i Zionists facing Communists: Hungary, 1945 1949 Abstract World War II had wide ranging consequences for the people of Eastern Europe and marked the beginning of a new social-political era. The Soviet army remained in the countries after defeating the Germans and, though Moscow claimed they did so in order to prevent return of the fascist regime, people in the region viewed their presence as an occupying army. Although not a full occupation, the Soviet Union had long-term intentions: Creation of a base from which they could establish Soviet influence over the region and imposition of Communist regimes in the future. To do so, Hungarian Communists who were staying in Moscow for an extensive period of time to prepare for eventual Communist control of the country, returned to Hungary together with the Red Army. This was the case in the other Eastern European countries as well. Yalta Conference agreements slowed the pace of the communization process, since the Soviet Union understood that it would need to conduct free elections and establish governments through participation of a variety of antifascist parties in the countries they controlled. The absolute majority obtained by a Western-oriented party in the Hungarian elections demonstrates the substantial obstacles the communists had obtaining full control on the state. The primary source of Hungarian grassroots opposition to the Communists and their intention of establishing a socialist regime lie, principally, in vivid memories of the difficulties encountered when Communist Revolution imposed a socialist government in 1919. For that reason, during the first stage, most of the Communist s resources and energies were directed to the difficult task of defeating the coalition parties. The Holocaust was another aspect of the war that had significant consequences that primarily effected the extensive concentrations of Jews in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, as in the rest of the Jewish world, the events of the Holocaust had significant implications for Jewish perceptions of the world after the war. Prior to and between the two wars, the overwhelming majority of Hungarian Jews defined themselves as a religious group of Hungarian nationalist identity. However, the events of the war and expressions of anti-semitism after
ii the war caused many Jews to re-evaluate their situation and to seek another answer to the Jewish question. In many ways, this was a turning point that involved a transition from identification with the Hungarian people to Jewish nationalism, on the one hand, and the Communist ideal, on the other hand. The changes in the nature of the regime and in the Jewish view of the world provided the Zionist leadership with an opportunity to open a new chapter in the history of Hungarian Zionism and to develop a movement that had an influence on the Jewish public that would lead to building a significant Zionist enterprise, one that offer a Jewish nationalist solution to those consider their options following the war. This was not a phenomenon unique to Hungary. Even though active prior to the war, the world Zionist movement gained momentum in the direction of political Zionism after the war due to universal support among world Jewry. Developments in Hungarian Zionism were a part of this trend. Indeed, the Zionists were much more prominent, in comparison with its limited past influence, and grew in strength due to the influence of its activists during the war and use of the post-war organizational network they activated among the Jewish public. However, the Communists were an obstacle to the Zionist enterprise and the ideology it advanced: The Zionists sought to interest Hungarian Jews in Jewish nationalism by involving them in pioneering efforts to immigrate to Israel; in contrast, the Communists opposed such an effort claiming that Zionism was a reactionary force. The ideology they proposed called for Jewish assimilation according to the socialist approach that intended to annul social classes and to provide an answer to the Jewish question and to anti-semitism. It is worth noting that the primary form of Communist opposition to Zionism was not ideological in nature, rather the struggle was concerned with the pragmatic implementation of Zionist ideas. Thus, in practice the sides did not focus on ideological debates, rather they emphasized actual achievements that would lead to realization of their ideologies. Extant research lacks systematic, comprehensive investigations of the struggle waged by the Communists with the Zionists, as part of Zionist development during this period. This dissertation seeks to fill this lacuna by focusing on the confrontation between the Communists and the Zionists within the larger context of the process of the communization. Particular emphasis is placed on decision-making processes and the Communists considerations regarding the manner and timing in directing this struggle. The study utilizes
