Confidence -- What it is and How to achieve it

Similar documents
Good morning. I am Don Norris, Professor of Public Policy and Director of the

DIRECTIVE November 20, All County Boards of Elections Directors, Deputy Directors, and Board Members. Post-Election Audits SUMMARY

The name or number of the polling location; The number of ballots provided to or printed on-demand at the polling location;

STATE OF NEW JERSEY. SENATE, No th LEGISLATURE

48TH LEGISLATURE - STATE OF NEW MEXICO - SECOND SESSION, 2008

ASSEMBLY, No STATE OF NEW JERSEY. 217th LEGISLATURE INTRODUCED FEBRUARY 27, 2017

Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machines

Trusted Logic Voting Systems with OASIS EML 4.0 (Election Markup Language)

L9. Electronic Voting

Risk-limiting Audits in Colorado

2017 Election Calendar

VOTING MACHINES AND THE UNDERESTIMATE OF THE BUSH VOTE

RANKED VOTING METHOD SAMPLE PLANNING CHECKLIST COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE 1700 BROADWAY, SUITE 270 DENVER, COLORADO PHONE:

Thoughts On Appropriate Technologies for Voting

Colorado Secretary of State Election Rules [8 CCR ]

The usage of electronic voting is spreading because of the potential benefits of anonymity,

Machine-Assisted Election Auditing

A paramount concern in elections is how to regularly ensure that the vote count is accurate.

WHY, WHEN AND HOW SHOULD THE PAPER RECORD MANDATED BY THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 BE USED?

COMMISSION CHECKLIST FOR NOVEMBER GENERAL ELECTIONS (Effective May 18, 2004; Revised July 15, 2015)

2019 Election Calendar

2019 Election Calendar

Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D. David Mertz, Ph.D.

Report and Analysis of the 2006 Post-Election Audit of Minnesota s Voting Systems

Challenges and Advances in E-voting Systems Technical and Socio-technical Aspects. Peter Y A Ryan Lorenzo Strigini. Outline

Statement on Security & Auditability

Options for New Jersey s Voter-Verified Paper Record Requirement

Instructions for Closing the Polls and Reconciliation of Paper Ballots for Tabulation (Relevant Statutes Attached)

2018 JOINT PRIMARY ELECTION SERVICES CONTRACT WITH THE COUNTY ELECTIONS OFFICER STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF

Office of Al Schmidt City Commissioner of Philadelphia

Draft rules issued for comment on July 20, Ballot cast should be when voter relinquishes control of a marked, sealed ballot.

CRS Report for Congress

The Election Validation Project: Increasing Trust in Elections Through Audits, Standards, and Testing

The Electoral Process STEP BY STEP. the worksheet activity to the class. the answers with the class. (The PowerPoint works well for this.

GEORGIA VERIFIABLE VOTING LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL CHRONOLOGY

Voting Protocol. Bekir Arslan November 15, 2008

E- Voting System [2016]

MICHIGAN S CONSTITUTION

Recount Process. Ventura County Elections Division. 800 South Victoria Avenue Ventura, CA (805) venturavote.

Colorado Secretary of State Election Rules [8 CCR ]

GAO ELECTIONS. States, Territories, and the District Are Taking a Range of Important Steps to Manage Their Varied Voting System Environments

HOUSE BILL 1060 A BILL ENTITLED. Election Law Delay in Replacement of Voting Systems

IC Chapter 3. Counting Ballot Card Votes

Introduction of Electronic Voting In Namibia

1S Recount Procedures. (1) Definitions. As used in this rule, the term: (a) Ballot text image means an electronic text record of the content of

SECURITY, ACCURACY, AND RELIABILITY OF TARRANT COUNTY S VOTING SYSTEM

Response to the Report Evaluation of Edison/Mitofsky Election System

*HB0348* H.B ELECTION CODE - ELECTRONIC VOTING 2 PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS

Hard Facts about Soft Voting

Risk-Limiting Audits

University of Miami Law Review

FSASE Canvassing Board Workshop. Conducting Recounts. Presented by: Susan Gill, SOE Citrus County

Analysis and Report of Overvotes and Undervotes for the 2014 General Election. January 31, 2015

