Religion and Politics in the European Union: Eurosceptic Allies or Euroenthusiast Friends? Simona Guerra Loughborough University.

Religion and Politics in the European Union: Eurosceptic Allies or Euroenthusiast Friends? Simona Guerra Loughborough University S.Guerra@lboro.ac.uk Abstract. This paper examines the relationship between religion and politics in the Eurosceptic discourse in Poland in comparative perspective. The results on the Polish Roman Catholic Church are discussed with reference to further case studies, Croatia (Roman Catholic Church), a current candidate country, and Serbia (Orthodox Christian), a would-be candidate country. This study adopts a similar framework to the one selected by Werner (2000) in her analysis on the Catholic Church in Europe after World War II. Thus, this research assumes that the Church can pursue a strategy as an interest group that, in order to solidify its influence, can seek alliances, allocating resources, through political parties. In this specific study, that is examined using EU accession as a turning point and exploring whether the Church aims to, and if so, why, use the political alliance to impact on the EU accession debate. The research undertakes a contribution to the literature on (i) the economics of religion, (ii) the politics of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches in post-communist Europe, and (iii)) Euroscepticism. Paper prepared for presentation to the Conference Does God Matter? Representing Religion in the European Union and the United States, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University, 12-13 November 2010

Religion represents a salient cultural and institutional force (Broughton and ten Napel 2000, xix). In particular, that is the case in Central and Eastern Europe, where the repression of the Churches from the Communist regime froze affiliations, but particularly in Poland did not halt people s beliefs. These persisted and re-emerged during the democratic transition and impacted on levels of public support for EU integration. In Poland, in 1999, with the support of Father Rydzyk, the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin: LPR) successfully capitalised on discontent towards the European Union (EU) and ultra-conservative Catholic sentiments and in the 2001 general elections gained 34 seats in the Polish parliament (Sejm) (de Lange and Guerra 2009). In Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica: HDZ), considered as the ruling Catholic party, is the main political party, currently in power since 2003. Both countries are considered as distinctively Catholic (Perica 2006) and have seen increasing levels of Euroscepticism in the run-up to accession (Szczerbiak 2001; Vujcic 2005). This analysis examines the role of Catholicism on opposition to and support for EU integration before accession in Poland, and discuss the case of Croatia, in comparative perspective, as two of the most Catholic countries in the post-communist area in comparative perspective. Also, it suggests why an enlargement towards the Western Balkans can present a further case of Eurosceptic religious ally with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Haynes (1998, 87) suggests that a progress of secularization is happening, with decreasing political and social significance of religious institutions. Casanova (2006) poignantly observes that joining the EU when the process of secularization is taking place provides the Churches with more chances to enter the political and social discourse. That can certainly be addressed both in the case of the Catholic Churches in Poland and Croatia. The Polish Church has traditionally embodied the civilizational identity of Poland, as it did in Croatia. Similarly, across their recent history, both countries have embraced a mobilization of Poles and Croats

under the aegis of the Virgin Mary - Queen of the Croats in the latter case. In fact, in 1971, Marija Bistrica became the Croatian equivalent to the Polish Czestochowa (Perica 2000, 539). Most of the studies have focused on the Orthodox Church (Marsh 2007; Leustan 2008), in the Balkans, where Orthodoxy is at the basis of national mythologies, the church is the cradle of the nation and the place in which political and religious rulers should cooperate (Leustan 2008, 431), while this analysis addresses how the Catholic Church can enter the political discourse as a Eurosceptic actor. In fact, both in the Polish case study and in the comparative framework, the Church has chances to enter the social and political discourse in the run-up to and after EU accession. This analysis seeks to investigate its role in the public life and answers if, when and how it strategically chooses to become a political influence regarding the EU issue. This study examines levels of public support for European integration in Poland, a new EU Member State, and Croatia, a current candidate country, in order to offer further observations towards the next enlargement to the Western Balkans. Firstly, the paper provides an overview on the literature on attitudes towards European integration. Studies have generally neglected religion as a determinant of support for or opposition to European integration, although religion and Christianity often overlapped with the idea of Europe since the Seventh century. An analysis of the determinants of support for European integration in the Polish case before and after accession highlights the positive significance of this variable after accession, while before accession the coefficient correlates with Eurosceptic attitudes - although Catholicism is not significant. Secondly, the paper outlines how this variable can affect attitudes in the Polish case. Catholicism has historically represented Polishness, and has protected the nation against the invasions. When the EU opened the negotiation process in March 1998, the increasing social costs and the long waiting before accession after the fall of Communism created a breeding ground for the

