Is China Reasonable and Trustful?: Lessons to Learn from the Senkaku Islands Incident (1)

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"JFIR Commentary" introduces news analyses and opinions in Japan on Japan's position in the international community, but they do not represent the views of JFIR as an institution. January 26, 2011 Is China Reasonable and Trustful?: Lessons to Learn from the Senkaku Islands Incident (1) By HARA Satoshi 1. Introduction: Two Aspects of Analysis What should we in the international community learn from the recent row between Japan and China over the incident of the arrest of the Chinese fishing boat captain by the Japanese Coast Guard in the adjacent water of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and his eventual release by the Japanese Prosecutor s Office? The way of reaction by China indicates a number of important elements of the basic thoughts of the Chinese authority as well as the Chinese people. There are two aspects of lessons as far as I see. One is whether China pays respect to and honor the universal values of fairness as well as the present international rules which the modern world consisting largely of liberal countries has so far developed and established in the form of international laws and treaties. In other words, whether or not China may be employing and imposing their own rules and values based on their own perception of its history. The other is which side, either Japan or China, seems right and just in asserting territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands ( 尖閣諸島 ) (or Diaoyu Islands ( 釣魚台列島 ) as China calls). 2. How to Assess the Chinese Reaction 2.1 Arrest of the Chinese fishing boat captain As to the first aspect, according to the Japanese Coast Guard, around seventy Chinese fishing boats were engaged in fishing in and around Japan s territorial water off the Senkaku, and it was the Chinese fishing boat that was witnessed engaged in fishing illegally in the territorial water, failed to respond and obey the order of the Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats to halt, ran away and, while being chased, all of sudden changed its course and collided with the patrol boats. This whole incident was videoed by the Japanese side. In China, however, a completely opposite story was 1

reported by its media that it was the Japanese Coast Guard boat which intentionally collided with the fishing boat. This initial Chinese media report apparently set the course of the anti-japan sentiment of the Chinese public since no different news such as the news from Japan or any other international news media are allowed to be reported as there is no freedom of the press in China. 2.2 Reaction of China Then, the Chinese Government speedily took several retaliatory measures against Japan on the basis of their territorial claim over the Senkaku. They include suspensions of a number of things, including governmental negotiations with Japan over the gas development in the East China Sea, aviation talks to increase flights between the two countries, organized tours to Japan by Chinese travel agents, visits of about 10,000 Japanese to China organized by Chinese firms, youth exchange program which had been agreed upon by the two Prime Ministers several months ago, and dialogues of ministerial-level or higher between the two countries. Moreover, after the Japanese court decided to extend the detention period of the boat captain for additional ten days due to further investigations on September 19, China reportedly took economic measures against Japan, including a restriction of export of rare-earth minerals only to Japan without which Japanese high-tech industries will be badly hit. Also, Japanese companies reported to the Japanese Government that the export-import of automobile and electronic parts between Japan and China has been significantly slowed down due to the unusual stringent inspections by the Chinese customs authorities at Chinese ports including Shanghai. On top of these, four Japanese nationals were detained in Hobei Province, China, due to allegedly taking photos in the restricted military zones though they could freely move into such zones. Although the Chinese authority never admits that this detention was linked to the Senkaku incident, many in the world suspect that there must be a linkage as the Chinese authority has never clarified the details of the detention. 2.3 Is the Chinese reaction compatible with the international standard? How should the international community interpret these reactions? Are the Chinese reactions reasonable and fair? While China protests to Japan about the arrest of the boat captain, the Chinese patrol boats have repeatedly arrested tens of Vietnamese fishing boats in the South China Sea and eventually confiscated the fishing boats and gears. This kind of Chinese action is seemingly based on their laws on territorial water (1992) and exclusive economic zone & continental shelf (1998). China asserts that its continental shelf from the Asian Continent extends to the lines artificially drawn immediately adjacent to the Philippines and Borneo Island in the - 2 -

