Egyptian Public Television during 2011 and 2013 Revolutions

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Egyptian Public Television during 2011 and 2013 Revolutions Dina Farouk Abou Zeid Associate Professor Mass Communication Department, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt dabozeid@hotmail.com Abstract Egyptian public television is considered the first in the Arab world. It has started since 1960. Egyptians call it governmental television because they feel its channels serve the government and not the people. Public television channels are owned and run by the Egyptian state. These channels are used to be the official speakers of the president, government and regime. Television chairman is appointed by the minister of information. Ministry of information in Egypt is in charge of the television and its policies which are always for the sake of the ruler. But, in these last years, Egyptian television has witnessed two revolutions, 2011 revolution against president Mubarak and 2013 revolution against president Morsi. The two revolutions seek democracy and freedom in all aspects of life including public television broadcasting. How did Egyptian television cover 2011 and 2013 revolutions? Did the television support the regime or the revolutionists? Did the television become the people's voice or the ruler's voice? Did the television coverage differ in the two revolutions? These are the main questions that the paper will answer through a survey of one hundred Egyptian television presenters and directors. Egyptian Public Television The Egyptian television was launched in 1960 (Learman, 2003). It is one of the sectors of Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) which is run by Ministry of Information so it is operated and owned by the government. Nowadays, many television channels belong to Radio and Television Union. ERTU has different sectors that provide TV channels. The television sector (network) includes Channel 1, Channel 2 and Al Masraya channel. They are considered the national channels directed to general audiences. Al Mahrosa sector (network) includes regional

channels offering services and covering Egyptian governorates. These channels are Cairo, Canal, Alexandria, Delta, Upper and Thebes. Specialized Nile channels' sector (NTN) includes specialized channels which are Cinema, Drama, Sports, Comedy, Cultural, Family, Life and a group of Educational channels. News sector includes Akbar Masr, Nile TV in foreign languages and Sout al Shaab channels ("ERTU", 2014). There was a sector for satellite channels but it is cancelled lately. All the TV channels that belong to ERTU even if they are terrestrial channels are available on Nile Sat, Egyptian Satellite. In Egypt, any public television channel is called Egyptian television even if the channel does not belong to Egyptian television sector. ERTU laws ERTU operates under Law 13 of 1979 which modified by Law 223 of 1989. The law No. 13 of 1979 states that the Union is a public organization responsible for all the functions and duties associated with the audio-visual media and broadcasting services in Egypt. The ERTU shall maintain a legal status and be headquartered in Cairo. Audio-visual media and broadcasting services shall be provided effectively for the benefit of the national interests respecting Egyptian culture, traditions, values and constitution. The Union shall enhance and promote values, social unity, social peace, human dignity, family stability and freedom. It shall spread knowledge. ERTU shall create programs in various fields for the development of the different population groups. It shall present public opinion, political development and the discussions of the parliament, or local councils. It shall respond to the requests made by the Government of Egypt to publicize and release official statements, public policies, or guidelines. It shall develop and improve the broadcasting services. The Union shall form a board of trustees, a board of managing directors, and a general assembly ("ERTU Law No 13 of 1979", 2014). Article No. 3 shows that the Union has many options to be independent financially from the government. It can invest in areas and fields of specialization. ERTU can establish companies and enter into joint or collaborative partnerships at the domestic and international levels. It can produce and sell radio and television materials besides offering advertising and commercial services. The Union can publish and release

