Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 1 of 16 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION SHANNON PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS, TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (MALC, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK PERRY, Defendant. CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR [Lead case] CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-361-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case] CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-490-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case] 1
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 2 of 16 MARAGARITA V. QUESADA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Defendants. JOHN T. MORRIS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Defendants. CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-592-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case] CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-615-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case] CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-635-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case] DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants Rick Perry, in his official capacity as Governor, David Dewhurst, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor, Joe Straus, in his official capacity as Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, Hope Andrade, in her official capacity as Secretary of State, 2
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 3 of 16 and the State of Texas (collectively, the State Defendants hereby file this reply in support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. I. The Consolidated Plaintiffs Have Not Identified Any Facts to Support their Fifteenth Amendment Claims. To prove a Fifteenth Amendment violation, the plaintiffs must show that the intent of the Legislature in drawing its redistricting maps was to deny them access to the ballot because of their race or ethnicity. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, 1 ( The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.. Such proof is different in kind, not degree, from a vote dilution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Voting Rights Act. None of the consolidated plaintiffs has identified competent summary judgment evidence demonstrating that they have been denied access to the ballot. The plaintiffs in the Perez, LULAC 1, NAACP, and Quesada cases did not respond to the State s motion for summary judgment on the Fifteenth Amendment claim. Accordingly, to the extent that they raised such a claim in their respective complaints, their claims should be summarily dismissed. The remaining plaintiffs have not identified any injury cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs appear to miss the point of the State s argument because their responses mostly focus on whether they can show discriminatory intent with respect to line-drawing. Additionally, they argue that vote-dilution claims are cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment. However, as explained in the State s opening motion, the Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected the plaintiffs argument. See Prejean v Foster, 227 F.2d 504, 519 (5th Cir. 2000 ( [T]he Supreme Court has rejected the application of the Fifteenth Amendment to vote dilution causes of action.. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has expressly recognized that the 1 Although LULAC includes the Fifteenth Amendment in its subheading, see Doc. 239 at 5, the body of its argument only addresses the Fourteenth Amendment claim. 3
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 4 of 16 Court ha[s] never held that vote dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320, n.3 (2000; see also, Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980 ( The answer to the appellees argument is that... their freedom to vote has not been denied or abridged by anyone. The Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the right to have [specific] candidates elected. ; see also id. at 84, n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment (characterizing plurality opinion as concluding that the Fifteenth Amendment applies only to practices that directly affect access to the ballot. The Rodriguez Plaintiffs assert that their Fifteenth Amendment claim should not be dismissed because it is grounded in intentional, deliberate, conscious acts of racial line-drawing in the districting process. Doc. 229 at 8-9. They incorrectly invoke Prejean to support their assertion that such claims are legitimately pursued under the Fifteenth Amendment. However, they fail to grasp the crucial difference between their claims and the claims at issue in Prejean. In Prejean, voters challenged the constitutionality of a remedial subdistricting plan which wholly prevented them from participating in the election of judges within the district in which they resided. Further, the Prejean plaintiffs alleged that at least one subdistrict was drawn with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Similarly, the Latino Task Force Plaintiffs also incorrectly cite Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960, to support their claim that intentional vote dilution can be raised under the Fifteenth Amendment. See Response (Doc. 242 at 2 n.2. But the Supreme Court explained clearly in Bossier that the Fifteenth Amendment violation found in Gomillion had nothing to do with racial vote dilution: Gomillion involved a proposal to redraw the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, so as to exclude all but 4 or 5 of its 400 black voters without excluding a single white voter... Our conclusion that the proposal would deny black voters the right to vote in municipal elections, and therefore violated the Fifteenth Amendment, 4
