Are Coalition Governments An Inevitable Occurrence In The Indian Context?

Are Coalition Governments An Inevitable Occurrence In The Indian Context? Abstract Since the late 1980s the Indian central government has been made up by coalitions of several parties. Examining what seems like a perpetual reoccurrence of coalition governments, this essay seeks to answer the question whether coalitions in the Indian context are inevitable and what inherent characteristics of the Indian state and society create the circumstances that favour political coalitions. This paper looks at essential features such as ethnic heterogeneity, the first-past-the-post voting system and socio-political developments within the Indian polity since independence. Finally, it also takes a look into the future and identifies clear requirements needed in order to break the cycle of reoccurring coalitions in Indian politics. Drawing on opinions and predictions of important scholars who have examined and commented on the features and developments in the Indian context since its independence in 1947, the findings point out clearly that coalition governments in Indian politics are inevitable for the present. Keywords Indian Politics; Coalitions; Multi-party government; Society; Politics; Developments Coalitions are alliances of parties that form if no single party has won the majority of seats in a parliamentary election. In that case, two or more parties group together to achieve a majority in the legislature and to form a viable majority government. Coalition-building and the political bargaining process that the parties engage in to form that alliance entails a great deal of compromise, especially if there is no one party that exceeds the other parties number of seats by a large enough margin that would allow it to lead the intra-coalition decision-making. In the Indian context, multi-party coalitions have been an essential feature for almost two decades. More or less since 1989, India has not been governed, at the national level, by a

non-coalition government, and scholars such as Vaishnav (2013), Maira (2013) and Misra (2014) predict this trend to continue in the future. In the light of the up-coming general election in April and May 2014, according to them, a coalition government at the centre is the most likely to occur. The prognosis aside, we must ask what the reasons for this tendency towards coalitions are. Why have coalition governments appeared continuously since 1996? Are they inevitable in the Indian context, and if so, why? This paper will address these issues and aims to explain the reoccurrence of coalition governments by looking at essential features of Indian society and its political system. In addition to that, it will examine the development of India s party system and trends in society since the 1970s. Finally, the paper will also turn to the future and will look at the factors necessary in order to reverse the inclination towards recurrent coalitions in the Indian government. While we will focus on the central Indian government, examples will be drawn from Indian states to study the inherent characteristics of coalitions in India. The essential aspect of Indian society, that most likely, logically, entails multi-party governments, is the country s ethnic heterogeneity: without any doubt, India is amongst the most diverse countries in the world (Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989: 191). Divided by ethnicity, language, religion, caste and class, there are many competing groups within society and parties have grouped around these social cleavages to gain support, for example from one particular linguistic minority or one certain caste whose representation might have been previously neglected. The tendency of mass party proliferation around social cleavages is clearly a trend that was developing during the time of Chhibber and Petrocik s article (1989). In their article they hint at it, but we can see that it was about to emerge more clearly afterwards. This is supported by Kumar and Lone (2013) who state that multiculturalism and ethnic diversity have caused the increase of parties at the national level (Kumar & Lone, 2013: 56). Sridharan takes this thesis even further and claims that, ethnic heterogeneity will exert a pull toward a multiparty system, which appears to be an obvious argument, also supported by Chakrabarty, who explains that the recent rise of coalition governments at the

