THE DRUG CRISIS IN THE AMERICAS. Gabriela Moreno. Center for International Studies University of St. Thomas Houston, Texas 77006

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THE DRUG CRISIS IN THE AMERICAS Gabriela Moreno Center for International Studies University of St. Thomas Houston, Texas 77006

Since the early 1980s, the United States has participated in the war against the illicit drug trade in the Americas, through funding and policymaking. The drug crisis has become a major issue that has deteriorated Latin American socioeconomic and political sectors, and as a result has become a threat to the United States and U.S. relations with Latin American countries. Because drug addiction has skyrocketed in the United States, the US government has had a greater incentive to interrupt the drug market and become more proactive in the War on Drugs. However, there is a growing concern in regards to the counternarcotics policies implemented in the Latin American drug war. This paper argues that a successful strategy requires a dramatic revision of existing policies and approaches to the War on Drugs. Authors such as Russell Crandall and Brian Loveman argue that even with the billions of dollars spent on U.S. efforts towards the War on Drugs, the War has not abated, and has only created collateral damage in the Latin American countries. Other authors such as Cindy Fazey and Moises Naim argue that the drug trade has transcended borders and has grown along with globalization; therefore, the proper solutions would have to be internationally-based. This paper will first discuss the relationship between the United States and Latin America and how this relationship influences the policies regarding the drug industry, followed by a historical overview to examine the origin and the major causes of the Latin American drug trade along with the countermeasures implemented over time. An analysis will follow in regards to the effects of the drug industry in the core countries of Colombia and the United States, and the strategic development of policymaking regarding this issue and its results on the War on Drugs. The rise in globalization since the 1990 s has created an increasingly integrated global economy, with products and ideas transcending borders more easily. Great technological innovations have provided the context for countries to become more interdependent through international trade. The rise in technology has revolutionized international trade transforming the way countries trade with each other in faster and closer networks. The increase of interdependence has lessened national regulations and protectionism around the globe, creating an increasingly open global market with an easy flow of ideas and products. This global interdependence is an achievement that provides great profit and development; but, along with the flow of products such as American jeans, music, movies and food, there seems to have been a great flow of illicit products such as cocaine, heroin and opium. In the Western Hemisphere, interrelations between countries such as the United States, Colombia, and Mexico have changed dramatically since the launch of the region s War on

Drugs. The United States has campaigned heavily for the growth of free trade and the lowering of borders in the region; however, this move for greater free trade has also provided the context for the illicit drug market to grow and prosper. The growing demand by U.S. consumers and the ease along the U.S.-Mexico border have created a large illicit drug market in the region that has deteriorated the socioeconomic and political sectors of the major drug producing countries. The consumption of illicit drugs transported from Colombia and Mexico has gradually increased over the years. Countermeasures implemented by the three most affected countries U.S., Mexico, and Colombia have not tamed the production and distribution of drugs. What has happened is that drug trafficking organizations (DTO s) have easily adapted to governmental countermeasures. Decentralization has given DTO s the flexibility to shift production and distribution to previously unaffected areas. This balloon effect is a major regional concern that could carry on to other countries such as Peru, Bolivia, and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The interrelationship between the U.S. and Colombia is characteristic of a dominantsubordinate relationship and therefore, U.S. national interests and concerns are at a higher priority than Colombia s in the decision making of the Drug War. Since the 1980's, when Colombia's drug crisis was at its peak, the United States became more proactive in the War on Drugs by funding U.S. aid for anti-drug trafficking solutions. The U.S. provided Colombia with training and military tools such as helicopters and firearms to combat drug traffickers and the guerrillas that assist them. U.S. funding, training and intelligence have provided Colombia with the ability to raid and confiscate a great supply of cocaine from traffickers, and to launch demand reduction programs, such as rehabilitation and drug prevention education. The increase in drug consumption in the United States and the growth in production in Mexico has raised the question among researchers and scholars of whether the current policies