IC Chapter 15. Ballot Card and Electronic Voting Systems; Additional Standards and Procedures for Approving System Changes

The Use of New Voting Technologies (NVT)

Testimony of George Gilbert Director of Elections Guilford County, NC

Voting Matters Democracies Need Voters Name: Get Registe red Motor Voter Law Political Parties Influence Voters

Primary Election Systems. An LWVO Study

Michigan Election Reform Alliance P.O. Box Ypsilanti, MI

CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT A

The Electoral Process

ACT-R as a Usability Tool for Ballot Design

Sexy Audits and the Single Ballot

Volume I Appendix A. Table of Contents

LOS ANGELES COUNTY Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk MEDIA KIT LAVote.net Nov.6,2018 General Election

The documents listed below were utilized in the development of this Test Report:

ELECTIONS 101. Secretary of State Elections Division November 2015 Election Law Seminar

(3) The name of the candidates as set forth on the ballot for the

Logic & Accuracy Testing

E-Voting, a technical perspective

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Florida s District 13 Election in 2006: Can Statistics Tell Us Who Won?

Why The National Popular Vote Bill Is Not A Good Choice

Voting and Elections. CP Political Systems

CHAPTER Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 7013

Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler

Response to the Scottish Government s Consultation on Electoral Reform

Michigan 2020 Delegate Selection Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS

Scott Gessler Secretary of State

Cryptographic Voting Protocols: Taking Elections out of the Black Box

NEVADA STATE DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN

3 GCA ELECTIONS CH. 11 CANVASS, VOTE TABULATION & DECLARATION OF RESULTS

June 4, Wisconsin Elections Commission 212 East Washington Avenue Madison, Wisconsin Dear Commissioners and Administrator Wolfe:

William T Fujioka, Chief Executive Officer POST ELECTION UPDATE: NOVEMBER 2, 2010 GENERAL ELECTION

June 16, 2020 Primary Election Calendar of Important Dates and Deadlines

ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY

Key Considerations for Implementing Bodies and Oversight Actors

The Electoral Process. Learning Objectives Students will be able to: STEP BY STEP. reading pages (double-sided ok) to the students.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA SESSION 2015 SENATE BILL 667 RATIFIED BILL

PRESIDEN T /VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Vote for One

VoteCastr methodology

CHAPTER Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 2566

Common Questions and Answers

S09A1367. FAVORITO et al. v. HANDEL et al. After a Pilot Project was conducted in 2001 pursuant to Ga. L. 2001, pp.

GUIDE TO REQUESTING A RECOUNT

The E-voting Controversy: What are the Risks?

2018 Election Calendar

Board receives letter of resignation for the Ward 4 Member of the State Board of Education, effective July 31, [3 DCMR 905.2].

FULL-FACE TOUCH-SCREEN VOTING SYSTEM VOTE-TRAKKER EVC308-SPR-FF

Ranked Voting and Election Integrity

Transcription:

NIST Symposium on Building Trust and Confidence in Voting Systems, Founder, VoteHere, Inc. Maryland, December 10-11 2003 Introduction The theme of this symposium is Confidence: We all want it voters, election officials, candidates, and every single person in this room. I am going to focus my discussion today on how we can guarantee confidence in our elections. We don t need to throw out electronic voting machines (DREs) to get this confidence and we don t need to add paper ballots to DREs to get this confidence. There is a third verification option that guarantees this DRE confidence in the face of the most heinous attacks, and it deserves careful consideration. Last year at around this time, I was speaking at the National Meeting on Election Reform in Florida. At that talk, I highlighted the need for verification, both of voter intent and tabulated result. However, what I did not talk about (and what I want to talk about today) is that verification must support a more fundamental, and traditionally ill-defined, goal of election confidence. That s the name of this conference and why we re here today. I will begin with defining and quantifying election confidence. How do traditional machine-counted paper ballots, current DREs, voter-verified paper ballots (VVPB), and receipt verification systems compare in this regard? The current California practice of automatically hand-recounting 1% of a county's precincts bounds the error margin to more than 50% for many races, including federal Congressional races! This means that 50% of the ballots could be cheated and the 1% recount would not detect it with acceptable assurance. We, as an industry and society, can and must do much better than this! I ll also discuss how any current electronic voting machine can be easily upgraded to support endto-end verification from voter intent to tabulated result. A low error margin of 0.5% can be achieved even if as few as 1000 voters or election observers participate in the verification process. This Copyright 2003 VoteHere, Inc. All Rights Reserved 121003081500

