The aim of this paper is to reveal the evolution of basic principles of international law and main approaches of great powers for regulation of regional conflicts on the base of Crimea and Novorossiya cases analysis. In late October 2014 in Sochi Putin emphasized that Russia was ready to stand up to the United States which, in his view, was crushing the global order and pushing humanity to the brink of war. Referring to the origins of the Russian- Ukrainian conflict, Putin explained that it had been caused by the haste with which the European Union pushed for association with Ukraine. That was unacceptable for Russia, because it infringed on its interests in a neighbouring state. Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, interprets the events in eastern Ukraine as next steps in the plan to disintegrate the Soviet Union and Russia [Darczewska, 2014: 4]. In this context, the annexation of Crimea and the conflict over Novorossiya, which Russia has been fanning, are just other incidents in Russia's information war on the West. This is primarily a war of narratives and interpretations. One s own interpretation is being reinforced and multiplied in all possible ways, while the foreign interpretation is being pushed to the margins where it poses no threat. The aim is to neutralise the enemy, support the allies and win over the undecided ones [Darczewska, 2014: 6]. This war did not start with the Euro-Maidan in December 2013. It started when Russia entered the path of authoritarianism under Putin. The Russian doctrinaires argue that by fighting liberal globalisation, Russia is primarily confronting anarchism ( the global Maidan, the negation of all hierarchic rules), and defending the sovereignty of the nation state and the nations right to choose their own values [Darczewska, 2014: 10]. This explains the propaganda career of the notion of Novorossiya. It denotes the alleged confederation of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Putin first called this part of Ukraine Novorossiya on 17 March, 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, and on 11 September he visited the church in Moscow to light candles for those fallen in the fight for Novorossiya. In the Russian empire, the term Novorossiya was used for entity created by Catherine II. It comprised parts of present-day Ukraine: the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mikolaiv, Kherson and Odessa Oblasts. Today Novorossiya with its news agencies, intelligence services, parliament, etc., is an example of a pseudo-reality created by Russia as it plays with the imperial heritage, just as the notion of the Russian world, which refers back to such historical notions as Pax Romana, serves to emphasise the Russian hegemony. These are the kind of ideas that define the lines of Russia's propaganda and its propaganda interpretation, serve to create new myths and new realities [Darczewska, 2014: 11]. New news agencies and news portals are also emerging, dedicated to individual countries, such as pl.novorossia.today and existing portals are adding new tabs devoted to the info war. The Crimean television has recently joined this trend with a tab that says its purpose is to show events from the point of view of the history of Russia and Crimea and the global rivalry between the Russian world and the Western world [Darczewska, 2014: 12].
Underlying the policy of concessions is the conviction that Russia has the right to defend its interests and soft power. However, the Russian and the Western soft power differ fundamentally. The vectors Russia's soft power, including the Russian-speaking minority organisations, have organised and rigged the referendum in Crimea, and have been destabilising the eastern regions of Ukraine. It refuses to reckon with the existing reality and international law, and creates a new reality. The Russian soft power, civil society, expert networks or analytic schools by definition are not equivalents or similar institutions in the West. They serve different functions, namely propaganda [Darczewska, 2014: 16]. At that time it became a priority for the politicians in the Kremlin to regain geopolitical control of the areas adjacent to the Russian Federation and rebuild the spheres of influence which existed back in the Soviet times. The Russian leadership tried to prevent Russia's neighbours (the Baltic countries, Georgia and Ukraine, and previously also Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) from entering the pro-western path. Underlying the Kremlin's tough info campaigns against these countries was the conviction that Central and Eastern Europe was a Russian sphere of influence and all measures undertaken by the West to challenge this were equivalent to challenging Russia's position as a world power [Darczewska, 2014: 5]. Geopolitical doctrines have practical value: they serve to formulate guidelines for actions aimed at the political re-integration of Asia and Central Europe. The proponents of Eurasianism claim that there exists a separate civilization and historical community in the territory corresponding to the area of the former Russian Empire. They ascribe a cultural meaning to the Russianspeaking community (the concept of the so-called Russian world). The concept of nation is expanded to include areas