iii primary resources that have only become available since the collapse of the Communist regime in Hungary. These resources make it possible to view issues from a point of view not raised in the limited, extant historiography. Following the general path of the struggle allows us to identify changes achieved by the sides over time, as well as, the degree to which each side implemented its ideology in practice. The course of the struggle was not constantly intensive; rather it became increasingly more intense over the three stages of its development. The struggle had limited influence on Zionists during the first stage; indeed it opened ways for them to realize the Zionist ideology. They succeeded in becoming the initiator and developed the Zionist enterprise with few interruptions. In doing so, they took advantage of the expanse for action allowed by the Communists and the willing cooperation of Jews in the community. The latter was the result of the crisis they experienced during and following the war. Indeed, as noted previously, the trend for many Jews was to exchange the Hungarian nationalism that had been prevalent for many decades, with Jewish nationalism by becoming Zionists. The Zionist enterprise was developed through frameworks in three domains: The Joint Distribution Committee (The Joint), Jewish immigration, and the Zionist establishment. The Joint provided assistance that was of great importance to Hungarian Jewry, and the Zionist leadership perceived it to be a timely source of funding for the Zionist movement. For this reason, Zionist representatives tried to become active in the administration of departments with access to significant budgets in the organization. Their successes provided the financial means that were needed to establish and to maintain the Zionist movement by directing funds to Zionist organizations and funding illegal immigration. Jewish immigration, principally the illegal immigration advanced by the Zionists, was the primary aim of the Zionist enterprise. Whenever possible, it sought to smuggle Jews out of Hungary for the purpose of sending them to Israel. However, the Zionists also aided Jews who wanted to flee to other countries. The extent of immigration was dependent, among other things, upon the tendency of Hungarian Jews to leave the country, whether to settle in the West or to arrive eventually in Palestine. Such tendencies were characterized by instability. Over the course of the first two years after the war, under the direct influence of the Holocaust, the Jews pressed for immigration. This was due as well to the outbreak of anti-semitism and the country s difficult economic
iv situation. However, as the economic situation stabilized, the drive to immigrate abated and immigration was based primarily on kibbutz members of the Zionist Movement. Toward the end of the period under study, when it became clear that the Communists had completed, essentially, the communization process, there was a reversal and Jews sought every possible avenue of escaping the country. In order to establish and develop Zionist institutions, Zionist leaders recognized that their members needed to assume key positions in the Jewish establishment and in the Community Council in order to run and to develop Zionist institutions. They succeeded in pushing aside the former communal leadership and assumed over half of the positions in the Council due to the failure of former communal leaders to act on behalf of the Jews during the war and as the public came to recognize the important role played by the Zionists in rescuing Jews during the war. As a result, the Zionists became influential office holders and, in turn, this made it easier for them to disseminate Zionist propaganda among the Jews. For example, as the Chief Educational Inspector, they were able to instill a Zionist spirit in the curriculum and to use these schools as the base to recruit youth to the Zionist Movement. In practice, the Zionist leadership established institutions that provided comprehensive services to its members: Early childhood centers, youth movements, agricultural and industrial training, as well as, political parties. All these institutions provided a Zionist education that sought realization of the pioneering aspirations. There were quantitative successes along with these other achievements. Though there was not a massive flow of Hungarian Jews to the Zionist Movement, it did rise to be 15% of the Jewish population. This was a ten fold growth, as in the past only 1.5% of affiliated Jews were Zionists. The Communists could not ignore this relative success. However, Zionists and Communists were not equal power entities. While far from being in full control of the country, the Communist Party had achieved positions of power through control of the Interior Ministry and the political police at an early stage in formation of the new regime. While these positions enabled them to curb the development of the Zionist enterprise in a technical manner, Communist policies toward the Jews were dependent on additional parameters; parameters that changed throughout the period and that to a significant degree determined the actions taken during the Communist struggle against the Zionists.