success of Eurosceptic social and political actors. Thirdly, the paper explains how that was possible using a market model, as suggested by Warner (2000) and points to successful (Poland) and less successful cases (Croatia). This analysis suggests the salience of the Catholic Church on attitudes towards EU integration, particularly in the run-up to membership. That is critical for studies on the domestic politics of the next candidate and possible candidate countries, in the Western Balkans and Turkey, where also Orthodoxy and Islam, as the paper addresses, can vocalize the threat of integration in the social and political debates. This analysis contributes to the literature on the economics of religion, the politics of the Catholic Churches in post- Communist Europe, and Euroscepticism. PUBLIC OPINION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION The question of what determines public support for the EU is the subject of extensive research in the literature on comparative European politics and contemporary European studies. This includes studies that examine the drivers of public attitudes in both current EU member states and candidate countries, focusing on the domestic context (Gabel 1998; Anderson 1998), political parties (Ray 2003a, 2003b) and perceived cultural threats (McLaren 2006; Carey 2002). The literature on parties provides different explanations: political parties can cue citizens, with the incumbent impacting only in case of a recent referendum; citizens are less Euroenthusiast when satisfied with their government (Ray 2003a), or political parties can impact on people s choices, when they agree on a common position towards the EU or a referendum, but depending on citizens political closeness and variation across the political spectrum (Ray 2003b). A different view explains a more dynamic relationship, where citizens can also cue political parties (Steenbergen et al. 2007). Further explanations focus on the utilitarian model and the domestic context (Anderson

1998). Gabel s model (1998), based on Easton s analysis on public support (1965), defined two different dimensions for the level of support; the former was the utilitarian ; the latter was the affective, where the utilitarian changed according to the benefits and was shaped by the governing authorities and political dimension. For these reasons it was to a certain extent unstable. The affective (interlinked to the utilitarian) embraced abstract values and commitments to an idea, and was more stable. Finally, McLaren (2006) shows that identity and hostility towards other cultures affects levels of opposition towards EU integration and similarly Carey (2002) addresses to what extent national identity can impact on lower levels of support. The case of post-communist candidate countries can reverse and confirm some of these assumptions. In a candidate country, citizens support cannot embrace any particular comprehension of the EU activities, institutions or future benefits. It is more likely that the EU represents a general idea, partly driven by the past history of the country, cultural links and perceived future benefits. As such, the affective can become to a certain extent unstable, while the utilitarian can be quite stable, whereas it can change after accession, following Gabel s analysis (1998). Also, the relationship between citizens and parties can be more dynamic due to the Communist legacy, and high levels of distrust towards political parties (Klingemann et al. 2006). Religion has been an independent variable that the literature has generally neglected. Nelsen et al. (2001) originally contributed to analyses on support for EU integration, stressing the importance of cultural factors, where one of the most vital elements is religion (2001, 192). Religion, and Catholicism, have played an important part in the history of Europe, from the first Crusades onwards (Mikkeli 1998, 20, 20-31; De Rougemont 1966, 53-87). In 2003 the Judeo-Christian roots of Europe in the preamble of the Draft Treaty,

Establishing a European Constitution, created the most controversial and the most emotive (Heyward 2005, 227) debates. Nonetheless, it is also not surprising that the Church enters the Eurosceptic political rhetoric. In the run up to the second Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, an Irish Catholic newspaper, Alive, let religion re-emerge in the European debates with a hard Eurosceptic discourse, where it advertised the Eire go Brach (meaning Ireland forever) campaign and warned that (T)he new legal directive [Article 6 of the Lisbon Treaty] (would) automatically allow the EU state to take possession of people s children, homes and financial savings. It further added that Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU could seize elderly people s savings and homes and can take children off people who suffer from mild forms of alcoholism or depression or who do not own a family home (Phillips 2009). It is not the first time that Catholicism has become a Eurosceptic public actor. Religion can become an important element for national identity, particularly in those countries that experienced the loss of national identity, as Poland, and South-Eastern European countries. The loss of sovereignty froze the percentage of believers at the level characteristic for more traditional societies (Gesis June 2009). Using Warner s (2000) model, this analysis suggests that the Church can represent a strategic, calculating, and influence-maximizing organization (2000, 17); as an interest group, it can support a political party and enter the political debate. In Poland, public support for the EU dropped up to 55% (in May 1999) (CBOS data) and the rhetoric of Eurosceptic parties, particularly the use of Catholicism against secular Europe as used by the League of Polish Families could impact on fears and concerns emerging after the opening of the negotiation process (Spring 1998). The support from Father Rydzyk and Radio Maryja was definitely fundamental for its electoral success and the League could gain seats in the Polish parliament for the first time in 2001. Further EU

