Russia is Officially in the Region: A New Order has Just Begun. by Fadi Elhusseini

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Transcription:

Russia is Officially in the Region: A New Order has A POLICY February, PAPER 2016

POLICY UPDATE Russia is Officially in the Region: A New Order has Canadian Global Affairs Institute Prepared for the Canadian Global Affairs Institute 1600, 530 8th Avenue S.W., Calgary, AB T2P 3S8 www.cgai.ca 2016 Canadian Global Affairs Institute ISBN: 978-1-927573-57-0

Russia is Officialy in the Region: A New Order has S ince the outbreak of the Syrian uprising, Russia has limited itself to its traditional role of providing arms as well as military and logistical expertise to its Arab allies. As Syrian President Bashar al-assad s regime weakened, the Russians intensified their military support dramatically. Recently, the Russian Caesar opted to expand his role in Syria to include direct intervention against enemies of the regime. The move towards direct intervention constitutes a revolution in Russia s role in the Middle East and portends a deeper shift in the region. Russia has claimed that its intervention in Syria was intended to destroy the Islamic State (IS) after the US-led campaign proved to be an abject failure, according to an unnamed US military official speaking to CBS News. Well acquainted with terrorism, one might argue that Moscow is undertaking a pre-emptive war against Islamic extremist groups. But some have linked the intervention to the Ukrainian crisis as well as the desire for increased leverage in the Middle East and more power at the negotiating table. Thus Russia s stated intentions have been met with skepticism about the real motive behind the decision to intervene directly. One widespread opinion is that Russia wants to secure a military presence in the warm-waters of the Mediterranean Sea. While this sounds plausible, Russia has been enjoying this presence for some time already. Warm-water ports are of great geopolitical and economic interest. Those ports have long played an important role in Russian foreign policy. The Russian Empire fought a series of wars with the Ottoman s in a quest to establish a warm-water port. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I did not give Russia any further control. The Soviet Union enjoyed access to naval bases throughout the Mediterranean, yet its collapse brought an end to that access, except for the base in Tartus in Syria. Since 1971, the Russian Navy has had presence in Tartus and with Russia s recent intervention, this port enjoyed unprecedented fame. So what really lies behind the dramatic shift in Russian foreign policy? In fact, Russia s recent direct intervention in Syria gave a goodbye kiss to the conventional regional order that ruled the Middle East for ages. Traditionally, and even at the peak of the Cold War, Russia s (either the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation) role was limited to sending arms, military and logistical experts to its Arab allies. The current intervention constituted a revolution in Russia s role and marked an extraordinary heavy military intervention. The recent Russian intervention coincided with a number of important events. First is the Iranian nuclear deal which gives Iran a more prominent regional role, especially when considering the economic potentials this deal left Iran with. Second is America s gradual withdrawal from the region, which was symbolized in the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, handing over Iraq s destiny to the Iranians, cooling off efforts in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that led to the emergence of other s initiatives (e.g. the French, New Zealand), and finally its decision to withdraw the defensive shield from Turkey (for technical reasons according to the Russia is Officially in the Region: A New Order has Page 1

Russia is Officialy in the Region: A New Order has US announcement). Giving up its historical allies in Egypt (Mubarak) and Tunisia (Ben Ali), in addition to leaving the Saudis and the Gulf to fight Iran s influence in Yemen alone are other signs of a declining American role in the Middle East. A few years ago, the president of the US Council on Foreign Relations, Richard N. Haass, wrote that the era of the United States domination in the Middle East was coming to an end and that the region s future would be characterized by reduced US influence. Many observers do not believe the US will voluntarily abandon its role in the region, but the actions of other nations, combined with the Russians plans in Syria, clearly point in this direction. Under the slogan fight against terrorism, China sent its aircraft carrier Liaoning-CV-16 to Tartus and sources revealed that Beijing is heading to reinforce its forces with J-15 Flying Shark jets and Z-18F & Z-18J helicopters equipped with anti-submarine, in coordination with Tehran and Baghdad. France and Britain followed suit; the latter announced that it would mobilize reinforcements and military capabilities to the Mediterranean and Paris said it would send the Charles de Gaulle to participate in operations against IS in addition to six Rafale jets in the United Arab Emirates and six Mirage aircraft in Jordan. For its part, the US, whose aircraft carriers have been absent from the region since 2007, ordered a mere 50 special operations troops to Syria in order to help coordinate local ground forces in the north of the country. US President Barack Obama condemned Russia s direct intervention strategy, saying it was doomed to fail. And yet in a press conference in August 2014, he acknowledged that the United States does not have a strategy in Syria. Media narrative aside, Washington cannot have been taken by surprise when the Russians commenced their operations in Syria. Assuming that the Obama-Putin summit, which came hours before Russia s earliest move in Syria, did not tackle Russia s intervention plans, there were many clues that prove that the US had prior knowledge of Moscow s decision. In July 2015 Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani visited Moscow to coordinate the Russian military intervention and thus forging the new Iranian-Russian alliance in Syria. According to a Reuters report, Soleimani s visit was preceded by high-level Russian-Iranian contact and meetings to coordinate military strategies. Two months later, Iraq, Russia, Iran and Syria agreed to set up an intelligence-sharing committee in Baghdad in order to harmonize efforts in fighting ISIS. A senior US official confirmed on 18 September that more than 20 Condor transport plane flights had delivered tanks, weapons, marines, and other equipment to Russia s new military hub near Latakia in western Syria, followed by 16 Russian Su-27 fighter aircraft, along with 12 close support aircraft, four large Hip troop-transport helicopters and four Hind helicopter gunships. Hence, it is clear that the US administration was at least aware of the Russian massive preparations and yet opted to keep its presence to the minimum. In this vein, it can be strategically said that this decision goes in line with the aforementioned US grand plan in the Russia is Officially in the Region: A New Order has Page 2