GUARANTEES, FOR EVERY ELECTION, that ballots were counted-as-intended at a confidence level exceeding 99%. Figures of Merit Let s face it; we don t know how to quantify election confidence. Before Election 2000, many believed that elections were perfect (unless, of course, the jurisdiction had a history of electoral fraud). This idyllic belief was shattered in many respects and we, as an industry and society, have struggled with that reality. Without defining and quantifying confidence, we are in an uncomfortable place where we are tempted to manage perceptions rather than scientifically provable realities. This is not new. In the mid 17 th Century, for example, the Black Plague struck Edinburgh, Scotland and thousands were dying from the disease. The city council was desperate for a solution and was politically pressured to act. So, at one of the town meetings, with no science to support the decision, the council concluded that cats where responsible, and so ordered that every feline in the town be slaughtered. This was a bad move considering that cats made excellent rat catchers, and rats carried the fleas that carried the plague bacteria. As you ve already guessed, by killing the cats, the city council caused the rat population to skyrocket along with the plague. The punch line, of course, is that you d better have a firm grasp on the science that drives an intended outcome. I don t mean to compare elections to the Black Death, but without applying clear science, we are being tempted into similarly bad policy, and are starting to fall victim to such temptation at both the state and national levels. In elections, of course, we have the tough task of simultaneously ensuring election integrity and ballot secrecy the classic audit/secrecy conundrum. However, this difficulty doesn t let us off the hook in delivering elections that can guarantee real confidence. Again, I underscore real, guaranteed confidence here because you don t the need the National Institute of Science and Technology if you re just willing to manage perceptions. Real confidence is based on well-understood science. We base our medicine on it; we base our polls on it; we base our state regulated lottery and casino games on it. Las Vegas never has a losing year because if it. We set desired confidence levels, acceptable error margins, quantify the odds, and Copyright 2003 VoteHere, Inc. All Rights Reserved 2

make informed, scientific policy decisions. Why don t we do the same for elections? If we did, we could set election policy that guarantees confidence. Is there a good measure of confidence that we can all agree on? Is there some strawman figureof-merit? Something like every election must guarantee an error margin of no more than 0.5% with 99% confidence. This guarantee can be quantifiably proven for each election in the face of the most heinous threats from insiders and outsiders, hackers and vendors, proven from voter intent to tabulated result. If we can agree on such a figure-of-merit and guarantee that every election meets or exceeds it, real confidence will rise. Any contested race will have the proof to resolve the protest within an acceptable error margin, in court if necessary. Before we dive into cures, like killing cats, we should define how we measure success. Maybe 0.5% error margin is too high for something as critical as an election. Maybe 99% confidence is too low. That s not for me to say. But, at least, we need a yardstick to measure how good our elections are. There is some precedent for this. According to California Elections Code, 1% of the precincts is randomly chosen by county elections officials for an automatic public manual tally in order to boost confidence that the machine count can be trusted. 1 We ll look at the effectiveness of this in a moment. Now let s see how three potential solutions (current DREs, VVPB, and ballot receipt verification) measure up. How do DRE s Compare? First, how do DREs compare to our 0.5% error margin. Well, the bad news is that there is no current way to really tell what the error margin is for a DRE since there is no end-to-end Election Day test from voter intent to tabulated result. DREs can fall victim to undetected changes in voter intent, 1 California Elections Code, Section 15360. During the official canvass of every election in which a voting system is used, the official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual tally of the ballots tabulated by those devices cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official. If 1 percent of the precincts should be less than one whole precinct, the tally shall be conducted in one precinct chosen at random by the elections official. In addition to the 1 percent count, the elections official shall, for each race not included in the initial group of precincts, count one additional precinct. The manual tally shall apply only to the ace not previously counted. Additional precincts for the manual tally may be selected at the discretion of the elections official. Copyright 2003 VoteHere, Inc. All Rights Reserved 3