where the Russian language and culture are dominant. This ideology has become an instrument for managing the conflicts in the post-soviet area (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, etc.). On March 1, 2014, Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, requested permission from the Council of Federation, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, to deploy military forces in Crimea. The decision was unanimously approved. The most interesting fact is that an authorization was given several days after more than 150,000 of the Russian troops have already been on alert near the Eastern border of Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula has been effectively controlled by the Russian militaries, however without any insignia. Putin requested a use of armed troops to normalize the socio-political situation in Ukraine as there is a threat to the lives of citizens of the Russian Federation as well as the personnel of the armed forces of the Russian Federation on Ukrainian territory. It shall be noted that this decision violates such international instruments as (1) the United Nations Charter of 1945, (2) the Declaration of Principles of International Law of 1970, (3) the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, (4) the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine of 1997 as well as (5) the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 in which the UK, the USA together with Russia agreed to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine and restrain from the 2
threat or use of force regarding Ukraine in exchange for the decision of Ukraine to become a non-nuclear State. Hence, Russia is responsible for the violation of the abovementioned international instruments and shall bear international responsibility [Stepanowa, 2014]. Under customary international law, to impute the responsibility of a State, two conditions should be met. Firstly, the conduct should be attributable to that State. Secondly, the disputed conduct must be in breach of that State s international obligations. It is generally recognized (Article 4 of Articles on State Responsibility (ASR), Genocide case) that the conduct of a State organ shall be considered as an act of that State. Moreover, a State should bear responsibility for actions of its military personnel (Thomas H. Youmans (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 1926; Article 4 ASR). However, the military troops deployed within the Crimean peninsula are without insignia. In addition, the officials of the Russian Federation deny any presence of the Russian troops at the territory of sovereign and independent Ukraine. Let alone, the interview of Putin that took place on March 3, 2014, in which he told that there are no Russian troops in Crimea, and all the militaries there are the members of the self-defence units of Crimea. Still, there are numerous evidence (videos, photos, eyewitness testimony etc.) that indeed it is the Russian militaries that are present at the territory of Ukraine. It is the Russian militaries that illegally occupied the peninsula encouraging Ukrainian militaries to surrender [Stepanowa, 2014]. Will Russia bear responsibility for the activities of the so-called self-defence units of Crimea consisted, as Russia claims, of Crimean dwellers? Yes. As it follows from the practice of International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Nicaragua case, Genocide case) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic case) to decide affirmatively on the attribution of a particular conduct to a State the level of control of that State over the conduct in question must be assessed. The abovementioned courts advanced several tests to benchmark the sufficient level of control exercised by a State to invoke its international responsibility, in particular, effective control applied by the ICJ and overall control test applied by the ICTY, respectively. In determining the question of attribution, the ICJ has consistently relied on its own effective control test as enunciated in the Nicaragua case (Nicaragua v. The USA, 1984). Here, the ICJ distinguished between two classes of individuals without the status of de jure organs of a State. Firstly, these are individuals totally dependent on the foreign State that were paid, equipped, generally supported by the foreign State. Secondly, these are individuals that retained a degree of independence of the foreign State that paid, financed and equipped them (contras). The Court found that the actions of totally dependent individuals were attributed to the USA. With regard to contras that committed military actions involving the use of military force against the territorial sovereignty and political independence of Nicaragua, the ICJ found that the USA is responsible as well as a result of its training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding the contra forces as it follows from the violation by the 3