publications, periodicals, and magazines. It can retain the intellectual property rights, such as copyright and publication ownership and trademarks of the broadcast materials and products developed. ERTU can receive bank and credit concessions and facilities to finance the investment enterprises launched within the credit limits identified by the government. It can maintain and manage its revenues according to its needs and requirements ("Al Qanoun Raqam 13", 2014). However, article 17 shows that the Union is depending financially on the government and regime. The article says that the principle capital of the ERTU shall be decreed by the President of Egypt. The Minister of Finance shall decree the formation of a committee to identify the Union capital assets and liabilities besides the debts. The committee can consider the debts as contributions by the Government to the ERTU principle capital. The recommendations reached by the committee shall be reviewed and approved by the Minister of Finance. Article 24 states that the government shall deposit the annual ERTU subventions in the Egyptian Central Bank (Al Mawsoa Al Alamaya, ). The most important amendments brought by Law No. 223 of 1998 are associated with the role of the minister of information and board of trustees. The law says that Radio and Television Union shall be the only authority to establish and possess audio and visual broadcasting stations in Egypt. It is mentioned that the Union shall create the guidelines and rules required to regulate the control and censorship of materials produced by the union or any companies owned by the Union. The Minister of Information shall be mandated to monitor the performance of the Union. The minister shall maintain balance between the union goals and services on the one hand and sovereign policies, social peace and national unity on the other hand. The decisions reached by the Board of Trustees shall be reviewed by the Minister of Information who can raise objections to the Board decisions. Objections shall be transmitted back to the Board of Trustees for review and re-consideration ("Law No 13 of 1979", 2014). Ministry of Information

Ministry of Information was established in Egypt in 1952 after 23 July revolution in 1952. Decree No. 310 of 1986 defines roles and responsibilities of the ministry. The decree states that the ministry puts the general plan and policy of the media in Egypt to serve the objectives of the society, achieve the goals of development and enhance democracy according to the framework of the general policy of the state. The ministry develops cooperation and relations with other countries in the different fields of media. It coordinates between various means of communication to achieve integration of the media message. The ministry raises awareness among Egyptians of their rights and current situations in the country. It provides the world with information and data about Egypt and faces anti-propaganda. Also, the decree says that the Ministry of Information provides media reports to the state. It highlights national celebrations and meetings between political leaders and citizens. The ministry is responsible for implementation of publication laws and regulations on Egyptian and foreign publications before being released. It supervises the activities of radio and television according to the law. The ministry offers training programs to media practitioners and develops media and communication technologies. The decree ensures that Minister of Information is responsible for radio and television ("Ministry of Information", 2014). 2011 Revolution in Egypt 2011 revolution in Egypt, also known as 25 January revolution, ended 30- years rule of Hosni Mubarak and his regime. Mubarak stepped down after 18 days of demonstrations, riots, marches, strikes and acts of civil disobedience in all Egyptian cities. On 11 February 2011, Vice President Omar Soliman announced in a televised address that Mubarak has resigned handed over control to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The revolution was mainly due to the long presidency era of Mubarak, fear of the inheritance of presidency by Gamal Mubarak the younger son of Hosni Mubarak whose political power was increasing, economic and political problems and corruption besides the influence of Tunisian revolution that led to the ousting of the former president Zine El Dine Ali. The revolution demanded freedom, democracy, economic and political reforms which are shown in its key slogan which says "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice" (Sowers, and Toensing, 2012).

2013 Revolution in Egypt 2013 revolution in Egypt was the fall of former president Mohamed Morsi after millions of protesters took the streets in all Egyptian cities demanding the resignation of the president who belongs to Muslim Brotherhood organization (MB). This was on 30 June marking the one year anniversary of Morsi inauguration as president. The revolution was due to Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood authoritarian regime. They ignored the opposition forces, issued a constitutional declaration to give the president full executive power over Egypt, tried to create an Islamist state according to Muslim Brotherhood ideology which is refused by the majority of Egyptians, just served MB interests, appointed MB members in the key positions in the government, had no experience in running a country and failed to solve economic, social and political problems (Mourad, 2013). Sample: The sample contains 100 subjects divided equally between television presenters and directors from different channels and sectors in Egyptian pubic television. Results: Awareness of Egyptian Television Taboos The majority of the sample (89%) did not read ERTU laws and ethics. They have learnt the television taboos and red lines through the following: (93%) formal meetings with the head and director of the channel or the department who give direct instructions and guidelines; (90%) informal talks with the head and director of the channel or the department especially when a simple mistake occurred; (51%) the causes of an internal affairs investigation with a colleague; (50%) attending a course in ERTU training institution; (27%) university undergraduate courses and (11%) personal interest in reading ERTU laws and code of ethics to be aware of these information. Before 2011 Revolution