enlargements can show similar cases to the Polish one, as such in the case of Croatia that registered a rise of Eurosceptic attitudes after it became an official candidate country in June 2004. RELIGION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION The idea and concept of Europe is a controversial one, made up of different - mythological, geographical, historical, political and cultural - dimensions. Europe as a term could not be found in the Bible, nevertheless Europe became a Christian notion (Wilson and van der Dussen 1993, 19), particularly under the threat of Islam and in its opposition. Christianity provided the western monarchies with a powerful myth of legitimation (Delanty 1995, 26). As early as in the Seventh century, in fact, it could have been possible to attach to the notion of Europe, an emotional charge linked to the ninth chapter of the Genesis, where Europe was the continent of Japheth and his descendants, the continents of Greeks and Christians (Mikkeli 1998, 14-5). The enemy (Islam) and political reasons (territorial claims) created the incentive for a common territory and entity in a Christian brotherhood supported by the Popes (from Gregory VII, 1073-85, to Innocent II, 1198-1216) (Mikkeli 1998, 21-26). With the Fifteenth century and the fall of Constantinople under Mohammed II (1453), Christianity felt threatened and the Papacy created a defence of the Respublica christiana against Islam, where Europe and Respublica christiana became interchangeable synonyms (Wilson and van der Dussen 1993, 35). It was the Turkish threat and the humanist culture developing in the Sixteenth century that further structured the idea of Europe upon the one of Christendom. If in the past history, Christendom became a synonym or a reference for Europe, when the six founding fathers of the EU joined in the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), this territory covered a similar geographical Europe to the one of Charlemagne, with the return of a common Judeo-Christian tradition (Asad 1993, 217). Across time, religion, and not only

Catholicism, has often represented the legitimating national authority: it is the official national religion, as such with Catholicism in Ireland, Islam in Iran, Lutheranism in Sweden, or Anglicanism in England ; it has represented the voice supporting resistance against communism in Poland, but it has also resisted democratisation in Spain (Jelen and Wilcox 2002, 7-8). With the Constitutional Treaty, and particularly with the Preamble, the EU tried to identify a few common values in search of a common European identity. Nevertheless the lack of legitimacy and the debate on the democratic deficit has animated the last twenty years of European integration. When the Constitutional Treaty has attempted to return to the EU s roots, religion is returned to be a salient debate that led to an agreement on the absence of the Judeo-Christian roots. These, however, as Nelsen et al. (2001) showed, and as the paper illustrates, can become an important issue when both Europe and, specifically, the EU are debated at the domestic level. RESEARCH QUESTION The enlarged European Union, the perspective enlargement toward the Western Balkans, the controversial debate on Turkish accession, and the double Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty have recently offered new debates on religion and the EU. The analyses on the role of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam in the EU (Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006) underline the impact and role on the political debate and on attitudes toward European integration. Byrnes and Katzenstein stress the institutional most favourable position of Catholicism over the other two religious communities, as institutionally, the Catholic Church is centrally located in Europe, participates in its political life, and can influence policy changes, - with the Holy See and its diplomatic corps; the COSCE and its secretariat in Brussels; the national Episcopal conferences resident in every European state (Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006, 302).

An analysis of the relationship of the three religious communities with the state, adopting an institutionalist approach, further confirms that Catholicism is sceptical towards the sovereign state, as this threatens the unity of the Roman Catholic Church. Consequently, it is also more willing to support transnational networks of cooperation, although it has its own idea of European integration. The NORFACE research project on Religion, Euroscepticism and the Media carried an in-depth analysis on religion and Euroscepticism. Results show that religion is not significant at the micro-level, but it is an explanatory variable at the macro-level (Boomgarden and Freire 2009, 1258-1261). Analyses give evidence that mainstream Churches are pro-eu, but there are fundamentalist groups that can assume different positions (Madeley 2007). Moreover, protest parties are likely to be, and are more generally, Eurosceptic, even though religion is largely irrelevant for explaining Euroscepticism (Boomgarden and Freire 2009). This study selects a different question from the previous studies and seeks to answer the new avenues of research they have addressed and explores the salience and impact of the religious factor on attitudes towards the EU since the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe. In order to do so, this analysis overviews the role of the Catholic Church in Poland - where Catholicism has played a fundamental role in public life - in comparative perspective. Poland is usually an outlier, particularly on the role of religion, however the next enlargement to Croatia represents the closest similar case. What is more, Poland has shown that Catholicism can become a successful electoral issue for populist radical-right wing parties (de Lange and Guerra 2009) and fuel Eurosceptic debates. The main research questions this paper seeks to explain are why, if so, religious actors intervene in the political scene, and when, if so, in order to influence the political debate with reference to European integration. As Diamanti and Ceccarini (2007) stressed in the

Italian case, when religious attitudes and political orientations combine, opinions become more radical. The debate, using media and available resources, as alternative associations, can impact on social and public debates, while supporting a political party can provide the Church with an ally that can influence political and policy choices - and that is fundamental during the process of democratic stabilization (Warner 2000). POLISH DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION This study is based on the empirical analysis of the Polish case, and applies a theoretical explanation that is further used for the case of Croatia, a Catholic country, whose negotiation talks started in 2004. Finally, it also draws conclusions that can be applied in comparative perspective towards Orthodox countries and in particular to Serbia, an Orthodox country that has gained the status of EU potential candidate following the Thessaloniki European Council (June 2003). This analysis starts from the quantitative analysis of determinants on European integration in Poland before and after accession. The independent variables were selected on frameworks offered in the existing literature. In choosing the framework, the study discarded the postindustrial cognitive mobilization (as working on a post-communist country), and political parties, as they can be a misleading indicator. Mistrust for political parties is caused by the negative connotations of the party generated by forty years of Communist party rule (Szczerbiak 2006, 116), the high volatility and mismatch between political parties and public opinion on the EU confirm Tucker et al. s observation, it was implausible that people could take party cues for such a fundamental issue as membership (2002). Identity issues are not a problem in Poland, they view the EU mainly as an economic organization, secondly as a political organization, a very small percentage as a cultural one (CBOS 2004, 05/2004).