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 5 of 16 had nothing to do with racial vote dilution, a concept that does not appear in our voting-rights opinions until nine years later. Bossier, 528 U.S. at 334 n.3 (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969. While unsupported accusations of racial motivation abound in the consolidated plaintiffs responses, there is no showing that the redistricting maps at issue prevent any plaintiff from casting a single ballot for a state or congressional representative, nor do they show how their ballot will be weighed using rules or procedures different from those applicable to every other ballot in the State of Texas. The Fifteenth Amendment claims by the remaining consolidated plaintiffs suffer from similar evidentiary defects. For these reasons, summary judgment should be granted on all Fifteenth Amendment claims. II. The Consolidated Plaintiffs Have Not Identified Evidence to Support their Claims that the State Engaged in Intentional, Invidious Discrimination on the Basis of Race. To be clear, to establish a Fourteenth Amendment claim, plaintiffs are obliged to prove discriminatory purpose. That implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course... at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 516 (2006 (Scalia, J., concurring (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979. In the context of this redistricting case, the consolidated plaintiffs must therefore prove that a majority of the Legislature including those Democrats who voted in favor of the challenged plans and the Governor had the specific purpose of harming people because of their race. The State Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment challenged the consolidated plaintiffs to identify evidence that the challenged redistricting plans are the products of actual intent to discriminate against Latino and African-American Texans on the basis of their race, ethnicity, or membership in a language 5
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 6 of 16 minority group. Plaintiffs have not done so, thus removing any doubt that their claims are based solely on the plans alleged disparate impact. They attempt to make up for the complete lack of evidence by raising baseless accusations of misconduct and relying on unfounded expert opinions. Their efforts would fall far short of establishing a genuine issue of material fact even in an ordinary case. They are completely inadequate to rebut the presumption of good faith that the law affords the State s redistricting plans in this case. Again, to prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of race. Invidious discriminatory animus is the sine qua non of a constitutional claim of racial discrimination. Coleman v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1997. None of the consolidated plaintiffs have identified any evidence in the record to support their claims of intentional discrimination. (Indeed, the LULAC plaintiffs cite no evidence whatsoever. Instead, the plaintiffs rely on the State s alleged failure to create their preferred number of minority-majority electoral districts, the alleged disparate burden the redistricting plans purportedly impose on minority voters, alleged deficiencies in the legislative process, and unfounded assumptions by lay and expert witnesses that the State intentionally discriminated against Latino and African American Texans. None of the evidence cited by the plaintiffs supports the inference that the Legislature acted with invidious intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Certainly none is sufficient to create a material fact issue of intent to discriminate. See Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1993 (describing burden as it relates to intentional discrimination in the Title VII scheme. Indeed, the only evidence of racial considerations throughout the legislative process merely demonstrates the State s effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The State, of course, has the primary responsibility of redistricting, and it was constitutionally obligated to do 6
