.t ON cro G IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA Joy., P, SC NO:SC14-2065 STEVE LYNCH, Sy Petitioner, 477 DCA CASE NO: 3D1-61 Vs. L.T. CASE NO: 01-368-C HON. PAM BONDI-ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF FLORIDA, et al Respondents. ON REVIEW FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA PETITIONER' S JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF Steven Lee Lynch DC# N10704 Cross City Correctional Inst. 568 N.E. 255'ª Street Cross City, Florida 32628
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Table of Citations... i Statement of the Case and Facts... 1 Summary of the Argument... 6 ARGUMENT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE ALL WRITS NECESSARY TO THE COMPLETE EXERCISE OF ITS JURISDICTION, TO PREVENT THE THREAT POSED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT' S INTERFERING WITH THE SUPREME COURT' S EXISTING OR FUTURE JURISDICTION ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES THROUGH THE RULES OF COURT...................... 7 Conclusion... 15 Certificate of Service... 16 Certificate of Compliance... 17 11
TABLE OF CITATIONS CASES State v. Robinson, 873 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 2004) ----------------- 19 Florida Senate v. Graham, 412 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1982) ------------ 5 Thomas v. State, 716 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ------------- 19 United Services Auto Asn. v. Goodman, 826 So.2d 914 (Fla. 2002) -5 Williams v. State, 913 So.2d 541, 543-544 (Fla. 2005 ----------- 1 STATUTES 775.21 Florida Statutes -------------------------------------- 12 775.21(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2001) ----------------------- 3,7 775.21(5)(a)1. Florida Statutes (2001) ------------------------ 6 794.011 Florida Statutes (2001) ------------------------------- 2 RULES Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(c). --------------------------------------- 13 Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(3)------------------------------------5 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Art. III, Section 6, of the Florida Constitution --------------- 5 Art. V, Section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution. ---------- 1,S,8 Art. V, Section 3(b)(7) of the Florida Constitution -----------5 Art. V, Section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution.-------------8 111
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS The Second Judicial Circuit Court [Case No: 01-368-CFA], Wakulla County, Florida, impermissibly enacted rules of procedure governing the initiation of designating an offender a Sexual Predator, contrary to the laws established by the implementation of Statutes by the Florida Legislature's authority to implement laws provided by Art. III, Section 6, of the Florida Constitution, and Rules of Criminal Procedure, implemented by the Florida Supreme Court's rulemaking authority provided by Art. V, Section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution. The First District Court of Appeals [1D13-461], per curiam affirmed on April 14, 2014, rehearing denied May 20, 2014, (no citation) the actions of the trial court, even though the lower court was without jurisdiction to entertain the State's motion because it was not presented in accordance with Florida laws, so as to provide the lower court with subject-matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner timely filed an all writs SC14-1296, which was dismissed on October 2, 2014 for lack of independent jurisdiction (Williams v. State, 913 So.2d 541, 543-544 (Fla. 2005), whereby this petition for All Writs follows with the appropriate jurisdiction invoked. The petitioner, Steven Lee Lynch Sr., was charged with a single (one) count information with Sexual Battery on a Child (M. B. H. ) over twelve (12) years of age 'but less than eighteen 1
(18) years of age, by one in familiar or custodial authority, in violation of Florida Statutes 794.011 (2001), and filed on the 15th day of January, 2002. On April 10, 2002, the petitioner entered an open plea of nolo contendere, the trial court accepted the plea, and sentencing was set for July 11, 2002. For whatever reason, sentencing was delayed until August 13, 2002, at which time the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty (20) years in the Department of Corrections, followed by ten (10) years of Sexual Offender probation. Without any prior notice, on May 20th, 2008, the State filed a notice to have the petitioner declared a "Sexual Predator." For whatever reason, the State had never moved the trial court to have the petitioner declared as a Sexual "Offender" or "Predator" prior to any plea agreement or sentencing, nor did the trial court ever sentenced the petitioner as a Sexual Predator at the Sentencing Hearing held August 13 h, 2002; although the probation portion of the sentence is to be sex "offender" probation. It was not until around May 22"d, 2008, almost six (6) years later when the State filed some papers seeking to have Mr. Lynch (petitioner) declared to be a Sexual Predator.1 l The State filed the action 5 months [May 22, 2006], prior to the actual letter from the Department of Corrections 2
