SOURCE #1: The "Peace Ballot" of 1934-35. 11.6 million votes cast; 38.2% of U.K. population over age 18. The League of Nations had a extensive network of local societies which were grouped in the League of Nations Union. The leaders of the League of Nations Union in Ilford in Essex held a national ballot asking people's views about the League, about the Locarno treaties, about disarmament and about the arms trade. The ballot was held in the autumn of 1934 and the results announced in the early summer of 1935. 1. Should Britain remain a member of the League of Nations? (over 90% said Yes) 2. Are you in favour of an all-round reduction of armaments by international agreement? (over 90% said Yes) 3. Are you in favour of the all-round abolition of national military and naval aircraft by international agreement? (80% said Yes) 4. Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit be prohibited by international agreement? (over 90% said Yes) 5. Do you consider that, if a nation insists on attacking another, the other nations should combine to compel it to stop, by (a) economic and non-military measures? (over 90% said Yes) (b) if necessary, military measures? (70% said Yes)
SOURCE #2: Conclusion of Note from General Ismay (Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence) to the British Cabinet sent on September 20th, 1938. 15. The broad conclusions of this Note may be summarized as follows: (a) A German absorption of Czechoslovakia will enhance her military prestige, increase her war potential and probably enable her to dispose of stronger land forces against France and ourselves than she can do at present. (b) So far as air power is concerned, Germany may be able to maintain her lead over the Franco-British Air Forces in air striking power. On the other hand, it is open to us, provided that we make the necessary effort, to catch her up, or at least greatly reduce her lead, in the matter of defence (both active and passive) against air attack. By so doing we shall have heavily insured ourselves against the greatest danger to which we are present exposed: indeed by substantially reducing Germany's only chance of a rapid decision, we shall have provided a strong deterrent against her making the attempt. (c) It follows, therefore, that, from the military point of view, time is in our favour and that, if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in say 6-12 months' time, than to accept the present challenge.
SOURCE #3: Letter from Arthur Pillans Laurie to Quintin Hogg (Conservative candidate for Parliament), October 1938. Dear Sir, I enclose a very interesting statement sent to me by a friend of mine Mr. Symonds of 12 Grove Rd North Southsea, who was in Prague and in Eger during the crisis. His statement shows clearly that the new government set up by the Czechs while telling the allies that they accepted the separation of the Sudeten German area, were doing their best to provoke war with Germany and so bring in France and Great Britain. The Czech press was openly agitating for this policy, and the intolerable situation had arisen that Czech soldiers were shooting down Germans as rebels in territory which it had already been agreed should be ceded to Germany. All these facts were of course known to Hitler, and are sufficient to justify his issuing an ultimatum. The suggestion that a British Prime Minister yielded to threats of force is absurd. After the Runciman report we were bound as a democratic people to admit the right of the Sudeten Germans to self determination which is the foundation on which democracy is built. It is not the first time in our history that a Prime Minister has yielded, even to our detriment, when he was satisfied as to the justice of the cause. Hitler and not Chamberlain was taking enormous risks as the combined forces of Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and Russia would have been sufficient to overwhelm Germany. Chamberlain had overwhelming forces behind him. I wish you all good luck in your fight. The issue is one between peace and war in Europe. Yours sincerely, A.P. Laurie
SOURCE #4: Extracts from the minutes of the Cabinet meeting on 11 March 1936 discussing German occupation of the Rhineland of March 7th. He [the Prime Minister] thought it inevitable that the French and Belgians would both announce their intention - if Germany could not be persuaded to evacuate the demilitarised zone - to ask the Council of the League of make a pronouncement. Then if Germany was still obdurate, they would proceed to military measures and ask us to do the same. In that case we should have to decide whether we intend to fulfil our Treaty obligation - and we should be in an impossible position if we refused. The Prime Minister thought at some stage it would be necessary to point out to the French that the action they proposed would not result only in letting loose another great war in Europe. They might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany going Bolshevik. From information given by the Service Ministers it transpired that our position at home and in home waters was a disadvantageous one, whether from the point of view of the Navy, Army or Air Force, or anti-aircraft defence. In addition, public opinion was strongly opposed to any military action against the Germans in the demilitarised zone. Moreover, many people, perhaps most people were saying openly that they did not see why the Germans should not reoccupy the Rhineland. In these circumstances, it was generally accepted that it was worth taking almost any risk in order to escape from that situation.