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 7 of 16 so after the 2010 Census. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995. The states are accorded some leeway to consider race in creating redistricting plans because they are entitled to assume that sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are constitutional. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996. The State s efforts to satisfy the Voting Rights Act, which requires the State to consider race, does not rise to the level of intentional racial discrimination or unconstitutional consideration of race as the predominant factor in redistricting. 2 The Latino Task Force Plaintiffs rely on volume, but they do not identify any evidence to support their claim of intentional discrimination. 3 As the party opposing summary judgment, the Latino Task Force Plaintiffs must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports their claim. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to sift through the record in search of evidence to support the non-movant s opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992. The Quesada Plaintiffs attempt to offset their lack of evidence with a litany of accusations impugning the State Defendants good faith in the discovery process. These accusations are unfounded and, indeed, read as though they were written without any knowledge of the case. Contrary to the Quesada Plaintiffs allegations, discovery has continued past the Court s deadline by agreement of the parties; depositions have been postponed at the request of counsel for plaintiffs and cross-claimants; and the individuals primarily involved in drawing the 2 After spending the better part of their Response charging the State Defendants with intentional racial discrimination, the Quesada Plaintiffs protest as inflammatory the suggestion that many of the plaintiffs proposed remedial districts were drawn primarily on the basis of race. See Response of Quesada Plaintiffs at 19. 3 The Latino Task Force Plaintiffs filed their response at approximately 10:30 p.m. seven and a half hours past the Court-ordered deadline. In addition to ignoring the filing deadline, the Task Force attached more than 1100 pages of exhibits to their Response. 7
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 8 of 16 State s electoral maps have already appeared for a total of more than thirteen hours of deposition testimony. 4 The record reflects that the State has endeavored to coordinate discovery with multiple groups of plaintiffs without the benefit of the liaison counsel ordered by the Court. More to the point, the plaintiffs attempt to shift the focus to the State Defendants alleged intransigence strongly suggests the Quesada Plaintiffs had no basis for their intentional discrimination claims at the time they filed their complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. III. The Plaintiffs Have Not Produced Evidence to Support Their Claims Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Against the Congressional Redistricting Plan. To survive summary judgment, the plaintiffs must produce evidence to support their claim that the State could have created more Latino or African-American majority districts. It is telling that the plaintiffs have produced only one such plan Plan C188 and that plan appears on its face to violate LULAC v. Perry. The plaintiffs failed attempt to produce the requisite evidence permits only one conclusion: there is no evidence to support the first Gingles factor with respect to the congressional redistricting plan. Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue of fact on a foundational element of their claims. Summary judgment should therefore be granted. 5 Section 2 requires the plaintiffs to prove, as part of their prima facie case, that the State could have created a congressional redistricting plan with more Hispanic Citizen Voting Age Population (HCVAP majority districts (or African-American majority districts than the plan the Legislature chose to enact. MALC s reliance on Plan C188 is instructive because Plan C188 is the only map that contains more HCVAP majority districts than the enacted plan, Plan C185. To 4 Gerardo Interiano, Doug Davis, and Ryan Downton have been deposed for a total of more than thirteen hours. Mr. Interiano has appeared twice. The State has agreed to make Mr. Interiano and Mr. Downton available again at the plaintiffs request. 5 MALC contends that its allegation of a Census undercount is not a separate claim but merely a factual basis for its challenge to the Texas House of Representatives redistricting plan under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Response (Doc. 237 at 11. Because MALC s challenge to Plan C185 is not based on the alleged Census undercount, the State Defendants do not address this issue in their Reply. 8
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 9 of 16 add an additional HCVAP majority district, however, Plan C188 includes not one but two districts that stretch all the way from the Rio Grande to Travis County. In LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006, the Supreme Court struck down a single district stretching from Laredo to Travis County on the ground that neither a Section 2 injury nor a Section 2 remedy could exist in such a noncompact district. Moreover, although the plaintiffs cite Dr. Kousser s opinion as to compactness, they produce no evidence that the districts would perform. There should be no doubt after LULAC v. Perry that Section 2 does not compel the State to create such districts. LULAC offers no evidence to support its claim that it met its burden under Gingles I other than its blanket statement that it submitted alternative congressional maps. Significantly, LULAC does not describe these maps to the Court or attach them as evidence. LULAC s response is therefore plainly insufficient. The responses of the Latino Task Force and Rodriguez Plaintiffs are likewise insufficient. The Latino Task Force and Rodriguez Plaintiffs contend that because they have identified Plan C190 and Plan C166, respectively, as alternative maps, they have met their burden. Nevertheless, the mere identification of an alternative map is not dispositive evidence that the the minority group... is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 51 (1986. Other than Plaintiffs baseless assertions, there is no evidence in the record that additional compact congressional districts can be created in which minority voters form a majority. Although the Quesada Plaintiffs insist they have not had access to discovery involving drawing of the maps, they openly ignore more than thirteen hours of deposition testimony by the House and Senate staffers who were instrumental in the map-drawing process and who repeatedly explained that the Legislature attempted to draw additional minority districts. 9
