Terrorism Group Profile: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: Homeland Security. Kathleen Murphy CSULB CRJU 604 SEC 01 7/5/11

RUNNING HEAD: Tamil Tigers Terrorism Group Profile: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: Homeland Security Kathleen Murphy CSULB CRJU 604 SEC 01 7/5/11

Running head: Tamil Tigers 2 Terrorism Group Profile: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) have been considered many things: a guerilla force; terrorists; Hindu fundamentalists; and, even a de facto state that maintained a brown-water navy (Roberts, 2008). One thing is certain: many lives have been lost, both soldiers and civilians, in their fight for land and statehood in Sri Lanka. Even though officially they have been defeated, the Tamil Tigers were considered the most successful terrorist group in a long line of groups that opposed the Sri Lankan government. What made this group so successful was its use of suicide bombing tactics, its successful ability to eliminate high profile targets and its incorporation of women into major combat units. History Sri Lanka is made up of two distinct groups, the Sinhalese, which comprise around 70% of the population, and the Tamils, which make up roughly 20% of the population. Starting in the 1500s, the Portuguese, Dutch and British colonized the island of Sri Lanka (DeVotta, 2009). The British favored the Tamils by providing them excellent educational resources, including English education. Around 1915, the Sinhalese believed that the Tamils were unfairly benefiting from the British colonial rule, receiving disproportionately more civil service jobs and university enrolments (Anderson, 2011). During the period leading up to Sri Lanka s independence, the Tamil elite considered themselves equal to the Sinhalese and were treated by the non-tamil counter parts as such despite the large difference in population (DeVotta, 2009). Sri Lanka gained its independence in 1948. In the beginning the Tamil and Sinhalese elite coexisted and worked towards equal representation and the proposal of two official languages (DeVotta, 2009). A major strike against the Tamils, however, occurred in 1948 when the Sinhalese nationalist introduced legislation that denied citizenship to hundreds of thousands

Running head: Tamil Tigers 3 of Tamils. Then during the 1956 elections, W.R.D. Bandaranaike, a member of Sri Lanka Freedom Party started to campaign on a Sinhala only platform (DeVotta, 2009). The Sinhalese nationalists began propagating the idea that the Tamils were invaders and that they were a threat to the Sinhalese culture and way of life (Anderson, 2011). The Sinhala Only Act of 1956 further divided the two groups, and required all government interaction to be conducted in Sinhala, which the majority of Tamil people did not speak. This caused the first ever anti-tamil riots (DeVotta, 2009). Even though in 1972 the Sri Lankan government had passed a new constitution and other policies that officially stopped some of the discrimination that the Tamils had been facing and allowed for official use of the Tamil language this did not stop the inequity (DeVotta, 2009). The native Tamils, who practice Hinduism and have their own language, did not take the Sinhalese-controlled government s 1972 declaration of Sinhala and Buddhism as the official language and religion well (Pickert, 2009). In response, the New Tamil Tigers was formed in 1972. Renamed LTTE in 1976, this small guerrilla group would become in the span of the 30-year war, a strong quasi-professional organization with a complex structure comprised of 5,000 to 10,000 guerilla soldiers. The fear of Sinhalese colonization of their lands enabled the Tamil people to justify the bombings, massacres and attacks on both civilian and military targets (Wickramasinghe, 2010). Its goal was to become a separate Tamil state within a state, also known as an Eelam. The Tamil Tigers engaged in a violent campaign to overthrow the Sri Lankan government and to secede from the island country of Sri Lanka due to the feelings of widespread discrimination from the Sinhalese-controlled government. This led to the passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1977, which is similar to the U.S. s Patriot Act but its powers were greatly abused. Among some of the actions committed under the PTA was the