SOURCE #5: Excerpt from a Letter to Quintin Hogg (Conservative candidate for Parliament), October 1938. Dear Sir, Can you really have confidence in insisting that his policy with Hitler was not weakness? Were our defences really so poor that we were forced to desert a brave and democratic little country to grovel (there is no other word) before a dictator of whose cruelty and unscrupulousness we have fresh proof every day. Thanks to Mr. Chamberlain Germany is now in a stronger position than ever before. Things do indeed look black. I consider & many others share my opinion, that Mr. Chamberlain has missed an unparalleled opportunity of making lasting peace secure by his policy of "conciliation". He has now proved to the world that brute force is the only thing that counts & in future Britain must see that she is the strongest power in the world so that next time she can dictate the terms instead of Hitler. The unfortunate weakness in that point is that we shall never be as strong again as we were this time & Hitler will be much stronger, thanks to the natural resources of Czechoslovakia. One last word about the watchword of your Party the final insult that we are asked to swallow. Instead of "Peace with honour", may I suggest "Peace at any price, provided someone else pays it". The honour this time rests with Czechoslovakia. I sincerely hope Mr. Chamberlain may enjoy the "peace" he has purchased for us at such a cost, for the remaining years of his life. Yours faithfully, Elizabeth E. Whitley
SOURCE #6: By British cartoonist David Low, Evening Standard, 8 July 1936. The first three steps are labeled Rearmament, Rhineland, and Danzig. The last step is labeled Boss of the Universe.
SOURCE #7: Excerpt from statement by Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, during the parliamentary debate on the Munich Agreement in the House of Commons, October 3, 1938. I have always been a student of foreign politics. I have served 10 years in the Foreign Office, and I have studied the history of this and of other countries, and I have always believed that one of the most important principles in foreign policy and the conduct of foreign policy should be to make your policy plain to other countries, to let them know where you stand and what in certain circumstances you are prepared to do... I believe that the great defect in our foreign policy during recent months and recent weeks has been that we have failed to do so. During the last four weeks we have been drifting, day by day, nearer into war with Germany, and we have never said, until the last moment, and then in most uncertain terms, that we were prepared to fight. We knew that information to the opposite effect was being poured into the ears of the head of the German State. He had been assured, reassured, and fortified in the opinion that in no case would Great Britain fight... The Prime Minister has believed in addressing Herr Hitler through the language of sweet reasonableness. I have believed that he was more open to the language of the mailed fist... The Prime Minister has confidence in the good will and in the word of Herr Hitler, although when Herr Hitler broke the Treaty of Versailles he undertook to keep the Treaty of Locarno, and when he broke the Treaty of Locarno he undertook not to interfere further, or to have further territorial aims, in Europe. When he entered Austria by force he authorised his henchmen to give an authoritative assurance that he would not interfere with Czechoslovakia. That was less than six months ago. Still, the Prime Minister believes that he can rely upon the good faith of Hitler; he believes that Hitler is interested only in Germany, as the Prime Minister was assured...
SOURCE #8: Excerpt from statement by Winston Churchill during the parliamentary debate on the Munich Agreement in the House of Commons, October 5, 1938. I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or forget but which must nevertheless be stated, namely, that we have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat, and that France has suffered even more than we have. The utmost he [Chamberlain] has been able to gain for Czechoslovakia and in the matters which were in dispute has been that the German dictator, instead of snatching his victuals from the table, has been content to have them served to him course by course. Nevertheless, I am not quite clear why there was so much danger of Great Britain or France being involved in a war with Germany at this juncture if, in fact, they were ready all along to sacrifice Czechoslovakia. The terms which the Prime Minister brought back with him.. could easily have been agreed, I believe, through the ordinary diplomatic channels at any time during the summer. France and Great Britain together, especially if they had maintained a close contact with Russia, which certainly was not done, would have been able in those days in the summer, when they had the prestige, to influence many of the smaller States of Europe Such a combination, prepared at a time when the German dictator was not deeply and irrevocably committed to his new adventure, would, I believe, have given strength to all those forces in Germany which resisted this departure, this new design. They were varying forces, those of a military character which declared that Germany was not ready to undertake a world war, and all that mass of moderate opinion and popular opinion which dreaded war, and some elements of which still have some influence upon the German Government. Such action would have given strength to all that intense desire for peace which the helpless German masses share with their British and French fellow men...