that are being implemented are really helping. Are we really winning this battle? It seems that the growth in consumption and the apparent balloon effect has proven that the policies being proposed by the United States and Colombia are ineffective. Apparently, the United States has focused its policies on hard power meaning that its policies are mainly military-based. Both U.S. and Colombian efforts have been to combat the production and distribution of cocaine, and have relatively ignored that there is an increase in demand for it. Over the years, the price on cocaine has declined signaling a surplus in production. For this reason, there has been growing concern over the policies implemented on this region s Drug Crisis. Concerns have spurred over the need to focus on social issues and rebuilding Colombia s infrastructure to successfully defeat the Drug Crisis. By providing a healthier social and economic infrastructure, the level of poverty would decline lessening the public s incentive to fall prey to the black market. What is certain is the need for mutual cooperation between Colombia and the U.S., and the need for a revisal of U.S. policies. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DRUG TRADE In the late 1800 s, demand for narcotics such as cocaine, marijuana, and heroin led to high levels of drug importation. U.S. companies profited by providing narcotics in their products such as Coca-Cola and their use of cocaine and offering the necessary tools for their use. However, by 1895, around three percent of the population [in the United States] was [already] addicted to morphine (Recio 2002, 23). These results led to a concern over the level of addiction in the United States, and led to various interest groups to lobby for their regulation. Not only was drug addiction a concern for the public, but drug regulation was also lobbied due to the drug consumption by minorities. A majority of people lobbying for drug regulations were campaigning as a result of their racial prejudices not only towards the consumers but towards

the foreign producers as well. The rising link between drug consumption and minorities led to a growing number of groups campaigning against products imported from countries such as China. For instance, in the 1870 s, Western states in the U.S. led a massive campaign against the use of opium and the Chinese. These campaigns began a surge of new laws and regulations against the use of opium. By the 1900 s, the prejudice groups and those groups mainly concerned with regulation of alcohol and drug consumption, joined forces. The growth of these campaigns created government and corporate pressures. Various states in the U.S. particularly those of the West were raising new restrictions in order to lessen the use of drugs. The excessive lobbying of groups led a change in perspective in the public over the moral grounds in restricting drug use. The Pharmacist Association played a major part in the new regulations: now prescriptions were needed in order to attain any drug and the use of narcotics on the medication was to be indicated on the labels for safety. However, interest groups continued to lobby for stricter regulations on the national level. The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act The continued pressure on the U.S. government led to the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 which placed regulations on drug production and distribution within the United States. The Act incorporated a sales tax to the sale of narcotics, reaffirmed the need for medical prescriptions, and imposed the mandatory request for such transactions to be reported to the Federal Government. Gradually the Treasury Department which was in charge of the Act used its own methods in enforcing this Act. These efforts involved the imprisonment of a vast number of physicians prescribing medication with narcotics to their patients. By 1921 the Narcotics Division employed 170 agents and had already sent 1,583 doctors and pharmacists to prison

(Recio 2002, 26). This aggression against physicians led to a gradual change in the Harrison Act transforming it into a prohibitionist law against the use of narcotics. Those who manufactured, distributed or consumed any narcotic were imprisoned. In contrast to governmental belief, these strict regulations on consumption and criminalization of addicts and consumers led to a growth in consumer demand which paved the way for the black market. A Shift in Focus In the early 1920 s, an interest group within the Treasury Department began a shift in perspective to combat drug use. It is then that the American government created the notion that in order to reduce U.S. drug consumption, production had to be lessened not only in the U.S., but in other producing countries as well. This was revolutionary to previous attempts on the matter, because the Department aimed at putting pressure on other countries that produced and distributed narcotics such as Mexico. A conveniently close neighbor, Mexico was already producing and distributing drugs and alcohol to the United States. The new prohibition laws gave Mexicobased producers an advantage one that provided many profits due to the increasing demand for narcotics. Evidently, the U.S. perceived this as a threat to national interests, and encouraged the surveillance of Mexican drug and alcohol production and distribution. Accordingly, the U.S. government began to exert pressure on Mexico over its opium imports. The United States believed that if producing countries also prohibited narcotics, drug prices even in the black market would be excessively high that consumers would be unable to pay. However, this was not the case. Although technically the U.S. and Mexico were working closely to regulate drug consumption, the United States remained skeptical and maintained surveillance on Mexican imports.

As mentioned above, prohibition of drug consumption in the United States, paved the way for the growth of black markets along the U.S.-Mexico border. Due to high demand, these markets were worth millions of dollars, and the smuggling of drugs expanded with the flow of human migration along the border. U.S. pressures on the Mexican government led to a growing number of restrictions in Mexico in regards to drug production and distribution. As a result, production expanded along various states in order to evade the new regulatory laws. Parallel to U.S. efforts years before, the Mexican government implemented stricter laws on the national level even incorporating them along medical lines. In mid 1920 s, the government required the transactions related to narcotics in drug stores, to be recorded. Non-tariff barriers such as the mandatory requests of special permits began to be implemented for the imports of marijuana, opium, morphine and cocaine. Because of the new Mexican regulations on opium imports, several countries in Mexico began to produce opium domestically. Various areas in the Northwestern part of Mexico had appropriate land for opium planting. However, Mexican efforts to enforce the law led to the imprisonment of any individual suspected of distributing drugs. Drug trafficking became more prevalent as the government grew more strict on its regulation. However, the growth in drug planting also depicted discrepancies in state and federal regulations in regards to drug production. In order for drug traffickers to successfully plant drugs and to attain the necessary derivatives, a state s mayor or governor had to practice a certain amount of leniency. Yet, even though Mexico already had experience in planting and sending such drugs to the United States, the country was not self-sufficient in production the drug entered Mexico illegally quite frequently (Recio 2002, 40). Many of the drugs imported to Mexico were from Asia and Europe depicting not only a Western drug problem, but an international one.