USA of principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the obligation not to use force in breach of the customary rule of international law corresponding to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter [Stepanowa, 2014]. Hence, according to the Nicaragua test, a State exercises effective control over military actions when it finances, organizes, trains, supplies, and equips persons conducting them, as well as selects military targets and plans the whole military operation. In other words, presence of the military units is not necessary. A State only needs to be involved in the financing, organization etc. of a group of people within the territory of another State. The second test for imputing international responsibility of a State concurrent to the one used by the Court in the Nicaragua case was advanced by the ICTY in the Tadic case. It is a so-called overall control test. The criterion for this control can be achieved when a foreign State has role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group. Moreover, as it was found by the ICTY, this test is applicable to matters of State responsibility. Despite the fact that the Russian militaries blocking Ukrainian military bases, airports and governmental buildings are without special identification marks, there is much evidence that in deed these militaries are from Russia. Moreover, the fact that Russian troops as well as the Russian armoured vehicles are at the territory of Ukraine has been recognized by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. In addition, the Russian government recognizes that there are much self-defence units of Crimea. And having a lot of similarities with the Russian troops, there are no doubts that they are organized, financed and supported by the pro-russian forces and the government of Russia [Stepanowa, 2014]. Taking into account all the abovementioned facts, all the activities of the Russian troops as well as of the self-defence units are attributable to the Russian Federation. Russia violated the jus cogens principle of non-use or threat to use force against territorial integrity and political independence of another State. In particular, under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against another State. Territorial integrity denotes the inviolability of a State s physical territory and the prohibition of forcible trespassing of any kind. One may argue that Russia did not violate this principle as there was no armed attack by Russia against Ukraine, however, it shall be noted that the transfer of one State s armed forces into another State in significant numbers without consent almost certainly falls within the prohibition under Article 2(4) of the Charter. Taking into account the facts that were affirmed by the Security Council Member States on March 3, 2014, it is Ukraine that has all grounds to lawfully use force against Russia as a lawful self-defence. Russian military action is not a human rights protection mission. It is a violation of international law and a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the independent nation of Ukraine, and a breach of Russia s Helsinki Commitments and its UN obligations, told Samantha Power, U.S. Ambassador to 4
the UN on March 3, 2014 during the meeting of the Security Council [Power, 2014]. On March 6, 2014, the Parliament of Crimea adopted a Resolution No.1702-6/14 that provided for a secession referendum to be held on March 16, 2014. Having been arranged at 10 days notice, the referendum was characterized by a complete lack of transparency regarding the composition of the lists of voters, the electoral commissions as well as the absence of impartial international observers. Moreover, the initiative did not offer its voters the status quo option by leaving only two possibilities: (1) to join the Russian Federation as a federal subject or (2) to return to the 1992 Constitution of Crimea and be an integral part of Ukraine. However, the 1992 Constitution entitled Crimea to full sovereign powers in terms of establishing relations with other States, which means that whatever the choice of the Crimeans would be, it would de facto break from Ukraine. First of all, referendum was organized by self-announced and self-appointed head of Crimea Sergey Aksenov (with criminal alias Goblin ), an individual with abundant criminal past. The referendum was held on 16th of March only on Crimean peninsula, which unequivocally contradicted the Constitution of Ukraine, as questions on border changes can only be decided in a national referendum. Secondly, referendum was organized in three weeks and was not supported by Ukrainian government. Third, indigenous dwellers of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars, boycotted the referendum. Moreover, referendum was held at the barrel of the gun of hundreds of so-called green men, in fact Russian militants that later received medals of honour for returning of Crimea back from Putin. Additionally, the Crimean referendum was rigged. According to official information, 123% of Sevastopol citizens voted for joining Russia. In fact, Crimean Annexation was never recognized by the international community, and even was announced illegal by UN General Assembly which supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Given all the abovementioned, claims on legality of the Crimea Annexation have nothing to do with reality and international law. But in Russia was reported that the choice to join Russia supported more than 96,7% of all voters. In other words, in Crimea a unilateral secession took place. Subsequently, the region declared