SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS POLITICAL STRATEGY IN ZIMBABWE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE BLIND SPOT? Obert Hodzi February 2012 Introduction Pre- and post-independent Zimbabwe has been marred by extreme political violence and gross human rights violations. Examples abound: the Chimoio and Nyadzonya massacres in the 1970s, the Gukurahundi massacres of the early 1980s, and since 2000, the unprecedented political violence that characterized elections. While these have been widely reported, the use of sexual violence as a political strategy has often been neglected. In the post-independence era, particularly after 2000, it has grown more widespread and systematic. Yet at all stages of political transition, state-enforced amnesia, reconciliation, and forgive and forget rhetoric is employed. Article VII of the 2008 Global Political Agreement established The Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) to advise the State on addressing past injustices and human rights abuse. The ONHRI paid little or no regard to the gender dimensions of political violence. Without a clear gender policy on transitional justice, impunity reigns, victims have no recourse and sexual violence remains a political strategy. As Zimbabwe draws closer to yet another election, this paper examines the use of sexual violence as a political strategy in past elections. The transitional justice discourse in Zimbabwe, I argue, has been defined narrowly and unwittingly focuses on civil and political 1
rights abuses; thus failing to capture the subtle dimensions of structural inequalities suffered by women. Accordingly, without a known gender policy in the ONHRI, politically motivated sexual violence remains at the fringes of transitional justice mechanisms in Zimbabwe. Sexual Violence as Political Strategy Broadly defined, sexual violence includes acts of a sexual nature committed on a person under coercive circumstances and may include acts that do not involve physical contact or penetration. 1 The Rome Statute has further defined rape as a crime against humanity, 2 which is excluded from amnesty provisions. Although Zimbabwe is a non-member, the ICC description of rape as jus cogens places a stern responsibility on any State to judicially deal with matters of widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a crime against humanity. Worrisomely, current Zimbabwean laws, simply address random acts of sexual violence perpetrated by an individual against another without regard to centrally organized, widespread and systematic acts. The laws, therefore, do not reflect the scale and monumentality of rape when committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians. 3 Furthermore, the laws fail to integrate the principle of command responsibility, which would enable the prosecution of organizers and sponsors of organized sexual violence. Faced with general mass discontent, socio-political opposition and heightened prospects of losing the 2008 general election, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) used sexual violence to re-establish political dominance. Being a highly conservative society that deeply holds social mores about women s honour and sexual purity, sexual violence was seen to be effective in spreading fear and terror among Zimbabweans, dissuading thousands of potential voters from joining the Movement for Democratic Change 1 Prosecutor V. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 580 (Sept. 2, 1998). 2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) Article 7 (g): Accessed at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/criminalcourt.htm 3 Aids-Free World (2009): Electing To Rape. Sexual Terror in Mugabe s Zimbabwe: New York: Aids-Free World, pp. 34 2
(MDC). As bearers and protectors of a community s culture and future generations, women were targeted in ways directly linked to their gender and sexual identity. 4 In breach of United Nations Resolution 1820 that recognized rape as a weapon of war and a threat to international security [ used] to humiliate, instil fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group, 5 sexual violence became a means, not only to undermine the strength and support of other political parties, but also to demoralize and vanquish whole communities perceived to be anti-zanu-pf. In 2008 the primary victims of sexual violence carried out by youth gangs, war veterans, state security agents and supporters of the ZANU-PF were perceived MDC-T supporters. A Solidarity Peace Trust report revealed that ZANU-PF youth committed 83 per cent of crimes while state agents- the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and members of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) committed 18 per cent. 6 The use of state security agents to commit sexual violence against civilians suggests a centrally organized campaign rather than spontaneous and random acts. In almost all cases, the sexual violence was nearly fatal 7 : victims were beaten, tortured and then raped in the presence of their families and whole communities. This pattern was repeated in almost all provinces of the country reinforcing suspicion that it was centrally organized. 8 Similarities in the methods used to torture and subsequently rape victims appear to be systematic and well-orchestrated. The salient resemblance in the perpetrators and victims, as well as the uniformity of the insults and reasons for their rape suggest that it was neither 4 Leiby, L. Michele (2009): Wartime Sexual Violence in Guatemala and Peru. In: International Studies Quarterly: Vol. 53, pp. 446. 5 Research and Advocacy Unit (2011): Forced Concubinage in Zimbabwe. Harare: Research and Advocacy Unit, pp. 5 6 Reeler, Tony (2008): Subliminal Terror: Human Rights Violations And Torture In Zimbabwe 2008. Braamfontein: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, pp. 31 7 Aids-Free World (2009): Electing To Rape. Sexual Terror in Mugabe s Zimbabwe: New York: Aids-Free World, pp. 10 8 Aids-Free World (2009): Electing To Rape. Sexual Terror in Mugabe s Zimbabwe: New York: Aids-Free World, pp. 17 3
