equipment (e.g., telephones, fax machines, computers, e-mail and internet access, etc.). The availability of volunteers is not fully exploited. 4. Are NGOs financially viable? What is their tax status? Are they obliged to and do they typically disclose revenue sources? Do government procurement opportunities exist for private, not-for-profit providers of services? Are NGOs able to earn income or collect cost-recovery fees? Most NGOs operate on shoestring budgets, and make do from grant to grant. Most NGOs depend upon volunteer support. Activists generally lack fundraising skills. The depressed state of the Yugoslav economy means that most NGOs will remain dependent on the international donor community for some time to come. Some NGOs receive in-kind support (e.g., the use of office space) from reform-minded municipal authorities in cities and towns run by the opposition. Another way for NGOs to raise funds is by charging for services and engaging in other revenue-raising activities. 5. Are there free trade unions? How many workers and what proportion of the workforce belong to these unions? Is the number of workers belonging to trade unions growing or decreasing? What is the numerical/proportional membership of farmers groups, small business associations, etc.? Article 41 of the FRY constitution guarantees workers the right to form free trade unions. All workers except military and police personnel are entitled to join or form unions. Out of a total estimated labor force of 2.3 million, the government controlled Alliance of Independent Labor Unions has an estimated membership of 1,000,000. The independent United Branch of Independent Labor Unions has about 170,000 members. Other unions are smaller and more sector-specific; for instance, the Union of Bank Employees claims some 12,000 members. Numerous smaller unions representing transportation workers, educational employees, journalists, retirees, etc., are very active, at least judging by their proclivity to strike. The independent unions, however, still have not reached the critical mass needed to organize successful, countrywide general strikes. Independent unions suffer from regime attempts to suppress their activities; for instance, unions are often prohibited from busing their members to strikes or demonstrations held in different parts of the country. 6. What forms of interest group participation in politics are legal? What types of interest groups are active in the political and policy process? Articles 39 and 41 of the FRY constitution grant citizens the freedom to form political parties and organizations, and freedom of assembly. There are numerous organized interest groups in the country, representing ethnic constituencies (e.g., especially prominent are those representing Albanians, Hungarians, Muslims, and Roma (Gypsies), business interests, such as the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce and Industry, women s rights groups, etc. 7. How is the not-for-profit/ngo sector perceived by the public and government officials? What is the nature of media coverage of NGOs? To what extent do government officials engage with NGOs? Is the government receptive to NGO policy advocacy?
Government officials associated with the ruling regime generally view NGOs (especially those with international connections) in suspect terms. Often they are accused of being traitors or foreign mercenaries. NGOs also suffer from the fact that they are not a traditional form of social activism in these regions; consequently, the local population often views them as mercenaries working for foreign interests. Moreover, there is in general a certain ignorance about what functions NGOs are supposed to perform in society. NGOs are usually viewed more favorably in towns and cities where the opposition has come to power. Independent/alternative media treat NGOs in more favorable terms, although the NGO community itself has frequently failed to understand the need of publicizing its activities through the local press. Federal and republic-level organs of government are generally perceived to be uninterested and unresponsive to NGO policy advocacy. Little contact takes place between NGOs and government bodies. There have also been reports of a certain amount of self-censorship on the part of NGOs for fear of governmental reprisals. INDEPENDENT MEDIA 5.75/7 1. Are there legal protections for press freedom? Articles 36 and 38 of the FRY Constitution guarantee freedom of the press and prohibit censorship, with one stipulation: press/media outlets enjoy these freedoms only if they are registered with the government. In practice independent/alternative media have frequently been subjected to numerous forms of legalistic/bureaucratic harassment. By 1998/99, as opposition to the Milosevic regime grew, this turned into outright persecution. A new media law presented in February 1998 on the allocation of frequencies for TV and radio stations, for instance, drew considerable criticism from the independent media because of its ambiguity. The new regulation imposed undisclosed fees for the allocation of frequencies, leaving officials free to price independent media houses out of business. Another feature of the new regulation warned that applications for a frequency would not be processed if technical details (for instance, how far the signal of a certain transmitter will carry) in the application were