independence and further asked Kremlin to join Russia. Notably, the referendum results were recognized only by several developing countries that have close ties with Russia. The complete implementation of the principle of self-determination undermines the principle of territorial integrity. In other words, only legal secession would not undermine territorial integrity of the parent state. There are several circumstances when a secession may be regarded as legal: (1) it shall concern people in territories that are subject to decolonization; (2) it shall be envisaged by the national legislation of the parent state concerned; (3) the territory inhabited by a certain people should be occupied or annexed after 1945; (4) the secessionists shall be a people ; (5) their parent state shall flagrantly violate their human rights and (6) no other effective remedies under national or international law may exist, if any of these conditions are met. 5
Firstly, Crimea is not subject to decolonization. Under Article 134 of the Constitution of Ukraine The Autonomous Republic of Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine and all issues delegated to its authority are resolved within its framework of reference as determined by the Constitution of Ukraine. Secondly, secession is not envisaged by the Constitution of Ukraine as a parent state. Generally, all political systems insist on legality of secession only through constitutional means. For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec case held that any attempt to effect the secession of a province from Canada must be undertaken pursuant to the Constitution of Canada. The Supreme Court of Alaska in the Kohlhaas v Alaska case (2006) found that a referendum on secession would be unconstitutional. The Ukrainian legislation is not an exception. Article 73 of the Constitution stipulates that any alterations to the territory of Ukraine shall be resolved exclusively by the All-Ukrainian referendum, not by the local one. Thirdly, the territory of Crimea was not occupied or annexed after 1945. Fourthly, the secessionists (i.e. Russian population of the Crimea) may not be regarded as a people. As it follows from the Quebec case a people shall be governed as part of a colonial empire, be subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation, be denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part. And in all other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-determination within the framework of their existing state. And finally, there is no evidence that the rights of the Russian population in Crimea have ever been subject to flagrant human rights violations from the government of Ukraine. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities found no evidence of violations or threats to the rights of Russian speakers during her visit to Kyiv and Crimea. Thus, all claims that the Russian-speaking population of Crimea is facing oppression and violence are, at the very least, groundless [Stepanowa b, 2014]. International law cannot be neutral regarding the unilateral secession of Crimea as the declaration of independence of Crimea was effected through the Russian military assistance. This argument is supported by the ICJ in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. In particular, in paragraph 81 the following is stipulated: The illegality attached to [some other] declarations of independence stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens). In other words, a unilateral declaration of independence will be recognized as illegal where a violation of jus cogens principles took place. Here, an unlawful secession in violation of jus cogens occurred as Russia violated jus cogens principle of non-use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. And where a declaration of independence is adopted in such manner, foreign states are under obligation to withhold or withdraw recognition [Stepanowa, 2014 b]. All wrote is true, but most important thing is that fast forward half a decade, Russia pours its troops into the Crimean region, justifying the intervention on the grounds of protecting a predominantly ethnic Russian population and guaranteeing 6
their right to self-determination. The argument by some Kremlin officials, including Putin, is that there are similarities between Kosovo and Crimea, and that the precedent of the former is substantial to justify Russian policy towards the latter. From the point of view George Topouria, this argument is a false analogy, and there are three key differences between Kosovo and Crimea that render Kremlin s argument as moot. Firstly, the Ukrainian Constitution states that any territorial alternation to its national borders should be decided through a nationwide referendum. Neither does the constitution of the autonomous republic of Crimea empower its Parliament or Government to initiate a referendum for independence, let alone joining the Russian Federation. This leads us to our second point: In Crimea, there were no such persecutions, nor have new central authorities in Kyiv hinted or acted in a way to threaten the livelihood and peace of the ethnically Russian majority in the region. Unlike the decade-long violent standoff between ethnic Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo, the multi-ethnic