The main question was what drives citizens attitudes towards EU integration before and after accession in Poland. The selection of a more suited framework for post-communist countries led to the study of domestic proxies, and the utilitarian variable, more specifically. Results underline the salience of distinguishing two levels of utilitarian proxies and three diachronic dimensions. The relative poverty of post-communist countries affects patterns of support; collective benefits and a mobilising unconditional support are the two factors impacting on public support for EU integration before accession. After accession, individual benefits can become more salient, particularly in future perspective, possibly affecting longterm patterns of behaviour. TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE The comparative study on the 2001 and 2005 Polish National Election Studies also shows whether and to what extent Catholicism represented an element of opposition prior to accession - though not significant, but visible at the aggregate level - and a highly significant factor of support for EU integration after accession, in line with previous studies that found Catholic countries warm towards the EU (Nelsen et al. 2001). TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE The increasing use of the threat of secular Europe vs. Catholic Poland by the League of Polish Families was particularly successful before EU accession. Data at the aggregate level reveal that those regularly attending Church services were those more sceptic towards the EU than those who attended more rarely.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE Quantitative analysis of public attitudes before EU accession shows that a hypothesis as The more devout believer is the citizen before accession, the lower is the level of public support for the EU is not supported with a significant coefficient. However, the negative sign of the B coefficient can indicate the trend at the aggregate level, and perfectly posits itself in the literature between Jasiewicz (2003) (asserting that Euroscepticism could not be structured around religion) and Nelsen et al. (2001), who focused on the role of religion and the economic variable, and in line with the findings by Boomgarden and Freire (2009). In fact, Euroscepticism is not structured on religion (Jasiewicz 2003), but Catholic EU Member States, and Poland, are likely to be warm toward the EU (Nelsen et al. 2001) and religion was a significant factor at the aggregate level before accession, but not at the individual level (Boomgarden and Freire 2009). That is even more interesting given that after accession Poland comes into line with the other Catholic countries, with support for EU membership correlating positively with levels of religiosity, as expected - where The more devout believer is the citizen, the higher is the level of public support for the EU. In the long term, this analysis also points to the literature (Jasiewicz 2003; Nelsen et al. 2001) and the significance of the economic variable, and expects that with the increasing secularization of society, the economic proxy can become more important compared to the religious variable. Finally, this analysis has used an original variable for the Polish case, as in Nelsen et al. (2001). The interest of this research, in fact, is not on how many times a week a citizen attends the mass, as usually analysed at the aggregate level (Szczerbiak 2001), but on whether religion makes the difference. Results show that before accession, in Poland, as Boomgarden

and Freire (2009) found, religion, in this case Catholicism, is not significant at the individual level, but it explains attitudes at the aggregate level. More importantly, attitudes before and after accession change; after accession, Catholicism becomes a positive significant variable, also at the individual level, at least in a country where religion is an important factor. Therefore, this research now outlines a theoretical explanation of how Catholicism could become such a relevant factor, while remaining not significant, before accession, and how it could change its impact after joining the EU. CATHOLICISM, THE CHURCH AND POLAND Catholicism in Poland has historically played the double role of maintaining social cohesion and representing the symbol against the enemy. On one side it was in opposition to the Slavic tribes at the time of the Piast family, on the other in the Eighteenth century it counter posed the devastation following the three partitions. Even though the Polish state was divided, the Polish nation could survive, and the use of religious symbols helped to overcome geographical and political divisions (de Lange and Guerra 2009). In a narrative discourse and in the literature, Poland has often been transposed to the Catholic idea of sacrifice and to the identification of Polishness with Catholicism. Poland is identified as the purest, a Christ of nations, and she suffers in order to redeem Europe (Grudzińska Gross 2000, 9). With the end of World War II Poland experienced the Soviet occupation. In Poland the Communist regime can be defined as consensus-oriented and never experienced a totalitarian character (Linz and Stepan 1996). As such Poles were allowed to maintain a certain degree of dissent that was often supported by the Church itself. When the Solidarity (Solidarność) movement was founded, it represented the first non-communist trade union (de Lange and Guerra 2009) and his leader, Lech Wałęsa, was often portrayed blessed by Pope John Paul II.