national level is the consequence of the growing fragmentation of the Indian party system along ethnic and regional lines (Sridharan, 2003: 137; Chakrabarty, 2008: 164). Especially since the Indian National Congress party (INC) has ceased to be a dominant umbrella party, India has seen a dramatic increase in state and regional parties: the current, 15 th Lok Sabha, for example, is composed of 38 parties, only two of which are not ethnically or regionally focused (Vaishnav, 2013). Chhibber and Kollman (1998) however, disagree with this thesis. According to them, the number of parties on the district level in India is much lower than the predominant cleavages there and so they question the widely held belief that the numerous Indian ethnicities (castes and religions) axiomatically inflate the number of parties (Chhibber & Kollman, 1998: 332). While there is certainly some truth to Chhibber and Kollman s argument, the discrepancy between the number of cleavages and parties might reflect on the ongoing, but weakened, ability of the Congress party to gain votes from large and diverse groups of the electorate. Additionally, not every minority group necessarily needs to have their own party. Some groups might feel represented by a larger, regional party and will vote for this party, although it is not specifically just for them. Thus, we have to view the increase of ethnically-charged parties as important and definitely related to the many predominant social cleavages of Indian society, but we must examine critically, around which cleavages parties have grouped particularly, and which groups still feel represented by the large national parties, to fully understand this trend. One of the most important features of Indian politics that needs to be examined in relations to electoral success of political parties it the electoral system. Like the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, India has a voting system that is commonly referred to as First Past The Post (FPTP), or single-member district simple plurality (SMSP) voting. What this means is that each constituency, or voting district has only one seat to fill and the winner, who gets this seat, is the candidate who gains the most votes. A majority is not necessary, and votes for other candidates are not represented in any way. As Mills (2013) notes, in theory this should lead to the dominance of one party, however in the Indian

context it has led to perpetual coalition government[s] at the centre and therefore contradicts the theory that only Proportional Representation (PR) voting will lead to coalition governments. Chakrabarty (2008) also points to the importance of the India s electoral system and claims that FPTP largely accounts for peculiar electoral outcomes that are favourable for coalitions (Chakrabarty, 2008: 155f.). According to him, parties with territorially extensive support and ideologically widespread parties are disadvantaged by the SMSP/FPTP system (Ibid.). The explanation for this is related to the role and the characteristics of state parties in India. Their support is almost exclusively territorially concentrated, meaning they will win significantly more seats than the big national parties in the areas where their particular electorate is situated. That is because the state parties also mostly represent an ethnic minority or a caste within a state. In state elections this leads to their dominance; however in national elections these parties often enter coalitions with the big national parties like the BJP or the INC, who desperately need those smaller parties seats to form a government. Thus, SMSP has supported the state parties rise to power at the national level and the trend of national-state party coalitions. Sridharan (2003) refers to Maurice Duverger s law that SMSP voting will lead to a two-party system, which, in the Indian context, means bipolarity of parties in each state. Because of India s linguistic diversity, which is also the main characteristic of its federalism, the bipolar party system also varies from state to state (Sridharan, 2003: 135f.) He calls this multiple bipolarities, explaining the great number of parties at the national level, opposed to the predominant twoparty structure in the states. According to Sridharan, both the electoral system and the linguistic divides which make up India s federalism have therefore influenced the recent fragmentation of the national party system which has led to a long series of coalitions between state parties and national parties (Ibid.). Palshikar and Yadav agree with this view and present examples of the immediate proliferation of non-congress parties, notably of the BJP in Gujarat, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh and Janata Dal in Karnataka, all of which gained power through the demise of the Congress party since the late 1970s (Palshikar & Yadav: 36).

What we can see is thus the relative advantage of regional or state parties in India s SMSP system. They gain decisive numbers of seats in the national legislature and therefore undermine the ability of the national parties to win a majority. National parties are then in the predicament of having to enter into coalitions with the state-level parties in order to be able to form a majority government. In this sense, the electoral system is a crucial factor in Indian politics that supports the constant reoccurrence of coalition governments at the national level. Another aspect of Indian politics which has contributed to the continuing trend of coalition governments in India is federalism. The country is currently made up of 28 states and several Union territories, all of which have their own governments which are mainly comprised of coalitions. During the dominance of the Congress party, in the immediate postindependence era, India adopted a unique form of centralised federalism that derived from the Westminster model (Verney, 2003: 155). As the main challenge during that time was to unite all of India, to build a stable and peaceful nation, the Constitution also reflects that aim in terms of federalism. It clearly gives powers to the states while it retains some of the most important powers, mainly the judiciary, at the national level. This shows that overall, although federalism was intended, unity in India s diversity was the main objective at the time (Ibid.). Even later, during the 1960s and 1970s, the Congress party made sure to keep India s federalism as centralised as possible, this became expressed most significantly when Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister. Chakrabarty (2008) explains that the concentration of powers to the centre, caused grievances and dissent in the periphery. Gandhi often neglected the federal channels, passed over Chief Ministers and went directly to local leader within communities if she consulted with anyone at all (Ibid.: 156). Naturally, the state governments were not content with this and Chakrabarty (Ibid.) claims that regionalism developed out of the feeling of the people and the leadership that they were being neglected. Consistently, regional parties formed during the demise of the Congress party and the resulting loosening of the centralisation. Fed up with the ignorance of the central government, the

