China's New Assertiveness in Foreign Affairs AUTHOR Mario Lootz August 2014
Introduction Recently, newspapers were filled with reports about quarrels in the South China See between China's and its South East Asian neighbor's marines. The moving of an oil-platform in Vietnamese maritime territories or territorial claims over the Scarborough Shoal and the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands put the bilateral relations between China and Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan to the test. The Chinese position in terms of the maritime territorial disputes is only one example for the recent change of the countries foreign policy performance. Through the worldwide shifting of power in favor of China since the financial crisis 2008 and with the inauguration of the New Leadership of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang in 2012, a major shift in China's global identity took place, including a new set of Chinese foreign-policies emerging. Foreign policy in China under Mao Zedong's leadership was shaped by a revolutionary approach towards the international system. He believed China to be surrounded by belligerent nations in an hostile world. After Deng Xiaoping came into power in 1978 and reforms to open up the country to the world were released, this notion gradually shifted. The international system was still seen as unjust and in need of fundamental changes, but not opposed in general. With the country's entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, a period of further Chinese cooperation in international organization was launched. 1 However, in the 30 years after Deng Xiaoping came into power in 1978, China's foreign policy was influenced by his dictum, that China should bide its time and hide its capabilities" (tao guang yang hui) 2 The main policy focus was put on domestic development, foreign policy was subordinated to this aim. To ensure a peaceful international environment that favors China's economic growth, Chinese leaders avoided confrontation with other countries by performing low-profile foreign policies. Seeing itself as part of the developing countries in the world, the communist regime perceived international organizations like the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund as,western-shaped' with an unjust power distribution favoring the Western industrial nations. Nevertheless, following Deng's maxim, the international system should be used, whenever it benefited the countries interests, but only then. The country should cut back its global ambitions until it has reached its glory of previous centuries. 3 Although China became increasingly active in foreign affairs by joining further international organizations in the early 2000s, China's global identity was still influenced by Deng's idea of tao guang yang hui. This is revealed for example by the proclaiming of the peaceful rise theory pushed forward by Hu 1 Lynch 2009, p. 90 2 Glaser/Medeiros 2007, p. 305 3 In particular referred to the 18 th century, before Western powers invaded China in the 19 th century, the so-called century of humiliation
Jintao in 2003, which adapted Deng's maxim, pursuing a well-off society by further integrating in the international community. The blueprint stressed that China's rise was peaceful and that China does not seek global leadership. 4 The first goal of China's foreign policy remained to provide the conditions for domestic development and although the integration in international organizations proceeded, China's role in global governance was characterized through a low-profile approach. Albeit a leading country in terms of its economy, in terms of foreign policy China in the 2000s is far from a global power in its current phase. 5 In the time since 2008, this situation changed fundamental. In the next part of the paper, I am going to present several cases, that show the renunciation of Chinese leaders from Deng's maxim of keeping a low-profile in foreign affairs towards an active stance in the international system. I illustrate by several examples, that China's global identity nowadays consists of the understanding, that the country has arrived as a great power, and do not need to hide its capabilities anymore. Instead, an assertive stance and a proactive role is taken by the new leadership in international relations, pursuing a high-profile by confidently relying on China's core interests. The New Assertiveness Starting with the strengthened Chinese position through the global financial crisis in 2008 and continued by the new leadership in 2012, there is empirical evidence, that China's leaders gave up their position of seeing China as a developing country and changed the countries foreign-policies from a low-profile to a high-profile approach in the international system. Chinese politicians and diplomats got more confident and active in international organizations, they began to defend Chinese core interests more assertive and they put a greater emphasize on labeling China as a great power. By the following examples of the performance of Chinese officials in terms of international affairs, this change of practice gets apparent. The global financial crisis starting in 2008 hit America and Europe more severe than China and shifted the worldwide political power structure, giving China a strengthened position. The state regulation of the Chinese banking-system prevented it from breakdowns, that the deregulated western financial institutes faced. In awareness of this advantageous position, former Chinese prime minister Wen Jiaobao gave a speech at the World Economic Forum in 2010, where he unequivocally criticized the western countries pre-crisis deregulative policies. Pursuing a lowprofile foreign-policy, this scenery of a Chinese politician publicly and directly criticizing other 4 Ibid., p. 308 5 Zhu 2010, p. 38