whether accidental or malicious. Of course, much is done procedurally to ensure confidence such as pre-election L&A (logic and accuracy) tests; post-election L&A tests; physical security; hardening to external and internal attacks; and security reviews. But, as many of my fellow panelists have pointed out, there are holes in all this apparatus that could corrupt voter intent or election results. The conclusion, and what I believe fuels the DRE security debate, is that current DRE error margin is unknown to a guaranteed level of confidence. Confidence is merely asserted, based on assumptions of good system design and election procedures. Since much of today s election apparatus is currently under scrutiny and doubt, in the absence of real guarantees, confidence undoubtedly suffers. How do Paper Ballots Compare? Next, how do machine-counted paper ballots compare to our 0.5% error margin? For this, it s instructive to look more closely at how effectiveness of California s 1% automatic precinct handrecount. Just to be clear, a precinct recount compares a hand-count of the ballots to the machine count. As part of California Election Code 15360, at least 1% of the precincts are randomly chosen by the local election official and hand-recounted. More precincts are included for down ticket races and at the discretion of the local election official. For sake of discussion, let s assume the ballot contains a statewide race, like Governor or US Senator, and a more localized countywide race, like member of US Congress. Assuming a county with 500 precincts (the average California county has about 450 precincts), 5 precincts would be chosen for hand-recount of the Congressional race. For the Senate race, 260 precincts would be chosen across the roughly 26,000 California precincts. Well, it turns out that the 1% precinct hand-recount narrows the error margin to ±2.3% for our Senate race, which is not bad but clearly no better than the confidence you d have in a typical poll. To put this in context, 2.3% error margin equates to more than 200,000 votes in a California statewide race where roughly 9 million votes are cast. The jaw dropper, however, is the Congressional race where the error margin is a whopping 60%, or 105,000 votes in a Congressional district where Copyright 2003 VoteHere, Inc. All Rights Reserved 4

175,000 votes are cast. Tripling the number of hand-counted precincts would only lower the error margin to about 30%. And to reach our 0.5% error margin target in a Congressional race, roughly 1000 precincts would require hand-counting in order to achieve 0.5% error margin. These conclusions are based on a white paper by VoteHere s Chief Scientist, Andy Neff, which details the mathematics behind this analysis. 2 How does VVPB Compare? It has been proposed that adding a voter-verified paper ballot (VVPB) to a DRE will improve confidence. One of the more compelling arguments for the VVPB is that it provides a way to conduct a hand-recount like that used in California. Given the analysis I just went through, the error margin does drop from an unknown level with current DREs. But it doesn t improve much at all, dropping to merely 60%. Given that the entire purpose of the VVPB is to ensure election confidence, this analysis shows that the VVPB is really just a fig leaf on election confidence. It helps the perception with false confidence but really just papers over the real problem. So, if you hand-recount the paper ballots, you get a small increase in confidence. However, we ve now created two unintended consequences that may dwarf the original problem. First, we ve introduced two, potentially contradictory ballot boxes one paper, the other electronic. Second, there is a question of when to count the paper ballots. Let s deal with those in turn. Proponents say that the paper ballot is the ballot of record and would legally supercede any electronic count. This is debatable given the dozens of election fraud cases perpetrated with paper ballots throughout our history (I have about a dozen right here over the last 50 years). But for sake of argument, let s concede this the paper ballot is the ballot of record. What political fall-out would descend when one candidate wins the electronic count and another candidate wins the paper count? What happens when it is highly suspected, but maybe not proven, that the paper ballots were mistakenly lost or maliciously changed? Do the electronic ballots count then? It s these ambiguous cases that will fuel future election controversies resulting in divisive politics and further erosion of confidence. 2 C. Andrew Neff, Election Confidence: A Comparison of Methodologies and Their Relative Effectiveness at Achieving It, VoteHere, November 2003. Copyright 2003 VoteHere, Inc. All Rights Reserved 5

