RETHINKING U.S. GRAND STRATEGY: THE CASE FOR OFFSHORE BALANCING Stephen M. Walt Harvard Kennedy School August 2009
INTRODUCTION REALISM: WHY STATES COMPETE FOR POWER U.S. GRAND STRATEGY, 1775-2009 1775-1900: ESTABLISHING REGIONAL HEGEMONY 1900-1945: OFFSHORE BALANCING 1945-1991: CONTAINMENT ( Onshore Balancing ) 1991-2009: ENGAGEMENT, ENLARGEMENT & REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP FOR REST OF TALK: WHAT IS AMERICAN PRIMACY? WHAT ARE U.S. INTERESTS? WHAT IS AMERICAN POWER GOOD FOR? WHY OFFSHORE BALANCING? Case Study: : The Middle East, 1945-2009
AMERICAN PRIMACY U.S. ECONOMY ~ 25% OF GROSS WORLD PRODUCT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY $$$ = REST OF WORLD COMBINED. -Result: global power projection capabilities and command of the commons U.S.ALSO CASTS LARGE CULTURAL SHADOW (Academia, Media, Leading Role in Global Institutions, etc.). U.S. GEOPOLITICAL POSITION IS VERY FAVORABLE. KEY GOAL: PRESERVE THIS SITUATION AS LONG AS POSSIBLE WARNING SIGNS: Primacy makes other states uncomfortable, fearful, and resentful, so opposition increases. U.S. and world economy facing major challenges after 2008 financial crisis. Budget and trade deficits pose long-term problem. Growing domestic demands (infrastructure, health care, etc.)
WHAT ARE U.S. INTERESTS? PRESERVE U.S. PRIMACY FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE MAINTAIN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY, INCLUDING ADEQUATE ACCESS TO ENERGY SUPPLIES, IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE ECONOMIC GROWTH. DETER/PREVENT DIRECT ATTACKS ON US HOMELAND, ESPECIALLY WMD ATTACKS WHERE FEASIBLE, ADVANCE U.S. VALUES OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, ETC.
WHAT IS U.S. POWER GOOD FOR? ECONOMIC POWER Foundation of U.S. Influence (no military power w/o strong economy) Diplomatic asset (other states want access to U.S. economy) MILITARY POWER: U.S. military very good at deterring large-scale conventional aggression, or reversing it when it occurs. Europe and Asia during Cold War Desert Storm, 1991. U.S. military is not good at governing other societies, especially when they are deeply divided, culturally different, and hostile to foreign interference. Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Latin America during 20 th century, etc. OTHER (NEGATIVE) CONSEQUENCES OF MISUSING U.S. POWER
OFFSHORE BALANCING ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES Global Hegemony Selective Engagement CORE PRINCIPLES of OFFSHORE BALANCING U.S. remains only great power in W. Hemisphere ( regional hegemony ) U.S. helps maintain balance of power in Europe, Asia, and Persian Gulf. U.S. relies as much as possible on regional allies, and passes the buck to them whenever possible. Key: U.S. deploys significant air/ground forces only when balance of power is in jeopardy. U.S. does not pursue regime change, nation-building, or other forms of social engineering. U.S. does not disengage: OB is neither isolationism nor a strategy for radical disarmament.
OFFSHORE BALANCING: A CASE STUDY The Middle East 1945-2009 1945-1990: U.S. acts as an offshore balancer in ME & P. Gulf No large-scale onshore military deployments RDF is kept over the horizon U.S. does not try to remake Middle East societies. Prior to 1967, support for Israel but not a special relationship. 1993-2001: Dual Containment U.S. now containing both Iraq and Iran; maintains large-scale presence in Gulf. U.S. now has special relationship with Israel; support is increasingly unconditional. US also pursuing soft regime change in Iran and Iraq. Result: rise of Al Qaeda, growing anti-americanism in region. 2002-present: Regional Transformation U.S. seeks to transform several Middle Eastern states into pro-american democracies. Result: costly quagmire in Iraq, balance of power in Gulf endangered. Main beneficiaries: Iran, China.
CONCLUDING REMARKS OPTION 1: USE AMERICAN POWER TO INTEGRATE OTHER COUNTRIES INTO U.S.-DESIGNED WORLD ORDER PROBLEM: THIS IS EXPENSIVE AND PROBABLY UNNECESSARY OPTION 2: OFFSHORE BALANCING ( Less is More ) DO NOT DISENGAGE, BUT DRAW DOWN U.S. PRESENCE IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST. PLAY HARD TO GET MORE OFTEN. STOP TELLING OTHER STATES HOW TO RUN THEIR SOCIETIES DON T ENGAGE IN AMBITIOUS SOCIAL ENGINEERING PROJECTS OVERSEAS.