South China Sea and to the Okinawa Islands in the East China Sea, and appears to assert that the waters above their alleged continental shelf are regarded as their own seas and should be controlled by them. This by all means conflicts with the present international law, particularly the Law of the Sea. A number of court rulings on maritime demarcation disputes at the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration have employed the fundamental principle of medium line which may be adjusted by other important factors if any. In reality, in order to demarcate the sea boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin, China insisted on the principle that the area be basically equivalently divided between China and Vietnam, which is apparently very close to the principle of medium line between its Hainan Island and the continental Vietnam. The final agreement was reached between China and Vietnam on this principle in 2000. However, China still refuses to accept the principle of medium line and insists on the far-reaching extension of their continental shelf in both the South China Sea and East China Sea. Doesn t it show its double standard? In this way, China, having long been preoccupied with the so-called Sino-Centrism, seems determined to go ahead with its own traditional thoughts that rules are created only by China. 2.4 Appraisal of the Chinese way of thinking We must analyze the recent incidents from the similar point of view. Are the anti-japan economic sanctions in line with the WTO rules? What laws justify the arrest of some Japanese in China? Is China a law-governed state? When the Nobel Prize Committee announced to award the Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo ( 刘晓波 ) who is in jail in China, the Chinese authority protested to it by asserting that Liu was a criminal sentenced by the Chinese judicial authorities for violating the Chinese law. But Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution unequivocally states that Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration. Isn t it the present Chinese Communist Party that violates their own Constitution by arbitrarily issuing regulations to suppress freedom of speech in defiance of their Constitution? While the People s Liberation Army has definitely strong influence over the Chinese territory including islands and sea boundaries, isn t it true that the Army is effectively controlled only by the Communist Party s Central Military Commission which consists of mainly uniform officers? Can the Chinese civilian Government exert the same influence over the Army? While so many Communist Party high-ranking officials stand politically much higher than the Government Ministers, why are they not directly accountable to the public though it is the Party itself that controls the Chinese Government? Aren t various reactions so far shown by China too excessive and high-handed in the light of the very spirit of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty signed in 1978 under the - 3 -

auspices of DENG Xiaoping ( 鄧小平 ) and FUKUDA Takeo ( 福田赳夫 )? At that time it was indeed China that, fearful of the Soviet Union, adamantly insisted to put in the Treaty an Anti-Hegemony Clause, which states that neither China nor Japan should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region. Isn t the Chinese leadership intentionally using the Senkaku incident or so-called Japan card in order to defuse the dissatisfaction and complaints of the Chinese public to the one-party rule over the huge gap between the rich and the poor, the lack of job opportunities, or the suppression of freedom of speech? By so doing, aren t they consolidating the Party s domestic power base? There are so many questions which the international community is willing to ask China. 2.5 Facts and international opinions must reach Chinese citizens Just like the row between France and China over Tibet in 2008, this time people in China have again shown a strong reaction against Japan over the Senkaku incident through demonstrations in streets and blogs on the Internet. We must analyze this reaction carefully from the cultural point of view. Chinese people are clever in the sense that they seem aware to what extent they can demonstrate their criticism of Japan, a country which is regarded as a sort of officially accepted scapegoat and to what extent they have to refrain from criticism of their Communist Party s autocracy. Once they go beyond a certain point, the authority immediately intervenes and guides the course of their reaction. The public, while being well prepared for this intervention, take appropriate actions and reactions very wisely vis-à-vis foreign countries or their own authority. Probably this has long been the history of the rulers and the ruled in China for thousands of years. As to the bilateral relations between Japan and China, it goes without saying that the Japanese, young and old, must be fully aware of, and reflect with remorse, what Japan did against neighboring countries before WWII. At the same time, I recall with nostalgic sentiment the beautiful tango danced jointly by NAKASONE Yasuhiro ( 中曽根康弘 ) and HU Yaobang ( 胡耀邦 ) less than thirty years ago. These leaders inspired two peoples to look ahead and work for friendship and good neighborly relations between the two nations. I believe that the bilateral friendship culminated at that time in the thousands of years of the history of relations. Today, people tend to look back unfortunately. Being fully aware of the above domestic environment in China, we in the international community must convey to as many Chinese citizens as possible an essential message that the world is closely watching whether China acts reasonably and trustfully in dealing with any international issues particularly in the light of the existing international laws and rules. Also, in spite of the existing so-called Golden Shields ( 金盾 ) installed by the Chinese authority to prevent the free inflow of - 4 -

unfavorable Internet information into China, we must reach Chinese people in a way or another in order to let them know sheer facts of any incidents or problems so that on the ground of genuine information they can freely think and find what will be a fair solution of any international issues. (Continued) (This is an original contribution by Mr. HARA Satoshi, Culture Analyst, to JFIR Commentary on 26 January 2011. Mr. HARA is a Member of the Policy Council of JFIR.) - 5 -