The other issue concerns when to count the voter-verified ballots? If the ballots are only counted on a close election, you create a procedural way to cheat by a large amount. It comes under the timehonored axiom of dictators: if you re going to tell a lie, make it a big one. On the other hand, if you only count the ballots on landslides, you create an onerous administrative burden by hand-counting many precincts. Actually, both of these strategies are poor with our 0.5% error margin figure-ofmerit, we now know have to hand-count 1000 precincts anyway. The VVPB add-on is really just a band-aid for the ills of unknown DRE confidence. This cure adds little real confidence and threatens to institutionalize ambiguity in our election systems. The solution: Ballot Receipt Verification The good news is that the same math that mandates 1000 hand-counted precincts to achieve a 0.5% error margin is the same math that allows 1000 verified ballots to achieve the same error margin. By verifying individual ballots, instead of precincts, this high level of confidence can be achieved with relatively few voters participating like 1000 out of 500,000. This is the punch line so let me say it again: verifying 1000 ballots instead of 1000 precincts can achieve our error margin of 0.5% with 99% confidence. In a typical county of, say, 500 precincts, that s two verifications per Election Day; and since any voter can choose to verify, the more verifications you do, the higher the more confidence you get. So how can we accomplish end-to-end verification without violating ballot secrecy? To explain how this could work, let s try this thought experiment. For the moment, ignore the secret ballot requirement and allow the voter to leave the polling place with a copy of their ballot. Stay with me here. After the election, all the ballots used for counting would be published. The voter would compare their ballot copy with the published ballots and make sure that what he/she intended is what got counted. Any cheating would be detected. Any voter can do it, and if more than 1000 voters did it, the error margin would be below our target of 0.5%. Now to iron out the wrinkle of the secret ballot; voters, of course, can t be allowed to leave the polling place with proof of how they voted. This is the classic audit/secrecy conundrum that has confounded elections since the Australian secret ballot was introduced in 1856. During a recent election, I noticed that a DRE county had the following answer in their Election Day Q&A: Copyright 2003 VoteHere, Inc. All Rights Reserved 6

No system can guarantee to a voter through some verification process that their vote was counted as it was intended. To provide such a system would eliminate the secrecy of the ballot. This isn t true anymore. This conundrum has been solved. To accommodate the secret ballot, the verifying voter is given a receipt with codes that represent their chosen candidates. The voter is shown which code corresponds to which candidate in the privacy of the polling place. The voter takes the coded receipt with them. The codes are unique for each ballot and candidate and so a voter cannot prove to anyone how they voted because only the voter knows which code matches which candidate. After tabulation, the codes are generated from the ballots in the ballot box and published so the voter can verify what he/she intended actually got counted. Granted that this is a bit more complicated for those voters that choose to verify; but only 1000 voters need to go through this process in a county of 500,000 voters to achieve our 0.5% error margin. These voters safeguard the election for the rest of us that don t bother to verify. Voters that don t choose to verify are not encumbered at all. The receipt verification approach provides three real benefits: 1) It is essential for smaller races, like Congressional districts, where recounting precincts with VVPB does not provide an acceptable confidence level. 2) It is much simpler and cheaper for the same level of confidence than recounting precincts. 3) Only a small number of ballots need be verified to guarantee a large confidence in the election as a whole. 4) The most heinous, malicious attempts to cheat anywhere in the system, from the voter s Conclusion intent to tabulated result, would be detected with guaranteed confidence. I think we can all agree that confidence in our elections is critical. That confidence comes from verification. Using the common science I ve discussed today, election verification can provide real, guaranteed confidence. Assertions and rhetoric on all sides of this debate only provide false confidence. We ve provided one way to objectively measure and prove election confidence. Copyright 2003 VoteHere, Inc. All Rights Reserved 7

The knee jerk to paper ballots is not based on any scientific measure of confidence. Actually, the science tells us that the error margin for paper ballots is many times larger than that of a common poll and can undermine the very confidence we re trying to improve. The solution exists. The ballot receipt verification methods I ve discussed preserve the secret ballot and provide a guarantee that elections were not cheated. Just like the best science, I don t ask you to believe me. The proof is in the math; the proof is in the verified ballots. The proof is in the data. Thank you for your attention. Copyright 2003 VoteHere, Inc. All Rights Reserved 8