The trade union found its legitimacy against the Communist regime by the shared norms and values mainly deriving from Catholicism. Lech Wałęsa himself was a very religious person and used to wear a badge with the image of the Madonna of Częstochowa with him. The visit that John Paul II paid to his country in 1979 and the support he gave to the Solidarity movement definitely gave the trade union legitimate authority; furthermore the combination of Catholicism and Solidarity by the Pope s blessing created Poland s pioneering and heroic path to democratic transition via ethical civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996, 272 in de Lange and Guerra 2009). Through the centuries Catholicism has therefore become the element forging social cohesion, protecting national sovereignty and the founding basis of the revolt against Communism and of support towards the democratization process. Since the fall of Communism the Church assumed a double position, on one hand supported democratization, on the other it had a defensive, and contrasting, attitude, as in the case of the reference to the Catholic roots of the Polish national identity in the new Polish constitution. The first Polish written Constitution (3 May 1791) had its first opening article referring to the name of Almighty God and the reference the Church requested for the new Polish Constitution in the 1990s could not be simply made in the wording, but in the substance. Eventually, the episcopate was dissatisfied on a few points (the Constitution did not state the protection of life since its conception), but obtained a few concessions. The Christian heritage of the nation was stated in the preamble and the article 25 of the constitution defined the relationship between the Republic of Poland and the Holy See (Byrnes 2002, 30-32). Despite that, the Church partly perceived the loss of that transposition between the Church and the national identity. While that had been possible during the Communist regime, the political context was changing and the Church was assuming a different and less important

role. Politically the fragmentation of the Solidarity movement and the aggregation of the most diversified political factions in the Solidarity Electoral Alliance (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność: AWS) did not permit the Church any possible alliance. Still the Sejm was represented with a cleavage between those attending regularly the religious service (belonging to the right-wing political parties), whereas almost no one among the deputies of the renewed post-communist party, the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: SLD) did the same (only 3%) (Castle and Taras 2002, 110-111 in de Lange and Guerra 2009). The absence of any further possible cleavage, due to the Communist legacy, enabled the religious dimension to become the most important factor impacting on party identification, as citizens could easily recognize themselves along the religious dimension in Poland. The League of Polish Families gathered most of that electorate in 2001. The radicalization of religious attitudes that also led to the electoral success of the League - can be traced through the loss of the Church guiding role. That became evident a few years after the fall of the Communist regime; in 1996 in the European Value Survey, Poland was one of the six countries out of 30 where more than 90% of the citizens replied they belonged to a religious denomination (95.4%, second after Iceland) and 58.9% attended the religious service once a week or more often (second after Ireland, 65%). Sacraments, such as birth, marriage and death, were more important for Polish citizens than any other. However, carrying out a comparative analysis of data from surveys carried out in 1990 and 1999, it is clear that Poles felt the pronouncements of the Church less adequate in some sectors of their private life: only 30.8% asserted they were adequate for the social problems facing the country today in 1999 (it was 38.3% in 1990), while still the Church had a relevant position for people s spiritual needs, 73.6% (it was 80.3% in 1990) (Marody 2004, 110-118).

The role of Catholicism in Poland has been fundamental as preserving and protecting the often threatened Polish identity. However, the position of the Catholic Church has changed after the fall of Communism, particularly before and after accession. The challenge of a pluralist society has impacted on the role of the Church in everyday life. If the Catholic Church could be the guide during the Soviet regime, the democratization process influenced people s attitudes towards the Church as institution. The Church was accepted as spiritual guide, responding to the Catholic spiritual needs. On the contrary, the Church was perceived as distant and unable to respond to the emergencies of contemporary changes. In particular, citizens believed that religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections ; Poles were in favor of further information from the Church on aspects of the political and social life, particularly those citizens with a lower level of education, living in small towns and rural areas, and old people. Nevertheless, they did not approve the church involvement in political life itself (Marody 2004, 128-129). Religiosity was becoming less institutional (belonging), while the spirituality side (believing) was still alive. Marody stressed the changes in Polish religiousness, and further pointed towards two directions: one following the individualization and secularization processes, the other following the significant extension of the institutionalization influence of the Polish Church, as perceiving the increasing detachment from the belonging dimension of religiosity. Specifically, the stress was towards a type of religiosity that, outside the institutional mainstream Church, touches upon a change of tone and the abandonment of the language of love to that of extremism and catastrophe. The Church was representing Polish morality, fearing a pluralistic society and pointing to devils in a satanic mission, as in the words of a reader s letter to a newspaper editor (2004, 130-131). Part of Polish religiosity and part of the Polish Church was ready to face an enemy. Even though the Church was not viewed as a