countries in international institutions has no equivalent before 2008. Besides, China's voting behavior in the United Nations Security Council reveals the change to a high-profile foreign-policy. While placing one veto in the time from 1971 to 1990 and three vetoes in the seventeen years between 1990 and 2007, in the six years between 2008 and 2014 the Chinese representatives at the UN put five vetoes, four times regarding resolutions on the conflict in Syria and once on Zimbabwe. 6 Furthermore, the China's leaders acknowledged the National Transitional Council, which was formed after the rebels overthrew the regime in Libya in 2012, as official Libyan government. This kind of partiality in another nations conflict was likely to be interpreted in China as a interference in a countries sovereignty and therefore denied before 2008. 7 Looking at China's methods to deal with its neighboring countries in terms of disputed islands, a further example to underline the Chinese shift from a low- to a high-profile power in international relations gets obvious. From Deng to Jiang and during early Hu's incumbency, China always sought to never pick up a quarrel with more than one neighbor at a time. 8 In these days, (June 2014) China has serious conflicts with Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam disputing maritime territories at the same time. Being criticized by the US and Japan on the Shangri-La security-conference in May 2014, PLA general Wang Guanzhong responded in a harsh manner, which was interpreted by Emile Hokayem from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London as the toughest speech ever by a Chinese official at Shangri-La Dialogue. 9 Especially regarding the conflict with Japan over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands, the policy change of the CCP gets obvious. Since the 1970s, when a normalization between Sino-Japanese relations took place, the arrangement of shelving the island dispute to the future was made. Looking at the dispute from a current viewpoint, it seems like for Chinese leaders this moment in the future has arrived. After the purchase of the island through the Japanese government they reacted assertive and try since then change the status quo in their favor. 10 A further indicator for a shift in China's global identity to a proactive international power are statements made at the 18 th Party Congress of the CCP in 2012. In his speech, Xi Jinping demanded that China should never yield to outside pressure and that he will protect China s legitimate rights and interests overseas. This kind of formulations have not been made at previous Party 6 United Nations Security Council Veto List 7 Factbox: Countries that recognize Libya's NTC. Reuters 2011. 8 Godement 2012, p. 6 9 Hokayem 2014 10 Zhai Xin, 2014
Congresses and can be interpreted as a hint to a more assertive foreign-policy. 11 They indicate that also Xi's style signals a shift in the perception of China's global identity. Xi puts forward the idea, that the 30-year period beginning with Deng Xiaoping has come to an end and that China has arrived. 12 He claims a role for China as a global power, including strategic parity with the United States. This way of thinking is revealed for example in his words, that the vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for the two large countries of China and The United States, not mentioning other South-East Asian countries or in the proclaiming of a new type of great power relationship with the United States. 13 This major shift in China's foreign-policy can be explained by internal and external factors. With China becoming the second-biggest economy in the world, showing presence in every continent, to advocate an low-profile approach becomes more difficult for Chinese leaders. The financial crisis affected the American and European economies more severely than China's and shifted the global balance of power. Before 2008, Chinese leaders feared, that the country is not ready for taking over more international responsibility because of prevailing domestic problems. Officials made reservations, that an international active China could be vulnerable for intentions by other nations to weaken China's position in terms of economical and political factors. The strengthened Chinese position after the crisis swiped this fear away and lead to a growing self-confidence in international relations. Another reason for a foreign-policy shift towards a high-profile is the nationalism of major parts of the Chinese population, demanding a tougher stance from the government in international conflicts. The fact that meanwhile an increasing number of actors influence the Chinese foreign-policy decisions, next to an increasing pluralistic society, signify that these shifts in China's international directions are never uncontested. While the public mainly demands an more assertive approach abroad, supported by scholars like Yan Xuetong, the debate is strongly influenced by globalist thinkers like Peking University's School of International Studies dean Wang Jisi or Wang Yizhou, who proposed the idea of a Chinese 'creative involvement' in international organizations. 14 While nationalists want China to assert itself on the global stage, globalists and internationalists encourage China to play a role in the existing institutions of global governance. 11 Ibid., p. 3 12 Godement 2013, p. 3 13 Ibid, p. 1 14 Leonard 2013, p. 22
Conclusion Since its foundation in 1949, the People's Republic China experienced several major shift in its domestic and foreign policy trajectory. Mark Leonard, Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations and author of the book China 3.0. What Does The New China Think?, argues, that next to the watershed in Chinese politics with Deng Xiaoping taking office from Mao Zedong and the opening of the country to the world, the financial crisis and its implications after 2008 mark a second main change in the history of Chinese politics. In this essay, I presented several empirical cases, which support Leonard's argument in terms of foreign affairs, showing a shift from a previous pursued low-profile approach in international relations towards a high-profile, including an active proceeding in international organization, the labeling of China as great power, engagement in conflicts around the globe and an assertive defending of China's core interests. There are authors like Daniel Lynch, who doubt the claim of a major shift in Chinese foreign policy for the time after the global financial crisis. In his paper, Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as the Ti, Rationalism as the Yong? 15 he states, that Chinese politics were always shaped by realism and that a low-profile in international relations or the claiming of a peaceful rise were only strategic moves. According to Lynch, an assertive stance in foreign affairs was already taken up in the early 2000s. Empirical evidence for his thesis can be seen in the examples of the foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, which was interpreted by observers as a move to build an Asian counterpart to the NATO and to restrict American influence in Central Asia, furthermore the support for Uzbekistan as it expelled U.S. forces from the country in 2005 or the large military exercise with Russia at the Chinese island Shandong in the same year. 16 Since these examples are few, they do not expose a major shift away from the,peaceful rise' and low-profile approach in Chinese foreign politics before 2008. The accumulation of cases after the financial crises and since the inauguration of the New Leadership showing an assertive and high-profile foreign policy in international relations make up the major shift in China's foreign policy behavior. 15 Lynch 2009 16 Ibid., p. 88, 91 and Sutter 2012, p.64
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