electorate turned to those state and regional parties for better representation. The rise of the state parties, helped by the electoral system, as discussed above, significantly changed the face of Indian federalism: according to Chakrabarty, the Upper House, the Rajya Sabha has come to play a significant and substantial role in the legislative process as state governments have much more of a say in national politics than during the time of the Congress system (Ibid.: 157). Verney (2003) agrees that there has been a greater tendency of genuine federation since the loss of power of the Congress party, however he also sees a negative side to this, as the proliferation of state and regional parties, in his opinion, threatens to turn India into a quasi-confederacy (Verney, 2003: 158). Along with the increase in state parties came the rise of the power of the state governments. Mashru (2014) points to Jaffrelot and Grare (2012) who clearly identify the growth of federalist structures within India as a root cause of the recurrent coalition governments. According to them, since the 1991 economic reforms, the states have gained more and more legislative authority. A possible explanation for the expansion of federalism and the recurrent coalition governments is most obviously that the increased presence of state parties at the national level has secured the continuance of rather loose ties between the centre and the periphery governments (Khan, 2003: 186). It is in the interest of the state parties to support that, because they are most likely to benefit from greater autonomy at the state level. For the electorate it thus seems that the state party and state government are much closer to them, they can possibly fill the political vacuum which the Congress party caused during the 1970s. In turn, they keep voting for them and therefore the state parties enter into coalition at the national level. Here, they can influence the extent of federalism again, and the results show up in the state, visible for the electorate. It is therefore a cycle of demand and supply which ensures that regional and state parties are constantly re-elected and form coalition governments. Daga (2004) agrees with this view and states that during Congress dominance, many groups were marginalised and excluded, so when the ties loosened the demand on the state parties was much greater than ever, as a result of the growing

regionalism. In his opinion, in the post-congress polity there is simply no escape from coalitions (Daga, 2004). Apart from the features enshrined in Indian society and politics, there have been developments in the Indian polity since the late 1960s and early 1970s which have supported the formation of a series of coalition governments from the 1980s onwards. The most important of them, which has been mentioned above, is the change of India s national party system from the one-party dominance of the Congress party, also referred to as the Congress system to a system of political competition and multi-party coalitions (Weiner, 1964). Kumar (2012) notes that the Congress party had a nation-wide appeal which led to its continued control of the central governments. Although not frequently and only at the state level, especially in Kerala, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, between 1952-1966, opposition parties won considerable amounts of seats, so that a majority government by one party was impossible, some smaller parties grouped together to form a state coalition, this did not last long and Congress emerged stronger thanks to absence of any viable political alternative at the national level (Kumar, 2012: 3). The advantage of the Congress was its coherence and strong party structure, opposed to the unstable, fragmented opposition parties at the time (Brass, 1968: 1191; Kothari, 1964). According to Chhibber and Petrocik, the Congress was beyond that also a heterogeneous, catch-all, centrist party which functioned as a coalition of interests for all major sections of society (Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989: 194). Its legitimacy and the legitimacy of the state were intertwined because of its important role during the independence struggle from Great Britain and therefore no opposition could win a large enough base of support to undermine its authority until the mid-1970s (Ibid.: 195). As mentioned above, the strong centrist tendencies of Indira Gandhi s policies, and not to forget the shocking developments during the National Emergency 1975-77, helped to strengthen the dissent towards the system and forced the downfall of it due to the growing instability (Kohli, 1990: 67ff.; Khan, 2003: 176ff.; Hasan, 2013). The consequence was the emergence of a multiparty system and what is widely