The illicit drug trade in Mexico expanded, and soon, corruption penetrated security agencies, such as Mexico s Customs agencies. The growing influence of the industry preoccupied Mexican interests groups. Several interest groups joined forces in order to combat drug trafficking in the country. Domestic and U.S. pressures created an anti-narcotics campaign in Mexico that placed great pressure on the government and its policies. However, these policies only exacerbated the problem by making the black markets stronger and more profitable. Social instability and a weak economic infrastructure only created an incentive for people to enter the black market in order to survive in the country s weak conditions. The narcotics industry not only [created] jobs, but also [offered] an escape from abject poverty to many and veritable fortunes and even quasi-elite social status to a few (Lee III 1985-1986, 148). However, much of the U.S. policies were misguided and were directed only at combating the supply of drugs in source countries, while neglecting the increasing domestic demand for narcotics. Many of the policies imposed on Latin America were biased and institutionalized. Bruce Michael Bagley, an associate professor at the Institute of Inter-American Studies of the University of Miami, stated that: While publicly trumpeting its hardline antidrug stance, the Reagan Administration indulged in counterproductive rhetorical denunciations and scapegoating of Colombia and other Andean countries and systematically underfunded U.S. assistance programs for the region (1989-90, 163). Market Reform. By the middle of the 1970 s in an increasingly globalized world Latin American countries strove to keep up with their industrialized counterparts in order to compete in the global market. At the time, these economies had very weak foundations with socioeconomic inequality. The lack of jobs and education in countries such as Colombia, Bolivia and Peru made it difficult for these countries to participate in the growing free market economy. Beginning in the 1980 s, the United States policies towards Latin America focused

on market reform and the elimination of the illicit drug market. These policies played a major role regarding the course of the drug market. In order to remedy the stagnant Latin economies, the United States provided foreign aid, and supported loans through multilateral funding agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade concessions, and diplomatic favour (Andreas 1995, 75). However, the strict and uniform policies requested by the IMF and supported by the U.S. only created greater inequality in the countries. The purpose of these neoliberal programs was to stimulate the domestic economy to boost profits and create jobs and to push the domestic industries to compete in the global market. However, in order to repay the loans given by the IMF and to fund the domestic programs promised, Latin American countries embraced the profits and the jobs gained by the illicit drug market. In the 1980 s, Latin America was highly in debt, and in order to repay the loans given and to appease international pressures, countries such as Peru and Bolivia had to conform to the strict guidelines given by the IMF for market reform. To respond to the guidelines, Latin countries stabilized their currency, reduced their tariff and non-tariff barriers, and privatized formerly state-owned industries. With these neoliberal policies, Latin countries were able to participate in the global market more easily. However, these policies were uniform and did not apply to each country s individual needs, which resulted in social and political instability. In order to comply with the IMF s and the U.S. demands and regulations, these countries exported their greatest commodity cocaine. These Latin American governments had a priority which was to appease international pressures over debt, and to appease domestic concerns over employment. These priorities diverted attention and resources from drug control (Lee III 1985-1986, 144).

Consequently, the major export and greatest supplier of foreign currency was the coca supply. Coca exports boomed and helped countries such as Bolivia to prosper economically. For instance, in 1987 coca exports generated $1.5 billion, which represented about 29% of GDP (Andreas 1995, 79). This economic flow generated a great flow of income and provided a higher level of employment for the country. With these policies, countries like Bolivia and Peru were able to appease both international and domestic pressures. With the introduction of the global market to these countries, drug trafficking and narcotics production increased. The increasing demand for cocaine in the United States generated a great flow of profit to the black drug market, and therefore the industry gradually became more powerful and innovative. Profit allowed drug traffickers to attain the necessary weapons and technology to become more powerful and influential in their countries. Soon enough, the countries of Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Mexico and Peru became the major producing and distributing sources of illegal narcotics in the Western Hemisphere. The bulk of these drugs were exported to the United States which even then had the greatest demand for narcotics in the Hemisphere. In 1983, then Assistant Secretary of State Dominick DiCarlo valued Peru s trade in 1982 at $850 million, Bolivia s at more than $1 billion, and Colombia s at $2 billion (Lee III 1985-1986, 146). Production of narcotics was specialized among these countries: Mexico produced marijuana and heroin, and Peru and Bolivia were the sources of the coca leaf. But Colombia was the main source of the drug market. Colombian traffickers not only produced and distributed their large production of refined cocaine from Colombia, but they extended their business to other Latin American countries as well. Colombian drug traffickers were very influential and powerful to organize and finance their production in other countries.