Running head: Tamil Tigers 4 burning of the Tamil library in Jaffna destroying 97,000 rare books and documents (DeVotta, 2009). The Tamils felt that the Sinhalese Buddhist state was determined to destroy their culture as well (DeVotta, 2009). The Tamils felt that they were victims of discrimination under this majority ruled government (Wickramasinghe, 2010). The first terror attack was a mid-air bombing of an Air Ceylon passenger plane in September 1978 (Van de Voorde, 2005). Since then, there have been over 200 acts of violence including suicide bombings of both military and civilian targets that have been attributed to the Tigers since they formed (FBI, 2010). In the beginning, the LTTE were one of several groups in the resistance movement but it was not until 1983, when they attacked the Sri Lankan security forces did they declare dominancy over the other groups (Pickert, 2009). LTTE increased their unyielding suicide bombing attacks in 1987 (Van de Voorde, 2005). Since 1983, more than 70,000 Sri Lankans have been killed on both sides of the war; two of those killed include the former Prime minister and the Sri Lankan President (FBI, 2008). In 1997, the U.S. Department of State classified the Tamil Tigers as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FBI, 2010). The FBI considered the group the most dangerous and deadly extremist organization in the world (FBI, 2008). In 1994 President Chandrika Kumaratunga tried to reach a peaceful end to the war in when she offered to let the LTTE rule the northeast for 10 years until a more permanent solution could be found. However, it is uncertain how sincere this offer really was based on previous false promises from the government (DeVotta, 2009). The repeated failure to reach a peaceful end to this conflict is partly due to the Sinhales parties unwillingness to work to broker a devolution deal that would be acceptable to the Tamil people (Wickramasinghe, 2010).

Running head: Tamil Tigers 5 Ideology The Tamil people have always considered the northeast region of the island to be their historic homeland (DeVotta, 2009). The desire for the Tamil nation and freedom from the Sinhalese rule included the aspirations of land ownership and basic rights of Tamil people (Alison, 2003). The LTTE had no political agenda other than its quest for separatist-nationalist and they were motivated to rise up against the Sri Lankan government by grievance-based issues. They also fostered the notion of self-sacrifice on behalf of the homeland and the leader of the LTTE often pointed to LTTE cadres who had perished to justify continuing the struggle for Eelam (DeVotta, 2009). Unlike most terrorist organizations, the LTTE was also not primarily motivated by religious independence. In fact, their goal was to set up a secular state in which no single religion carries emblematic status (Roberts, 2008). The only way for the Tamil people to live peacefully was to assimilate into the Sinhalese culture and lifestyle or secede and live their own way (Alison, 2003). Despite the successful inclusion of women in the forefront of its organization, women s emancipation and pro-feminism ideals were more of a secondary goal or benefit. If the LTTE had been victorious, their leader believed that women s emancipation would have been a natural outcome rather than a decisive objective (Alison, 2003). For the women, emancipation is not even the reason why they joined the Tamil Tigers; they did so out of ideological reason of nationalism or for more personal motives. Structure The Tamil Tigers organization was not only large, but also well organized and comprised of a centralized command structure. Their national leader was a man named

Running head: Tamil Tigers 6 Vellupullai Prabhakaran, who is considered a military genius who is highly charismatic, manipulative, brutal, and a megalomaniac (Van de Voorde, 2005). His uncompromising attitude, authoritarian decisions, and absolute power have never been disputed (not even by senior LTTE leaders) (Van de Voorde, 2005). He made all of his soldiers wear cyanide capsules around their neck and if captured they were required to swallow them (Anderson, 2011). The LTTE organization was comprised of two main branches, the primary quasiprofessional military branch and the smaller political branch (Van de Voorde, 2005). The established military branch included separate army and naval units. Each of the branches had an operational leadership and an administrative leadership, which were then further divided by gender which also had a secondary level of gender-based leadership. Made up of separate gendered cadres, both groups received the same training; gender equality played an important role in this organization. Some of the more notable wings of this organization were the Sea Tigers, which was the naval unit and the Black Tigers, the suicide bombers, which were included in each of the different naval and army units. As part of a recruiting technique, the Tigers asked each Tamil family to contribute one member of their family to the organization; children as young as ten were accepted into the ranks of the Tigers. While some coercion tactics were used among the families, many voluntarily joined the Tamil Tigers. Including women in the combat ranks was born out of the more pragmatic need for more soldiers, rather than aiding a feminist agenda. From the women s point of view, the big push to join the Tigers came from the period when the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) was patrolling Sri Lanka in the 1990s. During 1987 to 1990 hundreds of women were brutally assaulted, abused and raped by the IPKF soldiers (Alison, 2003). Women and