potential positive source of influence in public life, EU accession presented the right occasion to find alternative channels of oppositions to secular Europe. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: A MARKET MODEL In order to investigate the role of the Church in the Eurosceptic political discourse in Poland, this analysis adopts a similar framework to the one selected by Carolyne Warner (2000) in her analysis on the Catholic Church in Europe after World War II. Thus, this study assumes that the Church can pursue a strategy as an interest group that, in order to solidify its influence, can seek alliances through political parties. In this specific study, that is examined using EU accession as a turning point and exploring whether the Church aims to use the political alliance to impact on the EU accession debate. The League of Polish Families party used its Eurosceptic rhetoric and entered the social and political discourse as a successful political actor from 2001 to 2006 on the basis of its nationalist rhetoric and the perceived threat of secular Europe. The fundamentalist Church and Father Rydzyk supported the League, and were definitely fundamental for the League s electoral success. That can be explained following five main dimensions (as suggested, and re-adapted, by Warner 2000): (i) Channel (ii) Time; (iii) Resources; (iv) Political space; and (v) Gap: (i) Channel: Following a market model, a party can have some good (product) the interest group wants (Warner 2000, 33). It is possible to expect exchanges between the party and the interest group (the Catholic interest group; in the Polish case, Father Rydzyk). Support can end (as it happened between the League and Father Rydzyk), when the party no longer delivers what the group wants or simply when there is not any longer a convergence of strategies, as it would be costly for the interest group to go on supporting that party. Both the most conservative Catholic groups across the citizens and ultra conservative Catholics across

organizations gathered around Father Rydzyk and splinter parties joined the League of Polish Families. They did not belong to the traditional Church, but, as aforementioned, to an ultraconservative and nationalist faction. The League was the channel at the political level of Rydzyk s nationalism and opposition to secular Europe. (ii) Time: Time was decisive. Poland did not view the emergence of a Christian Democratic party (Bale and Szczerbiak 2006), when Catholicism played the most important cleavage (Markowski 1999), as aforementioned. The League s rhetoric linked with the extremist Catholic views of Radio Maryja, and despite it remained a niche party, it still followed a successful pattern, already followed by other Christian Democratic parties in Central and Eastern Europe (Bale and Szczerbiak 2006, 43). It represented a subcultural (Christian) party (Enyedi 1996): in this dimension, it could deviate from the usual patterns followed by the pro-eu Christian Democratic parties across Western Europe. In particular, it gained electoral success in the run-up to and just after accession, when fears related to EU integration were perceived by some sectors of Polish society - such as pensioners, farmers, less educated, unskilled workers. (iii) Resources: Time is connected with leaders and resources. The selection of leaders is fundamental, as they provide the organization and delivery of the agenda. In this case, Father Rydzyk selected its political leader and allocated resources (radio, newspaper, public channels) that were a fundamental factor in the electoral success of the party. (iv) Political space: the Polish party system lacked a Catholic party. A Christian Democratic party could have emerged from the Solidarity Electoral Alliance, but it was such a diverse, ideologically eclectic and heterogeneous electoral group, that it soon failed. Its closeness to the Solidarity movement involved an active position of the former Solidarity s leaders and members and the party never achieved its objective of becoming a mass. A

quite homogenous Catholic electorate, as the Polish one, lacked a Catholic party. The League represented the most conservative one and strongly opposed the EU. (v) Gap: Poland was experiencing a triple transition, the political system was not yet stable and parties were not (and are not yet) fully institutionalized. Poles feared the impact of EU membership, and the costs of transitions became a political sensitive issue from 1999 and 2001. Catholicism and opposition to the EU could link together among those voters for whom the question of Polish policy towards EU was important (de Lange and Guerra 2009), as for the League of Polish Families that strongly opposed also abortion, euthanasia, gay rights, and legalization of soft drugs. That overlapped with Father Rydzyk s discourse and further explains the selection of the leader and successfully fills an electoral gap. Thus, although Catholicism has represented a strong factor impacting on EU support for the EU, it can become a source for EU opposition, if politically represented or whether articulated in the rhetoric of important social leaders. Catholicism never becomes the fundamental element of opposition and does not become the basic element for Euroscepticism, but depending on the time and the domestic context, Catholicism can become a source of vocal opposition in the political and social debates before accession. In fact, the Church can select a party in order to impact on the draft of the national Constitution, at the time of the democratic transition, and on policy choices at salient turning points of the domestic political process developments. WHY RELIGION AND EUROSCEPTICISM Catholicism represented and represents a core and basic feature in Polish national identity. With the fall of Communism, the regime left a vacuum that religion could fill, appealing to national identity. [R]eligions have always been used and abused for political ends (Ivekovic 2002). Although the mainstream Church in Europe is an Euroenthusiast friend,