What's more, the court declared the petitioner to be a sexual predator, by Order of the Court, on July 28th, 2008, without any hearing and without any of the due process rights of any argument (s) or any available appeal (s) of such an Order. The State Prosecutor, Ms. Bueno, conceded that what had happened was, at the time of sentencing that no request had been made by the State Attorney's Office, for whatever reason. The failure to advise the court that the action commenced on May 22, 2008 without the prerequisite 775.22(5)(c), letter, erroneously permitted the trial court to improvidently exercise jurisdiction over the case without actual jurisdiction. The State Attorney admitted the letter (dated October 13, 2008) was used to initiate the action. The action was started by the State Attorney's Office on May 22, 2008, 5 months before she (state attorney) acknowledges the Department of Corrections sent a letter. Primarily, the fact that prosecution began the proceedings almost 5 months (May 2008) before the alleged letter was sent from the Florida Department of Corrections, therefore, the State was without jurisdiction during the entire initiation of the proceedings. Classification Officer requesting designation action [October 13 ª, 20081, ergo, the State filed without the prerequisite. 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT In this case, the Second Circuit Court violated the rules, laws, and procedures by: (1) not modifying Mr. Lynch's sentencing within the time limits prescribed under the law; (2) by exercising jurisdiction over the case before the court obtains proper jurisdiction by a state agency's (DOC) letter advising of the failure to make a designation; and (3) by assuming jurisdiction over the matter without first ascertaining subject-matter jurisdiction in accordance with the Statute used by the State Attorney to petition the court to designate the petitioner as a Sexual Predator. The jurisdiction of a court is a matter of law and rule, and the circuit court erred in assuming jurisdiction without a proper finding of authority. The First District Court of Appeals erred in failing to address in encroachment by the circuit court into an issue of jurisdiction which was not in accordance with the constitutional provisions of Article V, section 5, nor the Rules of Court following the procedures for a hearing. ARGUMENT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE ALL WRITS NECESSARY TO THE COMPLETE EXERCISE OF ITS JURISDICTION, TO PREVENT THE THREAT POSED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT'S INTERFERING WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S EXISTING OR FUTURE JURISDICTION ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES THROUGH THE RULES OF COURT. 4
The Second Judicial Circuit Court [Case No: 01-368-CFA], Wakulla County, Florida, impermissibly enacted rules of procedure governing the initiation of designating an offender a Sexual Predator, contrary to the laws established by the implementation of Statutes by the Florida Legislature's authority to implement laws provided by Art. III, Section 6, of the Florida Constitution, and Rules of Criminal Procedure, implemented by the Florida Supreme Court' s rulemaking authority provided by Art. V, Section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution. This cause stemmed from the State's sua sponte motion to declare the defendant to be a sexual predator, filed by the State Attorney's Office on May 22nd, 2008, and the trial court's Order Declaring The Defendant To Be A Sexual Predator (entered July 24", 2008) without any hearing. This court has jurisdiction to issue all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. Art. V, 3 (b) (7) Fla. Const., Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(3). Florida Senate v. Graham, 412 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1982). The extraordinary intervention by the court is necessary to prevent the threat posed by the lower courts in interfering with the Supreme Court's existing or future jurisdiction establishing procedures through the Rules of Court. In United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Goodman, 826 So.2d 914 (Fla. 2002) (the Supreme Court exercised its all writs jurisdiction to prohibit a trial judge from employing procedures 5
that "encroach on [the] court's ultimate jurisdiction to adopt rules for the courts.") The conflicts that have arose in this case began when the State never sought to have Mr. Lynch declared or sentenced as a Sexual Predator at the time of original sentencing in accordance with the terms of the agreement, and the trial court, thus, never found or sentenced Mr. Lynch as a Sexual Predator. Florida law mandates that: An of f ender who meets the sexual predator criteria described in paragraph (4)(a) who is before the court for sentencing for a current offense committed on or after October 1, 1993, is a sexual predator, and the court must make a written finding at the time of sentencing that the offender is a sexual predator... 775.21(5) (a)1. Fla. Stat. (2000). (emphasis added). First of all, it was an agreement between the, then state attorney and the defendant, that there would be no sexual predator designation sought by the State as part of, and in order to accomplish, the plea agreement in this case. So, when Ms. Bueno, the new Assistant State Attorney, told the court at the November 7th, 2012, Evidentiary Hearing, that "I think what happened was, at the time of sentencing, the request was not made by the State Attorney's Office, for what ever reason". (Record on Appeal, pg. 82), Ms. Bueno was either (2) completely unaware of the fact (s) and reasoning (s) for the contractual agreement (s) between the, then, State Attorney and the 6
defendant, or was aware of the reasoning but chose to, for whatever reason, not maintain and/or honor the State Attorney Office's previous contract. The only statutory authority which would allow the State Attorney to invoke the trial court' s jurisdiction to change and/or alter a previously entered sentencing, in order to have a criminal defendant designated as a sexual predator, is Florida Statues, Section 775.21(5)(c), which provides in pertinent part: (5) (c) If the Department of Corrections, The Department of Law Enforcement, or any other law enforcement agency obtains information which indicates that an offender meets the sexual predator criteria but the court did not make a written finding that the offender is a sexual predator as required in paragraph (a), the Department of Corrections, the Department, or the law enforcement agency shall notify the State Attorney who prosecuted the offense for the offender described in sub-paragraph (a) (1), or the State Attorney of the county where the offender establishes or maintains a residence...the State Attorney shall bring the matter to the court's attention in order to establish that the offender meets the sexual predator criteria. In the present case, the exercise of authority by the State Attorney was improper and untimely. First, the State Attorney admits that the petition to designate the petitioner as a sexual predator was not done at the initial sentencing. There was a valid reason behind this decision. It was not oversight, but part and parcel to the plea agreement between the then State Attorney and the petitioner. 7
