JERRY S. KELLY Distinguished Professor of Economics Department of Economics 110 Eggers Hall email: jskelly@maxwell.syr.edu Syracuse University Syracuse, New York 13244-2010 (315) 443-2345 Fields Microeconomic Theory Social Choice Optimization Theory Econometric Theory Education Harvard University: PhD (Economics) - 1969; MA (Economics) - 1967. Dissertation: Studies on the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth. Committee: K. J. Arrow; H. S. Houthakker; D. A. Starrett. University of Massachusetts: BA (Mathematics and Philosophy) - 1963. Awards 1995 Resident Scholar, The Rockefeller Foundation's Bellagio Study Center 1993 Distinguished University Professorship 1991 William Wasserstrom Award for Graduate Teaching (University-wide) 1990 Excellence in the Teaching of Graduate Economics Award 1989 Chancellor's Citation for Exceptional Academic Achievement 1989 Honorary member, Golden Key National Honor Society (elected as faculty member by Syracuse University undergraduates) Professional Activities Advisory Editor: Social Choice and Welfare Member of the Council of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare Maintainence of a Web-based social choice bibliography: http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/maxpages/faculty/jskelly/biblioho.htm Professional Memberships Society for Social Choice and Welfare, American Mathematical Society and Mathematical Association of America.
KELLY 2 Professional Employment (Spring, 1993 - date) Syracuse University: Distinguished University Professor (Fall, 1977 - Spring, 1993) Syracuse University: Professor. (Fall, 1979) Southern Methodist University: Professor. (Spring, 1977) Cornell University: Visiting Associate Professor. (Fall, 1975 - Spring, 1976) University of Minnesota: Visiting Professor. (Spring, Fall, 1974) Cornell University: Visiting Associate Professor, (Fall, 1972 - Fall, 1977) Syracuse University: Associate Professor. (Fall, 1969 - Fall, 1972) Syracuse University: Assistant Professor. (Fall, 1967 - Fall, 1969) Syracuse University: Instructor. (Spring, 1967) Boston College: Instructor. (Spring, 1967) Tufts University: Instructor, (Summer, 1966) Harvard University: Research Assistant (T. C. Schelling). (Summer, 1965) Arthur D. Little: Research Assistant (G. Gols). (Summer, 1964 - Spring, 1965) Entelek, Inc. Publications [1] Lancaster vs. Samuelson on the Shape of the Neoclassical Transformation Surface, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 1, No. 3 (October, 1969) 347 351. [2] The Continuous Representation of a Social Preference Ordering, Econometrica, Vol. 39, No. 3 (May, 1971) 593 597. [3] The Identification of Ratios of Parameters in Unidentified Equations, Econometrica, Vol. 39, No. 6 (November, 1971) 1049 1051. [4] Finite Ranges and the Identification Problem, International Economic Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (February, 1972) 171 178. [5] Proportionate Variances and the Identification Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November, 1972) 1147 1150. [6] Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters and the Number of Alternatives, Econometrica, Vol. 42, No. 2 (March, 1974) 239 251. [7] Necessity Conditions in Voting Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June, 1974) 149 160.
KELLY 3 [8] Linear Cross-Equation Constraints and the Identification Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January, 1975) 125 140. [9] The Impossibility of a Just Liberal, Economica, Vol. 43, No. 169 (February, 1976) 67 75. [10] Rights Exercising and a Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 13, No. 1 (August, 1976) 138 153. [11] with Douglas Blair, Georges Bordes and Kotaro Suzumura, Impossibility Theorems Without Collective Rationality, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3 (December, 1976) 361 379. Reprinted in Landmark Papers in General Equilibrium Theory, Social Choice and Welfare (The Foundations of 20th Century Economics) Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu (Edward Elgar Pub., 2002) [12] Algebraic Results on Collective Choice Rules, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (December, 1976) 285 293. [13] Discussion (of Kenneth J. Arrow's 'Extended Sympathy in Social Choice'), American Economic Review, Vol. 67, No. 1 (February, 1977) 242 244. [14] Strategy-proofness and Social Choice Functions Without Single-Valuedness, Econometrica, Vol. 45, No. 2 (March, 1977) 439 446. [15] Arrow Impossibility Theorems (New York, Academic Press: 1978). [16] The Number of Preference Preorderings, Economics Letters, Vol. 8 (1981) 315 319. [17] Externalities and the Possibility of Pareto-Satisfactory Decentralization, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September, 1983) 241 251. [18] Simple Majority Voting Isn't Special, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 7, No. 1 (February, 1984) 13 20. [19] The Sertel and Van der Bellen Problems, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 8, No. 3 (December, 1984) 287 290. [20] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 1. Condorcet Proportions, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December, 1986) 311 314. [21] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 2. Strategy-proofness and Domain Restrictions, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March, 1987) 63 67.