All television presenters and directors in the sample said that they did not show in their programs any criticism of former president Mubarak and his family. The majority of the sample avoided criticizing the following: (90%) Minister of Information, (85%) Prime Minister, (71%) ministers and (65%) governors. Most of the subjects (76%) mentioned that they talked in their programs about the problems and crises in Egypt but without mentioning the names of governmental officials who could be responsible of these problems and crises. The Impact of Private Satellite channels on Egyptian Public TV All television presenters and directors in the sample said that Egyptian television had changed before 2011 Revolution due to the success and freedom of private satellite television and their talk shows. Egyptian television had lost many of its viewers who preferred these private satellite channels especially Arab and Egyptian channels. The impact of private satellite channels on Egyptian public television can be found in different situations. The majority of the sample (85%) mentioned that few years before 2011 revolution they criticized all the ministers in their programs except Minister of information. But, 63% said that they showed criticism of Egyptian television programs' content, form, production and crew. Also, 51% mentioned that Prime Minister was criticized in their programs. Most of the participants (77%) had started to show opposition figures in their programs but only the opposition figures who knew the red lines and television taboos. This means they can criticize everything and anyone except Mubarak and his family. The majority of the sample (86%) ensured that they had given freedom in their programs according to the guidelines of their directors. This means that the policy of the regime was to show that Egypt had freedom. Concerning the image of Mubarak, more than half of the participants said the media showed him as war hero, father of the nation, healthy, strong, kind, funny and wise. The programs tried to convince Egyptians that

problems and crises were caused by the failure of the ministries and the only person who could solve these problems was Mubarak. On the other hand, few years before the revolution, Egyptian media showed Mubarak sad and weak after the death of his grandson. Also, the media talked about his illness showing his photos while having a surgery in Germany. It was forbidden in the past to talk about his health. Few months before 2011 Revolution, protests and strikes were occurring in front of the parliament and Egyptian cabinet building. Egyptian television could not avoid talking about these events especially after being highlighted and heavily covered by private satellite channels. But, 56% of the sample said that Egyptian TV programs tried to show that the problems and crises are ministers' responsibilities and failure. During 2011 Revolution Most of the respondents (96%) did not participate in the revolution because they are not interested in playing a political role besides being afraid of being negatively influenced in their work. They feel they belong to the regime and government because they work in public television. Only 4 respondents participated in the revolution by going to Tahrir square to spend some hours with revolts but after they felt that Mubarak regime was reaching its end. The majority (83%) went to the television building on 25 January and 26 January. They saw many protesters and policemen in the streets. Also, the area around the television building was witnessing unrest, disorder and danger. Most of the sample especially women (98%) avoided going to television even if they had live programs because the streets were very dangerous. Only 3% from the sample said that they were asked by the head of the channel to cover the protesters who supported Mubarak. Many of these protesters were celebrities especially actors, actresses, singers and football players. Their numbers were great in Moustafa Mahmoud square in Mohandesine area. The respondents who covered these protests added that they accepted this assignment because they were afraid to refuse especially if the regime did not fall. Also, they said that the channels ' heads wanted to play a role in protecting the regime thinking it was