Crimean population has lived peacefully with the rest of Ukraine since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. There have been no violent campaigns aimed at ethnic Russians. Thirdly, in Crimea, the referendum process was hectically rushed and held against the background of Russian military presence in a timeframe of less than three weeks. Also, the Russians had monopolized and exercised full control over the process, and unlike Western forces in Kosovo, immediately moved on annexing the newly-recognized territory as its own [Topouria, 2014]. With the abovementioned points, it is clear that there is very little credibility for Crimea- Kosovo parallels. In Ukraine till 2014 there were two main internal problems: opposition of East and West and Crimean question. East and West Ukrainian opposition has a long history. Today mental features of habitants of both parts of Ukraine are used by politicians in their struggle for power. Till 2014 the strongest clans were Donetsky and Dnepropetrovsky. After Orange revolution oligarch s battle had increased. The new re-division of the spheres of influence was occurring. This could lead to turning Ukraine from Unitarian into Federative state. This was moreover real, as Russia was strongly interested in such things on the move, and the laws, restricting Russia were becoming less and less. The problem of Russian-speaking now is most dangerous for the stability of Ukraine, because they are actively supported by Russian Federation. This question has periodically been raised in the 1990s, however gained sharp edges after Orange revolution. This is connected with Ukraine s change in foreign politics, taking the course for NATO accession, on the one hand. And on the other, it is connected with Russia s rigid course with Putin. Let s remember Summer war in 2008 between Russia and Georgia. Russian point was that Saakashvili left peoples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia no other choice but to ensure their security and the right to exist through self-determination as independent states. At a conceptual level, the doctrine of remedial selfdetermination concerns cases where a population is excluded from political 7
participation in the state or is severely mistreated, on grounds of its ethnic appurtenance. The EU demanded that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect fro the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognized by international law, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and United Nations Security Council resolutions. The rejection of the Russian claims, muted though it was, did not address the existence or otherwise of the doctrine of remedial self-determination. Instead, it appeared to focus on the absence of facts in this instance that might warrant its application [Weller, 2008: 88]. Nowadays it is a huge delusion (that actually Putin has first fallen a victim to) that everyone who is speaking Russian is pro-russian. It was easy to meet Russian speaking Ukrainian patriots during the Euro-Maidan. Moreover, according to the result of IRI survey of residents of Ukraine, conducted on September 12-25, 2014, no less than 79% of Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine oppose the decision of Russian Federation to send its army to protect Russian speaking citizens of Ukraine. In fact, total majority of people in the Russian-speaking South and East definitely do not support this decision [Sviatnenko, 2014]. Moscow too faces meaningful constraints. For now, Russians largely support the annexation of Crimea and the population believes the government s manipulated interpretation of events in eastern Ukraine. But support for open war in the east has declined, from over 70 percent in April 2014 to just over 30 percent at the beginning of 2015. The peak in deaths in August-September must have alarmed the Kremlin: in spite of media censorship, the public found out about the rising death toll, the coffins arriving in Russia from Ukraine, and the secret funerals of soldiers killed in action. A combination of military casualties and an economic downturn could spell future problems for the regime. Sanctions are hitting Russia and Moscow probably realizes that significant escalation of its involvement say, by creating a land connection to Crimea could result in further sanctions. Furthermore, any putative land-bridge to Crimea could only be achieved through open warfare; Russia would deniability of its involvement in such a broadening of the conflict. Finally, Russia s military establishment is reluctant to lead large-scale warfare that could expose deficiencies that recent army reforms have only partially addressed. However, Moscow s ability to defuse tensions is also restricted. The east Ukrainian rebels could not survive without Moscow s support, but many of them are still semi-independent figures. In Russia itself, a strong nationalist criticises the Kremlin for not grabbing more territory sooner. The Kremlin is far from being entirely hostage to their views, but the perception in Moscow is that defeat in Donbas would cause serious damage to Putin s reputation. Moscow wants to prevent Ukraine from moving to the West, but it is unsure how best to achieve it. It is torn between the contradictory options of trying to make Ukraine into a failed state, and pursuing a deal with President Poroshenko [Liik, Wilson, 2014: 2]. Minsk agreements foresee, among other things, the removal of military hardware from the separatist regions and the monitoring of the Russia-Ukraine 8
