When Crime Pays Money and Muscle in Indian Politics Milan Vaishnav April 7, 2015
From jail to bailing out the government
An Indian political success story
Percentage of Lok Sabha MPs Law-makers & law-breakers MPs with criminal cases MPs with serious cases 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 24% 12% 30% 15% 34% 21% 10% 5% 0% 2004 2009 2014 Lok Sabha Election Year Source: ADR
A widespread phenomenon Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Severity of charges is striking Source: Sastry (2013)
A puzzling coexistence
Key questions 1. Why do criminal candidates enter the electoral sphere? 2. Why do parties nominate candidates with criminal records? 3. Why do voters vote for them? 4. What are the resulting policy implications? 5. What are the lessons for democracy and accountability?
Preview Vibrant marketplace for criminal politicians exists in India As with any market, there are underlying supply and demand factors at work Existence of market does not mean that policymakers must meekly accept the status quo Have to change incentives, not just information
1. Why do criminal candidates enter the electoral sphere?
Criminals in politics not novel
Supply of criminals into politics
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014 Number of political parties Surge in political competition 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Source: ECI
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014 Number of political parties Congress vote share The end of hegemony 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Number of parties Congress vote share 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% Source: ECI
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 Percent of Hindi-belt MPs Silent revolution 70 60 Upper/Intermediate Caste Other Backward Classes/Scheduled Caste 50 40 30 20 10 0 Source: Jaffrelot and Kumar (2009) Year
Source: NCRB Institutional decay
Collapse of election finance regime Source: Indian Express
Vertical integration
Percent of MLAs facing criminal cases Criminals in UP assembly 60 51 50 45 40 30 31 35 36 35 20 10 8 12 0 1984 1989 1991 1993 1996 2002 2007 2012 Year Source: India Today
2. Why do parties nominate candidates with criminal records?
A new dataset
Parties as vital gate-keepers Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Probability of Winning Election Crime does pay! 25% 22% 20% 15% 10% 7% 5% 0% No Cases At Least One Case Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Probability of Winning Election Serious crime seriously pays 30% 25% 25% 20% 19% 15% 10% 7% 5% 0% No cases At least 1 case At least 1 serious case Source: Vaishnav (2015)
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014 Average number of electors Growing electorate 1800000 1600000 1400000 1200000 1000000 800000 600000 400000 200000 0 Year Source: ECI
1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014 Average Margin of Victory (%) Increasing competitiveness 30 25 23.9 26.1 20 18.2 19.5 15.4 15 10 14.8 13.7 14.1 11.9 10.0 10.0 12.2 9.7 15.2 5 0 Year Source: ECI
Rising expectations
The costs of democracy Growing competition Parties want selffinancing candidates Increasingly costly elections Parties motivated by rents Finite party coffers
Probability of Winning Election Money talks 30% 25% 26% 20% 15% 12% 10% 5% 0% 1% 1% Bottom quintile 4% 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile Source: Vaishnav (2015)
From money to muscle Increasingly costly elections Criminal candidates have access to finance Finite party coffers Party elites prioritize selffinancing candidates Parties motivated by rents
Proportion with Criminal Cases The merits of money & muscle 20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% Source: Vaishnav (2015) 6% Bottom quintile 19% 13% 9% 7% 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile Candidate wealth quintile
Probability of Winning Election (%) Moving beyond money Not facing serious cases Facing serious cases 45% 42% 40% 35% 30% 25% 26% 24% 20% 15% 11% 11% 10% 5% 5% 4% 1% 2% 0% 0% Bottom quintile 2nd 3rd 4th Top quintile Candidate wealth quintile Source: Vaishnav (2015)