incorrect. Since the methodologies for testing such things varies, this left considerable scope for arbitrary determinations that an application was technically incorrect. In October 1998, with the threat of NATO bombardment imminent, the Serbian government passed a decree on media conduct in a situation of immediate war danger, which enabled it to close or impose punitive measures against any media of its choice. The decree resulted in the closure of several independent papers, including Danas, DnevniTelegraf, Evropljanin, and Nasa Borba. After the immediate crisis passed, many of the measures were adopted as permanent legislation. When the NATO bombing campaign began on March 24, 1999, a new set of decrees were passed which established a system of wartime censorship. Media houses were provided with suggested language for describing NATO, the KLA, etc., and journalists were prohibited from reporting on military or civilian casualties. In April, the publisher of Dnevni Telegraf, Slavko Curuvija, was assassinated in Belgrade. His murderers were never found. Many independent journalists were also taken into temporary custody during the war. In a very controversial act, Yugoslav media also came under attack from a different source NATO itself, when cruise missiles destroyed the building housing Radio-Televizija Srbije (RTS), killing 16 reporters, editors, and technicians. 2. Are there legal penalties for libeling officials? Are there legal penalties for irresponsible journalism? Have these laws been enforced to harass journalists? There are laws on the books against slandering private individuals and government officials, but prior to 1998 the Milosevic regime had rarely used such forms of harassment. The October 1998 decree on the media included provisions allowing media outlets to be fined for publishing items of a personal nature without the consent of the concerned individual. The decree also allowed private individuals or organizations to sue media outlets for being insufficiently patriotic or for disseminating information that does not uphold the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the country. Most often, the legal penalties for such actions have been the imposition of exorbitant fines against the accused, with the intent of destroying their financial viability. yugoslavia 727
Nations in Transit 728 3. What proportion of media is privatized? What are the major private newspapers, television stations, and radio stations? Yugoslavia has a plethora of both electronic and print media outlets. According to one estimate, in 1997 there were 300 privately owned radio stations and 100 privately owned TV stations in Yugoslavia. Belgrade now has 12 daily newspapers. In Yugoslavia as a whole, there are 27 daily newspapers, 171 weeklies or biweeklies, and 188 monthlies. The largest and most influential media in Yugoslavia, however, both electronic and print, are state-owned. The most important TV station is the only governmentowned station RTS, with a signal covering most of the country. RTS s editorial policy is strictly pro-government; during the 1997 electoral campaign, for instance, the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade claimed that all of the opposition parties combined received only one-fourth of the airtime RTS devoted to the ruling SPS-coalition. A primary demand by the opposition since 1990 has been greater access to state-owned media. The most memorable feature of the winter 1996/ 97 opposition protests was the sight of tens of thousands of demonstrators rattling pots and pans and blowing their car horns during the broadcast of RTS s main evening news program. Montenegro and each of the provinces have their own state television services as well. In 1997, after the relationship between Montenegro s state-run television network (TV Crna Gora), and the Milosevic-controlled RTS soured, TV Crna Gora began broadcasting a more objective and open news-information program. Under TV Crna Gora s new editorial leadership, opposition political parties began to receive more coverage, and collaboration with independent news media in Belgrade, such as Radio B-92 or Belgrade s Studio B television station increased. By way of contrast, TV Crna Gora in 1997 stopped rebroadcasting RTS s main nightly news program. Among the most important print media in Montenegro are Vijesti and Monitor. In both Kosovo and Vojvodina, there are RTS broadcasts in Albanian or Magyar, respectively, although the editorial slant is pro-milosevic. Yugoslavia also has numerous print media for ethnic minorities published in their native languages, e.g., Novi Sad s Magyar Szo, a Hungarian-language daily (est. circulation: 26,000), or Pristina s Koha Ditore, an Albanian-language newsmagazine edited by a well-known Albanian activist, Veton Surroi. In 1998, a new Albanian language daily, Koha Sot, began publishing with a circulation of 35,000, with an editorial line pursuing a middle line between the more militant Koha Ditore and the pro- Rugova elements in the Albanian population. The largest print daily in Yugoslavia is the Belgradebased Politika (estimated circulation: 200-300,000), again with a pro-milosevic editorial line. There are a variety of opposition publications, and their popularity has increased in recent years. According to one report, in 1997 the overall circulation of the independent press surpassed that of the state