This economic prowess only made these countries dependent on the narcotics industry and consequently, on the drug traffickers. Gradually, drug traffickers became involved in social and political development. For instance, Colombian and Bolivian drug traffickers...sponsored public works programs, such as apartment complexes, schools, hospitals and urban renewal projects, and donated large sums to charity (Lee III 1985-1986, 150). However, as the country grew more dependent on narcodollars, drug traffickers became political influential through blackmail, coercion and intimidation. Any form of uncooperative policies against drug trafficking and their activities, would lead to violence and even assassinations of public officials. Even when political officials would muster the courage to publicly condemn and combat trafficking activities, the reality was that these countries were too dependent on this one industry. These governments faced domestic pressures such as unemployment and poverty, and the benefits of the drug industry were too abundant to ignore. Crop eradication efforts only raised public discontent over the loss of employment. Farmers and distributors did not earn equivalent profits by investing their time producing other licit crops. Not only did this raise unemployment, but the income lost on anti-trafficking measures and in the market, created a slump for these countries. As a result, Latin American governments would make efforts however minor in order to appease international pressures. Domestic pressures and lack of institutional support resulted in meager efforts by these countries, in destroying a few drug laboratories and uprooting a few coca bushes or marijuana plants (Lee III 1985-1986, 152) while leaving the drug industry to run as usual. These efforts were only executed to sell the image that Latin America was on top of the drug problem, while intentionally letting the illicit drug market to flourish.

Globalization Shown above is a clear depiction of how decisions made by one country, heavily affect others especially adjacent countries. By the 1970 s, an increasingly interdependent economy led to the decrease of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the lowering of borders. The growth in interdependence led to a growth in international trade and a global market that initiated technological innovations to create a swifter form of communications among traders and governments. The rise of the internet also opened doors to the growth of illicit trade around the globe. However, in the Western Hemisphere the United States found itself with a greater security issue with the opening of its southern border and the convenience of the internet for drug traffickers. The rise in information technology created a decentralized black market which made drug trafficking more difficult to track. Production and distribution were done more swiftly, without consumers or distributors having to do business personally. Because of this decentralization of the market and its transcendence over international borders, researchers have come to find that with the rise of globalization in the 1990 s, it is not states that can properly deal with the illicit market but transnational organizations. Just as in the early 1900 s, the United States has made the initiative to battle the supply of drugs in Latin America with an emphasis in Colombia. However, its efficacy has faltered and a growth of drug production and violence in Mexico has led analysts to believe that the solution for this crisis should be handled at the international level. In a highly globalized economy, it is a complex issue for the United States and Colombia to properly deal with the drug crisis in the region. For the sake of domestic and foreign interests, it is necessary to maintain an open economy with a swift trade flow along the borders. However,

it is incredibly difficult to monitor the borderlines as violence and migration has increased along the U.S.-Mexico border. The Illicit Drug Market The great demand in the United States for narcotics and the great supply of drugs in Latin America, led to a surge of drug exports into the United States. This convenience made Mexico the principle transit of illegal narcotics. Like previously mentioned, Mexico was a source country of heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine yet its production was not enough to sustain a strong illegal market. Profits were mainly attained by Mexican cartels transporting Latin America s drugs into the United States through the U.S.-Mexico border. Latin countries have had other transit routes such as the Caribbean Basin countries and other islands in the Atlantic and Caribbean Sea. However, the border between the U.S. and Mexico, which is nearly 2,000 miles gives Mexico the comparative advantage as the major transit country. According to a Congressional report by Colleen Cook, 90% of cocaine entering the United States transits Mexico (Cook 2007, 4). Colombian traffickers still have the comparative advantage in the industry because of their large level of supply and expertise on the trade; however the Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO s) have played a major role in the War on Drugs since the [demise] of the Colombian Medellin and Cali cartels. Latin American narcotics reach Mexico either by land, sea or air routes and reach the United States mostly by land through the U.S.- Mexico border. On October 30, 2008 a record breaking 23.5 ton shipment of cocaine was seized in Manzanillo that was concealed in shipping containers. As the United States has become increasingly involved in the War on Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. policies have emphasized the need to control narcotics production and distribution as a result, Mexico s role as a major transit of narcotics has become a security issue for America s policies. Mexico is

