IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF FLORIDA Case No.: SC05-1048 MARTIN LUTHER KING, Petitioner, vs. KING MOTOR COMPANY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Respondent. PETITIONER S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FOURTH DISTRICT Rebecca J. Covey, Esquire Raymond G. Ingalsbe, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 471641 Fla. Bar No.: 219241 Rebecca J. Covey, P.A. Raymond G. Ingalsbe, P.A. 1318 SE 1 st Avenue 4400 PGA Boulevard, Suite 800 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 Telephone: (954) 763-4300 Telephone: (561) 775-3505 Facsimile: (954) 763-4666 Facsimile: (561) 624-3533 Counsel for Petitioner, Martin Luther King
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CITATIONS... ii INTRODUCTION...1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS...2 The Fourth District Decision...3 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...4 ARGUMENT...5 1. The decision expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of other District Courts of Appeal and of the Supreme Court on the same question of law....5 2. The decision expressly declares as valid 319.001(8) (2002) and 320.60(10), Fla. Stat. (2000)...9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE... 11 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE... 11 i
TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Cox Motor Company v. Faber, 113 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)... 6,8 Dodge City, Inc. v. Byrne, 693 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)... 4, 10 Fletcher Motor Sales v. Cooney, 158 Fla. 223, 27 So.2d 289 (1946)...6 Huskamp Motor Co. v. Hebden, 104 So.2d 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)... 4, 10 Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1955)... 6, 7 Florida Statutes Section 319.001(8), Florida Statutes (2002)...3, 5, 9, 10 Section 320.60(10), Florida Statutes (2000)...3, 5, 9, 10 ii
INTRODUCTION This brief is filed on behalf of Petitioner, Martin Luther King, the plaintiff and the appellant in the lower tribunals, respectively. Throughout this brief Petitioner will be referred to as plaintiff or petitioner. Respondent, Appellee below, King Motor Company of Fort Lauderdale, will be referred to as King Motor. References to the District Court opinion will be designated A followed by the page number. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS Case: The petitioner-plaintiff brought a multi-count action against several defendants, including a count for certain violations of the Motor Vehicle Retail Sales Finance Act (MVRSFA) against King Motor, to wit: Obtaining plaintiff s signature on an incomplete RISC; failure to sign the retail installment sales contract (RISC) and failure to provide the plaintiff with a dealer-signed RISC; obtaining plaintiff s signature on a so-called bailment agreement. During the litigation the trial court granted motions for summary judgment filed by the various defendants, including granting summary judgment for King Motor on the MVRSFA. Plaintiff appealed resulting in an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal with opinion addressing the plaintiff s MVRSFA claims against King Motor. The opinion is appended hereto. The plaintiff timely moved for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and for certification of questions considered to be of great public importance. That motion was denied on May 10, 2005. Petitioner timely filed a notice to invoke this Court s discretionary jurisdiction. This jurisdictional brief follows. Facts: On February 27, 1998, plaintiff purchased a new 1997 Kia Sephia automobile from King Motor. (A.1). Among the papers presented to plaintiff for signature were two different RISCs, one included an extended warranty, and the 2
second did not include the warranty. (A.1). Plaintiff signed the two retail installment sales contracts but defendant did not itself sign the RISCs. (A.1). King Motor later signed its copy of the RISC without the warranty at the time of assigning its obligation to a third party, Primus Financial. (A.1). King Motor also obtained plaintiff s signature on a bailment agreement which purports to make financing contingent upon King Motor s ability to sell its RISC to a third party. (A.1). The Fourth District Decision observed that In oral argument, (plaintiff) emphasized provisions of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to support (his) contentions. (A.3). The Court held: a. Because plaintiff did not expressly plead a separate claim under TILA, TILA is inapplicable to plaintiff s claims brought in Florida under the MVRSFA and cannot be considered. (A.4) b. Florida Statute sections 319.001(8) and 320.60(1) (sic), cited by King Motor..., at the very least contemplate the use of conditional sales contracts in the motor vehicle sales industry. (A.3-4). c. King Motor s bailment agreement along with a RISC combine to form a conditional sales contract which [b]y a very reading of the 3