fundamentalist groups, as the ones around Radio Maryja in Poland, have gathered around their regained national sovereignty after the fall of Communism. The values flowing into their ideology belong to an ideological family that usually also presents Euroscepticism. As Taggart (1998, 379) shows (P)arty-based Euroscepticism stems from a combination of identity politics, position on the most appropriate site for conflict resolution, and relative position in the political system. In the middle of the Nineties, nationalist movements and farright groups connected around the fundamentalist Catholic Radio Maryja. The network led by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, of the Redemptionist order, was established in 1991, and soon gathered 2-3% of the overall Polish radio listeners; among them, the elderly and those with minimal education (Balser and Foxman 2006, 15). In these years, the All-Polish Youth (Młodziez Wszechpolska: MW), a young far-right group, trained a group of future young politicians who later became members of the League of Polish Families (see also de Lange and Guerra 2009). The agenda of Radio Maryja was and is distinctively anti-semitic and xenophobic, and it has been fundamental in the electoral success of the League in 2001. The Redemptionist order, known to have a very strict interpretation of the Catholic doctrine, had an impact on the programmes and information delivered by the Radio. The official Church has tried to smooth the tones of the Radio several times, without any success. The League s ideology and programme was definitely the ideal political representative for Radio Maryja. Although costly for the interest group, the Church is free to test parties and take a better choice (Warner 2000). Following Taggart s framework and how ideology and party families are distributed in Western Europe, it is possible to locate where the fundamentalist Church, radical-right wing parties and Euroscepticism can also meet in Central and Eastern Europe.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE If the Church decides to enter the social and political discourse, the party needs to respect the Church s privileges and promote explicit guarantees regarding their Christian social programme; where the ultimate target is the hegemonic position of control over the life and orientations of the collectivity (Warner 2000). After the fall of Communism, or any authoritarian and totalitarian regime, the Church is likely to lobby the political space, as the first elections are going to select members to the parliament that would write the Constitution. Although that could have had an impact on the Church in the long term, in the Nineties, the Church, as Radio Maryja, simply trained and was close to a group of young politicians-to-be. That was rewarding when the costs of the opening of the negotiation process became visible. TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE The EU represented hope and fears (CBOS data), as both a challenge and a threat. The challenge created potential Eurosceptic voters, whereas the threat appealed to those voters who posited great importance to Catholic and conservative values (see de Lange and Guerra 2009). These generally coincided among the listeners of the fundamentalist Catholic Radio. The LPR voter is nationalist and dissatisfied with the failure of the previous Solidarity Electoral Alliance (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność: AWS) government; also attached relevance to cultural values and Euroscepticism, and that posited the party on a more nationalist position than the Western Christian-Democratic parties, almost overlapping with Taggart s Western Neo Fascist parties. Therefore, in line with this typology, the LPR electorate also showed a hard Eurosceptic attitude. Catholicism, the Nation and Patriotism were in the LPR

main programme and perfectly responded to the message broadcasted by Radio Maryja. Moreover, anti-semitic comments were usually used in the messages sent to the Radio listeners. In a meeting at Częstochowa in July 9, 2006, led by the Radio, Bishop Ignacy Dec gave a speech where he asserted the anti-christian attitude of some masters of Europe today is clearly expressed through the promotion of abortion, euthanasia, homosexual marriage, feminist movements, and recently it was manifested in an aggressive assault against Poland, including against Radio Maryja and TV Trwam (the television linked to the Radio) (Balser and Foxman 2006, 15-17). These themes were common to the League s programme (see de Lange and Guerra 2009). When the young leader Roman Giertych was appointed Ministry of Education in the government coalition with Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS) and Self-Defence of the Polish Republic (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej: SRP), he asserted that there (was) no room, nor (would) there ever be any room, for homosexual activism within the school system in Poland on my watch, recommending a patriotic education for young people (Balser and Foxman 2006, 13-14). Between 2001 and 2006, Radio Maryja and the League of Polish Families shared common programmes, the former socially and culturally, the latter, socially and politically, and debates could take place on heated tones of political confrontation (Diamanti and Ceccarini 2007, 15-18). There was consistency between the political and religious leaderships. They both represented peripheral groups, and an alliance was not costly, but advantageous for both. The League offered a programme in line with Rydzyk s doctrine, while Radio Maryja fuelled its listeners to the ballots for the League of Polish Families. That lasted until Europe became less salient, because economic benefits materialized. Eurobarometer surveys give evidence of the positive attitude of Poland, 63% of Poles thought the country had benefited (the EU average was 52%) in October-November 2005 and Poland was one of the only three countries

increasing positive responses (even if just +1%) since the previous survey. The length of Polish membership correlated with a lower number of opponents. The increase in public support began just after accession and the stabilization to values around 77% appeared between September and November 2004, just a few months after accession. TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE At that stage, with decreasing levels of Euroscepticism and electoral support for the League, the religious lobby has two options, exit or voice, as a consumer: a consumer can switch brands if dissatisfied with the quality of the item purchased (exit) or instead of switching, the consumer can complain. They can both be successful depending on whether the likelihood of positive responses is greater than the effort of complaining or is greater than the likelihood of finding a suitable substitute elsewhere (Warner 2000). For Radio Maryja it was certainly less costly and more advantageous to find its political channel in the League s main political ally, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS). The League lost supporters, when some of its nationalist themes were important also for the PiS electorate. Law and Justice became one of the two main parties in Poland and led the government in 2005; when European integration became a good thing for the country and the LPR voter became more Euroenthusiast and less Eurosceptic, it was easier for Radio Maryja to exit and support Law and Justice. Inconsistency would have damaged the religious leader, and Father Rydzyk maintained his coherence and shifted his support for the main conservative social right-wing party, while the League fell short of the votes in the 2007 pre-term parliamentary elections (Guerra and Bil 2009). The case of Croatia offers both a similar and opposite, case. One of the most Catholic countries in Europe, it submitted its application for membership in 2003 and opened the