our next door neighbor and a significant economic partner in the North America Free Trade Agreement. Chaos in that country would inevitably impact Americans (Carpenter 2005, 6). Consequently, Mexican cartels have become more influential than Colombians in the West s drug industry. Because of the heavy flow of migration in the U.S.-Mexico border and the lack of an equal amount of law enforcement agents, Mexican traffickers are able to transport drugs and their profits along the border. Mexican drug traffickers increasingly smuggle money back into Mexico in cars and trucks (Cook 2007, 6) and commercial trucks with hidden compartments, or concealed within legitimate cargo (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2008; hereafter INL) and occasionally use human trafficking for narcotics transports. A current issue is the rise in kidnapping of U.S. citizens for their use in transporting drugs. Because customs officials might be less suspicious of U.S. citizens, Mexican traffickers kidnap innocent Americans to use them as mules for drug transport. Other forms of transit have been through the use of public officials. Through the course of the years, there has been greater police corruption. For instance, [the] PGR reported in late 2005 that nearly 1,500 of AFI s 7,000 agents were under investigation for suspected criminal activity (Cook 2007, 9). The AFI is Mexico s Federal Investigative Agency the equivalent of the U.S Federal Bureau of Investigation, designed to use modern and scientific modes of criminal investigation; and the fact that a major part of its agents are charged of corruption shows how drug trafficking has penetrated Mexico s political and social sectors, like in Colombia. Domestic Effects of the Trade The effects of drug trafficking in producing countries varies incredibly from providing a great flow of foreign income into the country, to increasing violence and corruption in society.

These drug related profits are beneficial in facilitating a country s competitiveness in the global market, yet negative effects include the rise in violence and corruption in the country, along with social degradation and loss of confidence within the country. Mexico and Colombia are of major concern to the United States: Colombia has been the linchpin of the narcotics trade and it has affected the Latin countries around it including Mexico. Now there is a growing concern that Mexico is following in Colombia s footsteps with the peak in drug related violence and corruption. Socioeconomic and Political Degradation in Mexico. Drug trafficking in Colombia and Mexico has been the cause of much corruption in these countries. The public has had a loss of confidence over political and law enforcement officials. Loss of trust and insecurity in these countries has led to an instability and degradation of the social sectors. The violence in these countries continues, and in recent months the U.S. media has focused on the chaotic violence taking place in Mexico. This is a security issue of high importance to the U.S. because the chaos is spilling over the border (Carpenter 2005, 1) and affecting U.S. border towns and its citizens. Every day, the media reveals new drug-related deaths along the border, and what seems to be of great concern is that many of the casualties are those of police officers and other public officials. This chaos in the border is mainly due to the cartels turf wars in the region for control of the access corridors to the lucrative U.S. market (Carpenter 2005, 2). The DTO s have created Areas of Influence where they operate and exert their greatest influence. For instance, the Tijuana cartel created its Area of Influence near the Baja California region; the Areas of the Federation consist of the West, South and the Yucatan Peninsula; and the Juarez and Gulf Cartel are stationed in the North and Northwestern part of Mexico. Aside from financing, producing and distributing narcotics, their activities consist of arms trafficking, auto theft and kidnapping.

The cartels have enforcer gangs in these territories to control drug trafficking routes and defend the cartel s terrain. However, violence and deaths occur when public officials get involved to interrupt these activities. Other issues are when these enforcer gangs become socially disruptive in towns for the sake of influence. In order to exert their influence, these enforcer gangs terrorize the streets of towns in their Areas. This disrupts the social peace in Mexican society and the trust the public has on the government s authority. Just like in Colombia during the 1980 s, the Mexican government s authority has been put into question because of the influence that these DTO s have on Mexico s policies. Political officials, journalists and other public officials involved in anti-drug trafficking activities are threatened and assassinated. Consequently, DTO s spread fear in the country to the point that many public positions are left vacant because candidates fear too much for their lives to fight in the War on Drugs. There are a few, like today s Mexican President Felipe Calderon, who stand up against drug trafficking and condemn its activities publicly, despite personal threats. However, the persistence of violence and social degradation in the country has the majority of the public concerned with the President s policies and effectiveness, although his efforts are positively acknowledged by the United States and the international community. During the Fox Administration the concept of public security was put as first priority. Before that, [according] to the Fox Administration, the confusion of national security with regime security had as a consequence the lack of attention to the real threats : the increase of organized crime, corruption, environmental degradation, among others (Chabat 2006, 17). Today, there is the public concern over Mexico s policies in regards to the War on Drugs due to the perception that they are an extension of American interests. This concern has risen from the militarization of Mexico in recent years. The United States has provided Mexico military aid to