Russia is Officialy in the Region: A New Order has region and marks a calculated strategic gain when securing a small share in a Russian traditional sphere of influence: Syria. The stated Russian motivation behind this involvement does not match the facts on the ground. In other words, fighting ISIS, who does not have fighter jets or missile defense systems, does commensurate neither with the sophisticated air defenses that the Russians installed at the "Humaimam" base (such as SA15 and SA22 surface-to-air missiles) nor the Russian announcements that 40 naval combat exercises were due to start in the eastern Mediterranean, including rocket and artillery fire at sea and airborne targets. For that reason, some other experts found in Russia s intervention part of its new maritime strategy, that was published on 26 July 2015. The new maritime doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020 is a comprehensive state policy for governing all of Russia s maritime assets, military fleets, the civilian fleet, merchant marine, and naval infrastructure. Russia therefore might be looking to kill as many birds as possible with one stone. Moscow will first and foremost dictate its political will on any future solution in Syria and the inclusion of Iran and Russia in Vienna talks is just a case in point. Better, Secretary of State John Kerry now concedes that the longtime Russia s ally Bashar Al-Assad might indeed be allowed to retain power for a period, Germany s Chancellor, Angela Merkel said that the West will have to engage with Assad if it is to have any chance of resolving the Syrian civil war and the British indicated a similar shift in policy. Second, Russia has now guaranteed a bigger role in the formation of a new Syrian government, even if Assad is pushed out of power and any nascent regime would seriously consider Russia s role and presence in the country; including military, investment and commercial interests in 2011 Russia invested $19 billion in Syria). Third, Russia is expanding its military presence; not only in Syria, but also in the region and the announced intelligence sharing agreement demonstrates this goal. For example, Russia offered a large array of military hardware to Iraq (such as military helicopters in 2013 and Su25s fighter aircraft) that the US has refused to sell. Fourth, although it looks like Russia and Iran have a common goal in Syria, Russia s blatant involvement ceased Iran s monopoly over the Syrian file. Fifth, Russia is making pre-emptive war against Islamic extremist groups from which Russia has long suffered. Russia can t tolerate the return of Chechens or other fighters who joined ISIS and is concerned that the West may use those radicals against Russia in a similar scenario to the Afghan case. Sixth, the Russian intervention came amidst confirmed military sources that the long-time Russian ally the Syrian regime is about to fall when it controlled only 18 percent of the country and its army exhausted 93 percent of its stock. Russia is Officially in the Region: A New Order has Page 3

Russia is Officialy in the Region: A New Order has Seventh, the mounting leverage of Russia in the region will give Russia a more powerful bargaining postion at the Ukrainian negotiations table. Finally, Russia aims at the revival of its military industries market as it was able to promote itself as an international player that can be relied upon to contain Iran, to prevent the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons, to contribute actively in the fight against terrorism, and to sell technologies for peaceful energy in the Middle East. For example, the Russian Defense Ministry is working currently on major deals with Gulf Arab states in order to develop the Marine Corps, and air defense systems, techniques of unmanned aircrafts, armored vehicles and signal systems. Russia is now building two nuclear facilities in southern Iran and in February Russia agreed to build nuclear reactors in Egypt. Moscow is negotiating as well with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Jordan for deals to develop nuclear power, the largest deal was on 19 June 2015 when Moscow agreed to establish 16 nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia. In short, Russia must now be taken seriously as a major player on the Middle East scene. The Russian recent intervention is Syria was not the first move in that direction and regional powers have reached the same conclusion. That said, it was not outlandish to see Middle Eastern leaders visiting Moscow so fast. Russia is Officially in the Region: A New Order has Page 4

About the Author Fadi Elhusseini is a political Counselor and the coordinator of Human Rights and Democracy Unit (HRDU) and an Associate Research Fellow (ESRC) at the Institute for Middle East Studies- Canada. He is a doctoral candidate at the University of Sunderland in Britain. Twitter @Felhusseini

Canadian Global Affairs Institute The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada s international relations in all its forms including (in partnership with the University of Calgary s School of Public Policy), trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States) or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests. The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada s contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security. In all its activities the Institute is a charitable, non-partisan, non-advocacy organization that provides a platform for a variety of viewpoints. It is supported financially by the contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications and programs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Institute.