Running head: Tamil Tigers 7 children were seen as innocent and nonthreatening allowing them less scrutiny and greater access to reach their intended targets. Birds of Paradise The media referred to the women of the LTTE as the Birds of Paradise or Freedom Birds, suggesting that the Tamil women were seeking their freedom from traditional Hindu/Tamil cultural restrictions (Gunawardena, 2006). In the beginning of women s involvement in the organization, they were primarily kept at the peripheral level. They handled propaganda, provided medical care, collected information, conducted fundraising and handled recruitment. It wasn t until 1983 that a separate female section was created, called the Vituthalai Pulikal Munami (The Woman s Front of the Liberation Tigers) (Alison, 2003). However, they did not start receiving combat training until 1985. In 1987, Prabhakaran created a female only training camp. Many of the women who have joined the Black Tiger cadre have been victims of sexual assault and their status as women was nullified (Gunawardena, 2006). Because of this nullification and dishonoring, the only option that some women felt they had left was to take on a man s role and redeem themselves by dying for a good cause. Other women were motivated by anger over the loss of loved ones by the Sri Lankan police and military (Alison, 2003). While the LTTE are not unique in their use of women as suicide bombers; others include the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Chechens Black Widows and a few Palestinian groups, they were the first to use women in that role. Capitalizing on the image of women who were victimized and driven to drastic retaliations, such as suicide bombings, helped make the Black Tiger suicide bombing tactics acceptable to the international community.

Running head: Tamil Tigers 8 The Tamil Tigers leader Prabhakaran saw the value in women being part of the organization both from a tactical point of view and a public relations standpoint. He has implied that only women who are involved with the Tamil nationalist struggle can achieve liberation for women (Alison, 2003). Prabhakaran also saw that the use of female suicide bombers played well in the media and the world arena due to the overtones of martyrdom and national liberation. Furthermore, this helped increase the group s legitimacy among the LTTE s supporters (Gunawardena, 2006). In addition to the extra weight it carried with the media, the LTTE did legitimately improve the standing of women in a conservative, male-dominated society. The LTTE discouraged dowries and encouraged the LTTE men to marry women whom the IPKF and Sri Lankan military soldiers had raped (DeVotta, 2009). Black Tigers The LTTE was one of the first organizations to fully embrace and exploit the use of suicide bombers. The Tamil Tigers used the suicide attacks as their primary tactic due to the massive political impact and high potential for success. Their attacks were indiscriminant; they have been used against civilian, military, political, economic and even cultural targets. The individuals who chose to become Black Tigers were considered to be mentally sound and have no psychological problems. In fact, most volunteer for the Black Tigers cadre. This selfsacrificial service mentality is considered more conventional thinking with the Tamil people rather than an aberration. In the span of 25 years, 316 Black Tigers have been killed in either training or violent acts of aggression. Of the 316 soldiers killed, 24% of them were women. The FBI credits this organization with perfecting the use of suicide bombers and inventing the suicide belt (2008). One of the most famous and successful uses of this tactic was by a 17-year old female Black

