Gov 384M: AGENDA-SETTING (38935) Department of Government University of Texas SPRING 2012 BAT 5.108 Instructor: Bryan Jones TUE 3:30 6:30 Office: BAT 3.154; Tel: 512-471-9973 Office Hours: T 1-3, W 2-4 Email: bdjones@u.austin.utexas.edu Course Overview The question of how an issue gets on the policymaking agenda that is, is considered seriously by policymakers seems simple, but the most obvious explanations are questionable. It is not easy to explain what, how, and when an issue will come to prominence in a political system. This seminar will explore the notion that individual choices, choices within political institutions and public policy outputs are interconnected, but that the connections are not simple. We will examine the processes of how people and policy-making institutions process information and make choices, and how those choices lead to change in public policy outputs. In doing so, we study how the adaptive but limited nature of the cognitive capacities of individuals and institutions lead to an evolutionary pattern of policy changes. In addition, we will explore the use of two powerful databases that can be used to study agenda-setting, The (US) Policy Agendas Project (http://www.policyagendas.org/ ), located in the Government Department at UT, and the Comparative Agendas Projects (http://www.comparativeagendas.org/ ), a network of country studies modeled on the US project. 1
Grades will be based on: Course Requirements 1) Research Paper. A research paper that is related to one of the theoretical perspectives on policy processes discussed in the course. I am flexible about what you address, but it is necessary to get prior approval from me for whatever you decide to study. A prospectus will be due at the middle of the semester. 50% 2) Class Participation. Each student will serve as a class organizer at least once during the term, with responsibility to provide the class an overview of issues and a discussion framework. Class organizers will make available to the class a short paper summarizing the up-coming discussion. 20% 3) Research Presentation. A brief formal presentation to the class on the research project. 10% 4) An examination covering the course material. 20% Course Materials (available at the Co-Op) Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow. Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux. ISBN: 0-374-27563-1 Jones, Bryan D. and Frank R. Baumgartner. The Politics of Attention. Chicago. ISBN: 022640653-9 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time. Princeton. ISBN: 0-691-11715-2 Schedule of Sessions PART I: Preferences, Information, and Institutions January 17 th : Organization and Overview: The Single Rational Decision- Maker In rational decision analysis, a decision-maker has preferences for outcomes, and is faced with a set of potential instruments for achieving those outcomes. How does he choose among these outcomes? B. Jones, The Rational Choice Model. (On Blackboard) January 24 th : Preferences and Choices: Multiple Decision-Makers If there are numerous decision-makers within a system, then how are the preferences of these decision-makers combined to achieve a social choice? 2
Anthony. Downs. 1957. A Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 65: 135-60. Otto A. Davis, Melvin Hinich, and Peter Ordeshook. 1970. An Expository Development of A Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process. American Political Science Review 64: 426-448. Elinor Ostrom. 1986. An Agenda for the Study of Institutions. Public Choice 48: 3-25. Keith Kreihbiel. 2004. Legislative Organization. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 18: 113-128. Recommended: K. Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics Tsbellis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Shepsle, Kenneth A. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 1979), pp. 27-59 Thomas H. Hammond, Gary J. Miller. The Core of the Constitution American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Dec., 1987), pp. 1155-1174. January 31 st : Information and Choice in Rational Systems How do rational individuals use information? Anthony Downs. 2008. How Rational Citizens Reduce Information Costs. http://keithoughts-kwc.blogspot.com/2008/10/how-rational-citizensreduce.html Thomas Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. Organization of Informative Committees in a Rational Legislature. American Journal of Political Science 34:531-564. Arthur Lupia. 1994. Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias. American Political Science Review 88: 63-76. J. Stiglitz. 2000. The Contribution of the Economics of Information to 20 th Century Economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 1141-1478. Part II: Bounded Rationality and Cognitive Constraints February 7 th : Issues in Preferences Some aspects of preferences are bothersome from the perspective of choice and policymaking. 3
H.A. Simon. 1985. Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science. American Political Science Review 79: 293-304. Sen, Amartya K. "Rational Fools." Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, no. 4 (1977): 317-344. B. Jones and J. Surface-Shafran. 2009. Do Legislators Sometimes Vote Against Their Prefereneces? (On Blackboard) Druckman, James N., and Arthur Lupia. Preference Formation. 2000. Annual Review of Political Science: 1-24. Wildavsky, Aaron. "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions." American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 3-21. Bowles, Samuel. 1998. Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions. Journal of Economic Literature 36: 75-111. February 14 th : Bounded Rationality as a Foundation Bendor distinguishes two traditions in the study of decision-making not based on rational choice: the Simon program and the Kanehman-Tversky (K-T) program. We focus here on the Simon program, which stresses goal-oriented behavior and adaptive rationality. Jon Bendor. 2003. Herbert Simon: Political Scientist. Annual Review of Political Science. B. Jones. 2003. Bounded Rationality and Political Science. Journal of Public Administration Theory 13: 395-412. B. Jones and H. Thomas. Bounded Rationality and Public Policy Decision- Making. (on Blackboard) John Conlisk. 1996. Why Bounded Rationality? Journal of Economic Literature 34: 669-700. Wilson, Rick. 2011. The Contribution of Behavioral Economics to Political Science. Annual Review of Political Science 14: 201-23. Jones, Bryan, Graeme Boushey, and Samuel Workman, Behavioral Rationality and the Policy Process, in Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, eds., The Handbook of Public Policy (2006). Recommended: B. Jones, Politics and the Architecture of Choice; especially Chs. 1-4. Simon, Herbert. 1995. Rationality in Political Behavior. Political Psychology 16: 45-61. Quattrone, George and Amos Tversky. 1988. Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice. American Political Science Review 82: 719-36. 4