negotiation talks in 2005, after unsuccessful previous attempts. This asymmetric relationship (Grabbe 1999) impacted on attitudes towards the EU, additionally to the perceived threat to national sovereignty. On one hand, in fact, EU conditionality is perceived as an insult to the national pride, on the other the loss, once again, of national sovereignty, similarly to Poland and the other newly free post-communist countries, increases levels of Euroscepticism. That is further more important in the case of small countries that have a minimal impact on the EU policy-making process (Štulhofer 2007, 151). Symbolism and ideology were important for Father Rydzyk in Poland and the League s electorate, and are important for Croatian nationalism, as for the Orthodox religion in comparative perspective. Particularly, this symbolism overlaps with the rhetoric of radical-right wing parties. Croatia s transition to democracy can only be explained through its historical past and the impact of the War of Yugoslav. Just like Poland, the Croatian territory has been invaded by the Hungarians in the Eleventh century, and in the Sixteenth century it was divided between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. Since then, Croatia was then assigned to the Habsburg Empire, for a short time to the Illyrian province, in autonomous zones, and again split between Austria and Hungary. In the first half of the Twentieth century (1918-1941), Croatia was part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, to become, after World War II, a republic of socialist Yugoslavia (Ramet 2010, 258-259). During the transition, Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999) became and represented the Father of his country. He was at the head of his party, the Croatian Democratic Union and ruled the country through a formal and institutionalized power, and informal power. The provisions of the constitution gave him the power and his party could represent the only credible voice to enter the political and social debate for the Church. The Croatian Church, in fact, did not choose the Croatian Right s Party (Hrvatska Stranka Prava: HSP), the radical-right nationalist party, but allied with the most important party in

Croatia. The Croatian Democratic Union gathered more than 40% of the votes, when Tudjman was still the leader of the party; after losing the year 2000 political election, it is now back in power since 2003. The party that could provide the Church with resources to have an impact on policy choices and to impact on the social and political debate was Tudjman s party. Since 2000, Croatia has chosen the path towards EU accession, the Church knows that needs to smooth its tones towards EU integration and has carefully chosen its most advantageous political channel. Still, Euroscepticism is definitely on the rise, and uses some common issues to the Polish one, but without the Church s influence, at least up to date. TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE Decreasing levels of support for European integration took place after the long waiting for accession and the opening of the negotiation process brought costs (as it happened in Poland, see Szczerbiak 2001). Significantly, more citizens are concerned on economic problems and a partial loss of national independence (MVPEI data). In 2009 (EB 72 2009) only 24% thought membership was a good thing, while 37% asserted it was a bad thing for Croatia. More citizens (+3%) perceive they do not know about benefits from accession compared to the previous survey, and 36% respond Croatia would benefit, while 52% think the country is not going to benefit (EB 72 2009). Trends are similar to Polish attitudes in 2000 and 2004. That makes the quality of Croatian Euroscepticism similar to the Polish one, but without the same impact of Catholicism. Some Catholic bishops are critical of the EU on issues that concerned the Polish Church in the late Nineties, as on areas of scientific research and marriage. Nevertheless, the HDZ has been successful in leading the country for a long time, and has been the most successful ally for the Croatian Church. As the leading party, it is

constrained to carry out the reforms dictated by the negotiation process and support the reforms in the country. This leverage (Vachudova 2008) tempers also the Church that softens its attitudes towards the EU. The Croatian Church does not aim to cue citizens on the EU and officially published a letter of the Croatian Church openly supporting EU integration in April 2010. The alliance with the HDZ makes a new Polish case unlikely in the case of Croatia, and possible only if a fundamentalist Catholic Church decides to support a radicalright wing party before accession. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE This analysis suggests that religiosity can become an important ally to vocalize Euroscepticism in the political and social debate of a candidate country. The market model, adopted by Carolyn Warner (2000), is explanatory in the Polish case and can suggest a less intrusive role in the case of Croatia. Further, it suggests that a possible peripheral fundamentalist Church can benefit with a possible political ally in comparative perspective. Among the next enlargements of the EU towards the Western Balkans this analysis points to the Serbian case, where the Church has an ambivalent attitude toward the EU (Perica 2006, 177). The Serbian Church, in fact, has always had a quite anti-western attitude with an outright rejection of the strengthening of civil society. Although the conservative Serbs have been supportive toward EU integration - recognising the historical opportunity of integration (Perica 2006, 199) and the newly elected patriarch Irinej supports the process of European integration, recently, the domestic political climate has taken a more Eurosceptic turn. After the EU has recognised the independence of Kosovo, and after 22 out of 27 Member States did the same, Euroscepticism has been on the rise (Stojić 2010) and in times of crisis the warrior church is likely to turn militant (Perica 2006, 201). Furthermore, the Orthodox Church can present similar challenges, as it traditionally rejects changes and