Present: Honorable JOSEPHINE L. STATON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Terry Guerrero Deputy Clerk ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF: Not Present N/A Court Reporter ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT: Not Present PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (Doc. 52) Before the Court is Plaintiff Ian Freeman s Motion for Class Certification. (Mot., Doc. 52.) Defendant Zillow, Inc. opposes the Motion. (Opp., Doc. 57.) Freeman replied. (Reply, Doc. 66.) Having considered the Parties briefing, heard oral argument, and taken the matter under submission, the Court GRANTS Freeman s Motion. I. BACKGROUND This putative class action arises from an employment dispute. Freeman alleges the following facts. (See generally Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 45.) Zillow, an online home and real estate marketplace, operates one of the largest real estate and rental advertising networks in the country. (SAC 12.) As part of its workforce, Zillow allegedly employs 150 non-exempt full-time hourly employees as Inside Sales Consultants ( ISCs ). (Id. 13.) Freeman was a non-exempt hourly ISC from September 17, 2012 through September 4, 2014. (Id. 11.) The SAC alleges that Zillow operated an illegal design to circumvent Federal and State laws with the sole purpose of maximizing profits through a systematic scheme of exploiting and intimidating its employees to miss meal breaks, rest breaks, and work overtime without compensation. (SAC 1.) 1
Specifically, the SAC alleges that Zillow had a policy preventing [Class Members] from inputting their true and correct overtime hours in an attempt to prevent [Class Members] from being compensated for any overtime hours worked. (Id. 37.) According to the SAC, Zillow utilized various memos, meetings, and methods of intimidation to demand that Class Members begin work prior to the automaticallyrecorded 8:00 a.m. start time and continue working well beyond the previously recorded 4:00 p.m. punch-out time. (Id. 3.) Separately, the SAC asserts that Zillow had an unlawful policy of refusing [Class Members ] requests for meal and rest periods and prevented [Class Members] from leaving the office for lunch by requiring them to continue working while eating lunch at their desks. (Id. 47.) In part, Zillow facilitated these purportedly unlawful policies by designating specific hours of the day as the wave or the blitz, during which ISCs were allegedly required to make non-stop sales calls without taking breaks. (Id. 48.) The SAC states the following eight causes of action against Zillow: (1) failure to pay wages in violation of Cal. Labor Code 1194; (2) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of Cal. Labor Code 510; (3) failure to provide meal and rest breaks in violation of Cal. Labor Code 226.7; (4) waiting time penalties pursuant to Cal. Labor Code 203; (5) failure to provide accurate wage statements in violation of Cal. Labor Code 226; (6) UCL violations; (7) willful violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act; and (8) violations of the FLSA. (Id. 55-110.) The Motion requests to certify the following class: Current and former non-exempt hourly employees who are or were employed by Zillow, Inc. in California as an Inside Sales Consultant who worked a scheduled shift beginning approximately between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. at any time beginning four years preceding the filing of the Complaint in this action through settlement of final judgment. (Mem. at 7.) Additionally, the Motion further requests to certify the following sub-class: Former non-exempt hourly employees who were employed by Zillow, Inc. in California as an Inside Sales Consultant who worked a shift schedule between 2
8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. at any time beginning four years preceding the filing of the Complaint in this Action through final judgment in this action. (Id. at 8.) The Motion requests the Court to certify Freeman as Class Representative and to appoint his counsel, Mark J. Geragos of Geragos & Geragos, APC and Bobby Samini of Samini Scheinberg, PC, as Class Counsel. (Mot. at ii.) II. LEGAL STANDARD A party seeking class certification must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and the requirements of at least one of the categories under Rule 23(b). Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2013). Rule 23(a) requires a party seeking class certification to satisfy four requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Id. (citing Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011)). Rule 23(a) provides: One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. This requires a district court to conduct a rigorous analysis that frequently will entail some overlap with the merits of 3
