Twenty Years of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned? William Durch, Senior Associate, Stimson Center, Prepared for the NDIA conference on Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction Operations, 18 June 2014
Peace Operations = Peacekeeping + Peacebuilding PB includes: Reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, Strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); Improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; Providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and Promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.
Peacebuilding and the Fragile State" Fragile is the opposite of effective. An effective state has: the capacity and willingness to mobilize resources, exercise political power, control its territory, manage the economy, implement policy, and promote human welfare in an inclusive manner. (Alistair McKechnie, Drawing on Experience: Transforming fragile states into effective ones, Development Outreach 11:2 (Oct. 2009): 2.) A fragile state s grip on these attributes is tenuous, subject to challenge, and hard to regain if challenged by: natural disaster (flood, earthquake, drought/famine) outside human action (invasion, mass flight from elsewhere) internal forces (political rivalry driven by greed/grievance or both) A post-conflict state is fragile almost by definition, but a fragile state (Haiti) need not be post-conflict.
Problems in Reducing Fragility Capacity building in post-conflict and fragile states presents three unique challenges: everything is a priority, existing capacity is weak, and visible results must be achieved quickly. (Sanjay Pradhan, Building Capacity to Move Past Conflict and Fragility, Ibid., 7.) In particular, there are two fundamental public goods which [the 60 countries of the bottom billion] are structurally ill-equipped to supply internally: security and accountability... Some form of international supply is necessary... (Paul Collier, A Worldwide Pact for Security and Accountability in Fragile Bottom Billion States, Ibid., 10 12.) Peacekeeping succeeds in bringing down risks that states will revert to conflict, but there is no coherent budgetary framework in which its value is compared and evaluated against aid. (Collier)
Peace Support Operations, 1948-2008, Parsed by Source of Deployment Authority 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Peacekeeping Troops and Police, Thousands UN-led "Ch. 6.5" UN-led Ch. 7 UN-Authorized UN-Recog'd Other Ops
140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0 January-04 April-04 July-04 October-04 January-05 April-05 July-05 October-05 January-06 April-06 July-06 October-06 January-07 April-07 July-07 October-07 January-08 April-08 July-08 October-08 January-09 April-09 July-09 October-09 January-10 April-10 July-10 October-10 January-11 April-11 July-11 October-11 January-12 UN Mission Personnel Strength, 2004-2012 UNTSO UNMOGIP UNFICYP UNDOF UNIFIL MINURSO UNOMIG UNMIK UNAMSIL MONUC MONUSCO UNMEE UNMISET UNMIT UNMIL UNOCI MINUSTAH ONUB UNMIS UNMISS UNAMID MINURCAT UNISFA
A mission s reach should exceed its grasp, or what is world peace for? * Security Council mandates: repeatedly exceeding politicalsecurity capacities of implementers. National ownership goals vs. entrenched local interests & networks reaching back into wartime. Insufficient or inconsistent high-level political back-up to the operational level. Temporary exception? Eastern DRC/M23/FIB and associated Peace and Security Framework for the region. (*Apologies to John Donne)
Notional Trends in Operating Environments Level of Violence Description of Levels UNMIBH UNMIK UNTAET MONUC UNAMSIL UNMISET UNMIL UNOCI ONUB MINUSTAH UNMIS UNMIT UNAMID MINURCAT UNMISS MINUSMA 10 No cease-fire; major armed violence in some or all of AOR X 8 Partial cease-fire (btw. certain groups or in parts of AOR) X X X 7 All armed parties sign accord; one or more sign in bad faith* X X X 6 Significant, hostile armed groups are not parties to peace accord X X X X X 5 All parties sign in good faith; violent factions break away X X X Notional trend line 4 General cease-fire; no peace accord X X 3 Other states/entities use exfighters for criminal purposes X X X X X X 2 All armed parties sign accord; one or more obstruct mission X X X X X X 1 All armed parties sign in good faith; minimal spoiler activity X X --- *Indicators of bad faith: resumption or continuation of violence against political, ethnic or religious foes.
What we know about what interventions need in order to accomplish their objectives. Sustained great power support for peace. Sustained support for peace in the neighborhood. Local parties willingness to shift from military to political competition and risk political loss (with expectation of survival and opportunity to compete and win later). Necessary evolution of local politics beyond wartime leaders. Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia. That marginal control of natural resources by legitimate local actors can fuel spoiler activities. International peace support team must be able to invest at least a decade in the socio-political-economic transformation.
Transition From/To Types Transitional Administration to Supporting Operation Larger to smaller complex operation Complex operation to special political mission Complex operation to government (and UNCT). SPM to government (and UNCT). Mission to chaos.
Transition Factors Outside the Control of the Operation Almost everybody and everything not specifically within the operation and some that are within it: Regional political and conflict processes Transnational organized crime The host government Ethnic/confessional communities default response to insecurity IDP and refugee returns Partners who transition by the clock (duration-specific regional or coalition operations) Partners who don t transition by the clock (at least not yours) Troop and police contributing countries caveats Humanitarian actors views and programming Donors legislatures, aid agencies, and implementing partners The climate, weather, and geology of the mission area
Outcomes Sample Completed Operations Measured goal attainment Nicaragua (UN, 1990; CIAV, ~1994) Cambodia (UN, 1993), Mozambique (UN, 1994), Croatia (eastern, UN, 1998), Bosnia (2002), Kosovo? (2008) Predicted goal attainment Strategic consent revoked [Return to war/evacuation] Strategic need goes away (interstate peacekeeping) Sierra Leone (UN, 2005, accurate) Timor Leste (UN, 2005, inaccurate; 2012, accurate so far) Egypt-Israel (1967), Angola (1992-98) Iran-Iraq (1990), Somalia (1995), Bosnia (1995), Iraq-Kuwait (2003), Burundi (2006), Ethiopia-Eritrea (2008), Chad (2010) Not so far (e.g., southern Lebanon, Golan Heights, Sinai, Kashmir, Cyprus)
Durability of change vs. sustainability of trust and hope: A Mental Model of Peace Ops, Governments and Publics Strength of trust & hope High Low Public trust and hope* without govt. change. with govt. change Typical UN mission presence Gov t employees trust & hope grow as govt. change occurs. If change is not well-embedded, with champions, it will lose out to patronage nets & other business as usual and begin to unravel. As govt. behavior reverts, trust and hope are lost, first by civil servants, who see things first hand, and then by the public. Absent Change/reform in govt. 1 5 10 15? Years from peace accord and mission deployment Critical window for visible change * Trust: the present measure of public affinity for government. Hope: anticipation that trust will last or improve. Hope becomes trust if government performance earns it. Else hope wanes and trust is directed to or kept at levels of personal interaction and private security (family, community).