Syllabus for POS 592: American Political Institutions Dr. Mark D. Ramirez School of Politics and Global Studies Arizona State University Office location: Coor Hall 6761 Cell phone: 480-965-2835 E-mail: mark.ramirez@asu.edu Class meets: Monday, 5:40 PM to 8:30 PM in Coor 6761 Course description This is a course on American Political Institutions. It covers traditional topics such as the presidency, Congress, Supreme Court, and bureaucratic agencies. It also covers interactions between institutions. It s diverges from traditional courses on institutions in that its focus is on institutions and how instituitons matter. Thus, much of the readings will contrast the sociological approach to studying the behavior of public officials within institutions to studying the role of institutions within institutions. In short, this instructor believes a great deal of the behavior of public officials is dictated by institutional structures and norms. The readings are designed to 1) provide students with the foundational knowledge of the field of political institutions, 2) provide an introduction to current research on political institutions, and 3) provide insight into how the study of political institutions fits into our broader understanding of politics questions of power and democracy. Course Organization and Requirements Course grades: Course grades will be assessed on the basis of: Course participation (50 points) Written assignments (50 points) Late work will not be accepted in this course. Furthermore, taking an incomplete in this course is not an option. Students undergoing extenuating circumstances should contact me ASAP and we will discuss the situation during the course of the semester. Syllabus: American Political Institutions (Spring 2012) 1 of 6
Course calendar Week 1 (1-9): What is institutionalism These readings contrast the behavioral approach to studying political institutions to the institutional approach to the study of political institutions. The behavioral approach has its roots in sociology and psychology, while the institutional approach derives from economics. The latter saw a resurgence in research starting around the late 1970s leading to the claim of a new institutionalism. The new institutionalism criticized the behavioralist approach for failing to account for the importance of institutions (see North for a definition) in the study of political governing bodies. Oppenheimer, Bruce I. Behavioral Approaches to the Study of Congress. in The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress, eds. Eric Schickler, Frances E. Lee, and George C. Edwards. Oxford University Press. 11-35. North, Douglass C. 1991. Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1): 97-112. March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. American Political Science Review, 78(3): 734-749. Week 2 (1-16): Congress I: Electoral connection What motivates the behavior of members of Congress and the design of Congress itself? Mayhew argues its a desire for re-election, while Arnold shows how the policy goals of legislatures fit into the theory. Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Yale University Press. Arnold, Douglas R. The Logic of Congressional Action. Yale University Press. Chapters 1 and 3. Week 3 (1-23): Congress II: Distributive politics What motivates the behavior of members of Congress and the design of Congress? A desire to pass pork... and get re-elected. Evans, Diana. Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress. Cambridge University Press. Week 4 (1-30): Congress III: Informational perspective What motivates the behavior of members of Congress and the design of Congress? Organizational structures that reduce the transaction costs of obtaining costly information required Syllabus: American Political Institutions (Spring 2012) 2 of 6
to make public policy. Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Organization. University of Michigan Press. Week 5 (2-6): Congress IV: Party governance This week extends the debate on the organization of Congress and what explains the behavior of members of Congress by adding political parties as a potential explanation. Although some see party influence as the main influence on member behavior (Ansolabehere et al. and Cox and McCubbins), others note that it might be impossible to disentangle the effect of party influence from other factors (Krehbiel). Smith provides an overview of the entire debate noting that even among those that agree parties are important, the theories of party influence are not homogenous. Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart. 2001. The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 26(4): 533-572. Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. Where s the Party? British Journal of Political Science, 23(2): 235-266. Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2002. Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1986. Parties, Procedure, and Policy: Essays on the History of Congress, David W. Brady and Mathew McCubbins, eds. Stanford University Press. Smith, Steven S. 2000. Positive Theories of Congressional Parties. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 25(2): 193-215. Week 6 (2-13): Presidency I: Presidential power What power does the president hold? How does the president shape public opinion and policy? Neustadt takes a pluralistic view of politics where they president must strategically shape coalitions and factions. This book provides the foundation for most of the modern work on the presidency. Cane-Wrones provides the most recent test of many of Neustadt s claims regarding the ability of the president to influence public opinion and policy. The book is noteworthy for its rigorous testing of these questions and highlighting important methodological problems facing presidency research. Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents Free Press. Chapters 1-3. Canes-Wrone, Brandice. Who Leads Whom?: Presidents, Policy and the Public. University of Chicago Press. Syllabus: American Political Institutions (Spring 2012) 3 of 6