strong and would not fall. One mentioned that his channel's head was an important member in the ruling party. When Egypt cut off internet and mobile phones' services on 28 January, they did not communicate with their channels. On 29 January, a curfew was declared so they were busy protecting their homes, streets and districts in the absence of police especially that some thieves, looters and robbers wanted to get benefited from this chaos. Most of the sample (95%) did not want to participate in Egyptian television coverage of the revolution being afraid to be negatively affected by the new regime. Majority of the directors and television presenters (91%) did not believe the Egyptian television coverage and they watched Egyptian private satellite channels besides Al Jazeera channel which were supporting the revolution and criticizing Mubarak. Some of Egyptian satellite channels tried at first to support Mubarak by criticizing the protestors especially one channel because its owner was a member of the ruling party. But, at the end, all the channels supported the revolution. Few persons were allowed to enter the television building. All the channels stopped their programs but only broadcasted channel 1 coverage. Every night, one shot was on TV showing an empty bridge to give impression that there were no protesters in the streets. But, Tahrir square was full of protesters. The Egyptian television tried to defend and protect Mubarak regime making celebrities especially movie stars and football players talk about the regime and Mubarak in a positive way to influence public opinion. It was obvious the disappearance of politicians who belong to the regime and members of the ruling party. They did not show on television during the revolution. When Mubarak stepped down on 11 February 2011, the television was run by the head of the news sector. One of the respondents who belongs to the news sector and worked during the revolution said that she was chosen to cover the revolution with few members of the news' sector who were known with their loyalty to the Egyptian television and regime besides they were trusted by the head of the sector. They took the instructions from their head. The ones

who worked during the revolution believed that they were working for the sake of Egypt and its stability trying to help Egyptians feel secure. Egyptian television showed the official statements and meetings. Egyptian celebrities were on television defending Mubarak and criticizing the protestors. Later on Egyptian television started to show Egyptians ' complaints and problems during these insecure and unsafe situations. Women were crying on phones saying they had been raped in their homes and others screamed saying houses, cars, shops, malls and banks had been robbed. When Mubarak's resignation was announced, celebrations were in Tahrir square. On the other hand, some were crying in the news studio and control room because they did not hate Mubarak and mainly they were afraid about their future after spending 18 days defending Mubarak and not showing Tahrir square and the protestors. After 2011 Revolution After 2011 revolution, 89% said that they returned to their works with different opinions, thoughts and attitudes. No information minister to run the television but a new ERTU head was appointed by the military council and he is a university professor so 70% mentioned that they felt he did not belong to the television building. According to more than half of the sample, people who work on Egyptian television had the courage to ask for their rights demanding the government to solve their financial and professional problems. They recognized the power of protests, riots and strikes which were misused directly after 2011. These means were heavily used to attack any new head of department and channel and to criticize any instructions and orders. Egyptian public television was criticized by revolutionists and protesters in Tahrir square due to its policies during Mubarak regime and its coverage during the revolution. Persons who work in Egyptian television were considered Mubarak tools of political propaganda. Almost half of the sample said that this was their major problem after the revolution. As a consequence, they tried in their programs to show that they belong to the revolution, talked about their suffering during Mubarak era and said that they participated in the revolution.

Most of the sample (69%) said that the revolutionists had become daily guests in programs besides the politicians who were banned from public television during Mubarak era. 93% added that the revolution was praised by television presenters. All the television presenters and directors in the sample were heavily criticizing Mubarak policies. More than half of the sample mentioned that they were eager to have freedom of speech without any limitations but they made mistakes. They were biased. Rumors were showed as true events. They expressed their personal opinions in news coverage. Insulting political figures was considered freedom of expression. A large percentage of respondents (95%) heavily criticized Prime Minister, ministers and politicians. Citizens were given the opportunity to talk freely in programs about all political issues and figures. 43% criticized the policies of the military council that ruled Egypt but without mentioning the names of the members of the council. A high percentage of respondents (94%) said that television rarely punished any person even the ones who made mistakes just to avoid protests and riots. Not few respondents (44%) mentioned that they were not happy to find Egyptian public television officials during Mubarak era in court and prison being accused of corruption. The majority (57%) admitted that unconsciously they tried to avoid criticizing who were in power after Mubarak for example military council members in 2011 and Muslim Brotherhood in 2012. Before 2011 revolution, female television presenters were not allowed to appear on television if they were wearing veils but television lifted the ban after the revolution. Concerning presidential elections in 2012, 89% said that they were very neutral in their coverage trying to give equal opportunities for all the candidates. They did not talk on TV about their own opinions and choices in the elections. On the other hand, television presenters in private satellite channels publicly supported some candidates. These private satellite channels are more popular than public television so their presidential elections coverage attracted more viewers.