[22] An Interview with Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March, 1987) 43 62. KELLY 4 [23] with Susan H. Gensemer, An Efficient Algorithm for Voting Sequences, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 14, No. 1 (August, 1987), 59 75. [24] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 3. Voting Sets, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September, 1987) 235 239. [25] Review of Schofield's Social Choice and Democracy, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 25, No. 3 (September, 1987) 1314 1316. [26] Social Choice Theory: An Introduction (Springer-Verlag, 1987). [27] Social Choice and Computational Complexity, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1988) 1 8. [28] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 4. Minimal Manipulability and Local Strategy-proofness, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March, 1988) 81 85. [29] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 5. Computational Complexity, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 5, No. 4 (November, 1988) 313 317. [30] Rights and Social Choice: Comment, Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 4 (Fall, 1988) 316 325. [31] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 6. The Ostrogorski Paradox, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January, 1989) 71 76. [32] Liberals, Information and Webster's Principles: Comment, Theory and Decision, Vol. 26, No. 2 (March, 1989) 197 201. [33] A New Informational Base for Social Choice, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April, 1989) 177 188. [34] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 7. Dictionaries, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July, 1989) 253 258. [35] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 8. Interjacency, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October, 1989) 331 335. [36] with Kislaya Prasad, NP-Completeness of Some Problems Concerning Voting Games, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 19, Issue 1 (1990) 1 9.
KELLY 5 [37] Impossibility Results with Resoluteness, Economics Letters, Vol. 34, No. 1 (September, 1990) 15 19. [38] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 9. Symmetry Groups, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 8, No. 1 (February, 1991) 89 95. [39] Social Choice Bibliography, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 8, No. 2, (April, 1991) 97 169. [40] Conjectures and Unsolved Problems: 10. Craven's Conjecture, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July, 1991) 269 274. [41] Abelian Symmetry Groups in Social Choice, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 25, No. 1 (December, 1992) 15 25. [42] Almost All Social Choice Procedures Are Highly Manipulable, But a Few Aren't, Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 10, No. 2 (April, 1993) 161 175. [43] with Donald E. Campbell, t or 1 t. That is the Trade-Off, Econometrica Vol. 61, No. 6 (November, 1993) 1355 1365. [44] The Free Triple Assumption, Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 11, No. 2 (April, 1994) 97 101. [45] with Donald E. Campbell, Trade-Off Theory, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 84, No. 2 (May, 1994) 422 426. [46] The Bordes-LeBreton Exceptional Case, Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 11, No. 3 (July, 1994) 273 281. [47] with Donald E. Campbell, Non-dictatorially Independent Pairs, Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 12, No. 1 (February, 1995) 75 86. [48] with Donald E. Campbell, Lebesgue Measure and Social Choice Trade-offs, Economic Theory, Vol. 5, No. 3 (May, 1995) 445 459. [49] with Donald E. Campbell, Asymptotic Density and Social Choice Trade-Offs, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 29, No. 3 (June, 1995) 181 194. [50] with Donald E. Campbell, Social Choice Trade-off for an Arbitrary Measure: With Application to Uncertain or Fuzzy Agenda, Economics Letters, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January, 1996) 99 104.
