Drug trafficking, violence, corruption and democracy in Mexico.

Drug trafficking, violence, corruption and democracy in Mexico. Dr. Carlos Flores cafp72@gmail.com November, 2009.

Introduction. In Mexico, drug trafficking is an old issue, however, the high levels of violence related to organized crime are the edgier consequence of a deeper problem, the wide erosion of the state s institutions. The actual problem of Mexico is impunity, a politically based issue. In the old regime, the mechanisms of control over organized crime were preponderantly based on corrupt-extortive practices. Alternation in power modified the political conditions that warranted the functioning of such practices but, instead of collapsing the whole corrupt structure, it just fragmented it. Any succeeding strategy to coup with organized and crime and violence in Mexico needs not only to implement immediate security measures, but an institutional rebuilding compatible with democracy.

The control of organized crime in the post-revolutionary regime. Between 1929 and 1946, Mexico consolidated a civil but authoritarian and centralized political regime that mitigate several structural weakness of Mexican State. The regime was based on two central figures: the Presidency, who controlled the federal bureaucracy and nominee governors and congressmen, and the state party, that controlled corporately the political and social organization. The regime fostered high levels of corruption because its lack of transparency and accountability to the citizens, whose vote was not the actual way to achieve power. Its capacity to control all the relevant political and social actors included organized crime, that was fostered by several politicians and high rankings officers within security institutions, as a clandestine way for profiting.

The control of organized crime in the post-revolutionary regime. Organized crime was a dependent subject to political power, with the intermediation of security institutions. The criminal organizations that could develop were those that had the support of members of the state. The increasing international demand of drugs supposed an unprecedented opportunity to profit and the already deeply corrupted Mexican security institutions took the protection of drug traffickers to a higher stage. In the interaction between drug traffickers and public officers, the last ones extortioned-protected the former. This condition depended on the functioning of the authoritarian and centralized regime. Federal security institutions were in charge of combating drug trafficking, and were prevailed over their local counterparts, because of the political correlation of power between the center and the states.

The control of organized crime in the transition-alternation period. In the 1994-2000 period, the long liberalizing process finally led to the adoption of effective democratic electoral process in the federal arena. However, besides electoral reforms, most institutions dragged their background of authoritarianism, lack of transparency and in several cases, corruption. This was particularly true in the security institutions. Between 1994-2000, in the fight against organized crime, diverse cases of high political corruption related to drugs were uncovered and several of them were prosecuted. In 2000, the alternation in the Presidency raised high expectancies, but even if different relevant capos were arrested, the fight against the high political corruption that fostered the illicit business stopped suddenly.

The control of organized crime in the transition-alternation period. Alternation in the Presidency fractured the central executive s control over the political structure, the base of their capacity to control-extort the criminals, and altered the business logistic. The corruptive structure that protected the traffic did not crumble, but just fragmented, confronting even diverse public officers linked to different criminal clients. Already gigantic criminal organizations suddenly faced a narrowed State s capacity of control, because of their own divisions. The criminals are not dependent subjects to politicians or security officers anymore. Often, they are the new patrons of the clientelar relation.

The control of organized crime in the transition-alternation period. The absence of hegemonies in the political world has also fostered a similar condition in the criminal arena, and the effect has been the irruption of an unprecedented violence related to drug trafficking. This violence, is increasingly eroding the governability conditions of several regions of the country and exerting extreme strain over their populations. Although its wide political legitimacy, Fox s administration was reluctant to confront the roots of such violence and in the middle of 2005 opted to deploy federal police effectives in some or the most affected states. The current administration s political limitations determine the shortcomings of its strategy to coup with violence and crime.