combat the drug supply and its distribution. However, the clashes between the military and the DTO s only create further dangers and disrupt the peace. Daily deaths [occur] both from confrontations between the army and the drug traffickers, and battles between drug cartels seeking to re-establish control over territory and leadership (Carlsen 2007, 3). U.S. intervention of Mexico s crisis only bolsters U.S. influence and emphasizes its dominance in the region. Therefore, the nation s dependence on drug trafficking profits and U.S. aid only makes the government seem overly dependent and less authoritative and to protect the country. The lack of trust in the government only creates a weaker sense of security which creates vulnerability among the public regarding the benefits of being in the drug trafficking industry. The continued corruption charges against important public officials well known for their anti-drug trafficking efforts, is also a major concern in the public sphere. By the end of the year 2000, there were more than 3,000 law-enforcement officers suspended for corruption (Chabat 2006, 15). Also, the arrest of public officials such as Ricardo Gutierrez Vargas, Mexico s liaison with Interpol and director of the AFI charged with leaking classified information to Mexico s drug trafficking organizations depicts the penetration of drug trafficking in Mexico s social sectors. Even some major corporations with anti-drug trafficking missions were accused of participating in drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping (Chabat 2006, 5). The Bush Administration has perceived Mexico s drug crisis as a major security concern to the United States, due to the increase in violence and drug related killings near the border, and committed over $400 million for Mexico s anti-drug trafficking efforts. The increase in abductions and killings of innocents has resulted in Mexico launching an anti-kidnapping squad made of 300 officers. There has been a loss of confidence in the

government s capacity to fight violence and corruption. Abduction and killing of children and the suspicion of police involvement has made the public angry and resentful of drug trafficking. Socioeconomic and Political Degradation in Colombia. Like Mexico has done today, the benefits of drug trafficking in Colombia in the 1980 s were highly welcomed yet these benefits had a short term effect. The drug industry created long-term consequences that would negatively affect Colombian society. The illegal drug market negatively affected Colombia by making it dependent on that single industry, with no regard to the country s weak economic infrastructure. The drug industry [had] acted as a catalyst that accelerated a process of delegitimation of the regime that [had] contributed to the country s stagnation (Thoumi 1995). This process produced a sharp decline in trust that increased transaction costs, contributed to increased violence and impunity that induced clean capital flight and larger security costs, promoted expectations of very fast wealth accumulation that produced highly speculative investments and increases in bankruptcies, embezzlements, and so forth (Thoumi 2002, 110-11). Because drug trafficking has permeated Colombian society for over 90 years, the issues of Colombia differ in some way from Mexico s problems. By the 1980 s-1990 s, the Medellin and Cali cartels had corrupted the political and economic spheres of Colombian society; and had created enough violence to make Colombia a regional concern. The demise of these two infamous cartels did not have a long term positive effect: political and socioeconomic instability, human rights abuses, militarization of society and violence, are issues still affecting Colombian society today. The rise of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) a terrorist guerrilla group and its influence on the political and social spheres, created further violence in Colombia despite the demise of the infamous Colombian cartels. Since his first term in office, President Alvaro Uribe has implemented relatively successful anti-drug trafficking campaigns

that have lessened violence and attacks on the country s infrastructure and have put pressure on the FARC. During his first term, the level of kidnappings decreased substantially: [an] annual average of 2,843 in 1996-2002 to 1,061 in 2002-2006, a drop of 63 percent (Bustamante and Chaskel 2008, 78). Same thing with assassinations: threats on political figures attributed to guerilla groups fell by 11 percent (Bustamante and Chaskel 2008, 78). These successes by President Uribe have granted him greater domestic support and have provided Colombian citizens with a greater degree of security. However, researchers have found that the FARC may be adapting to the government s military strategies. Most of the government s successes were during Uribe s first presidential term, and there are concerns whether the Administration will have the same level of success during his second term. A current issue remains the negotiations for the release of roughly 500 prisoners in the hands of the FARC. A social concern in the country is the great number of people being displaced from their homes as a result of [repeated] threats and acts of aggression by guerrillas, paramilitaries, and their associates in the narcotics industry (Bustamante and Chaskel 2008, 79). More than 3 million people have been displaced over the past 20 years because of the dangers by the FARC and its associates, and many have had to move to slums and shantytowns. Many of the crimes still prevalent in society are the extrajudicial killings performed by some members of Colombia s armed forces. According to Bustamante and Chaskel, these crimes consist of members killing innocent people and then dressing them up as the enemy combatants to justify the murders. The murder of these victims are not put to justice, that [less] than 1 percent of reported instances of extrajudicial killings lead to criminal convictions (Bustamante and Chaskel 2008, 79). Although Uribe s policies have lessened violence and chaos in the country, Colombia remains a