KELLY 6 [51] with Donald E. Campbell, Continuous-valued Social Choice, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1996) 195 211. [52] with Susan Gensemer and Lu Hong, Division Rules and Migration Equilibria, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 69, No. 1 (April, 1996) 104 116. [53] with Donald E. Campbell, Trade-offs in the Spatial Model of Resource Allocation, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 60, No. 1 (April, 1996) 1 19. [54] with Donald E. Campbell, Independent Social Choice Correspondences, Theory and Decision, Vol. 41, No. 1 (July, 1996) 1 11. [55] with Donald E. Campbell, Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences, International Economic Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 (November, 1996) 803-823. [56] with Peter C. Fishburn, Super-Arrovian Domains with Strict Preferences, SIAM Journal of Discrete Mathematics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February, 1997) 83-95. [57] with Donald E. Campbell, Relaxing Pareto Optimality in Economic Environments, Economic Theory, Vol. 10, No. 1 (June, 1997) 115-130. [58] with Donald E. Campbell, Sen's Theorem and Externalities, Economica, Vol. 64, No. 255 (August, 1997) 375-386. [59] with Donald E. Campbell, Preference Aggregation, Mathematica Japonica, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1997) 573-593. [60] with Donald E. Campbell, The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice, in Social Choice Re-examined (Proceedings of the 1994 International Economic Association Conference at Schloss Hernstein, Austria.) K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds.) (London: Macmillan, 1997) pp. 179-204. [61] with Susan Gensemer and Lu Hong, Migration Disequilibrium and Specific Division Rules, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 15, No. 2 (February, 1998) 201-109. [62] with Donald E. Campbell, Quasitransitive Social Preference: Why Some Very Large Coalitions Have Very Little Power, Economic Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1 (July, 1998) 147-162. [63] with Donald E. Campbell, Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and the Condorcet Condition, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 15, No 4 (August, 1998) 583-592. [64] with Donald E. Campbell, A Democracy Principle and Strategy-Proofness, Journal of
KELLY 7 Public Economic Theory, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October, 1999) 465-473. [65] with Donald E. Campbell, Information and Preference Aggregation, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January, 2000) 3-24. Correction: Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 24, No. 3 (June 2005): 395-396 [66] with Donald E. Campbell, Weak Independence and Veto Power, Economics Letters, Vol. 66, No. 2 (February, 2000) 183-189. [67] with Donald E. Campbell, A Simple Characterization of Majority Rule, Economic Theory, Vol 15, No. 3 (May, 2000) 689-700. [68] with Donald E. Campbell, A Trade-Off Result for Preference Revelation, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 34, No. 1 (August, 2000) 129-142. [69] with Donald E. Campbell, Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare (North-Holland, 2002), 35-94. [70] with Donald E. Campbell, Are Serial Condorcet Rules Strategy-proof? Review of Economic Design Vol. 7, No. 4 (February, 2003) 385-410 [71] with Donald E. Campbell, A Leximin Characterization of Strategy-proof and Non-resolute Social Choice Procedures, Economic Theory, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2002) 809-829 [72] with Donald E. Campbell, Non-monotonicity Does Not Imply the No Show Paradox, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July, 2002) 513-515 [73] with Donald E. Campbell, A Strategy-proofness Characterization of Majority Rule, Economic Theory, Vol. 22, No. 3 (March, 2003) 557-568 [74] with Donald E. Campbell, Preference Revelation with a Limited Number of Indifference Classes, Spanish Economic Review, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (June, 2002) 151-158. [75] with Donald E. Campbell, On the Arrow and Wilson Impossibility Theorems, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April, 2003) 273-281. [76] with Donald E. Campbell, Extraneous Variables and Strategy-proofness, The Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), 439-451. [77] with Donald E. Campbell, Social Choice Rules with Vetoers, Economics Letters, Vol. 82, No. 2 (February, 2004) 245-248. [78] with Donald E. Campbell, Social Welfare Functions Generating Social Choice Rules that
are Invulnerable to Manipulation, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January, 2006) 81-89. KELLY 8 [80] with Donald E. Campbell, Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 29 (2007) 69-82 [81] with Donald E. Campbell, Pareto, Anonymity, and Independence: Four Alternatives, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 29 (2007) 83-104 [82] with Donald E. Campbell, Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA: Countably Many Alternatives, forthcoming in The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn. Edited by SJ Brams, WV Gehrlein and FS Roberts. Berlin: Springer. (2008) [83] with Donald E. Campbell, Uniformly Bounded Information and Social Choice, forthcoming in the Journal of Mathematical Economics. [84] with Donald E. Campbell, Gains from Manipulating Social Choice Rules, forthcoming in Economic Theory. [85] with Donald E. Campbell, Losses from the Manipulation of Social Choice Rules, revised, resubmitted to Economic Theory. [86] with Donald E. Campbell, Strategy-proofness and Weighted Majority Voting, under revision for Mathematical Social Sciences. Work in Progress [1] with Donald E. Campbell, Universally Beneficial Manipulation [2] with Donald E. Campbell, Organ Transplants, Hiring Committees, and Early Rounds of the Kappell Piano Competition, [3] with Donald E. Campbell, Information Structures for Social Welfare Functions. [4] with Donald E. Campbell, The Relationship between Strategy-proofness and Coalition Strategy-proofness. [5] with Donald E. Campbell, Gibbard-Satterthwaite on a Restricted Domain.