media. The Belgrade-based newsweeklies Vreme and NIN are strongly anti-regime. In recent years, tabloids such as Belgrade s Blic have also gained in popularity. In 1998, however, as part of Milosevic s overall crackdown, a number of print media, such as Nasa Borba, Demokratija, Dnevni Telegraf, and NT Plus were closed, as well as the weekly Evropljanin. Among the most important privately-owned electronic media are Belgrade s B-92 radio station and Studio B independent television station. B-92 has long been noted for its strong anti-war stance, and during the winter 96/97 Belgrade demonstrations actually gained many new listeners as people tuned in to get more objective reporting as to what was going on around the country. B-92 has also organized a network of 24 opposition radio stations throughout Serbia, Vojvodina, and Montenegro. All told, the network s program reaches 70 percent of Serbia s population. After the NATO bombing campaign began in March 1999, one of the regime s first acts was to arrest B-92 s editor-in-chief, Veran Matic. (Matic was subsequently released, although B-92 was forced to operate under strict governmental supervision for the duration of the war.) Over the past several years, Belgrade s Studio B television station provided opposition parties with much more coverage than they could receive on RTS. Studio B s signal, however, only reaches limited parts of Belgrade, and over the past several years the government has repeatedly refused to allow Studio B to obtain a stronger transmitter. Opposition cadres from the Zajedno coalition took charge of Studio B after the results of the 1996 municipal elections were recognized, but in September 1996 squabbling among opposition parties led Vuk Draskovic s SPO to purge the station of Zoran Djindjic s supporters. Opposition figures subsequently claimed the Studio B had become the SPO equivalent of Milosevic s RTS.
The most important privately owned television station is BK Television, owned by three brothers who made their fortune in banking. Although originally close to Milosevic, their television station increasingly began to criticize regime policies, and in March 1997 the state temporarily suspended BK television s broadcasts outside of Belgrade to prevent Serbia s wider population from learning about the extent of the opposition movement. More recently, BK television has again adopted a more pro-regime line. 4. Are the private media financially viable? Only a very few, such as BK Television. Many, such as Vreme and Radio B-92, depend on foreign donations to survive. In March 1997, the Serbian government proposed new draft legislation requiring the various media to disclose any funding they receive from abroad. Another feature of the legislation, prohibiting any radio or television station from broadcasting to more than 25 percent of the population, had to be dropped after the Zajedno coalition threatened to boycott the upcoming elections. 5. Are the media editorially independent? Are the media s news gathering functions affected by interference from government or private owners? State-owned media tow the government/party line. Private and independent media, on the other hand, have completely independent editorial policies. Many newspapers, magazines, and radio stations are vehemently anti-regime. The Milosevic government tolerates this state of affairs because these same media have relatively little impact on public opinion. The limited impact independent media have is mainly the result of two factors. First, given the economic situation, most people simply cannot afford to buy alternative/independent publications. Second, Yugoslavia s rural population relies mainly on state-owned media for information. Nevertheless, on some occasions the regime decides not to take any chances; thus, in the run up to the Serbian elections in the summer of 1997, the Milosevic government temporarily shut down 77 private radio and television stations around the country. 6. Is the distribution system for newspapers privately or governmentally controlled? Newspapers and other print media are disseminated through several well-established distribution chains, most of which are government affiliated, e.g. the Politika publishing house s kiosk chain. In larger cities independent publications are easily obtained, even at stateowned kiosks. The terms under which governmentowned chains distribute independent publications, however, are usually financially unfavorable. The government-owned chains also frequently delay or postpone payment to independent media outlets, which, given the level of inflation, means that newsstand earnings are usually worthless. A common form of government harassment has been to deny independent publications newsprint, or to make the cost of newsprint prohibitively expensive. One consequence of the NATO bombing campaign has been to make it even more difficult for independent media outlets to distribute their publications. Damage to the telecommunications system has made it more difficult to gather news and information, and damage to bridges and roads has made it more difficult to distribute papers. 