border. The border between Russia and Ukraine is mainly porous and effectively non-existent east of the rebel republics at the moment. The current bordermonitoring mission led by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe is only symbolic. The mission may even do more harm than good, since the OSCE presence lends legitimacy to an unacceptable situation, and implies a degree of control greater than the OSCE actually possesses [Liik, Wilson, 2014: 3]. The Minsk agreements were partly Moscow s initiative, so Moscow could present its de facto retreat as a victory. If Western sanctions and falling oil prices undermine Russia s economy and thus the regime s popularity, a face-saving way out might become an attractive option. Some commentators and some Ukrainians have suggested a radical solution: abandoning Donbas altogether. This would free Kyiv up to focus on reforms and spare it a real economic and political burden. It could cut the region loose economically or it could grant it independence. Independence for Donbas is probably unrealistic: not to mention the moral aspect, many forces in Ukraine would be against it, and so would the West, since it is not interested in new border changes in Europe. But it is an option that Moscow neither expects nor wants. Russia wants leverage over Ukraine, not burdensome new obligations. Being left with Donbas instead would feel like a bitter disappointment: having tried to catch a man, Moscow would be left with just his jacket. Moscow is itself obsessed with territory, so it would not expect this move, and it would certainly try to prevent it. Keeping the independence option up its sleeve might serve to pressure Moscow to comply with the Minsk agreements and to try to ensure the regions return [Liik, Wilson, 2014: 4]. However, if Russia is not interested in the de jure severing of Donbas from Ukraine, it is likely be interested in making the region economically more viable; and this may involve further conquests. The traditional economic key to the region is Mariupol. Its railways and port bring in the supplies and imports that the processing industry in Donetsk and Luhansk relies on. Crimea is also facing huge problems with transport links as well as water and electricity supplies. Any operation around Mariupol could tempt Moscow to go further and open a land corridor to Crimea and secure its transport, water and energy supplies. Or Russia could whole of the east and south of Ukraine. Previous attempts to foster uprisings in places like Odessa and Kharkov failed through lack of popular support [Liik, Wilson, 2014: 4]. But in future Russia might return to the plans of carving out a more sizeable Novorossiya. Crimean question before 2014 could be divided into two parts: problem of Crimean Tatars and the problem of Russian-speaking habitants. Crimean Tatars fight for the returning of their territory, which was taken away in the 1940 th. Thus, this problem had more economic weight than political or ideological one. Crimean Tatars has hopes for the support of Turks first of all, however, Turkey has never put forward the proposition of Crimea s secession in its favor. 9
Russian Duma has raised the question not once already about Crimea s returning to Russia. Many years Crimea was loud with secession from Ukraine and accession to Russia. Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea, its aggressive behaviour against eastern Ukraine and its destabilisation of the Ukrainian state has become yet another field of Russia's experimentation with information operations. Using methods inherited from the Soviet times, Russia has managed to transform the real Ukrainian-Russian conflict and military intervention into a virtual conflict between Russia and the West. It has declared an info war on the West (especially the USA and NATO) and has been building up the war's resources and facilities. Having resurrected the old foreign policy model based on a rivalry with the United States, Russia has now revealed its geopolitical ambitions and has set out to impose its way of thinking in terms of geopolitical blocs, while forcefully delineating a border between the Russian world civilisation and the West. This has been the source of many difficulties and upheavals in Russia's relations with the West in recent history. So far, the West has not been able to formulate a good response to Russia's revisionist policies, or find a way to support Ukraine, the victim of Russia's policy [Darczewska, 2014]. Conclusions The current conflict opens a new page even in terms of the turmoil that has been besetting Eastern Europe. Putin s escalation of the conflict is ideologically based on the Novorossiya concept, and was essentially very different from, for example, the aggression against Georgia in 2008. Then Russia drew the red line which the EU or US integration projects could not cross, now Russia has decisively crossed the red lines laid down by the West. For example, according to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Great Britain, Russia and