the plaintiff s underlying claim. Id. Second, the proposed class must satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b). Id. at 2548. Here, Plaintiff seeks certification of the class under Rule 23(b)(3) (Mem. at 14), which permits maintenance of a class action if the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). III. DISCUSSION All eight of Freeman s causes of action are directly or derivatively premised on two allegations. First, Freeman argues that Zillow employed an automatic timekeeping system that did not log class members actual work hours, and that Zillow then refused to allow class members to alter these recorded hours to accurately reflect the length of their workdays. (Mem. at 15 (describing theory that supports liability as to four out of eight causes of action).) Second, Freeman contends that Zillow and its managers had a uniform corporate policy and practice of requiring class members to perform work duties during meal breaks and to discourage class members from taking rest breaks mandated by law. (Id. at 16 (describing theory that supports the third cause of action in SAC).) The Court considers whether these theories and Freeman s Motion warrant certification of the proposed class. A. Rule 23(a) 1. Numerosity The requirement of numerosity is discharged if the class is so large that joinder of all members is impracticable. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). Freeman contends that Zillow has employed over 150 Inside Sales Consultants in California in the four years preceding this action. (Mem. at 8.) For support, Freeman provides declarations from several ISCs confirming 4
that Zillow typically employs more than 100 ISCs at any given time. (See, e.g., Kremer Decl. 3, Doc. 52-2); Boehler Decl. 3, Doc. 52-3.) Because joinder of all current and former ISCs in a single case would be impracticable, the Court finds that Rule 23(a) s numerosity requirement is satisfied. 2. Commonality The Supreme Court has made clear that [w]hat matters to class certification... is not the raising of common questions even in droves but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of common answers. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis in original). Moreover, [a] party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc. Id. (emphasis in original). The crux of Freeman s theory of liability is that Zillow implemented an automated method of recording its employees work hours through an automatic timekeeping system programed [sic] to auto-populate its employees hours worked to begin at 8:00 a.m. and end at 4:00 p.m., regardless of employees[ ] [sic] overtime hours worked and missed meal and rest breaks. (SAC 2.) According to Freeman, Zillow then [t]hrough various memos, meetings, and methods of intimidation... demanded than ISCs arrive prior to 8:00 a.m. and stay past 4:00 p.m. (Id. 3.) Relatedly, Freeman contends that Zillow unlawfully demanded that [Class Members] work through their legally mandated off the clock meal and rest breaks while denying them compensation by automatically subtracting this time from their previously auto-populated timesheets. (Id. 4.) In sum, each of Freeman s causes of action stems from the same two factual allegations: first, that Zillow utilized a timekeeping system that auto-populated a nine hour workday less one hour for lunch for each employee; and second, that Zillow systematically coerced employees to work overtime or to skip meal and rest breaks without recording these additional work hours into the timekeeping system. 5
Based on these allegations, Freeman contends that the claims in this action present the same core questions of fact and law that will resolve all of the class members claims. (Mem. at 10.) For example, Freeman states that each putative class member worked in the same position, were subject to the same automated timekeeping system, and received the same inaccurate paystubs[.] (Mem. at 9.) Furthermore, Freeman identifies seven questions that are supposedly common to all class members, including [w]hether Zillow s automated timekeeping system failed to record the actual hours worked by class members, [w]hether Zillow had a policy or practice of providing inaccurate wage statements to class members due to its policy of refusing to alter work hours logged by its automated time system, and [w]hether Zillow had a policy or practice of failing to pay earned wages and overtime wages... due to its policy of refusing to alter work hours logged by its automated time system[.] (Id. at 10.) Here, too, it is evident that Freeman s theory rests on Zillow s purported use of an automated timekeeping system while at the same time refusing to modify the timekeeping records when employees worked overtime or skipped meals. Freeman supports his allegations with seven declarations by former ISCs (Mot., Exs. 1-7, Doc. 52-1 to -7), as well as two emails from supervisors at Zillow purporting to show company-wide policies of refusing overtime pay and denying meal and rest breaks (Freeman Decl., Exs. A-B, Doc. 52-1). The Freeman Declaration, for example, states that [b]ecause I could not alter the automatic time entry stems, my hours were reflected as consistently being from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., even on days that I worked overtime. (Freeman Decl. 4.) Freeman further attests that he was encouraged not to take meal breaks and rest breaks and that his lunch breaks were routinely interrupted by his supervisor. (Id. 5, 7.) Similarly, the Kremer Declaration asserts that Kremer s work hours were automatically recorded into a computerized time-keeping system[,] and that her supervisor, Edward Cornelius, instructed her not to place overtime requests because he would not approve them. (Kremer Decl. 4-5.) Likewise, Kremer states that [w]e were encouraged not to take lunch breaks and not to take rest breaks. (Id. 6.) Kremer further describes wave days and blitzes wherein ISCs were purportedly instructed to arrive early and stay late, or to work overtime without pay. (Id. 7-8.) This evidence supports Freeman s allegations that Zillow utilized an automated timekeeping system while refusing to alter the timekeeping entries to reflect the ISCs actual hours worked. 6