The premises of the official discourse about violence and crime in México. The fight is new Precedent governments did not do anything against the problem and were linked to the crime. In the past there were not violence because of corruption. It would have been worst not acting at all. Violence is magnified The media magnify violence. Civilian people is not affected by violence. Criminals are killing each other. Violence is actually lesser than 15 years ago. Only three states are affected by violence. The strategy is succeeding Drug traffickers are cornered and therefore they kill each other. The strategy is recovering territorial control. The government s actions are preventing drugs to reach youth. Governance is not at risk State institutions are solid. There is not lost of territorial or functional State s control. There are not significative human rights violations. High federal functionaries are free of corruption.

The facts contradict the official discourse. The fight is old The attempts to build an integral policy against organized crime, that included the combat to high political corruption and seizing patrimonial profits unexplainably stopped ten years ago. Nobodyquestions the need to act, but is the current policy leading to somewhere? Violence is real The media are not inventing an inexistent violence. In 2008, national homicide rate increased and several local homicide rates did it dramatically. The instrumentalization of paramilitarized organized s violence crime is not directly comparable with common homicides. The strategy is failed In 2006, Mexico contributed only with 3% of the global cocaine seizures. 90% of the cocaine that enters the U.S does it through Mexico. Violence does not seem to be permanently affected by the massive deployment of security forces. There is not social policy as preventive measures against organized crime. Governance is at risk Several State institutions show clear signs of capture by criminal interests. By no ways it could be stated that corruption dissapeared with this administration. Different prestigious organizations of Mexico and the world have probed grave violations to human rights in the fight against drug trafficking. All the relevant political parties have shown clear signs of organized crime s infiltration.

Homicides related to organized crime (executions) in México. Entidad 2006 2007 2008 2009 (Aug. 28) 2009 (Oct- 16) Aguascalientes 2 27 38 20 25 Baja California 163 154 617 178 208 Baja California Sur 1 1 0 1 1 Campeche 3 2 3 2 2 Coahuila 17 29 53 119 132 Colima 2 0 5 10 10 Chiapas 14 12 30 9 21 Chihuahua 130 147 1652 1268 1616 D.F. 137 145 138 116 144 Durango 64 124 272 430 512 Estado de México 31 111 360 225 271 Guanajuato 25 40 61 113 133 Guerrero 186 253 294 407 524 Hidalgo 16 37 37 27 29 Jalisco 45 92 148 123 154 Michoacán 543 238 233 271 298 Morelos 10 17 28 23 51 Nayarit 1 2 5 20 22 Nuevo León 50 107 79 47 66 Oaxaca 17 33 49 6 6 Puebla 4 2 15 18 20 Querétaro 0 4 7 5 6 Quintana Roo 9 34 18 21 26 San Luis Potosí 1 13 40 5 7 Sinaloa 350 346 686 393 536 Sonora 61 125 137 61 79 Tabasco 19 24 20 41 49 Tamaulipas 181 88 110 29 43 Tlaxcala 0 1 1 2 3 Veracruz 25 48 30 49 54 Yucatán 0 1 17 0 0 Zacatecas 12 13 24 20 23 Total 2119 2270 5207 4059 5071 Total executions in the Calderón s transcurred period: 12,548. Source: Reforma http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_2009/

Comparison between total homicides and executions in 2007. State Total homicides in 2007 (a) Deaths in legal or war operations 2007 (b) Executions in 2007 (c) Aguascalientes 44 0 27 Baja California 369 0 154 Baja California Sur 35 0 1 Campeche 50 0 2 Coahuila 107 0 29 Colima 43 0 0 Chiapas 101 0 12 Chihuahua 518 9 147 D.F. 848 0 145 Durango 178 4 124 Estado de México 1244 0 111 Guanajuato 219 0 40 Guerrero 764 0 253 Hidalgo 74 0 37 Jalisco 450 0 92 Michoacán 556 0 238 Morelos 126 0 17 Nayarit 108 0 2 Nuevo León 279 0 107 Oaxaca 563 0 33 Puebla 274 18 2 Querétaro 56 1 4 Quintana Roo 121 2 34 San Luis Potosí 142 0 13 Sinaloa 397 0 346 Sonora 321 0 125 Tabasco 146 0 24 Tamaulipas 193 0 88 Tlaxcala 36 0 1 Veracruz 380 2 48 Yucatán 49 3 1 Zacatecas 73 8 13 Total 8864* 47 2270 * Not include 4 homicides reported as committed abroad. Source: (a) (b) INEGI, Mortality Statistics; (c) Reforma.

