Politics is the subset of human behavior that involves the use of power or influence.

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Transcription:

What is Politics?

Politics is the subset of human behavior that involves the use of power or influence. Power is involved whenever individuals cannot accomplish their goals without either trying to influence the behavior of others or trying to wrestle free from the influence exerted by others.

Who has power, where does it come from, and when is it used?

How will a citizen react to a negative change in her environment? The government increases taxes The government imposes a ban on handguns. The Supreme Court rules that prayer in public schools is unconstitutional. The quality of peaches at your local fruit stand declines.

Exit: Accept the negative change but alter one s behavior to optimize in the new environment. Voice: Do not accept the negative change and seek to persuade the government to reinstate the original environment. Loyalty: Accept the negative change and make no change to one s pre-existing behavior.

So, how should the citizen react to the negative change in her environment?

So, how should the citizen react to the negative change in her environment? Much presumably depends on what the citizen thinks the government will do.

Respond: Respond positively and reinstate the original environment. Ignore: Ignore the citizen and maintain the new environment.

Game theory is a fundamental tool for analyzing strategic situations. In a strategic situation, the choices of one actor depend on the choices made by other actors. We can think of the decisions to be made by the citizen and the state as a game.

A game is a situation in which an individual s ability to achieve her goals depends on the choices made by other actors. Games have players and rules about how decisions are made. The basic rule is that players choose to do what they believe is in their best interest.

The payoffs in a game indicate how the players value each of the possible outcomes. Players prefer outcomes with higher payoffs.

Two common ways of modeling strategic interactions: Extensive Form Games sequential choices. Normal Form Games simultaneous choices

( 4, 2 ) U 2 u d ( 3, 5 ) L 2 R 1 D u ( 2, 3 ) 1 U D 3, 3 1, 4 4, 1 2, 2 2 d ( 3, 5 ) Extensive Form Game Normal Form Game

An extensive form game consists of choice nodes linked in a sequence. A choice node is a point in the game at which a player must choose an action. The initial node is the place where the game begins. The branches represent the actions that can be taken at the choice nodes. A game tree is the entire specification of choice nodes, branches, and payoffs.

The Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (EVL) Game Prehistory... There has been a negative shock resulting in a transfer of some benefit from the citizen to the government. The negative shock might be a tax increase. Citizen must decide whether to exit, use voice, or remain loyal.

Solving the EVL Game A rational player does what she believes is in her best interest given what she knows at the time. A subgame perfect equilibrium is an important solution concept for extensive form games in which all actors do the best they can at every point where they could possibly make a decision.

A subgame perfect equilibrium can be found using a method known as backward induction. Backward induction is the process of reasoning backward, from the end of the game or situation to the beginning, in order to determine an optimal course of action.

Subgame perfect equilibrium: (Voice, Exit; Respond) Observed outcome: Citizen uses voice and government responds. Payoffs: Citizen obtains 1 c and government obtains L.

Subgame perfect equilibrium: (Loyalty, Loyalty; Ignore) Observed outcome: Citizen remains loyal. Payoffs: Citizen obtains 0 and government obtains 1 + L.

Subgame perfect equilibrium: (Exit, Exit; Ignore) Observed outcome: Citizen exits. Payoffs: Citizen obtains E and government obtains 1.

Subgame perfect equilibrium: (Loyalty, Loyalty; Ignore) Observed outcome: Citizen remains loyal. Payoffs: Citizen obtains 0 and government obtains 1 + L.

Evaluating the EVL Game The government responds positively to voice only if 1. the citizen has a credible exit threat and 2. the government is dependent on the citizen. Think about what this means for your life!

In the absence of a credible exit threat, the citizen is a sitting duck! The government can take away her benefits, and there is nothing that she can do about it but accept the new state of affairs.

It is sometimes difficult to draw inferences from real-world observations. While it is always possible to infer the citizen s type by observing her actions, this is not the case with the state. Voice, or the lack thereof, cannot be taken as a straightforward revelation of citizen preferences.

Why would a dependent state ever take a benefit away from citizens with credible exit threats?

Why would a dependent state ever take a benefit away from citizens with credible exit threats? It wouldn t!

Power is not always observable. This poses a big problem for empirical political science.

When power is most potent, it is least likely to be used. Voice Power. Presidential vetos.

Structural dependence of the state on capital. Differenet economic sectors. 2008 US Bailout, click here

The model suggests citizens use voice only when it is effective. But we often see states ignoring citizens who are protesting. Why?

The model suggests citizens use voice only when it is effective. But we often see states ignoring citizens who are protesting. Why? 1. Voice may be a benefit rather than a cost.

The model suggests citizens use voice only when it is effective. But we often see states ignoring citizens who are protesting. Why? 1. Voice may be a benefit rather than a cost. 2. Incomplete information.