During Morsi Presidency Most of the respondents (86%) were not satisfied with former president policies. In their opinion, their colleagues who supported Mubarak regime were the ones who supported Morsi regime. Mohamed Abdel Maksoud, Minister of Information during Morsi, was a member of Muslim Brotherhood. 76% had negative opinions about the minister. They said he did not belong to television because he is a journalist. Also, they considered him undistinguished and unsuccessful journalist. They believed that he was a minister of information to have full control of the media and to use the media to support Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood besides opening the way for Muslim Brotherhood to enter television especially that it was very rare to find a MB member working on TV. Most of respondents (82%) did not vote for Morsi and did not like his ideology. They consider themselves liberal and not conservative. Concerning the changes that had occurred in their programs, more than half of the sample said that many Muslim Brotherhood members and Islamists were on TV when Morsi became president. Some of their colleagues tried to create contacts with them because they were in power. Also, they were in programs because they were influential in the country. They dominated the parliament and the most important posts and ministers. Moreover, this was an instruction from the minister. 89% did not praise Morsi in their programs as they did with Mubarak when he was president. However, 81% did not criticize him in their programs in a direct way or by mentioning his name because they were afraid to lose their jobs or to be punished. 10% criticized Morsi and his policies in direct ways and were punished for example two television presenters were banned from appearing on television. The revolutionists who work in television were showing their opposition to Morsi without fear in face to face communication and by the time many were showing opposition in television building, on facebook and Twitter. These attitudes had never been done before. The policies of Morsi and the government were severely and heavily criticized. The television presenters talked in a revolutionary way. They highlighted the negatives, problems, crises, failure and catastrophe in the country. They were trying to make people

aware of the hidden agenda and plans of Muslim Brotherhood but in an indirect ways. They focused on the opposition movements and events against Morsi. The head of Egyptian television sector and specialized channels sector (TNT) and Egyptian satellite resigned due to Muslim Brotherhood policies. The majority of the respondents (76%) said Information minister was not able to solve their problems. Aslo, he was not interested in developing Egyptian media. All his aims were to support Muslim Brotherhood regime and agenda. Many in Egyptian television were very angry from Morsi regime. They were waiting for 30 June to join the revolution even the ones who were not used to participate in any political event. During 2013 Revolution Most of the sample (71%) said that Egyptian television in 2013 had avoided the major mistakes of 2011. They did not ignore protestors in Tahrir square and Al Atahadaya palace. Egyptian television did not avoid talking about these protests. TV showed images of these protests. Television presenters did not praise Morsi. The two respondents in the sample who worked during the revolution said that they tried to be neutral showing the two sides of the political situation. They mentioned that public television gave equal chances for Morsi supporters and opponents to show their opinions. But, the television was criticized by the two sides for being biased. Most of the sample who did not work during revolution said that the influence of MB Ministry of Information was found in the news sector coverage. The minister tried to protect the president and Muslim Brotherhood. The sectors, channels and departments' chiefs were appointed by the minister so they followed his orders and instructions. Also, they were not sure if the revolution would be successful. The channels in 30 June 2013 were broadcasting the daily regular program of Friday. The TV screen showed the protests in 2 boxes without audio. Television did not talk about the protests in all other cities. MB members and Morsi supporters were given more space in news bulletin comparing to the opponents. Television did not show the real number and