In opposition, Zillow provides evidence intended to show that the ISCs had varied experiences over the course of their employment. For example, with respect to overtime, several ISCs report undergoing training on how to enter overtime. (See, e.g., Ex. 1, Alvord Decl., 12, Doc. 59-1 ( I will say that when I was in training, HR made it very[,] very clear that we will be paid for overtime. That you need to clock in your time, you need to log your time. ); Ex. 8, Efstathiou Decl., 17 ( I understood that I could change my time entries in ADP, so that if I worked longer than 8 hours in a day, I knew that I could change my time entries to reflect that. ).) Moreover, other ISCs state that they were, in fact, encouraged to report overtime accurately, and that in some cases they were paid overtime. (See, e.g., Ex. 6, Denessen Decl., 11-12 ( My manager, Sammy Tyby... really encourages me to enter that time as overtime. ); Ex. 17, Lingane Decl., 8-9, Doc. 59-2 (stating that she was never pressured to work overtime by her manager); Ex. 27, Stone Decl., 13, Doc. 59-3 (stating he had never been pressured or otherwise worked overtime); Ex. 20, Nasca Decl., 8 (describing situations wherein he worked overtime and received compensation therefor).) Moreover, Zillow provides expert testimony and related evidence showing that at least 26 ISCs actually received overtime pay in 2015. (See Anderson Decl. 24, Table 1 (listing declarant ISCs who according to payroll records were paid overtime premiums), Doc. 58.) Zillow attempts to identify similar factual differences in the context of meal and rest breaks. (See, e.g., Ex. 9, Ellis Decl., 8 ( I take breaks whenever I feel like it. ); Ex. 11, Franco Decl., 10 ( I have never been pressured to miss a lunch or rest break. ); Ex. 18, Martin Decl., 7-8 ( In terms of rest breaks at Zillow, I don t really feel that there are rules that tell me when to take them and how long they should be.... In terms of lunch breaks... [n]obody here pressured me to [eat at my desk] or told me that I had to[.] ); Ex. 22, Norwood Decl., 7 ( I always felt that I was able to take as many breaks as I wanted, when I wanted. ).) What Zillow fails to do, however, is to refute that there are two central, common questions at the heart of Freeman s action: namely, whether Zillow utilized an automated timekeeping system that always logged a nine hour workday (less one hour for lunch) for each employee; and whether Zillow refused to alter or, alternatively, discouraged ISCs from altering the records to accurately reflect time worked. Although Zillow provides some evidence to suggest that certain ISCs received training on how to modify the 7
automated timekeeping system, Zillow offers absolutely no evidence that the company, in fact, ever paid a single penny in overtime prior to initiation of this action. This omission is even more striking in light of the declaration from Zillow s expert (Anderson Decl. 24, Table 1), which confirms that the company started paying overtime only after initiation of this lawsuit. Indeed, the very same employee-declarants who claim that they were never pressured to work or not record overtime began recording and being paid for overtime when Zillow changed its system to one that did not use a no overtime default setting. (Id.) These facts strongly support the argument that Zillow s automated timekeeping system and policies discouraging overtime were centralized and common to all class members. For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Freeman has demonstrated commonality for purposes of Rule 23(a). 3. Typicality The typicality prerequisite of Rule 23(a) is fulfilled if the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)). A class representative s claims are typical if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members[.] Id. Here, as stated above, Freeman s core claims relate to Zillow s automated timekeeping system and its purported corporate policy and practice to discourage ISCs from entering overtime or taking meal and rest breaks. (SAC 1-6.) Although Zillow devotes much of its brief to exploring whether ISCs actually worked overtime or took meal breaks (Opp. at 8-20), there is no argument that Freeman s claims, if proven, would not be reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. Therefore, the Court concludes that Freeman s allegations and claims satisfy Rule 23(a) s typicality inquiry. 4. Representativeness Rule 23(a) s final requirement is that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Id. at 1020 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)). Determining adequacy requires a Court to consider (1) whether there exist conflicts 8