Running head: Tamil Tigers 9 Tiger who exploded herself, the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandi and several other bystanders during a political rally just before the Indian elections on May 20, 1991. This was the world s first female suicide bombing (Anderson, 2011). Others consider the suicide truck bombing in 1997 against the freshly inaugurated World Trade Center in Colombo to be the most spectacular suicide attack the LTTE committed (Van de Voorde, 2005). There was one suicide attack that did more harm to the LTTE s reputation than it did in physical damage to the intended target. In April 2006, a thirty-four year old Black Tiger gained access to a military hospital that was located next to a high security complex. She was able to gain access because she appeared to be pregnant. Further investigation revealed that she was not actually pregnant, but rather cleverly disguised. While women suicide bombers have been considered acceptable throughout this conflict, there was an adverse reaction to this imagery. The revulsion at the decision of using a pregnant woman has had adverse effects on the LTTE, both from the international community as well as from within the Tamil community itself (Gunawardena, 2006). Silencing the Tiger The 2009 finale victory claimed by the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan government came at a heavy price that was paid in blood of the innocent Sinhalese and Tamil people. The aggressive tactics that the Sri Lankan government used resulted in many civilian casualties. The army created no fire zones in which they allegedly fired into killing many of those civilians. The Sri Lankan government were willing to go to great lengths to rid the country of the LTTE, lengths that many other countries cannot and will not go to to reach the same results. Just after being elected in 2006, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister Rajapaksa stated that no matter what the cost

Running head: Tamil Tigers 10 they would destroy the LTTE (Smith, 2010). The final fighting resulted in 7,000 civilian deaths, 16,700 wounded and another 200,000 civilians displaced (Smith, 2010). Many countries are impressed that Sri Lanka was able to eliminate this massive and highly-organized terrorist threat. Others believe that the Sri Lankan government went too far in their equally aggressive campaign to crush the Tamil Tigers. Sri Lanka is credited as being the first country to end terrorism. Around the world, military groups have labeled the Sinhalese-run government counter-insurgency tactics as the Sri Lanka option. The Sri Lankan military claims the basic set of guidelines of the Sri Lanka option were to: deny access to the media, the United Nations, and human-rights group; isolate your opponents, and kill them as quickly as possible; and segregate and terrify the survivors or, ideally, leave no witnesses at all (Anderson, 2011). In addition, the military s counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine included: no negotiations, complete operational freedom, accent on one s commanders, and no ceasefire (Smith, 2010). However, despite all the aggressive COIN tactics and the flagrant disregard for civilians, the victory is not solely the achievement of the Sri Lankan army. The Tamil Tigers made many mistakes post-september 11 th by continuing to operate as if the world had not changed its views towards terrorists. Failing to realize this shift, Prahabharan made poor strategic and tactical choices that doomed his movement long before the government began its final offensive (Smith, 2010). Before, they had received sympathy from many western countries such as the United States, but in 2006 they were even branded a terrorist organization by European Union, a decade after the United States had done that (Anderson, 2011). These declarations made it difficult to keep the LTTE financially supported. Even other organizations such as the Irish Republican

Running head: Tamil Tigers 11 Army (IRA) realized that post-september 11 th American tolerance for terrorism had evaporated and they needed to change their tactics (Stevenson, 2003). In addition, the Sri Lankan government gained a great asset and insight into the organization when Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, a senior commander of the Tamil Tigers, defected after a disagreement with Prabhakaran (Smith, 2010). Muralitharan provided key information and advice to the army on ways to defeat the LTTE. The final element that enabled Sri Lankan government to have free reign over the Tamil Tigers was support from China. China was essential to providing financial support to increase the militaries budget. They also provided a level of political protection from the United Nations and other countries, which were becoming increasingly critical of renewed offensive and the lethal lengths to which Sri Lanka was going after the LTTE (Smith 2010). Threat Potential Currently, the Tamil Tigers are labeled as defeated by the Sri Lankan government. Despite that the threat potential from the LTTE in Sri Lanka maybe considered low or even nonexistent, the Sri Lankan government is still fighting Tamil rebels and insurgents. The army has to maintain a heavy presence in the north to make sure that Tamil radicalism does not gain strength again (Anderson, 2011). This military presence in the northern region forces the Tamil people to live like second-class citizens with no chance of being able to embrace their own culture and way of life without it being mistaken for revolutionary actions. Without adequate powersharing and a full reckoning of Tamil grievances, experts warn that a military victory won't bring lasting peace (Montlake, 2009). It is just a matter of time before another group picks up where the Tamil Tigers left off to fight for Tamil independence. In fact, the Army is just now starting to realize how well organized the Tamil Tigers really were. The Sri Lankan Army