the US gave security assurances that they would not use force against the territorial integrity of Ukraine. As a result Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons stockpile. But the agreement collapsed after Russia annexed the Crimea, although this action was almost unanimously condemned by the UN Resolution adopted by 100 countries, including two guarantors of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Despite that both European and American leaders called on Russia to stop at first by terminating support to the men in green, later by ceasing conflict escalation and supply of weapons, and not carrying out unilateral humanitarian operations withdrawal from all these red lines was made, because the West avoided getting into a direct confrontation with Russia. Particularly since countries in the West have limited influence in the region. According to the Russian logic, Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries should accept the status of buffer zones. At the same time Russia is seeking to acquire an informal veto right over further EU and NATO enlargement to the east. It should be noted that the neutrality status imposed on Ukraine at the international level would first of all mean that Russia s ability to use its own tools to affect the current status quo in this country would be much more influential compared with the EU s leverages. In order to keep Ukraine in the post-soviet 10
space Russia only needs to maintain the existing rules of the political and economic game; meanwhile in order to expand its European regulation, the EU must change these rules fundamentally. The status of a buffer state would certainly be the factor causing a stalemate in the current situation. The situation after the 2008 conflict in Georgia allows Russia to assume that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, it will in any case hold more than before the start of the conflict and relations with the West will eventually revert to the business as usual situation. Russia hopes to repeat this scenario again. It is important to emphasize that the business as usual concept includes not only normalization of economic relations, lifting of sanctions, and renewal of the political dialogue, but also recognition of Russia as a veto holder in the security architecture of Europe. The practical manifestation of such recognition could be that the expansion of the transatlantic institutions further to the post Soviet space would not be possible without Russia s approval. The Ukraine crisis has substantially and perhaps permanently altered Europe s security structure. Europe is now much less secure, and its security architecture altogether less stable, more confrontational, and less predictable. Individual states, along with NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, must now address the deficiencies in this new order. At the same time, Europe has a better chance to exist peacefully if it succeeds in binding Russia into a cooperative order as demanding as that will be. Thus far, the reactions of the EU, OSCE, NATO, and their allies to Russia s aggression against Ukraine have fluctuated between determination and helplessness. There is a distinct impression, however, that the Western world is merely reacting, while Russia sets the pace; rather than proactively managing the development of the conflict, Europe seems to be limping behind. Europe has sought very early on to demonstrate both internal unity and unity with the US in its support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russia s actions though the Americans made it clear from the beginning that they considered the Ukraine crisis to be more of a European problem and accordingly expected European engagement while themselves taking a backseat. The Ukraine conflict will determine the course of Europe s security policy for the foreseeable future. A painful realization follows from this: The Russia policy that Germany and Europe have followed up to now, based on the assumption of common values, cooperation, and integration, and the respect of commonly agreed rules, is done for the time being. Clearly, Russia is no longer a partner for stability in the European neighbourhood. References 1. Darczewska Jolanta, (2014), The Information War on Ukraine: New challenges, Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper, 14/08, 19 p. 2. Stepanowa Anna, (2014), Is Russian military presence in Crimea legally justified?, http://beyondthe.eu/is-russian-military-presence-in-crimea-legallyjustified/ 11
3. Power Samantha, (2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/samantha-powerrussia-ukraine-un-security-council-2014-3 4. Stepanowa Anna, (2014b), International law on legality of the Crimea secession, http://beyondthe.eu/international-law-crimea-secession/ 5. Topouria George, (2014), Three reasons why Crimea is not Kosovo, http://beyondthe.eu/crimea-definitely-not-kosovo/ 6. Weller Marc, (2008), Negotiating the final status of Kosovo, Chaillot Paper, 114, 5-94. 7. Sviatnenko Sviatoslav, (2014), Ten Western myths about Ukrainian Crisis, http://beyondthe.eu/ten-western-myths-ukrainian-crisis/ 8. Liik Kadri, Wilson Andrew, (2014), What will happen with Eastern Ukraine? Policy Memo, The European Council on Foreign Relations, 119, www.ecfr.eu 12