importance of the anti Morsi protesters. No details about the political situations were mentioned in news and programs. TV focused on Morsi supporters in Rabaa mosque although their number was very few comparing to Morsi opponents. News tried to show that they are equal in number and importance. TV vans went to Rabaa and were stolen by Al Jazeera to broadcast what was happening among Morsi supporters. The events were not analyzed and explained. TV tried to present news more than comments. Television presenters did not mention their own opinions at all. Egyptian public TV was as usual a place to broadcast official announcements and speeches of the military and presidential palace. On the other hand, private satellite channels supported the revolution and played an important role in its success. These channels encouraged Egyptians to revolt against Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood. They had spread awareness of all the mistakes and hidden agenda of MB. It was said that Morsi was planning to put in prison many famous television presenters who criticized him in these private satellite channels. In 2011 revolution, social media especially facebook and Twitter had important impact but in 2013 revolution private satellite talk shows' presenters had a great impact. The majority of the sample (62%) said that they think Egyptian viewers prefer to watch private satellite channels and television has lost more viewers after 2011 revolution. But, Egyptians like to watch state television during crises and revolutions to know the government directions and announcements. Step by step, the revolution news, shots and figures dominated Egyptian public television especially on 3 June 2013 when the army supported the majority of Egyptians who were against Morsi. Most of the respondents (64%) felt more relaxed and secured during 2013 revolution compared to 2011 revolution. They had lived the experience before. Also, they felt that Egyptian citizens and protestors are protected and supported by the police and the army. After the fall of Morsi, his opponents were on TV. Politicians and activists were interviewed talking about the reasons and causes of the revolution and failure of Morsi in ruling Egypt. Also, they talked about the future trying to suggest plans for the upcoming days.

Concerning the current situation, the majority of the respondents (53%) consider Egypt in a transitional period and in a state of war against terrorism. They are still trying to protect Egypt from Muslim Brotherhood. Conclusion All television presenters and directors are waiting for political stability and a new elected president in 2014 to demand changes in Egyptian public television and apply many articles about the media in the new constitution which was declared in 2014. In the constitution, article 70 gives the right to own, issue, establish and distribute newspapers and visual, audio and digital outlets but according to the law which will regulate these processes. Article 71 bans censorship, confiscation or shutting down any media. Article 72 ensures the independence of all the media. Article 76 gives the right to establish federations and syndicates that should be independent to defend the members' rights, improve their skills, protect their interests and practice their activities freely. ERTU members had tried to establish a syndicate but the regime and government disagree. Article 211 says that a national media council should be established to regulate radio, television printed press and digital media. The council should have technical, financial and administrative independence ("Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt", 2014). Persons who work on TV need a syndicate. They want to regain Egyptian audiences and produce programs with big budgets. In their opinions, the huge number of employees, programs and channels are obstacles in public television development. They dream to be stars as the pioneers of Egyptian public television and consider BBC the best example of public service broadcasting. Egyptians have lived two revolutions in 2011 and 2013 but are still waiting for radical changes in Egyptian public television to be a public television not a governmental tool for its propaganda. References:

1- Learman, Oliver (2003). Encyclopedia of Middle Eastern and North African Film. London: Routledge. 2- ERTU. (2014). Retrieved February 20, 2014, from http://ertu.org/1/sectors.asp 3- ERTU Law No 13 of 1979. (2014). Retrieved January 11, 2014, from http://www.law-democracy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/law.ertu_.no-13-of-1979.pdf 4- Al Qanoun Raqam 13. (2014). Retrieved March 2, 2014, from www.ug-law.com/index.php? 5- Al Mawsoa Al Alamaya. (). Cairo: Ministry of Information. 6- Law No 13 of 1979 (2014). Retrieved from May 15, 2014, from http://www.law-democracy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/law-ertu-amend-223-of-1989.pdf 7- Ministry of Information. (2014). Retrieved May 4, 2014 from affairshttp://www.moinfo.gov.eg/page.php?id=2 8- Sowers, Jeannie, and Toensing, Chris (2012). The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and Social Change in Egypt. London: Verso Books. 9- Mourad, Mary (2013). Retrieved May 18, 2014 from http://english.ahram.org.eg/newscontent/1/64/75614/egypt/polit ics-/revolution-part--the-fall-of-mohamed-morsi.aspx 10- Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt 2014. (2014). Retrieved July 2, 2014 from www.sis.gov.eg/newvr/dustoren001.pdf