spontaneous nor coincidental. Furthermore, refusal by the police to investigate reported cases of sexual violence indicated a state-sanctioned, albeit unofficial campaign. However, specific figures of the number of incidences of sexual violence in 2008 remain elusive. Most cases were not reported for fear of reprisals, stigmatization and police refusal to investigate complaints against ZANU-PF officials, supporters and state agents. Within international legal institutions, the use of sexual violence for purposes of political expedience constitutes a crime against humanity. Yet it has been discarded as a women s issue that requires no special priority in the transitional justice discourse of Zimbabwe. With the ZRP and the Attorney General refusing to investigate and prosecute politically-motivated cases of sexual violence, victims are left without options for justice while perpetrators continue with impunity. The ONHRI has also failed to mainstream gender in its programs and insisted on focusing on violations other than sexual violence. This position disregards the gendered dimensions of sexual violence as well as its role in driving poverty, social rejection, health and other psychological problems. As a consequence, politically motivated sexual violence is marginalized in Zimbabwean transitional justice processes. As such, the ONHRI has been dismissed as a largely symbolic entity without a gender oriented statutory mandate or a gender policy. Two years after its establishment, it remains hinged on reconciliation and national healing without establishing accountability. The Organ for National Healing and Reconciliation: Toothless? The ONHRI is a result of protracted political negotiations that led to the signing of the GPA. The United Nations Security Council calls for the inclusion of women in peace processes 9, peace agreement implementation and for peace negotiations to address sexual violence. 10 With the exception of Priscilla Misihairambwi-Mushonga who participated in the entire 9 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 10 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 4
negotiating process leading to the GPA, no other female was visible. Consequently, implementation of the GPA and subsequent transitional justice mechanisms disregarded gender dimensions of political violence. There was, therefore, a lack of justice for genderbased violence and a failure to examine how gender inequalities underpin many incidences of Zimbabwean violence. Although the mere inclusion of women in peace negotiations may not automatically guarantee gender-sensitive transitional justice frameworks, their absence indicates total disregard of gender-sensitivity when negotiating political transition and reflects the deep-seated masculinization of Zimbabwean politics and justice. The phrase politics is a dirty game is not only a description of the nature of Zimbabwean political conduct - it denotes a masculinized field. Coupled with a conservative patriarchal society, women in Zimbabwe are usually confined to the political shadows until discovered through piecemeal affirmative action policies. Over the past three decades ZANU- PF s violent suppression of opposition politics has shaped the gender composition of Zimbabwe s opposition politics, activism and human rights advocacy. Resultantly most visible perpetrators and victims of gross civil and political rights violations are predominantly male. As such, politics in Zimbabwe is de facto a male-dominated field that constricts transitional justice understanding by disregarding its gendered dimensions. The effect is that the politics of Zimbabwe and resultant transitional justice processes fail to mainstream gender from policy formulation to implementation. Furthermore, the ONHRI has no known gender policy towards transitional justice in the country. The outreach it undertook in local communities failed to mainstream gendered political violence. Victims of sexual violence were largely ignored, as was the case with Ghana s National Reconciliation Commission where gender based abuses were subsumed among broader human rights violations The lack of focused attention on women rendered gender-based 5
violence largely invisible within the process. 11 As a result, neglect of gendered patterns of politically motivated sexual violence has entrenched impunity, distorted truth finding outcomes and undermined the legitimacy of transitional justice initiatives proffered by the ONHRI. Conclusion The transitional justice framework being pursued in Zimbabwe is oblivious of the gendered dimensions of political violence. As argued above, the intention of politicians has largely been to maintain peace and socio-political stability without concern for prevailing impunity and lack of accountability. Zimbabwe has failed, therefore, to acknowledge that the administration of justice as well as social integration and rehabilitation constitute the two pillars of transitional justice management. 12 The overarching effect of ONHRI failure to formulate and implement a credible gender policy that addresses political use of sexual violence will inevitably lead to private vengeance fuelled by widespread discontent driving further oppression, social unrest and instability. Accordingly, within the ambit of transitional justice administration, accountability and social integration are imperative to building sustainable peace and development in Zimbabwe. Yet, were the political use of sexual violence draws on a patriarchal approach to the role of women in the Zimbabwean society; the country s transitional justice focus should not just be on dealing with the civil and political dimensions of women s rights violations, but should also address economic, social, and cultural dimensions of human rights violations, especially those of women whose experiences are too often under-reported. 11 Scanlon, H & Muddell, K (2009): Gender and Transitional Justice in Africa: Progress and Prospects. In: African Journal on Conflict Resolution: Vol. 9:2, pp. 10. 12 Hong, Seong-Phil (2010): Transitional Justice in North Korea: Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities. 1st Annual Conference of the CSIS-USC Korea Project August 20-21, 2010: University Of Southern California: Korean Studies Institute 6
Obert Hodzi is the Program Officer Governance at the Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation (HIVOS) in Zimbabwe. He holds a Bachelor of Laws (Honours) degree from the University of Zimbabwe, a Masters in International Studies from Stellenbosch University, South Africa and a Masters in Democratic Governance and Civil Society from the University of Osnabrueck, Germany. He is a legal practitioner registered with the High Court of Zimbabwe. 7