3. Why do voters vote for criminal candidates?
Why is this man a success story? Anant Singh, three-time member of the Bihar state assembly from Mokama constituency and well-known strongman
Criminality as credibility
The Bihar case Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Chhote Sarkar
Mechanisms of credibility Redistribution Willingness and ability to bend rules to skew benefits to co-ethnic base Coercion Ability to use reputation to coerce rivals in context of multi-ethnic competition Social insurance Capability to act as de facto social safety net Politics of dignity Credibility grounded in politics of dignity and self-respect Dispute resolution Enhanced capacity to adjudicate disputes
Criminality as credibility - Anant Singh is not a murderer. He merely manages murder (Interview with JD(U) party worker) Source: Vaishnav (2015)
Uncovering support for criminal candidates Would you vote for a candidate who delivers benefits to you even if s/he faces serious criminal cases? 26% responded Yes Source: Lok Foundation
Detecting social biases Would you be troubled if a [Upper Caste/OBC/SC/other social group] candidate wins the election in your constituency? 38% responded Yes Source: Lok Foundation
Criminality & credibility Source: Sircar and Vaishnav (2015)
4. What are the resulting policy implications?
Paradoxical Indian state
Ease of Doing Business ranking Over-bureaucratized 160 140 142 120 120 100 90 80 60 40 43 62 20 0 South Africa Russia China Brazil India Source: World Bank
Russian Federation Canada France United Kingdom Germany United States Italy Brazil China Australia Argentina Turkey Mexico Japan Saudi Arabia South Africa Indonesia India Public employees per 10,000 residents Under-manned 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Source: Vaishnav and Swanson (2013)
Rule of law supply chain Laws Judges Prosecutors Police
Rule of law supply chain Laws
Outmoded laws Apprentices Act, 1961; Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966; Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1976; Beedi Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1976; Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986; Children (Pledging of Labour) Act, 1933; Cine-Workers and Cinema Theatre Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1981; Cine-Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1981; Cine- Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1981; Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948; Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970; Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948; Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986; Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952; Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948; Employers' Liability Act, 1938; Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act,1959; Equal Remuneration Act, 1976; Factories Act, 1948; Fatal Accidents Act, 1855; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; Inter- State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979; Iron Ore Mines, Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare Cess Act, 1976; Iron Ore Mines, Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1976; Labour Laws (Exemption from Furnishing Returns and Maintaining Registers by Certain Establishments) Act, 1988; Limestone and Dolomite Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1972; Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; Mica Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1946; Mines Act, 1952; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; Payment of Wages Act, 1936; Personal Injuries (Compensation Insurance) Act, 1963; Plantations Labour Act, 1951; Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976; Trade Unions Act, 1926; Weekly Holidays Act, 1942; Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955; Working Journalists (Fixation of Rates of Wages) Act, 1958; Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 Source: Bibek Debroy (n.d.)
Rule of law supply chain Laws Judges
Pending Cases (Supreme, High, and District/Subordinate Courts) Slow wheels of justice 33,000,000 32,000,000 31,000,000 30,000,000 29,000,000 28,000,000 27,000,000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Source: Supreme Court of India
Rule of law supply chain Laws Judges Prosecutors
Politicized prosecutors????? March 2007: CBI files corruption case September 2013: CBI closes case July 2008: SP provides support to UPA December 2012: SP allows FDI retail bill December 2008: CBI withdraws case March 2011: CBI reverses withdrawal Spring 2011: seat-sharing spat for UP elections
Rule of law supply chain Laws Judges Prosecutors Police
Police shortfalls Source: Vaishnav and Swanson (2013)
Opaque political finance 4368.75 534.99 1082.58 Income from known donors Income from other known sources Income from unknown sources Source: ADR
Weeding out the rascals Criminal candidates make mockery of rule of law Proposals to disqualify candidates with serious cases Restricting candidate entry could violate the rule of law Hindering democracy to save it?
5. What are the lessons for democracy & accountability?
Bad politicians & accountability Access to information Ability to punish "bad" politicians Democratic accountability preserved Voters armed with information Provide support for "bad" politicians Success of "partial" accountability
The governance election
Source: ADR Is sunlight the best disinfectant?
The Robin Hood phenomenon
Thank you! mvaishnav@ceip.org @MilanV http://www.carnegieendowment.org/vaishnav