Causality Reality A military view from decades More understanding of causalities = less reality of casualties 1
Outline Aim to show how application of some simple CAS principles can get better results to navigate the causality-reality challenge in military operations, and how simplification and narrative can have terrible consequences Setting the frame for military Monty Python risk An exercise found in the Royal Marines to minimise risk with a few simple principles Case studies from the Cold War Lessons from the Afghan War (Helmand) Questions/discussion
Different types of military Holywood Conscription Professional
UK Professional Army Regimental based Ethos and purpose Role of command and control (NB Stuart s enablement and constraints) High level of skill and professionalism Key skill for a soldier: Ability to think more important than obeying Knowing how and when to disobey!??
BUT does not allow free thinking have risks?? The Monty Python risk. Source: Monty Python s Meaning of life 1983
An exercise from the Royal Marines.1970s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ob1yq5hm6qwit Who needs leaders? (with subtitles) 6
So why did they laugh? What would have happened if we had put one of you in charge? Surprising conclusion re leadership and complexity.. 7
How did they do that? The exercise you ve just seen typically gets the following response to the question What was in place to enable you to complete such a complex task? : The will and the skill of participants Clear individual objective Few simple rules Discretion which way to move freedom of action Clear boundary Continuous feedback Tolerance to ambiguity/chaos Underlying purpose
Enable better causality-reality.+ Underlying purpose Few simple rules People Skill & will Ambiguity tolerance Unambiguous feedback Defined boundaries Freedom to act Explicit objectives NB Michael s Tensions matter and another Magic!
Ethos and systemic understanding 1990s Lt. General van Riper USMC
The Cold War..a change of strategy - 1980 s
UK Cold War Counter Stroke Brigade ( Desert Rats ) 3 Battle Groups Case study: REFORGER exercise Certain Strike US III Armoured Corps
Cold War Combat Team Level ~18 Challenger Tanks Major ~1 Warrior APCs (100 infantry) Major Artillery Battery support FOO Engineering, Anti-Air, logistical assets etc
Attack advance. Engrs AA Casevac Logistics etc 1.5 2 km Direct kill range 3+kms Direct kill arc10 sq kms Indirect kill range 15kms+ SHQ CHQ 2 2 FOO 3-5 kms spread 10 Square kilometres
Contact! Engrs AA Casevac Logistics etc SHQ CHQ 2 2 FOO
Contact! SHQ 2 FOO Engrs AA Casevac Logistics etc CHQ 2
Command leading to control Time taken to plan, code and communicate orders 30 mins approx
Forming Up Point (FUP) to attack Fire Base FOO Engrs AA Casevac Logistics etc FUP Time taken to plan, code and communicate orders 30 mins approx A causality reality problem
A few simple rules.. Every soldier can recognise key things: Forming Up Point (FUP) Firing position Time to travel to FUP (which drives H Hour ) How to call in artillery strike Anyone can send these orders..role of Combat Team s command and control pushed down 9 levels NB George s Ontology and pushing decision making down, and De s Magic
Contact! Engrs AA Casevac Logistics etc SHQ CHQ 2 2 FOO FUP at grid xyz
Contact! Fire position grid xyz Engrs AA Casevac Logistics etc SHQ CHQ 2 2 FOO FUP at grid xyz
Contact! H hour at xx hrs Fire position grid xyz Engrs AA Casevac Logistics etc SHQ CHQ 2 2 FOO FUP at grid xyz
Contact! H hour at xx hrs I m reserve armour I m reserve infantry Fire position grid xyz Engrs AA Casevac Logistics etc I m back left I m fire support SHQ CHQ 2 2 I m fire support on the left FOO I m back right I m front left FUP at grid xyz We reposition to the right I m front right Old way to get attack planned and ordered: 30 minutes New way: 30-60 seconds
A few simple principles.. Underlying purpose Few simple rules People Skill & will Ambiguity tolerance Unambiguous feedback Defined boundaries Freedom to act Explicit objectives
Helmand UK Campaign - Afghanistan
A clear and laudable Purpose "We're in the south to help and protect the Afghan people to reconstruct their economy and democracy. We would be perfectly happy to leave in three years time without firing one shot. Dr John Reid, Kabul 23 April 2006 on UK forces deployment into Helmand Province
Helmand Background Desired Causalities and some resultant Realities Late 1950 s US work on giant dam to harness Helmand river: Cause: economic development/modernisation via electricity & water management Reality: Raised water tables and salt levels in Helmand soil where poppies could thrive 1970s pre and post revolution make land ownership fairer Cause create a fairer more equal agrarian society Reality deep divisions, war lords and source of fighting Early 2000 s US forces occupy Afghanistan (90% supplier of opium for the global heroin trade) Cause: Destroy Al Qada, and introduce democracy to safeguard against further extremists Reality: In Helmand (largest supplier to heroin trade) Regional Government (ex war lords) takes over and profit from opium, oppressing local farmers 2006 ISAF forces start to replace US forces after democratisation Cause: economic development and modernisation and support the new democracy through protection against Taliban Reality warning, colourful bad language..8 min video
Helmand causality and reality Source: Adam Curtis Bitter Lake BBC 2015
A clear and laudable Purpose "We're in the south to help and protect the Afghan people to reconstruct their economy and democracy. We would be perfectly happy to leave in three years time without firing one shot. Dr John Reid, Kabul 23 April 2006 on UK forces deployment into Helmand Province Unsustainable purpose A purpose based on false assumptions Use of simplistic narrative Causality reality gap
Summary a military view Modern wars and battlefields are complex Underlying complexities are critical to understand causalityreality better Simplification and simple narratives can have terrible consequences and paradoxically The gap/dynamic between causality-reality can be better navigated using a few simple and well founded principles so that. Units/organisations, who move towards non-hierarchical selforganising CAS, perform better in VUCA environments IF complexity is recognised and better understood The emergent science of complexity has much to offer organisational leadership in VUCA times
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Self-organisation gets better results.. Source: The HOW Report New Metrics for a New Reality Rethinking the source of resilience, innovation and growth LRN 2016
2011 2016 3,500+ Execs/managers 0+ countries 20+ industries 33
Preliminary Findings by ERAU/CAAL - research re CAL EBITDA Growth 2005-2011 Mean Source : Bloomberg, Oliver Wyman proprietary analysis, 2009-2011 1% Above Average Revenue & EBITDA Growth 12% High score CAL Principles Company A 10% Company B 8% -5% -3% -1% 1% 3% 5% 7% 6% Low score CAL Principles Company D Company C % 2% Below Average Revenue & EBITDA Growth Mean Company E 0% 3 9% Revenue Growth 2005-2011
CAL principles and Project Teams performance Research done in Russia on software teams dealing with complex projects Yulia Sirazitdinova Palex; Complex Adaptive Leadership Ltd; ICCPM CIS Proprietary research 2013-201 35
Follow-up measurement results 12 months after CAL sessions from sample of 00 managers Examples of qualitative results: Deliverables that took 3- weeks now take 2-3 weeks Reduced e mails by 50% Much less stress Much more focus on the right things Team members feel more valued, trusted and are much more engaged..better able to adapt to change Managed a much bigger project with less resources My management team becomes more self-steering Firmer with customers and better communications with them Increased motivation Average payback of total programme costs per group of 30 managers <6 months 36