MILLER v. WILLIAM CHEVROLET/GEO, INC. 326 Ill. App. 3d 642; 762 N.E.2d 1 (1 st Dist. 2001) Plaintiff Otha Miller appeals from an order of the Cook County circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant William Chevrolet/GEO, Inc. Miller's lawsuit arose from allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations made by William Chevrolet during the sale of a used Nissan Altima. The circuit court found that Miller suffered no legally cognizable injury and thus failed to establish a prima facie case for either his common law fraud claims or for his claims under Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1998). BACKGROUND... It is uncontested that in late February 1998, Miller went into the William Chevrolet dealership and began looking at used vehicles. Miller admits that he had not dealt with defendant dealership on any prior occasion and called his decision to look at their cars "random." After discussing available cars and financing with William Chevrolet personnel, Miller took a Nissan Altima (different than the one he eventually purchased) home for the night as a test drive. The following day, Miller returned the car to William Chevrolet and began discussions about the 1997 Nissan Altima that he ultimately purchased. During his deposition, Miller alleged that William Chevrolet's salesperson told him that the 1997 Altima was "executive driven" and that it was a "great car." In its response to interrogatories, William Chevrolet stated that the only representation its salespeople ever attached to the vehicle was "used." In his deposition, Miller stated that he interpreted the phrase "executive driven" to mean that the car had previously been used by high ranking employees of either Nissan or William Chevrolet and had therefore been well cared for. It is not disputed that the Altima had not been driven by these executives and that William Chevrolet had recently purchased the vehicle from Enterprise Leasing Corporation. Miller admitted to knowing at the time that the Altima was used (he was buying a 1997 model year car in 1998) but claims he did not know, nor did he inquire further, about the Altima's history or previous owner. Upon his decision to purchase the Altima, Miller was presented a number of documents to sign. At his deposition, Miller recognized his signature on a number of exhibits, including a retail installment contract, an odometer disclosure form, a handwritten vehicle sales order, and a typed vehicle sales order. Although Miller did not remember in detail each form he signed, he did recall that he was neither pressured nor rushed to complete the paperwork. From the record it appears that these documents describe the car in question as a 1997 Nissan Altima and all contain plaintiff's signature and are dated February 27, 1998. The retail installment contract contains the typed word "used" in a box designated "New or Used." Both vehicle sales orders contain checks in the "Used" box of a section which also contains boxes titled "New" and "Demo." None of these documents make reference to the car's prior owner, Enterprise Leasing Company. During his deposition, Miller was also shown an Indiana certificate of title, the front of which lists "ENTERPRISE LSG CO. OF INDIANAPOLIS" as the original owner. The back of this title contains a section labeled "First Re-Assignment By Registered Dealer Only" under which William Chevrolet is listed as dealer and Otha Miller is listed as purchaser. Miller acknowledged signing every document he was asked to sign, including the title. Next to the purchaser's signature block on the back of the title is a date of sale box in which "3/25/98" is written... Miller admits having driven the Altima since its purchase without any serious malfunction. Based primarily on this admission, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that Miller's submissions did not raise any legally cognizable injury. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits illustrate no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... An order granting summary judgment should be reversed if the evidence shows that a genuine issue of material fact exists or if the judgment was incorrect as a matter of law. II. Fraudulent Misrepresentation Miller contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on both his common law and statutory fraudulent misrepresentation claims. We agree. We first consider whether summary judgment is appropriate for Miller's common law fraud claims. A. Common Law Fraud Fraud has been said to comprise anything calculated to deceive and may consist of a single act, a single suppression of truth, suggestion of falsity, or direct falsehood, innuendo, look or gesture. The elements of common law fraud are (1) false statement of material fact; (2) defendant's knowledge that the statement was false; (3) defendant's intent that the statement induce the plaintiff to act; (4) plaintiff's reliance on the statement; and (5) plaintiff's damages resulting from reliance on the statement. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co. 174 Ill. 2d 482, 496 (1996). In analyzing the appropriateness of summary judgment in this case, we will consider each element in turn. 1. False statement of Material Fact This element encompasses three requirements: the defendant must (1) make a misrepresentation, (2) it must involve a fact and (3) the misrepresentation must be material. Miller contends that William Chevrolet told him that the Altima was "executive driven" and that this characterization was false and affirmatively misrepresented the car's true history as a rental vehicle. Defendant offered no evidence that the car was ever driven by executives of either William Chevrolet or Nissan. Miller has thus raised a triable question on the misrepresentation requirement of this element. We conclude that a material controversy also exists on the requirement that defendant's misrepresentation involve a fact. Defendant argues that the designation "executive driven" has no clear meaning and at most is "puffing." Puffing is defined as a "bare and naked statement as to value" of a product and is considered a nonactionable assertion of opinion. Statements of existing facts or comments that ascribe specific virtues to a product are not generally considered puffing and may be the subject of a fraud claim. Whether