between named plaintiffs or class counsel and absent class members, and (2) whether named plaintiffs and class counsel will vigorously prosecute the action. Id. Here, Freeman asks the Court to certify him as Class Representative and to appoint his attorneys, Mark Geragos and Bobby Samini, as Class Counsel. (Mot. at ii.) Freeman contends that his personal experience with the underlying facts and his cooperation in prosecuting this case render him adequate to serve as class representative. (Mem. at 13.) Likewise, Freeman argues that Geragos and Samini, together with their respective law firms, have extensive experience in complex and class action litigation. (Id. at 13, 19-20.) Zillow raises several arguments intended to show that Freeman cannot adequately represent the interests of absent class members. First, Zillow contends that Freeman s status as a former employer will unfairly disadvantage those individuals in the proposed class who are current employees. (Opp. at 22.) This Court has previously refused to certify a class where doing so would result in impermissible claim splitting. See, e.g., Beal v. Lifetouch, Inc., No. CV 10-8454-JST MLGx, 2012 WL 3705171, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012). In Beal, after concluding that a former employee (and proposed class representative) lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief, the Court held that it could not certify only a class for monetary damages because the claims of current employees would be impermissibly split. Beal, 2012 WL 3705171 at *3-4 (citation omitted). Here, in contrast, because Zillow recently adopted entirely new timekeeping software (Opp. at 17-18), any future claim for injunctive relief would not raise the same res judicata concerns present in Beal. Nevertheless, the Court will modify the relevant class period to run from November 19, 2010 (four years prior to filing the lawsuit) until January 4, 2015 (the last day Zillow utilized the automated timekeeping system at issue in this action). (See generally Complaint, Doc. 1; Blackbourn Decl., Ex. 129 (email from Zillow human resources announcing launch of Workday timekeeping system on January 5, 2015), Doc. 60-1.) 1 Second, Zillow argues that Freeman cannot adequately represent the proposed subclass of former ISCs because some of these employees but not Freeman executed 1 At the February 5, 2016 hearing, Freeman, through his attorney, agreed to limit the relevant class period based on adoption of the new timekeeping system. 9
Separation and Release of Claim Agreements when they left Zillow. (Opp. at 22-23 (citing to sealed versions of Separation and Release of Claims Agreement).) In Reply, Freeman appears to concede the argument, but adds that the release of claims by some former ISCs should not prove fatal to the remaining class members asserting their rights. (Reply at 10.) Based on Freeman s concession, the Court will exclude from the proposed class and subclass any former ISCs who executed Separation and Release Agreements. Separately, Zillow contends that proposed class counsel is inadequate because counsel is simultaneously representing other ISCs in other pending lawsuits against Zillow. (Opp. at 24.) For support, Zillow relies on Lou v. Ma Laboratories, Inc., No. C 12-05409 WHA, 2014 WL 68605, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). (Id.) In Ma Labs, a district court held that class counsel was inadequate where they represent different plaintiffs in different actions proceeding at the same time with the same claims, same counsel, and same defendants[.] Ma Labs, 2014 WL 68605 at *2. The instant case is readily distinguishable from Ma Labs. Here, Freeman alleges wage and hour causes of action, or claims derivative thereof. (See generally SAC.) In contrast, the other cases against Zillow involving proposed class counsel raise allegations and causes of action relating to employment discrimination based on age, disability, religion, and race. (Bonn Decl., Exs. 32-35, Doc. 59-4.) Although certain discrete allegations may tangentially overlap with the issues in Freeman s class action, the Court concludes that proposed class counsel is not inadequate under the reasoning of Ma Labs. Zillow raises a related argument against Freeman, who admitted in his deposition that he too is considering bringing wrongful-termination claims, but that he has not yet considered whether he would be willing to resolve the putative class claims if it meant releasing his wrongful termination claims. (Opp. at 24-25 (citing Freeman s deposition transcript).) This argument is not compelling. The case relied upon by Zillow De La Cueva v. Alta-Dena Certified Dairy, LLC, No. CV 12-1804-GHK (CWx), Dkt. 61, Order at 3 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2013) is factually distinct from the instant action. Unlike the proposed class representative in De La Cueva, Freeman has never stated that his individual claims are his no. 1 interest[.] Rather, Freeman s deposition testimony reflects that he may consider pursuing a wrongful termination claim against Zillow in the future. (Bonn Decl., Ex. 37, Freeman Depo., at 21-24, Doc. 59-6.) This is not the sort of actual conflict that undermines adequacy. 10
Finally, Zillow contends that Freeman s attorneys wrongly assured [Freeman] payment of an incentive award. (Opp. at 25.) Although Freeman s deposition testimony indicates he had some conversations with counsel regarding incentive awards (Freeman Depo. at 107-111), this is a far cry from the formalized incentive agreements at issue in Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2009), wherein the incentive payments were expressly referenced in the retainer agreements and obligated counsel to seek tiered incentive payments contingent on the size of the class settlement. In fact, Freeman s description of incentive awards is innocuous: [m]y understanding is that in addition to the I believe I m saying this correctly the punitive damages paid to the class members, I receive some sort of compensation on top of that for the trouble of being the class representative. (Freeman Depo. at 107:8-12.