v The Communists posed limited opposition to establishment of the Zionist enterprise during the first stage. Although the Zionist movement was neither approved nor legalized, the Communists did not block Zionists'endeavors. There were a number of parameters and various considerations that guided their stance toward the Zionists at this time. First, in an effort to distance the British from the Middle East so that they could be the primary influence in the area, the Soviets supported, implicitly, Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe to refugee camps in the west and establishment of a Jewish state. As a result, Moscow was flexible in allowing countries in Eastern Europe to act and to interpret their relations with the Zionist Movement in their area. Second, world public opinion, which the Communists valued at the time, would not permit massive attacks against Zionism after disclosure of fate of the Jews in the Holocaust. Third, due to the Communists political weakness and the centrality of the communization process, the Hungarian Communists concentrated on the struggle with the coalition parties, a struggle that had a much higher priority than the small, less important Zionist group. These factors had a significant influence on the Communists considerations when determining their policies in regard to the Zionists during the first stage. Yet, though these considerations lead to the decision not to do battle with the Zionists at this particular period of time, they still did not permit the Zionists full freedom of action. The limitations imposed on the Zionists were derived, in great degree, from antipathy toward the Jews felt by a significant part of the population. The source of such hostility was due to accusations that the Jews were responsible for the trials against war criminals initiated by the Communists, trials viewed by the public as Jewish revenge. Another conflict was the tension between Jews and the general population related to the formers'demand that Jewish property confiscated during the war be restored to their owners. Having been awarded or looted this property prior to and during the war, members of the public claimed ownership and refused to return it. For their part, the Communists needed the support of the general population for electoral purposes as well as in order to strengthen and expand their party. Accordingly, they supported the anti- Jewish sentiments popular among the public and ignored the Jews'claims, and abandoned them. A similar stance was assumed by the Communists in regard to the post-war outbreak of anti-semitism that appeared primarily in the peripheral regions. In
vi opposition to their declared ideology, which claimed that the Communist Party was not anti-semitic and that the problem would be solved through the socialist method, Communist leaders advanced a policy that was implicitly anti-semitic. They used anti-semitism in a manipulative manner as a political tool in their struggle with the coalition parties; as a means of advancing economic and monetary programs; and, during a certain stage, were even responsible for advancing a pogrom that included the murder of Jews. Aside from these pragmatic considerations, there was a psychological factor that influenced the Communist s ambivalent approach in regard to anti-semitism: The Jewish origins of a majority of the Communist leaders, including the head of the Party. Having repressed their connection to Judaism, these zealous Communists feared that the anti-semitic public would oppose them due to their origins. Therefore, they distanced themselves from any form of public or media involvement in Jewish affairs, including Zionism; an approach that can be characterized as the "silence motif. This motif was the primary characteristic and dominant factor throughout the entire period and it was the primary parameter through which they limited Zionist activity. What this meant in practice was that any Zionist activity undertaken in quiet was tolerated, as long as it passed by unnoticedby the Hungarian public. In addition to the Communists demand that the Zionists act quietly, in the first stage, the advancement of Zionism required confronting additional difficulties imposed by the Communists. The leadership of the Joint was pressured to limit transfer of budgets to the Zionists and to prohibit them from conducting Zionist propaganda. Inspectors were sent to supervise related activities of the organization. However, such difficulties did not have enough of a significant impact to impede the development of Zionism. Immigration met the same fate: The Communists neither grant permission nor assistance and thus the Zionists had to use bribery and forgery in order to assist Jews escape from Hungary. These limitations were even tightened in the spring of 1946 when the Communists political status was strengthened to a certain degree: They made it more difficult to use the easier escape routes, such as trains, and the organizers had to return to leading Jews across the border by foot. In so far as Zionist institutions were concerned, the only difficulties imposed were the demand to act behind the scenes in order to remain outside public vision.