Week 7 (2-20): Presidency II: Presidential Decision-making Historic work on presidential decision-making focused on presidential personality and organizational style. Tucker provides an overview of this type of research. Contemporary research examines how institutions constrain presidential decision-making. Cameron focuses on the presidential veto to understand how presidents make decisions in relation to Congress. Cooper and West show how OMB rules influence presidential power. Deering and Maltzman show the limits of presidential use of executive orders to forge policy. Thus, this work diverges from historical presidency literature by focusing on institutions. Tucker, Robert C. 1977. The Georges Wilson Reexamined: An Essay on Psychobiography. American Political Science Review, 71(2): 606-618. (Skim) Cameron, Charles M. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 3, 4, and 5. Cooper, Joseph and William W. West. 1988. Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules. Journal of Politics, 50(4): 864-895. Deering, Christopher J. and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. The Politics of Executive Orders: Legislative Constraints on Presidential Power. Political Research Quarterly, 52(4): 767-783. Week 8 (2-27): Courts I: Attitudinal model A behavioral approach to Supreme Court decision-making. Justices vote their ideological preferences. Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. Cambridge University Press. Recommended: Epstein, Lee, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Harold J. Spaeth. 1998. Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices. Journal of Politics, 60(3): 801-818. Week 9 (3-5): Courts II: Rational choice model An institutional approach to Supreme Court decision-making that views justices as strategic actors making decisions in a complex inter-institutional government. Knight, Jack and Lee Epstein. The Choices Justices Make. CQ Press. Syllabus: American Political Institutions (Spring 2012) 4 of 6
Week 10 (3-12): Public policy regulation The book examines how institutions form and political power is created in response to public officials, interest groups, citizens, and environmental constraints. It focuses on the importance of agencies in shaping policy outcomes. It s also notable for its mixed-method approach to the study of public policy. Meier, Kenneth J. The Politics of Sin: Drugs, Alcohol, and Public Policy M.E. Sharpe. Week 11 (3-19) Spring break Week 12 (3-26): Institutional interactions I: Executive delegation This week provides an introduction to why political actors will delegate policy-making authority to subordinates. Wood and Waterman use a principle-agent approach to understand how president s can control bureaucracies. Wood. B. Dan, and Richard W. Waterman. Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy. Westview Press. Week 13 (4-2): Institutional interactions II: Legislative/Judicial delegation This week continues the discussion of policy delegation. Huber and Shipan present a review of the various theoretical reasons for delegation in relation to legislatures and bureaucratic agencies. McCubbins and Schwartz explore oversight mechanisms and ask the question if congressional oversight of agencies should look like policy patrols or fire alarms. Meier and Krause note that agencies might not need oversight, while Rogers reviews the literature on delegation of policy by the Supreme Court. Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2000. The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25: 25-52. McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science, 28(1): 165-179. Meier, Kenneth J. and George A. Krause. Conclusion: An Agenda for the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy. in George Krause and Kenneth J. Meier, Politics, Policy, and Organizations. University of Michigan Press. Rogers, James R. Why Expert Judges Defer to (Almost) Ignorant Legislator. in Institutional Games and the Supreme Court, James R. Rodgers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R. Bond, eds. University of Virginia Press. Syllabus: American Political Institutions (Spring 2012) 5 of 6
Week 14 (4-9): Interests groups Smith provides an interesting theory and set of empirical findings on when interest groups are able to influence public policy. Smith, Mark A. American Business and Political Power. University of Chicago Press. Week 15 (4-16): Institutions and the economy North s nobel prize winning work on how institutions matter in shaping the economy an important and overlooked aspect of political life. North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press. Statement about students with disabilities The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal anti-discrimination statute that provides comprehensive civil rights protection for persons with disabilities. Among other things, this legislation requires that all students with disabilities be guaranteed a learning environment that provides for reasonable accommodation of their disabilities. If you believe you have a disability requiring an accommodation, please contact the Department of Student Life, Services for Students with Disabilities in Room 126 of the Koldus Building, or call 845-1637. Copyright statement The materials used in this course are copyrighted. By materials, I mean all products generated for this class, which include but are not limited to syllabi, web pages, multimedia files, presentations, quizzes, exams, lab problems, in-class materials review sheets, and additional problem sets. Because these are copyrighted, you do not have the right to copy the handouts, unless I expressly grant permission. Statement about plagerism As commonly defined, plagiarism consists of passing off as ones own the ideas, words, writings, etc., which belong to another. In accordance with the definition, you are committing plagiarism if you copy the work of another person and turn it in as your own, even if you should have the permission of the person. Plagiarism is one of the worst academic sins, for the plagiarist destroys the trust among colleagues without which research cannot be safely communicated. If you have any questions regarding plagiarism, please consult the Texas A&M University web site, http://aggiehonor.tamu.edu. Syllabus: American Political Institutions (Spring 2012) 6 of 6