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 10 of 16 Gerardo Interiano, Ryan Downton, and Doug Davis all testified that no additional districts could be drawn based on the geographic and demographic composition of the state. See Deposition of Doug Davis at 16:2-17:14, 58:2-60:8, 61:2-17, 62:2-63:3; Deposition of Ryan Downton, at 63:16-69:10. Rather than address this testimony with facts, the Quesada Plaintiffs simply state that the record establishes at least a material dispute as to whether minority communities are sufficiently compact to meet the first Gingles prong. Quesada Response (Doc. 233 19 20. The Quesada Plaintiffs do not identify an alternative map or explain how it would allow minorities a better opportunity to elect their candidate of choice than the plan enacted by the Texas Legislature. Instead, they cite a compactness study that does not even address the relevant issue. Id. at 20. This hardly establishes the potential to draw a map that will allow minorities greater opportunity to elect their candidates of choice, and it does not allow the Court to evaluate whether any such map would comply with the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the NAACP and African-American Congressional Plaintiffs claim that the Fifth Circuit has resolved the question whether coalition districts are within the reach of section 2, they ignore the Supreme Court s pointed observation that [n]othing in 2 grants special protection to minorities to form political coalitions. 6 Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1243 (2006. As a result, Plaintiffs claims that they have met their Gingles burden by introducing plans that propose the creation of coalition districts are without merit. PRAYER For the reasons stated above, the State Defendants pray that the Court grant their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE (1 all claims of intentional discrimination under the Fifteenth Amendment, (2 all claims of intentional discrimination under 6 They do not cite the subsequent history of their authority in the Fifth Circuit. 10
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 11 of 16 the Fourteenth Amendment, and (3 all claims challenging the congressional redistricting plan (Plan C185 under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 11
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 12 of 16 Dated: August 24, 2011 Respectfully Submitted, GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas DANIEL T. HODGE First Assistant Attorney General BILL COBB Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation DAVID C. MATTAX Director of Defense Litigation J. REED CLAY, JR. Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General /s/ David J. Schenck DAVID SCHENCK Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel Texas Bar No. 17736870 ANGELA COLMENERO Assistant Attorney General Texas Bar No. 24048399 MATTHEW H. FREDERICK Special Counsel to the Attorney General Texas Bar No. 24040931 ANA MARIE JORDAN Assistant Attorney General Texas Bar No. 00790748 P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711-2548 (512 936-1342 (512 936-0545 (fax ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS, HOPE ANDRADE, RICK PERRY, DAVID DEWHURST, AND JOE STRAUS 12
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 13 of 16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this filing was sent via the Court s electronic notification system and/or email to the following counsel of record on August 24, 2011, to: Via CM/ECF DAVID RICHARDS Texas Bar No. 1684600 Richards, Rodriguez & Skeith LLP 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1200 Austin, TX 78701 512-476-0005 davidr@rrsfirm.com RICHARD E. GRAY, III State Bar No. 08328300 Gray & Becker, P.C. 900 West Avenue, Suite 300 Austin, TX 78701 512-482-0061/512-482-0924 (facsimile Rick.gray@graybecker.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS PEREZ, DUTTON, TAMEZ, HALL, ORTIZ, SALINAS, DEBOSE, and RODRIGUEZ JOSE GARZA Texas Bar No. 07731950 Law Office of Jose Garza 7414 Robin Rest Dr. San Antonio, Texas 78209 210-392-2856 garzpalm@aol.com MARK W. KIEHNE mkiehne@lawdcm.com RICARDO G. CEDILLO rcedillo@lawdcm.com Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza McCombs Plaza 755 Mulberry Ave., Ste. 500 San Antonio, TX 78212 210-822-6666/210-822-1151 (facsimile ATTORNEYS FOR MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS GERALD H. GOLDSTEIN State Bar No. 08101000 ggandh@aol.com DONALD H. FLANARY, III State Bar No. 24045877 donflanary@hotmail.com Goldstein, Goldstein and Hilley 310 S. St. Mary s Street 29 th Floor, Tower Life Bldg. San Antonio, TX 78205-4605 210-226-1463/210-226-8367 (facsimile PAUL M. SMITH MICHAEL B. DESANCTIS JESSICA RING AMUNSON Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20001 202-639-6000 J. GERALD HEBERT 191 Somervelle Street, # 405 Alexandria, VA 22304 703-628-4673 hebert@voterlaw.com JESSE GAINES P.O. Box 50093 Fort Worth, TX 76105 817-714-9988 gainesjesse@ymail.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS QUESADA, MUNOZ, VEASEY, HAMILTON, KING and JENKINS 13