vii During the second stage of the confrontation, which began in the second half of 1947, Communist actions raised the level of the struggle. They abandoned the tactic of imposing obstacles in favor of direct attacks on the Zionists. Since there was no discernable deterioration in Moscow s approach to Zionism in Eastern Europe, the basis for change in the level of the struggle appears to reside in changes in other parameters that influenced Communists considerations: Less importance was ascribed world public opinion due to the signing of the Paris peace agreements between the Allies and Hungary (i.e., Hungary no longer had to strive to impress commission members who determined the agreement s conditions); intensification of the Cold War following the Marshall Plan; Stalin s order to advance the sovietization process in the Eastern European countries, all caused the decline of importance Communists ascribed to world public opinion. However, the principal factor responsible for escalation of the confrontation was Communist advancement in the communization process in Hungary and their greater political power. These changes made the coalition irrelevant, indeed dependent upon them, following the dismissal of the right-wing branch of the opposition majority party by the use of force and violence and dismissal of the prime minister who was a member of this party. As a result of these changes, the level of struggle with the Zionists intensified. The Communists sought to keep the Zionists out of the key positions they held in the Joint. The decrease in the transfer of funds for the Zionist enterprise that they achieved affected the Zionists ability to function and limited its breadth. By asserting pressure on the Joint leaders, the Communists succeeded in shifting the power in the Joint that had resided in Zionist hands to the communal leaders. This tactic was based on the premise, which proved to be accurate, that Jewish communal interests were closer to the Communists aims since this leadership supported assimilation and cooperated with the Communist Party. This turned out to be a very meaningful step in the communization of the Jews. The turning point in relations between the Communists and the Zionists occurred in fall 1947, yet it had practically no impact on immigration. A reason for the absence of a stronger confrontation in this domain was the decline in Jewish immigration. This was a result of the economic stability and tendency of the Jews to integrate and to assimilate into Hungarian society. However, the degree of
viii difficulty imposed by the Communists on those who organized the escapes remained in place at this stage, as well. In a manner similar to actions taken against the Joint, the Communists seized the opportunity to weaken the Zionists status in communal institutions. They did so by cooperating with the community leaders during the election campaign to marginalize as well as to limit the Zionist's power in the centers of influence in the Community Council by transferring it to communal leaders. At the same time, the president of the community became a loyal Communist supporter and cooperated fully with them. This led to nearly complete communization of the Jewish establishment. The Communist attack on the Hungarian Zionists during the second stage took place at the same time that the USSR was at the zenith of its support for establishment of the state of Israel, beginning in May 1947. The most prominent expression of support was the call by the USSR Ambassador to the United Nations for the establishment of a Jewish state. The Hungarian Communists could not ignore this political line. They demonstrated such identification, primarily of an ideological nature, mainly in articles published in the Hungarian Communist newspapers. These articles supported the Soviet policy and explained the need to fight against British imperialism in Palestine and to support the progressive forces there among Jews as well as Arabs. However, in practice, the support offered by the Hungarian Communists for establishment of the Jewish state was minimal, especially in comparison with the much more massive support offered by other states in the Eastern bloc. This Hungarian assistance included permission to transfer weapons purchased in Czechoslovakia to the Yishuv, allowing limited recruitment of Jewish youth to fight in the war on behalf of the State of Israel, and allowing solicitation of funding for the Hagana. This dissonance in support for the establishment of the Jewish state and the stance of the Communists in regard to Hungarian Zionists requires explanation. Here we should distinguish between positive support for the general Zionist position regarding the establishment of a Jewish state and the specific case of Hungarian Zionists. The latter had no need to seek to be part of future state since in their view the place of Hungarian Jewry, and the solution of their problems, could be found in their integration according to the communist method.