Running head: Tamil Tigers 12 discovered stockpiles in hidden bunkers as they drove the Tamil Tigers from the northern territory which they defended. The soldiers found massive amounts of weapons, underwater fuel-storage tanks with 67,500 litres of diesel, boatyards, submarines, armored vehicles, bunkers and two aircraft hangers (Economist, 2009). In addition, the LTTE s network was not limited to the island country of Sri Lanka. As of 2005, the LTTE was considered actively well represented in about 40 countries (Van de Voorde, 2005). The majority of their fundraising donations came from Tamil people who had left the country. There are somewhere between 450,000 and 500,000 Tamil refugees dispersed among 50 different countries (Van de Voorde, 2005). The Canadian Tamil network alone contributed $12 million annually to support the Tamil Tigers (Smith, 2010). In spite of what the Sri Lankan government claims and the internationalization of the LTTE, there is no realistic way to completely eradicate the threat posed by the Tamil Tigers. The continued oppression of the minority populations of both Tamil and others by the Sri Lankan government practically assures that if the LTTE do not rise again, another group will come together to oppose the government. The attitude and the mindset of the Sinhalese people, who currently appear indifferent to the plight of their countrymen due to the longtime portrayal that all Tamils are terrorist, must change to prevent another war from occurring. If the LTTE regroups or another group takes up this cause, there is no guarantee they will not strike out at international targets and countries which have done nothing to help the current plight of the Tamil people. Both the Sri Lankan government and its insurgents need to be monitored closely for the next several years for signs of the situation deteriorating further or for outside negative influences.

Running head: Tamil Tigers 13 References: Alison, M. (2003, Winter). Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Civil Wars 6(4), 37-54 Anderson, J.L. (2011, January 17). Death of the Tiger: Sri Lanka s brutal victory over its Tamil insurgents. The New Yorker, 40-55. DeVotta, N. (2009). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka. Asian Survey, 49(6), 1021-1051. FBI. U.S. Attorney s Office, (2010, October 8) Singapore Man Convicted of Conspiracy to Proved Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organizations. District of Maryland Press Release. Retrieved from the www. FBI.gov FBI. (2008). Taming the Tamil Tigers From here in the U.S. Retrieved from www.fbi.gov Gunawardena, A. (2006). Female Black Tigers: A Different Breed of Cat? P. 81-90 In Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University Montlake, S. (2009, May 31). The fate of Sri Lanka's Tamils after the Tigers. Christian Science Monitor. p. 12. Retrieved from EBSCOhost. Pickert, K. (2009) A brief history of the Tamil Tigers. TIME.com Retrieved from www.time.com The Tigers' lair. (2009). Economist, 390(8619), 46. Retrieved from EBSCOhost. Roberts, M. (2008). The Tamil Tigers: Sacrificial Symbolism and Dead Body Politics. Anthropology Today Vol 24, No 3

Running head: Tamil Tigers 14 Stevenson, J. (2003). Exploiting Democracy: The IRA's Tactical Cease-Fire. Review of International Affairs, 2(3), 159-170. Retrieved from EBSCOhost Smith, N. (2010). Understanding Sri Lanka s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers. Joint Force Quarterly 59(4), 40-44. Van de Voorde, C. (2005, May). Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Police Practice and Research 6(2). 181-199 Wickramasinghe, N. (2010). In Sri Lanka, the Triumph of Vulgar Patriotism. Current History, 109(726), 158-161. Retrieved from EBSCOhost.