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that the proposed class representatives and proposed class counsel are adequate under Rule 23(a)(4). B. Rule 23(b)(3) Freeman seeks certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). (Mem. 14-19.) Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 919, 981 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3) is far more demanding than the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). Id. at 981 (citing Anchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-24 (1997)). If common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication, then there is clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual basis. Id. (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022.) Freeman argues that common issues predominate because each cause of action relies upon a single line of inquiry factual findings regarding Zillow s automated timekeeping system and Zillow s policy and practice of refusing to allow Plaintiffs to modify their automatically recorded hours. (Mem. at 15.) For the reasons already discussed, the 11
Court concludes that Freeman s theory of liability rests on two questions that are common to all ISCs and can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication. In re ConAgra Foods, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 981. The Court finds this is sufficient to show that common issues predominate as required by Rule 23(b)(3). The superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) requires the Court to find that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Several factors should guide the Court s inquiry: (1) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of a separate action; (2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy that has already commenced; (3) the desirability of concentrating the litigation in a certain forum; and (4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class. Id. District courts are afforded wide discretion to determine whether a class action is the superior method in a given case. Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978). Zillow does not challenge superiority on any of the first three factors. Rather, Zillow argues the case is unmanageable because the company purportedly has a right to cross-examine each putative class member and exercising this right would render the instant case unmanageable. (Opp. at 21 (citing Jimenez v. Domino s Pizza, Inc., 238 F.R.D. 241, 253 (C.D. Cal. 2006).) Contrary to Jimenez, however, which involved classwide misclassification claims, the allegations raised by Freeman relate to Zillow s use of an automated timekeeping system and the existence of a corporate policy to unlawfully refuse overtime pay and deny ISCs meal and rest breaks. Unlike Jimenez, these issues do not require individualized inquiries to determine liability. See, e.g., Kamar v. Radio Shack Corp., 254 F.R.D. 387, 406 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ( The most significant issues that determine liability for the reporting time and split shift claims are susceptible to class-wide proof, as they arise from RadioShack s uniform policies and procedures or can be determined without individual testimony from class members. ). Separately, Zillow contends that a class action is not a superior method of adjudication because putative class members have sufficient monetary incentive to pursue their own claims[.] (Opp. at 21.) For support, Zillow notes that Freeman claims his damages are in excess of $140,000. (Id. at 21-22.) Still, it is telling that, to date, there do not appear to be any such claims currently pending. This casts some doubt on 12
Zillow s monetary incentive argument. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has held, [n]umerous individual actions would be expensive and time-consuming and would create the danger of conflicting decisions as to persons similarly situated. Lerwill, 582 F.2d at 512. Here, permitting potentially hundreds of lawsuits to move forward to litigate identical issues is highly inefficient. This fact strongly favors the superiority of a class action. Based on these facts, the Court concludes that Rule 23(b)(3) s predominance and superiority requirements are satisfied. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Freeman s Motion for Class Certification. The Court CERTIFIES the following class and subclass: Class: Current and former non-exempt hourly employees who are or were employed by Zillow, Inc. in California as an Inside Sales Consultant, who worked a shift scheduled between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. during the period November 19, 2010 through January 4, 2015 and who did not execute a Separation and Release of Claim Agreement after ending their employment. Subclass: Former non-exempt hourly employees who were employed by Zillow, Inc. in California as an Inside Sales Consultant, who worked a shift scheduled between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. during the period November 19, 2010 through January 4, 2015 and who did not execute a Separation and Release of Claim Agreement after ending their employment. Additionally, the Court APPOINTS Freeman to serve as Class Representative and APPOINTS Mark J. Geragos of Geragos & Geragos, APC, and Bobby Samini of Samini Scheinberg, PC as Class Counsel. Initials of Preparer: 13