a representation will be considered one of opinion or fact depends upon the circumstances of the case. We find that a salesperson's description of a used car's as "executive driven" could be viewed as a statement about an existing factual situation intended to conjure a specific, factual idea about the car's history in the mind of a typical consumer. Unlike phrases such as "expert workmanship," or "magnificent" which courts have found to be mere statements of value, "executive driven" is sufficiently susceptible of interpretation as a factual description of a car's history to defy our characterizing it as "puffing" as a matter of law. Miller has therefore put forward sufficient question as to the categorization of "executive driven" to survive summary judgment on this requirement of the first element of fraud. Finally, a misrepresentation is "material" if the plaintiff would have acted differently had he been aware of it, or if it concerned the type of information upon which he would be expected to rely when making his decision to act. Plaintiff's deposition indicated that he did not want to purchase a car previously used for
rentals and that he would not have purchased the Altima in question had he known of its history. Plaintiff's opinion witness also indicated that purchasers who request or knowingly accept cars previously used as rentals expect a reduction in price as a result. Furthermore, the fact that other states [e.g. Massachusetts and Kansas] demand that rental history be divulged in writing to prospective car buyers reveals that this is precisely the type of information that people use as the basis for purchasing decisions. 2. Knowledge of Falsehood That the defendant know of the falsehood is also an element of common law fraud. In the instant case, defendant does not dispute that its salespeople knew that the car had been titled to Enterprise Rental prior to the sale to Miller. To the extent that "executive driven" can be considered a statement of existing fact, defendant knew it to be a false representation about the car in question. 3. Intent to Induce Reliance Miller alleges that he was told the car was "executive driven" in conjunction with being told that it was a "great car" and defendant offers no suggestion why the salesperson used the phrase "executive driven" other than to explain the car's history in an effort to get Miller to buy it. The particular phrase "executive driven" logically appears to have been employed to encourage the purchase. Defendant counters that there was no showing that the alleged comment was intended to induce plaintiff to purchase the Altima... [B]oth Miller's opinion witness and common sense tell us that used car dealerships have reason to know that the history of a car is of concern to purchasers. This is all the more true when the history involves previous service as a taxi or rental vehicle. One can hardly disclaim the lack of intent to persuade while one is simultaneously employing a specific description of the car's history in a sales pitch. We acknowledge that Miller's claims about William Chevrolet's intent to induce are compromised by Miller's failure, at the time of the negotiation, to state to the salesperson that he would not purchase a car previously used by a rental company. At the very least, however, this discussion reveals that Miller has raised genuine issues of material fact pertaining to the intent element of common law fraud. 4. Reliance William Chevrolet argues that Miller's reliance on the assertion that the car was executive driven is unreasonable as a matter of law. Because Miller ultimately signed the back of the car's title, the front side of which listed Enterprise as the previous owner, William Chevrolet claims that Miller cannot assert that he reasonably relied on its oral statements about the Altima's history. The law will not allow a person to enter into a transaction with eyes closed to material facts and then claim fraud by deceit. To sustain a claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they "justifiably relied on defendant's words or silence." Central States Joint Board v. Continental Assurance Co., 117 Ill. App. 3d 600, 606 (1983). The right to rely depends on consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.... [W]hen defendants make positive statements of material fact in intentional tort cases, the plaintiffs' negligence in failing to uncover the truth is not fatal. One of the most important of the surrounding circumstances is timing. A plaintiff may not generally rely on representations made when the plaintiff has ample opportunity to ascertain the truth of the matter before acting. From the record, it appears that the certificate of title was the sole document that revealed the Altima's prior owner. The date on which the title was signed over to Miller reads March 25, 1998. The contract of sale, however, bears the date February 27, 1998. Thus the record reflects that Miller's opportunity to find out the car's history did not occur until after he was obligated on the sales contract... Miller's later opportunity to discover the truth behind the alleged misrepresentation does not alter the
nature of his reliance at the time he signed the sales contract and became legally obligated to William Chevrolet. This issue at least raises a material question of fact sufficient to be presented to the trier of fact... Defendant also asserts that the sales contract indicated that the car was "used" and therefore any facts plaintiff inferred from the phrase executive driven could not be reasonably relied upon. The record reveals, however, that plaintiff never doubted that the vehicle, was used: he was purchasing a 1997 model year car in 1998. Plaintiff instead claims that the designation of "used" in a box labeled "New or Used" did not contradict nor call into question the salesperson's classification of the car as "executive driven." 