February 21 st : Cognitive Friction: Psychological Approaches to Choice The K-T program suggests serious problems in adaptive decision-making and information processing that are often cannot be overcome. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow Chris Mooney. 2011. The Science of Why We Don t Believe Science. Mother Jones http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/03/denial-science-chris-mooney February 28 th : Issue-Attention, Framing and the Media Can preferences be affected by one s focus of attention? If so, what are the consequences? B. Jones. 1994. A Change of Mind or a Change of Focus? A Theory of Choice Reversals in Politics. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. (On Blackboard) Matthew Vanderbroek. 2011. Lost our Lease. American Politics Research Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman. 2007. Framing Theory. Annual Review of Political Science 10 Wolfe, Michelle, Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2012. A Failure to Communicate. (On Blackboard) Frank Baumgartner, Susanna Linn, and Amber Boydstun. 2009. The Decline of the Death Penalty. (On Blackboard). Max Rose and Frank Baumgartner. 2011. Framing the Poor. (On Blackboard). ***Paper prospectus due*** March 6 th : Bounded Rationality and Issue Intrusion How do boundedly rational governing institutions process information? Davis, Otto A., M.A.H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildvsky. A Theory of the Budget Process. American Political Science Review 60: 529-47. Lindblom, Charles. 1959. The Science of Muddling Through. Public Administration Review 19: 79-88. (It has become clear that the initial incremental policy studies relied on a stable environment; what happens when that environment is not stable?) Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention. Chapters 1-3. Workman, Samuel, Bryan Jones, and Ashley Jochim. 2010. Bureaucracy, Information Processing, and Overhead Democracy. Handbook of American Bureaucracy. 5
Wolfe, Michelle. 2012. Putting on the Brakes or Pushing on the Gas? The Media and Public Policy. Policy Studies Journal (on Blackboard) Read if you are not familiar with punctuated equilibrium: James True, Bryan Jones, and Frank Baumgartner, Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in American Policymaking, Chapter 6 in Sabatier Theories of the Policy Process Robinson, Scott. Punctuated Equilibrium. Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy. March 13 th SPRING BREAK Part III: Policy Consequences March 20 th : Bounded Rationality and Political Institutions Jones and Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention, Parts II and III (Chapters 5-11) Frank Baumgartner, et.al. 2009. Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective. American Journal of Political Science 53: 602-619. Bryan D. Jones, et.al. 2009. A General Empirical Law of Public Budgets. American Journal of Political Science 53: 855-73. March 27 th : The Public As A Source of Policy Ideas? Is the public a major source of policy ideas in democracies? Or does the public react to the activities of policy elites? Benjamin I. Page, Democratic Responsiveness? Untangling the Links between Public Opinion and Policy, PS: Political Science and Politics, Volume 27, Number 1 (March 1994): 25-29. James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert Erikson, Dynamic Representation, American Political Science Review, Volume 89, Number 3 (September 1995): 543-565. Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending. American Journal of Political Science, 39. Taber, Charles, Information Processing and Public Opinion, in David O. Sears, Handbook of Political Psychology (On Blackboard) Bryan D. Jones, Heather Larsen-Price, and John Wilkerson. 2009. Representation and American Governing Institutions. The Journal of Politics, 71: 277-290. Laura Chaqués Bonafont and Anna Palau. 2011. Assessing the Responsiveness of Spanish Policymakers to the Priorities of their Citizens. West European Politics, 34:4, 706-730. 6
April 3 rd : The Heavy Hand of History Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time. Richard Rose, Inheritance before Choice in Public Policy, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Volume 2, Number 3 (July 1990): 263-291. (RP) Schrad, Lawrence. 2007. Constitutional Blemishes: American Alcohol Prohibition and Repeal as a Policy Punctuation. Policy Studies Journal April 10 th : Policy Diffusion Ideas may come from other political systems, a process known as policy diffusion. Three major questions are raised by diffusion studies: 1) Galtung s problem whether the process is really diffusion or whether similar internal dynamic are causing similar policy adoptions; 2) Whether the process is rational learning or boundedly rational mimicking; and 3) Whether the diffusion is caused by a central government (for state level diffusion) Walker, Jack L. 1969. The Diffusion of Innovation among the American States. American Political Science Review 63 (3): 880-889. Volden, Craig. 2006. States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children s Health Insurance Program. American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 294-312. Karch, Andrew. 2006. National Intervention and the Diffusion of Policy Innovations. American Politics Research 34(4): 403-426 Weyland, Kurt. 2005. Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform. World Politics 57, Number 2: 262-295 Boushey, Graeme. 2012. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and the Diffusion of Innovations. Policy Studies Journal Mintrom, Michael. 1997. Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation. American Journal of Political Science 41 (3): 738-770. April 17 th : Comparative Agenda Analysis Comparative Analyses of agenda setting have indicated a problemcentered issue-attention dynamic, and have downplayed the roles of preferences and political parties. Read the collection of articles in Baumgartner, Frank R., Sylvain Brouard, Christoffer Green-Pederson, Bryan D. Jones, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2011. The Dynamics of Policy Change in Comparative Perspective, a Special Issue of Comparative Political Studies. 7
The CPS special issue focusing on the Comparative Agendas Project may be accessed at: http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/books/cps/cps-home.htm April 24 th : Alleviating Collective Action Problems Can boundedly rational actors overcome collective action problems? Elinor Ostrom, 1999. Coping with Tragedies of the Commons. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 493-535. Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." American Political Science Review 92: 1-22. Henrich,Joseph. et. al., Economic Man in Cross-Cultural Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences May 1 st : Paper presentations May 8 th Final paper due 8