7. What proportion of the population is connected to the Internet? Are there any restrictions on Internet access to private citizens? Precise figures on the proportion of the population connected to the Internet are not available. There are 4.95 internet hosts per 10,000 people in Yugoslavia. Limited access to the Internet is more the result of a lack of computers than of government restrictions. Although Yugoslav citizens had been in the first wave of Internet users in the early 1990 s, a permanent satellite link to the Internet was only established in February 1996, courtesy of a Norwegian provider. In November 1995, with help from the Soros Foundations, Belgrade s Radio B-92 founded Opennet, which was originally restricted only to Serbia s academic network. According to one estimate, one Yugoslav citizen in one thousand is a regular Internet user. Early in 1998, Yugoslavia s largest Internet services provider, EUNET, signed up its 20,000 th subscriber. Many individuals have access to the Internet through academic and governmental institutions, or through various business enterprises; according to some informal estimates, the total figure stands at approximately 300,000 people. Belgrade also has Cyber Cafés where people can stop by and log on. The Internet quickly became an important battleground between the Milosevic regime and Serbian civil yugoslavia 729
Nations in Transit 730 society. In November 1996, after widespread protests erupted throughout Serbia to protest the Milosevic government s annulment of municipal election results, Radio B-92 began to broadcast reports on the protests via the Internet. The regime then tried to jam B-92 s radio signals, to which B-92 responded by using a computer program called RealAudio (which carries sound through the Internet) to relay its radio programs, allowing Internet users both in and outside of Yugoslavia to listen to B-92 s programs. The US manufacturer of RealAudio subsequently donated more powerful equipment, which allowed more than 500 people to listen to the Internet broadcasts simultaneously. Rumors (which were impossible to confirm) circulated at the time that the regime had pressured Internet service providers into disconnecting Serbia from the World Wide Web. The cyber war between the Milosevic regime and Radio B-92 heated up again in October 1998, after Serbia s new media legislation was passed. The Serbian government placed a filter on web browsers at the University of Belgrade, which blocked B- 92 s site, and similar ones. B-92 responded by asking contacts outside of Yugoslavia to copy their website and then distribute B-92 s reports by email. On December 28, 1998, the regime again had to admit defeat and removed the filter. During the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, B-92 s website was shut down. In Kosovo, the Albanian-language daily newspaper Koha Ditore established Kosovo s first email system Zananet, in 1994, as part of the ZaMir network. By March of 1999, there were four Internet service providers in Kosovo: Pronet (owned and managed by Albanians), Eunet, Co.yu, and the PTT. Prior to the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, Pronet s staff frequently had to hide its equipment from police raids. Pronet was estimated to be serving several hundred users. Radio 21, and independent Albanian radio station based in Pristina, also managed to broadcast its reports via the Web. In the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, Anonymizer.com, an Internet gateway which has an anonymous email service, created the Kosovo Privacy Project, which offered anyone in Yugoslavia a dedicated gateway through which they could send their email, without any possibility of being monitored by, for instance, Milosevic s security forces. 8. What are the major press and journalists associations? What proportion of their membership is made up of women? Among the more important professional journalistic organizations in Yugoslavia are the Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM); LOCAL PRESS, an organization of independent local magazines in Serbia; and NUNS (National Union of Independent Journalists). Information on the proportion of women in their membership is not available. 9. What has been the trend in press freedom as measured by Freedom House s Survey of Press Freedom? Freedom House s annual Survey of Press Freedom rated Yugoslavia Not Free from 1991 through 1999. GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 5.50/7 1. Is the legislature the effective rule-making institution? The trend in recent years, and especially in 1997, has been for the SPS party leadership, and especially Milosevic himself, to determine the outlines of policy, which the SPS-dominated Federal Assembly then rubberstamps. In 1997, the Federal Assembly convened only one time, and one report charged that decisions are taken at one power center and then take the shape of decrees, written or oral instructions, many of which are not even published. This state of affairs has become more pronounced as the Milosevic regime has slowly lost its exclusive monopoly on state institutions and has had to allow opposition forces into government institutions. In Montenegro, for instance, the reformist victory in October 1997 forced Milosevic loyalists out of office. In Serbia, the opposition parties victory in the November 1996 municipal elections gave them a toehold on power at local levels, and the September 1997 Serbian parliamentary elections gave non-sps parties a majority in the Serbian Skupstina. 2. Is substantial power decentralized to subnational levels of government? What specific authority do subnational levels have?