States homicides rates above the national average. State 2007 2008 Sinaloa 28 43.7 Chihuahua 18.5 42.1 Guerrero 25.4 30.2 Durango 16.3 27.8 Baja California 17.1 27.7 Oaxaca 26.7 20.6 Sonora 12.5 15.8 Nayarit 11.2 15.2 Quintana Roo 14.4 15.2 Michoacán 13.2 14.2 National homicide rates (per 100,000 habitants). 2007 2008 10.0 12.0 Source: Source. ICESI. Sixth National Survey on Insecurity. Principal results. August, 2009. http://www.icesi.org.mx/documentos/encuestas/encuestasnacionales/ensi-6.pdf

2008 homicides related to organized crime in México. Total executions in the Calderón s transcurred period: 12,548 (October 16, 2009). Source: Reforma. Executions 2008 More than 500 100-500 51-99 26-50 1-25 No executions Where should be placed the threshold that separates what could be considered violence as usual if there is any that could be harmless from instability and fast erosion of governance? What should be considered a risky scenario in a specific state, 50 organized crime killings a year? Or the alarm should be turn on when they surpass 100, 500 or 1,000?

Special considerations. The Mexican increased level of violence can not only be measured in homicide rates; the violence has also become qualitatively more gruesome. Beheadings, mutilated bodies, messages of threat, and the use of fragmentation grenades even against unarmed civilian people are now a part of the violent environment of several regions. Such acts suppose an instrumentation of violence that differentiates them from less systematic actions of violence, and makes them more concerning. Some of the criminal groups have transited to paramilitary structures, adopting a territorial expanding pattern that resembles those used by subversion in other latitudes.

A general assessment of the Mexican State s strength to fight organized crime. AFI 5,906 Navy 50,548 PFP 24,478 Army 198,697

Army desertions Military Personnel Desertion during 2001-2006. Rank Number of deserters Colonels 1 Lieutenant Colonels 9 Majors 38 First Captains. 50 Second Captains. 49 Lieutenants 459 Sub Lieutenants 782 First Sergeants 354 Second Sergeants 2,239 Corporals 9,919 Soldiers 109,318 Total 123,218 Military personnel desertion in the current administration (July 31, 2009): 31,202. Source: SEDENA s disclosure of information in response to public request number 1, of March 13, 2007. In 2006, the total of positions accounted for budgeting was 177,198, which may reflect the Army s actual personnel. Source: Sedena. Answered requests of information, August 3, 2009. http://www.sedena.gob.mx/leytrans/petic/2 009/agosto.pdf Average military personnel deployed in the operations against drug trafficking every month: 45,000. Source: Sedena. First inform of executionof National Development Plan. http://pnd.presidencia.gob.mx/pdf/primerinf ormeejecucion/1_4.pdf

Federal police recient evolution. Elements 2006 2007 2008 AFI (PGR) 8127 7992 5906 PFP (SSP) 12907 21761 24478 Ardelio Vargas Fosado Edgar Millán Valenzuela Víctor Gerardo Garay Cadena Rodrigo Esparza Cristerna Facundo Rosas Rosas

Security budget, 2009. Army, $43,623,321,860 Mexican pesos 16.8% to Materials and Supplies and Physical Infrastructure. 78.3% to salaries. Navy, $16,059,281,110 Mexican pesos 23.6% to Materials and Supplies and Physical Infrastructure. 70.5% to salaries.