being called the deepening and widening of Indian democracy (Chakrabarty, 2008: 158; Kohli, 1990: 72f.; Mashru, 2014). Singh comments, that in the initial years after the breakdown of the Congress systems, what appeared was the real essentially fragmented and coalitional nature of Indian society and culture (Singh, 2001: 329). During the period of restructuring of the party system (1989-99) there was no majority won by any of the parties and thus they formed coalitions and minority governments who were mainly characterised by their instability and ephemerality (Ibid.: 330; Brass, 1968: 1178f.). Parties struggled to form coalitions that were compatible in terms of ideology and policies, and realised that, although this was extremely difficult, there was one feature they all had in common: anti-congressism (Ibid.: 331ff.). This pragmatism continues until today and can be seen in various coalitions around India, where parties have formed governments on virtually contradictory manifestos, simply to oust either the Congress or the BJP out of government. Another development of this is the formation of coalitions by putting up a brave front with either one of those big national parties (Brass, 1968: 1180f.). For example in Punjab, the Akali Dal party has won the largest share of the votes but nevertheless needs the support of the BJP to form a majority government. In this coalition the Sikh Akali Dal ideology and policy portfolio seems to be contradictory to that of the BJP, nevertheless both parties work together in order to keep the Congress party out of the government in Punjab, and to support the BJP and the National Democratic Alliance at the national level. In fact, pre-election alliances have become an interesting feature of Indian politics since the fall of the Congress and the continued failure of any national party to gain a majority in the elections. Subrahamanyam and Sarojanamma explain that pre-poll alliances are beneficial to the parties as they create a common platform to attract the electorate and could even publish a joint manifesto to avoid troubles of opposing ideologies later on (Subrahamanyam & Sarojanamma). The development of the Indian multi-party system has definitely supported the formation of coalitions with the increase in parties and therefore political competition. Because this system is still establishing itself, parties are still testing out the best possible alliances and

the stability of the new system is still questionable and often criticised (Maira, 2013; Brass, 1968: 1189f.; Kanwar; 2012). The second important development is the mobilisation of new political actors within Indian society and politics. Because of the growing tension between the periphery and the centre during the Congress system, people became more and more aware of their role in civil society. The grievances of minorities in the states motivated them to mobilise, which is also the reason why parties decided to form around these groups and the cleavages they were representing. These were mostly minorities, religious minorities and ethnicities which had previously been under the Congress umbrella but who had been experiencing a political vacuum in the recent years due to the neglect on the central Congress government, especially under Indira Gandhi. Chakrabarty (2008) explains that due to the big socioeconomic and demographic changes of the Indian polity, new groups have emerged who are bringing new views to the political processes (Chakrabarty, 2008: 156). According to him, the political sphere has changed and political and social cleavages have become visible. The people have developed new attitudes towards politics: they want freer access and better government performance; they want to participate actively and make a free choice at elections (Ibid.). This is especially true for the economically disadvantaged groups who have since appeared as active political citizens (Ibid.: 164). Kohli (1990) supports this argument as well: the formerly unrepresented and passive backwards castes have become aware of the polls and seem to have understood the purpose of representation (Kohli, 1990: 72f.). This means that India has become more democratic, more inclusive and that government coalitions become even more likely with the newly encouraged, more diverse electorate sparking off competition between parties (Ibid.) but not permitting any of them to win a clear majority due to the heavy, renewed fragmentation of both the society and the political arena. As we can see from the study above, coalition governments in the Indian context have become extremely frequent and highly likely due to a variety of reasons. Firstly, the institutional framework of an electoral system that favours territorially concentrated state