According to the FRY constitution, the republics enjoy considerable autonomy, and the right to local selfgovernment is guaranteed (Article 6). In practice, however, while Milosevic s Montenegrin protégé, Momir Bulatovic, was president in Serbia s federal partner, most decision-making was centralized. After October 1997, the Djukanovic leadership began to reassert its authority and standing as an equal partner in the federation. Within the republics, there is a high degree of centralization; for instance, the republican education ministries design school curricula, textbooks, etc., which then have to be implemented throughout the republic. Similarly, prices for various utilities are determined at the republic level, not at the municipality level. Most importantly, the police forces in both republics are highly centralized. Most political parties are highly centralized as well, largely because of the fact that the support they garner is more a function of their leader s charisma than the party s political program per se. 3. Are subnational officials chosen in free and fair elections? Subnational officials are not chosen in free and fair elections. As noted above, the ruling party has numerous ways to influence the outcome of elections. For instance, the OSCE s special representative for Yugoslavia, Felipe Gonzales, noted in his December 1996 report after a fact-finding trip to Yugoslavia the existence of deficiencies (of a structural nature) in the electoral system that make it possible to falsify or circumvent the sovereign will of the citizens. Similarly, a recent analysis of the human rights situation in Yugoslavia noted that in practice, citizens cannot exercise their right to change their government. Since the first multi-party elections in 1990 at the beginning of the post-communist era, opposition parties have consistently charged the regime with committing outright vote fraud. The most notorious case of vote fraud came after the November 1996 municipal elections in Serbia. Opposition parties won power in most of Serbia s largest urban areas, including Belgrade, Nis, and Kragujevac. The Milosevic regime, however, refused to acknowledge defeat and declared the elections invalid. Wide-scale, massive protests then erupted throughout Serbia, developing into a three-month long protest movement, with nightly marches and demonstrations by opposition parties. In February 1997, under severe international pressure, Milosevic was forced to back down, and a lex specialis (i.e., a special law ) was passed in the Serbian Skupstina accepting the opposition parties victory (the constitutionality of the law itself, however, was questioned by most observers). 4. Do the executive and legislative bodies operate openly and with transparency? Is draft legislation easily accessible to the media and the public? Sessions of the Federal Yugoslav Assembly, or the Serbian or Montenegrin Skupstina s are frequently televised or otherwise covered by the press; however, much of the actual decision making takes place behind closed doors. Milosevic s SPS often tries to act unilaterally. For a recent appearance of Yugoslav delegates before the European Parliament, for instance, the SPS tried to send its own cadres, with their own platform, without including opposition members or Montenegrin officials. 5. Do municipal governments have sufficient revenues to carry out their duties? Do municipal governments have control of their own local budgets? Do they raise revenues autonomously or from the central state budget? Although municipal governments do raise some revenues autonomously (e.g., turnover taxes from the sale of property, issuing various types of personal identification, the sale of vehicle license plates, setting prices of public transportation, etc.), most rely on supplemental funding from the central government. One World Bank specialist on Yugoslavia noted, It is hard even to say what local government is when all of the money goes to the central government. After losing the 1996 municipal elections in several Serbian cities, Milosevic s SPS cadres essentially emptied municipal coffers before the opposition could take power. The Milosevic regime then resorted to punishing municipalities that had voted for the opposition by denying them funds from the republican budget. Central authorities have also begun a campaign to reduce local competencies; for instance, municipal government s recently lost the right to grant foreign companies concessions for communal utility services. 6. Do the elected local leaders and local civil servants know how to manage municipal governments effectively? yugoslavia 731