Security budget, 2009. PGR $12,309,857,565 Mexican Pesos $943,284,104 U.S. Dollars 77.6% to salaries The total budgetary amount of these two dependencies is equivalent to $3,465,647,198 U.S. Dollars. SSP $32,916,838,380 Mexican Pesos $2,522,363,094 U.S. Dollars 49% to salaries

Concerning issues. In 2007, the Army warned the Congress that the erosion of Mexican military power was so notorious that in the following five years could become irreversible. Military sources express that, in current conditions, they may not able to successfully confront a simultaneous challenge, if social turmoil and political unrest arises. Federal police corporations have been under a tortuous process of transformation that runs from their uncompleted unification, decreed in the beginning of the administration, to the constant change of their chiefs. In the current administration, security institutions, especially SSP and PGR have become reluctant to transparency and accountability, in contradiction to basic premises of democracy.

Concerning issues. 72% of Mexican people are afraid of becoming victims of kidnapping (México Unido Contra la Delincuencia, June, 2009). From January of 2007 to June of 2009, there were 591 cases of kidnapping, which lead to the arrest of 374 kidnappers; only 41 were processed and just one was sentenced (México Unido Contra la Delincuencia, June, 2009). In August, 2009, the Army took control of the 49 custom offices of the country. Around 1,100 officers were fired: most of the investigations on drug trafficking showed their direct involvement. None of the fired functionaries are facing a penal process and the functionaries of superior level have not even been under a wider investigation.

Concerning issues. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, in 2007, between 545 and 707 metric tons of cocaine produced in South America were transported to the U.S. Around 90 percent of it was transported through México. In such time, México contributed with the 7% of the world cocaine seizures (48 tons), quite far from the 147.8 tons seized by the U.S. in the same year, and even below Panama, that seized 60 tons. Such amount was mostly the result of only two actions: the seizure of 23 tons of cocaine in Colima, plus 12 tons seized in, Tamaulipas, both supported by intelligence information provided by the U.S. In 2006, Mexico contributed with the 3 per cent of world seizures, with 21.3 tons of cocaine even below Spain (49.6 tons) and Portugal (34.4 tons). In 2008, the amount reduced again to 19 tons. (World Drugs Reports 08-09).

Concerning issues. According to CIDAC, in 2008 there were 71,000 processes opened by drug s possession, but only 14% of them were considered by PGR as possible distributors. This practice has raised the number of people incarcerated in federal preventive prison and those of them that are not yet sentenced increased from 25% to 38% over pressuring the penitentiary system. The penitentiary system is overpopulated. In the middle of 2008, there were 167,281 available places for inmates in the whole country; inmate population reached 218,030. Correctional facilities show serious irregularities: from Osiel Cárdenas Guillén rule over the Gulf s Cartel, while imprisoned at a high security penitenciary, to the rescue of more than 50 Los Zetas allies, from a state prison, without firing a single bullet.

Conclusions. Whatever the name we could chose to call the phenomenon, it is clear that Mexican state is increasingly loosing the factual control of several portions of its territory. For such condition, it does not matter if there are formal authority there, what matters is that it has not been able to confirm itself as the only force able to determine the norms of public order and to monopolize violence. It is compulsory to crumble high political and police corruption that protects organized crime and the institutional protections inherited from the authoritarian regime that spawn impunity. Because of the lack of political willingness to take more effective measures to combat organized crime, the armed forces' action will necessarily be insufficient to solve the problem.

Conclusions. If additional adverse political an economical conditions are adjoined, the situation could become more complex as to criminal violence could be summed social and political turmoil. Sooner or later, Mexico will have to implement harsher measures to coup with violent criminal organizations. The sooner and faster they are implemented, the healthier that the social tissue could be preserved. No endurable conditions of stability could be reached without further democratic changes within Mexican institutions, to guarantee a functional political agreement and a more prosperous horizon for Mexican population. The core question is if Mexican current authorities and institutions are actually willing and capable of confronting such a formidable challenge. The facts exposed lead not to be optimistic.