5. Damages Unlike many of the common law requirements discussed above, damages are a necessary element of the prima facie case for both plaintiff's common law and statutory consumer fraud claims. We will therefore address the question of damages for both claims in this single section. The trial court found that, as a matter of law, plaintiff could not prove damages resulting from William Chevrolet's alleged misrepresentations about the history of the Altima. In the absence of any complaints by plaintiff about the car's condition during his use of it, the trial court found that plaintiff's alleged loss of confidence in the car and his assertion that he overpaid and had lost resale value because he was misled about the car's history were not legally cognizable harms.... In Connick v. Suzuki, 174 Ill. 2d 482 (1996), the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated a consumer fraud claim the damages portion of which alleged only diminution in value.... In deciding that Miller failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding damages, the trial court relied primarily on the recent Kelly v. Sears Roebuck Co., 308 Ill. App. 3d 633, (1999) decision. The court there found that a risk that a product may in the future either fail or provide unsatisfactory performance is insufficient to adequately state a compensable injury. The facts in Kelly, however, distinguish it from the instant case. In Kelly, the plaintiff claimed that Sears sold him a car battery as "new" which might have been used, and therefore might have been of lesser quality than a new battery. The plaintiff could not, however, establish that he had in fact been sold a used battery. In effect, allowing the plaintiff's claim based merely on a question as to whether his battery was used would have dictated that damages could be obtained by every purchaser of a Sears car battery during the relevant time period, without ascertaining the existence of any defect. The Kelly court distinguished [the facts in that case from other cases involving] diminution in resale value or diminished value from a known defect.... In the instant case, William Chevrolet does not dispute that the car in question was owned previously by a rental company. And Miller's opinion witness presented evidence of diminished value of rental cars generally. Unlike the theoretical, future possibility of lost value facing the plaintiff in Kelly, Miller has raised a question of material fact regarding the presently diminished value of the Altima.... We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the issue of damages. B. Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (hereinafter "the Act") eliminated many of the common law fraud elements, creating a new cause of action that affords consumers broad protection by prohibiting any "deception" or "false promise." Section 2 of the Act itself provides: Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with
intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact * * * in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby." 815 ILCS 505/2. The Act offers "a clear mandate to the Illinois courts to utilize the Act to the greatest extent possible to eliminate all forms of deceptive or unfair business practices and provide appropriate relief to consumers." Totz v. Continental Du Page Acura, 236 Ill. App. 3d 891, 901 (1992). The elements of a claim under the Act are: (1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2) defendant's intent that plaintiff rely on the deception; (3) that the deception occur in a course of conduct involving trade and commerce; and (4) damages. Damages are discussed above and the third element is not disputed in the instant case. This list illustrates that under the Act a consumer need prove significantly fewer elements than required to satisfy a common law fraud claim. For example, the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's deception is not an element of a consumer fraud claim. Instead, the plaintiff need show only that the fraud "proximately caused" plaintiff's injury. Nor need the defendant have intended to deceive the plaintiff; innocent misrepresentations or material omissions intended to induce the plaintiff's reliance are actionable. Having raised triable issues under the more stringent requirements of common law fraud, plaintiff finds his consumer fraud case virtually made. As the Illinois Supreme Court has noted, "In superimposing the elements of the two causes of action and holding them up to the light, it is unquestionable that so long as the alleged deception occurred in a course of conduct involving trade or commerce, facts satisfying a claim for common law fraud will necessarily satisfy a claim under the Act." The following discussion of Miller's statutory claims will therefore be brief. The "deceptive practice" requirement under the Act is met by the defendant's material misrepresentation as discussed under common law fraud above. The intent required by the Consumer Fraud Act "is merely the defendant's intent that the plaintiff in the action rely on the... information the defendant gave to plaintiff as opposed to any intent to deceive" as required under the common law. As Miller raised a genuine issue of fact regarding William Chevrolet's intent to deceive under the common law, he has also raised a triable issue of defendant's intent under the relaxed standard applied by the Act. Although plaintiffs need not establish reliance as an element of their consumer fraud claim, plaintiffs must show that the fraud "proximately caused" their injury. Because the "theory of reliance is ambiguously present within the parameters of the concept of proximate cause," logic dictates that Miller's success in raising a material issue of genuine fact concerning his actual reliance satisfies this element of consumer fraud... Finally, the Act eliminates any requirement of plaintiff diligence in ascertaining the accuracy of misrepresentations. When a defendant makes a an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact with the intention of inducing the plaintiff's reliance, plaintiff's negligence works no bar to a consumer fraud action. Miller's possible negligence in failing to ascertain the Altima's previous owner is therefore irrelevant to his claim for fraudulent misrepresentation under the Act. We therefore conclude that Miller has raised sufficient issues of material fact to survive a motion for summary judgment on his claim of fraudulent misrepresentation under the Consumer Protection Act. We reverse the trial court's determination that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his fraudulent misrepresentation claims under both common law and the Consumer Fraud Act.... As to these claims, we vacate and remand to the trial court.