The Supreme Court's authority to establish rules for court procedure is a matter of constitutional standing, and is provided by Article V, Section 2 of the Florida Const. (1980), and the circuit court erroneously assumed jurisdiction contrary to the statutory authority of 775.21(5)(c), which had prerequisite requirements, primarily, waiting until the action was initiated by the Department of Corrections. The State Attorney did not even possess the requisite letter from the Department of Corrections at the time of initiating the proceedings, therefore, the error of the court is manifestly apparent, and results in the circuit court usurping the Supreme Court's authority to regulate when circuit courts exercise jurisdiction over subject-matter, based on the provisions of authority possessed by Article V, Section 5 (b), whereby the circuit courts authority is suppose to be uniform throughout the state. As the Florida Supreme Court has the sole authority to establish rules for the courts of the State, the Florida Constitution provides jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to regulate the actions of the courts to ensure uniform compliance with the established laws of the state, therefore, this Honorable Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to address the departure from the constitutional requirement of 8
uniformity by the courts, and review the actions of the Second Circuit Court in this case. Florida Supreme Court has expressly addressed the fact(s) that a criminal defendant has standing to challenge a lower court's Order. See: State v. Robinson, 873 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 2004) citing Thomas v. State, 716 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (An Order designating a defendant a sexual predator was entered after the defendant had been convicted and sentenced and is therefore appealable). It should also create concerns with whether Mr. Lynch should be allowed to withdraw his plea. The petitioner was never informed, at any time, prior to taking his plea that a different Assistant State Attorney could alter the contract between Mr. Lynch and the State, in which the State at the time, did not want or seek any sexual designations, due to, and based upon, the facts in the case. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the lower tribunal never had jurisdictional authority to accept any motion submitted on behalf of the State without determining the court's own jurisdiction to hear the matter. WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays this Honorable Court exercise its jurisdiction, and issue an Order to the lower court 9
to have the original plea contract to be upheld and the sexual predator designation to be removed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Initial Brief of Jurisdiction, with Appendix, has been placed into the hands of institutional authorities, Ms. Davis, for mailing via U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, to: Attorney General, The Capital, PL-01, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050, on this Q ay of December, 2014. Steven Ly Petitioner pro se N10704 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I Hereby Certify that this computer-generated brief is prepared in Courier 12-point font and complies with the requirements of Fla. R. App. P. 9.210 (2). Steven Lynck DC # N10704 Cross City Correctional Inst. 568 N.E. 255th Street Cross City, Florida 32628 10
APPENDIX
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA STEVEN L. LYNCH, Appellant, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED v. CASE NO. 1D13-461 STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. Opinion filed April 14, 2014. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Wakulla County. Charles W. Dodson, Judge. Steven L. Lynch, pro se. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Meredith Clark Hinshelwood, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. CLARK, MAKAR, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT 2000 Drayton Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Telephone No. (850)488-6151 May 20, 2014 CASE NO.: 1D13-0461 L.T. No.: 01-368-CFA Steven L. Lynch v. State of Florida Appellant / Petitioner(s), Appellee / Respondent(s) BYORDEROFTHECOURT: Motion for rehearing en banc filed by the appellant on April 25, 2014, is denied. I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the original court order. Served: Hon.Pamela Jo Bondi, A.G. Meredith Clark Hinshelwood Steven L.Lynch Jm JO(/S. WHEELER, CLERK
Bupreme 254ourt of floríba WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2014 CASE NO.: SC14-2065 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 1D13-461; 652001CF000368CFAXMX.STEVEN L. LYNCH vs. STATE OF FLORIDA Petitioner(s) Respondent(s) Petitioner's initial brief on jurisdiction with appendix, which was filed with this Court on December 1, 2014, does not comply with Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.120(d) and 9.210 and is hereby stricken. Petitioner is hereby directed, on or before December 22, 2014, to serve an amended brief with appendix. It shall contain, in the following order: a cover sheet, a table of contents, a table of citations, a statement of the case and of the facts, a summary of argument, an argument, a conclusion and include a certificate of compliance which immediately follows the certificate of service. The brief shall be paginated with the table of contents and the citation of authorities excluded from the computation and shall not exceed ten pages in length. The appendix shall contain o_nly a copy of the opinion or order of the district court of appeal to be reviewed and shall be separately bound or separated from the brief by a divider and appropriate tab. A True Copy Test: Jolm A. Tomasino Clerk, Suprerhe Court eg Served: MEREDITH C. HINSHELWOOD STEVEN LEE LYNCH