contract, it is clear that no obligation existed until a satisfactory financing arrangement was obtained. Citing and quoting Huskamp Motor Co. v. Hebden, 104 So.2d 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); Dodge City, Inc. v. Byrne, 693 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). (A.4). d. The MVRSFA at 520.02(14), defines retail installment contract to include a conditional sales contract and a contract for the bailment or leasing of a motor vehicle... (A.3-4). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The federal Truth In Lending Act is the supreme law of the land in the context of retail installment transactions, including the one sub judice. The MVRSFA is Florida s supplement to and extension of the Truth in Lending Act. The decision expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the Supreme Court and with decisions of other district courts of appeal on exactly what a conditional sales contract is. Heretofore case precedent had long established that a conditional sales contract was simply a deferred payment contract and since the enactment of the MVRSFA is called a retail installment contract. By holding that King Motor s so-called bailment agreement is legitimate and may be used in conjunction with a RISC to delay consummation until some indefinite future time 4
when King Motor finds a buyer for its RISC, the district court held two regulatory statutes valid and fundamentally changed the meaning and legal effect of a conditional sales contract/risc. By citing Florida Statutes Section 319.001(8) (2002) and 320.60(10) (2000) in support of its holding that retail installment contracts can be made contingent upon the creditor s ability to assign its RISC to a third party, the Fourth District has ruled that those statutes are valid. Those two statutes contain the undefined phrase conditional sales contract, and the district court has engrafted a meaning that is contrary to established precedent. The district court ruled either that (1) King Motor s so-called bailment agreement is itself a conditional sales contract, or (2) King Motor s so-called bailment agreement along with a buyer-signed RISC combine to form a conditional sales contract, which holding directly conflicts with established precedent on the same question of law. ARGUMENT 1. The decision expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of other District Courts of Appeal and of the Supreme Court on the same question of law. The transaction between the plaintiff and King Motor is defined in the MVRSFA as a retail installment transaction, i.e., every consumer retail vehicle purchase where payment of a portion of the purchase price is deferred and financed 5
by use of a retail installment contract is governed by the MVRSFA. A RISC alone is a conditional sales contract. But the Fourth District s decision holds as a matter of law that either (1) the combination of King Motor s bailment agreement along with a buyer-signed RISC forms a conditional sales contract, or (2) King Motor s bailment agreement is itself a conditional sales contract. Either scenario is in direct conflict with Fletcher Motor Sales v. Cooney, 158 Fla. 223, 27 So.2d 289 (1946); Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1955); Cox Motor Company v. Faber, 113 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959), among others. The question of law long established in Florida is that a conditional sales contract is a deferred payment contract or a retail installment sales contract. The terms are synonymous. By holding that a conditional sales contract is something different, the Fourth District is in irreconcilable conflict with these cases. a. Fletcher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Cooney, 158 Fla. 223, 27 So.2d 289 (1946). On February 10, 1945, Fletcher Motors sold a used Mercury to buyer Schaar. Evidence of the sale included a conditional sales contract providing that Schaar pay a $200 downpayment to Fletcher Motors and providing also for the balance of $476 to be paid in installments. Fletcher Motors then delivered the 6
Mercury to buyer Schaar. On February 12, 1945, Fletcher Motors signed the contract and assigned it to a third party. Meanwhile, on February 11, 1945, while driving the Mercury, Schaar was involved in a collision resulting in the death of his passenger whose surviving husband sued Fletcher Motors alleging that Fletcher Motors at the time of the accident (on February 11) was the legal owner of the Mercury, not Schaar. The Court held that Fletcher Motors was not liable because the sale and financing were completed on February 10, 1945 upon Schaar s signing the conditional sales contract and taking delivery of the Mercury. [T]he conclusion is irresistible that there was a meeting of the minds of the seller and the purchaser about each detail of the sale on February 10, 1945. The acceptance of the conditional Sales Contract by the Fletcher Motor Sales, Inc., occurred on February 10, 1945, although not formally signed by the seller until February 12, 1945. It is reasonable to infer that the Fletcher Motor Sales, Inc., inadvertently omitted the formal acceptance of the Sales Agreement until it took the necessary steps to transfer it to the finance company. b. Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1955). On August 16 1952, R.S. Evans used car lot agreed to sell an automobile to buyer Hughes for $1,030, obtained Hughes signature on a purchase order and a credit application, and took a $50 partial downpayment. The vehicle was not then delivered. 7