very dangerous country with a high degree of impunity and low security for minorities. Security measures remain a luxury in Colombia and only the elite can afford it. According to the State Department in 2002, members of the armed forces and the guerillas worked together making deals for profit at the expense of civilians. Because of U.S. pressures, military personnel were suspended by Colombia because of human rights abuses and their collaboration with guerrillas. However, major human rights organizations and groups have disputed that Colombian efforts are not in compliance with U.S. regulations. These groups have named several high-ranking officials who have avoided suspension and prosecution despite facing serious allegations (Vaicius and Isacson 2003, 14). The weak economic infrastructure in Colombia has left poverty and the economic inequality prevalent in Colombian society. A number of projects have been funded, either by the United States directly or through multilateral agencies that aim at providing alternative commercial crops for farmers growing coca (Reuter and Kleiman 1986, 308). Anti-drug trafficking efforts such as crop eradication are also a cause of poverty today. Colombian peasants have attempted to survive economically by producing crops for the market, yet the most profitable crops to be produced are illicit crops more specifically, coca. For this reason, there are many farmers producing illicit crops for the sake of survival. Consequently, crop eradication efforts also cause loss of jobs for farmers in the illicit crop production business. Within Colombia, the drug trade has complicated the preexisting social conflict between the traditional landowners and the landless. The success of the drug trade [has] allowed narcotraffickers to buy land joining the ranks of the traditional landowners, but with different interests and goals (Holmes et al. 2006, 167). Coca production is a large source of employment in Colombia and crop eradication affects the farmers in these areas. The United States and multinational organizations have designed alternative programs in order to offer farm families an alternative form employment

through compensation and guidance for licit crop production. However the alternative development money continues to be delayed by U.S. bureaucracy. The long processes and inefficiencies in attaining this money only increase unemployment and poverty in the country. Farmers can earn far higher returns from illicit plants than from the alternatives. For that reason, even when they enter crop-substitution programs, peasants often continue to grow drug plants in other areas (CATO, 570). Consequently, the Colombian government uses crop surveillance via satellite to make sure these farmers do not revert back to illicit crop production. Crop eradication is also a problem for rural society because of the effects that aerial spraying has on the soil and the groundwater. Aerial spraying is effective in destroying illicit crops and cutting production in those areas, but it also contaminates the soil and groundwater enough to generate disease in the surrounding areas. Colombian DTO s have penetrated the political and judicial system through intimidation and bribery consequently, reducing credibility and trust by the people. Colombia is in the midst of an institutional crisis characterized by extremely low levels of social capital and trust (Thoumi 2002, 112). The lack of social commitment to the drug crisis only exacerbates the problem and gives leeway to further corruption in the political system. This lack of motivation to deal with the drug crisis is a result of the income generated by the illicit drug market. Colombia s economic infrastructure is too weak to sustain itself without the benefits generated by the narcotics trade. Regional Effects of the Trade. The Western Hemisphere s Drug Crisis is an issue that not only affects producing and consumer countries, but the whole Hemisphere as a whole. Spillovers even traverse to overseas markets, yet because this paper is focused on the Western Hemisphere only certain effects will be discussed. In order to combat the West s War on Drugs,