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 14 of 16 NINA PERALES Texas Bar No. 24005046 nperales@maldef.org MARISA BONO mbono@maldef.org REBECCA MCNEILL COUTO rcouto@maldef.org Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-224-5476/210-224-5382 (facsimile MARK ANTHONY SANCHEZ masanchez@gws-law.com ROBERT W. WILSON rwwilson@gws-law.com Gale, Wilson & Sanchez, PLLC 115 East Travis Street, Ste. 1900 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-222-8899/210-222-9526 (facsimile ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, CARDENAS, JIMENEZ, MENENDEZ, TOMACITA AND JOSE OLIVARES, ALEJANDRO AND REBECCA ORTIZ JOHN T. MORRIS 5703 Caldicote St. Humble, TX 77346 281-852-6388 JOHN T. MORRIS, PRO SE MAX RENEA HICKS Law Office of Max Renea Hicks 101 West Sixth Street Suite 504 Austin, TX 78701 512-480-8231/512/480-9105 (facsimile rhicks@renea-hicks.com ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS CITY OF AUSTIN, TRAVIS COUNTY, ALEX SERNA, BEATRICE SALOMA, BETTY F. LOPEZ, CONSTABLE BRUCE ELFANT, DAVID GONZALEZ, EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, MILTON GERARD WASHINGTON, and SANDRA SERNA LUIS ROBERTO VERA, JR. Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera, Jr. & Associates 1325 Riverview Towers 111 Soledad San Antonio, Texas 78205-2260 210-225-3300 irvlaw@sbcglobal.net GEORGE JOSEPH KORBEL Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid, Inc. 1111 North Main San Antonio, TX 78213 210-212-3600 korbellaw@hotmail.com ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR- PLAINTIFF LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS ROLANDO L. RIOS Law Offices of Rolando L. Rios 115 E Travis Street Suite 1645 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-222-2102 rrios@rolandorioslaw.com ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR- PLAINTIFF HENRY CUELLAR GARY L. BLEDSOE State Bar No.: 02476500 Law office of Gary L. Bledsoe 316 W. 12 th Street, Ste. 307 Austin, TX 78701 512-322-9992/512-322-0840 (facsimile garybledsoe@sbcglobal.net ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR- PLAINTIFFS TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, ALEXANDER GREEN, HOWARD JEFFERSON, BILL LAWSON, and JUANITA WALLACE 14
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 15 of 16 STEPHEN E. MCCONNICO smcconnico@scottdoug.com SAM JOHNSON sjohnson@scottdoug.com S. ABRAHAM KUCZAJ, III akuczaj@scottdoug.com Scott, Douglass & McConnico One American Center 600 Congress Ave., 15th Floor Austin, TX 78701 512-495-6300/512-474-0731 (facsimile ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS CITY OF AUSTIN, TRAVIS COUNTY, ALEX SERNA, BALAKUMAR PANDIAN, BEATRICE SALOMA, BETTY F. LOPEZ, CONSTABLE BRUCE ELFANT, DAVID GONZALEZ, EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, ELIZA ALVARADO, JOSEY MARTINEZ, JUANITA VALDEZ-COX, LIONOR SOROLA-POHLMAN, MILTON GERARD WASHINGTON, NINA JO BAKER, and SANDRA SERNA CHAD W. DUNN chad@brazilanddunn.com K. SCOTT BRAZIL scott@brazilanddunn.com Brazil & Dunn 4201 FM 1960 West, Suite 530 Houston, TX 77068 281-580-6310/281-580-6362 (facsimile ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR- DEFENDANTS TEXAS DEMOCRATIC PARTY and BOYD RICHIE VICTOR L. GOODE Asst. Gen. Counsel, NAACP 4805 Mt. Hope Drive Baltimore, MD 21215-5120 410-580-5120/410-358-9359 (facsimile vgoode@naacpnet.org ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR- PLAINTIFF THE TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES ROBERT NOTZON State Bar No. 00797934 Law Office of Robert S. Notzon 1507 Nueces Street Austin, TX 78701 512-474-7563/512-474-9489 (facsimile robert@notzonlaw.com ALLISON JEAN RIGGS ANITA SUE EARLS Southern Coalition for Social Justice 1415 West Highway 54, Ste. 101 Durham, NC 27707 919-323-3380/919-323-3942 (facsimile anita@southerncoalition.org ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR- PLAINTIFFS TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, EARLS, LAWSON, WALLACE, and JEFFERSON DONNA GARCIA DAVIDSON PO Box 12131 Austin, TX 78711 512-775-7625/877-200-6001 (facsimile donna@dgdlawfirm.com FRANK M. REILLY Potts & Reilly, L.L.P. P.O. Box 4037 Horseshoe Bay, TX 78657 512-469-7474/512-469-7480 (facsimile reilly@pottsreilly.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT STEVE MUNISTERI 15
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 251 Filed 08/24/11 Page 16 of 16 Via Email JOAQUIN G. AVILA P.O. Box 33687 Seattle, WA 98133 206-724-3731/206-398-4261 (facsimile jgavotingrights@gmail.com ATTORNEYS FOR MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS KAREN M. KENNARD 2803 Clearview Drive Austin, TX 78703 (512 974-2177/512-974-2894 (facsimile karen.kennard@ci.austin.tx.us ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CITY OF AUSTIN DAVID ESCAMILLA Travis County Asst. Attorney P.O. Box 1748 Austin, TX 78767 (512 854-9416 david.escamilla@co.travis.tx.us ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF TRAVIS COUNTY /s/ David J. Schenck DAVID J. SCHENCK Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel 16