Two days later, Hughes returned to the used car lot, paid $300 in additional downpayment, signed a conditional sales contract, and took delivery of the automobile. Twenty minutes later while driving the automobile Hughes struck Palmer who was riding a motorcycle. Palmer sued the dealership alleging that vehicle ownership remained with R.S. Evans and had not transferred to Hughes. In the case at bar, the parties intended to enter, did enter, and ultimately memorialized in writing, a conditional sales contract, in which title was retained by the seller until the completion of payment. Id. at 637. The Court ruled that under the circumstances Hughes was the beneficial owner of the automobile, not the seller who held the title only as security for Hughes paying the remaining installments under the conditional sales contract. c. Cox Motor Company v. Faber, 113 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). On January 7, 1959, buyer Hildebrand signed a purchase contract with Cox Motors for a used Chevrolet for $295, but did not take delivery. On January 8, 1959, buyer Hildebrand returned and paid $50 in downpayment and agreed with Cox Motors in writing to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments. Cox Motors delivered the car. A month later Hildebrand struck a pedestrian while driving the Chevrolet. The injured pedestrian sued Cox Motor Company. The court ruled that Cox Motors was not liable. This case involves a contract to purchase, later to be replaced 8
with a deferred payment agreement or conditional sales contract.... Obviously this was a binding written contract to purchase under which each party had mutual obligations and by which the purchaser had an equitable right resting in contract. An agreement to sell is generally held to be a sale on condition or conditional sale. In almost all jurisdictions a conditional sale is a sale in which the vendee receives the possession and right of use of the goods sold but the transfer of the title to the vendee is made dependent upon the performance of some condition or the happening of some contingency, usually the full payment of the purchase price. The contract in question could not be a technical bailment or lease. The performance of the condition is a condition precedent to the vesting of the legal title in the purchaser but not the vesting of certain contractual rights. The contract was nonetheless a conditional sales contract even though it contemplates the execution thereafter of another contract to secure the purchase price. Id. at 773-74. (Citations omitted.) In its decision sub judice the Fourth District s formulation of a conditional sales contract is in direct conflict with established precedent as exemplified in the cited cases. 2. The decision expressly declares as valid 319.001(8) (2002) and 320.60(10), Fla. Stat. (2000). The court noted that in opposition to the plaintiff s MVRSFA claims, King Motor cited 319.001(8) and 320.60(10), Fla. Stat., for the proposition that conditional delivery has been approved by the Florida Legislature. In its decision 9
the court found that: [W]e do not find King s (plaintiff s) state law arguments on this point to be persuasive. This is because the statutes cited by King Motor, in addition to cases, at the very least contemplate the use of conditional sales contracts in the motor vehicle sales industry. See Dodge City, Inc. v. Byrne, 693 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).. ; Huskamp Motor Co. v. Hebden, 104 So.2d 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).... Sections 319.001(8) and 320.60(10) each refer to conditional sales contract without definition. The Fourth District interpreted that phrase in the context of the two statute sections as meaning either, (1) the combination of King Motor s bailment agreement along with a buyer-signed RISC (as that is what occurred in the case sub judice), or (2) King Motor s bailment agreement is itself a conditional sales contract, a conclusion reached by the Second District in Dodge City, Inc. v. Byrne, 693 So.2d at 1035, a case cited in the Fourth District s opinion. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Petitioner requests the Court to accept jurisdiction and direct the parties to submit briefs on the merits. 10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a copy hereof has been furnished by U.S. Mail this 17th day of June, 2005 to: Rebecca J. Covey, Esquire, 1318 SE 1 st Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316; Ricardo A. Reyes, Esquire, Tobin & Reyes, P.A., 7251 West Palmetto Park Road, Suite 205, Boca Raton, FL 33433; Nancy W. Gregoire, Esquire, Bunnell, Woulfe, Kirschbaum, Keller, McIntrye & Gregoire, P.A., One Financial Plaza, 9 th Floor, 100 SE Third Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316; Kenneth L. Paretti, Esquire, Adams & Quinton, P.A., 80 SW 8 th Street, Suite 2150 Miami, FL 33130. RAYMOND G. INGALSBE, P.A. Attorney for Petitioner 4400 PGA Boulevard, Suite 800 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 Telephone: (561) 775-3505 By: RAYMOND G. INGALSBE FLA. BAR NO.: 219241 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I CERTIFY that the brief complies with the font requirements of Rule 9.210(a)(2). By: RAYMOND G. INGALSBE 11
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