ix The attack on Zionism that took place in the second half of 1947 brought the Communists closer to realization of their ideology in regard to the Zionist connection and, on the other hand, distanced Hungarian Zionists from realization of its ideology. The counter-changes of directions continued into 1948 when a change began in Soviet policies in regard to Zionism. The first sign of this change was the appearance in Soviet newspapers of articles attacking Israel and Zionism. These articles signaled Eastern European countries to change their relations with Zionism. In parallel with the change in Moscow s policy, the communization of Hungary pressed forward and, as a result of the unification of the two labor parties the Communist Party and the Social-Democratic Party, the Communists gained nearly total control of the Hungarian government. This regime led the transition to a socialist economy that included nationalization of small businesses, yet to have been nationalized, and completion of the communization process that included a decisive attack on the Catholic Church and nationalization of all religious schools, including Jewish schools. The Hungarian communization process applied what was called the salami tactic, according to which the foes of the Communists were eradicated one after the other. The Zionists were included in this process, and in the third stage, at the end of 1948, they remained the last enemy to be eliminated. This timing was connected, as noted, to the change in the Soviet policy in regard to the Zionists, but also the Hungarian Communists did not want to be the first Eastern European country to eliminate Zionism from its territory. Only following the precedent of the Rumanian government s aggressive public propaganda against Zionism that led to its eradication did the Hungarian Communists become involved in disassembling the Zionist Movement from their home. This was not a direct or public process as it was in Romania, rather the Hungarian case was characterized again by the silence motif. Here, too, the Communists were assisted with cooperation of the president of the Jewish community: The Zionists were lured through the promise that immigration permits would be granted on the condition that they dissolve the Zionist umbrella organization (Histadrut) on their own. Similar promises of immigration permits were made to the Israeli representative and the European director of the Joint on the condition of cessation of Zionist activity. The Communist tactic succeeded because these persons tended to believe that the Communists had honest
x intentions. And, further, they thought that if the Zionist leadership accepted selfdissolution, then legal immigration would be permitted. Accordingly, they sought to convince the leadership of the Zionist Histadrut to declare dissolution. Such pressure achieved its aim in the end: While the Zionist leadership agreed to dissolve itself, no legal immigration was allowed following their declaration. Simultaneously, the Zionist leadership organized massive flight of the movement from Hungary. Though the Communists were fully aware of the plans for such an action, they chose not to interfere, and approximately 10,000 Zionists left the country. The explanation for this policy may be their interest in dispense with young Zionists who had proven to be a source of internal disturbance. However, the moment Hungary became a full people s democracy, following the elections in May 1949; the Communists changed their policy and stopped the mass exodus. They arrested and conducted show trials of the Zionist leaders and organizers of the mass flight in order that Hungarian Jewry would understand that the Zionist era was over. Only at this stage was complete correlation between the Communist ideology and practice in regard to Zionism achieved: The Zionist movement was no longer active in Hungary, rather Jews were integrated in accordance with the communist method and hence full communization of the Jews was achieved. The exact opposite process occurred among the Zionists: If in the initial stages they realized their ideology in an impressive manner, meaningful Zionist activity ceased to exist in Hungary by the end of the period under study. However, this end did not erase the achievements of the Hungarian Zionists: They convinced many Jews who wanted to escape Hungary to realize the Zionist ideology by immigrating to Israel, while at the same time assisting those who preferred escaping to the West. Altogether 25% of the Hungarian Jewish population chose one of these options, 10% of them to Israel. However, the majority of the Jews remaining in Hungary continued the path of historic assimilation and did not leave the country. Yet, given the limited existence of the Hungarian Zionists, the Zionist enterprise that was established during these years certainly can be considered to be a singular achievement in Hungary. In assessing relations of Hungarian communists to Zionism, it can be claimed that they provided the least assistance of any of the other Eastern European countries who permitted varying degrees of immigration during different periods of time. In fact, Hungarian assistance was minimal and Hungary
xi had the lowest level of immigration. In doing so, the Hungarian leadership applied the most minimalist interpretation of the policy set by Moscow, apparently because they feared being cited in public as the ones who assisted the Jews and as they were the strictest in seeking to realize the principle of maximum integration of Hungarian Jews in the Communist regime. Adina Stern June 2009