parties undermines the national parties ability to gain a majority in the legislature, as their support base is much more widespread and will therefore inevitably lose to some of the popular state parties. Secondly, the impact of multiculturalism is contested but makes a good case because it explains both, the plurality of parties grouped around social cleavages but also the fragmented, plural characteristic of the Indian society who vote mostly along ethnic or regional divides. With the diversity of divides in India, it is not surprising that parties neither at the national nor at the state level have been able to gain a majority and therefore coalitions have to be formed to avoid the immense instability that minority governments would entail. The third institutional factor is the nature of India s federalism which further supports fragmentation of the party system and the society. Federalism and state boundaries are based on linguistic divides which add another cleavage to the existing ethnic, religious and caste divisions. Parties group around this cleavage and support the trend of regionalism over national unity. The electorate in the states will see what the state party has done for them in terms of policy outcomes and will continue to vote for them rather than the big national parties. Because the parties differ from state to state, a multitude of parties will gain seats at the national level and coalitions are inevitable once again. In addition to that, state governments have increasingly become more powerful than the central government and these are mainly made up by state party coalitions or state-national party coalitions with the state party being stronger. This created the trend of superiority of the state party which voters will surely notice and consider at the polls. Coalitions are therefore created also through the increasingly looser federal structure. Moreover, there have been two very important developments in the Indian polity since the 1970s which have contributed hugely to the rise and the continuance of coalition governments. Firstly, the demise of the Congress and the dramatic increase in the number of parties, which has helped to evolve the once one-party dominated party system into a multiparty system. Once the Congress party was pushed aside, the heterogeneity of Indian society and its fragmentation along social cleavages became visible and these cleavages

got the opportunity to be politicised with different parties grouping around them and representing the wishes of particular minorities. This made the occurrence of coalitions extremely expectable and as this system is still developing and stabilising, it is still one of the major reasons for the recurrent multiparty governments. In fact this development also supports the multiculturalism argument because it shows clearly what a heavy impact social fragmentation has on the political sphere. Social fragmentation seems to lead to political fragmentations, or at least it shows a significant correlation between the two. Both, in turn foster the failure of parties to gain a majority of votes in the Lok Sabha and therefore support the formation of coalitions. The second development that is important when examining coalition governments is the recent increased mobilisation of the electorate in India and especially greater political participation by the economically backward groups within society. Not only do they seem to take greater activity and understand the purpose of representation and elections, but they have started to voice their demands more clearly. Some of the Dalit movements for example have been politicised by turning from a social movement into a party competing in elections. This has made Indian politics more democratic because these groups are no longer excluded from the political sphere, but it has also further supported the trend for fragmentation of the party system to include these new parties. So, although voter turnout might have risen since the 1970s especially amongst the SC/ST and backwards castes, national parties have not benefitted from this trend at all, or only to a very limited extent, as these groups have become supporters of their own parties or state parties. They seem to have more confidence in the smaller parties to be the best representatives of their needs and demands. And as most small groups seem to act accordingly, coalitions of these parties at the centre become not only likely but inevitable. Looking to the future we cannot say for certain how the trend of coalition governments will develop. As mentioned above, scholars agree that there will be a continuance of the tendency for all the reasons discussed above and because the party system of India is still

very unstable and fluid. What could reverse the trend would be the appearance of a party that is able to unite the majority of the fractions within Indian society, a party that would be similar to the Congress party pre-1970s. Even if this were to happen, Maira (2013) comments that India fears strong leadership at the centre and the possibility of autocracy, so it is highly doubtable that a party like this would lead a popular government. Advantages and disadvantages of coalition governments in India aside, it seems that the recent socio-political developments of India and the underlying institutional framework have created a situation where coalition governments will most likely reoccur. The development from a multiparty system back to single-party dominance is very doubtable and thus it seems that coalition governments, at least for the moment, are inevitable in the Indian context.

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