research groups and organizations have invested heavily on research and development. Treaties and Regional Agreements have been recognized by the region s countries; however their level of implementation is doubtful. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Organization of American States (OAS) have provided research and recommendations over the drug crisis in order to assess drug control in the region. This provides regional pressures on producing countries that fail to comply with drug control measures. Regional mechanisms are applied in order to help Latin America with its drug crisis and the effects it has on the rest of the region. Despite U.S. and Latin American efforts in regards to military training, crop eradication, destruction of laboratory sites and interdiction, the illicit drug market continues to grow and has expand regionally. What we have found is a balloon effect throughout the hemisphere that has policymakers wondering what their next initiative will cause. Since the 1980 s, when Colombia s drug crisis was at its peak, the United States became more proactive in the War on Drugs. Since then, the U.S. has continued to fund Colombia s various mechanisms and equipment for the fight against drugs. As the dominant power in the region and seeing how this problem is a hemispheric threat, the U.S. has found it necessary to aid in the crisis by supplying Colombia with foreign aid, military equipment and training and policies. During the time period of 2004 to 2006, Latin countries received more than $500 million in investment for alternative development programs. Evidently, this issue does not only involve the United States and Colombia: these investments have been funded through international cooperation as well. Nevertheless, the United States has been proactive in funding Colombian efforts with more than $35 billion invested since 1981. However, the problem lies when these large funds are invested in policies that have not proven effective in the past years. This becomes a domestic issue because it affects the pockets of U.S. taxpayers. Fruitless results

will only create a negative public rating in regards to the War on Drugs and the politicians supporting it. As Mexico has become more proactive in the drug trade, there has been a continuing spillover of drug related violence into the United States. Not only is violence prevalent in the U.S.-Mexico border, but crimes related to money laundering are also a result of this proximity. This problem is highly related to the balloon effect of the industry: illicit drug production and distribution has expanded from Latin America to Mexico, and now its social effects are being felt in the United States. Despite the numerous strategies that the U.S. and Colombia have come up with, it seems that DTO s are always a step ahead and this seems to be a result of their massive economic resources. The massive profits of this industry allow traffickers to adjust to counternarcotics measures easily, and their decentralization gives them flexibility. The most salient consequence has been the rise of drug production in Mexico. In the 1980 s, when the United States was implementing its hardline policies in Colombia against its infamous cartels, many drug lords shifted their business to Mexico where they resumed their trade. Today, Mexico s drug related violence and corruption is a major threat to United States national security. Another social concern over this industry is the link of drug trafficking with terrorism. Research has found a link between drug seizures with those of ammunition and firearms. For instance in 2006, 79,056 firearms and 1,860,066 of ammunition were seized in illicit trafficking cases. The number of ammunition seized in drug trafficking offenses has exceeded those of firearms and explosives. This quantitative connection has led researchers and policymakers to conclude that drug related profits fund terrorist activities. This greater threat requires funding for border controls not only border interdiction but stricter forms of identification measures.

Recently, the United States has funded for greater identification measures by creating an electronic passport. This is an achievement because it makes imitation more difficult than previous U.S. passports. And in the summer of 2009, United States citizens will be required to have a passport for any form of travel. The increase in drug addiction in the United States is a national concern. Over the years, demand for narcotics has increased, which has led the U.S. to fund for drug preventive and rehabilitation programs around the country. Other regional concerns consist of the negative effects that the illicit drug market may have on the global market. The economic successes of most of the Latin American countries are a result of drug related profits. This illicit industry has only exacerbated Latin countries weak infrastructures by having society ignore core economic issues. Despite the great profits gained from the illicit market, these economies continue to have great levels of inequality and low education. Poverty, inequality and illiteracy are not characteristics that can boost society into modernization. It is a problem that Latin American countries continue to ignore these problems. Dependence on the illicit drug market and its profits has only created rentier economies with a dependence on an illicit industry. It is imperative that these economies improve domestic education and focus on improving the other sectors to prepare them for market competition. Otherwise, the regional market will consist mainly of unstable, rentier economies generating instability in the market as a whole. Interrelations The growth of the drug market in the Americas has affected the interrelations between the United States and the drug producing countries. What is evident is that the United States has more at stake in dealing with drug trafficking in Mexico than in Colombia, due to the close trade

relations the U.S. has with Mexico. In the 1980 s, the U.S. and Colombia had a strained relationship. The United States time and effort put on the War on Drugs was not as dedicative as it is now with Mexico, and its recommendations on Latin America were more stringent and demanding. During the Samper Administration (1994-98), the U.S. government considered Colombian president Ernesto Samper an enemy in the drug war. U.S. antidrug policy targeted not just illicit crop cultivation, traffickers, and money laundering but also the democratically elected president himself (Crandall 2001, 95). The aggressive proposals implemented on Colombia and the concessions applied due to noncompliance, easily depicted the dominantsubordinate relationship between the two countries. Since then, the United States continues to fund Colombia s anti-drug trafficking efforts. However, critics continue to scrutinize American efforts on Colombia s crisis claiming that the time and funds invested on the War are not satisfactory to Colombia s needs. According to researcher Kenneth Sharpe, the United States has not been willing to commit the resources that would really be necessary a source country like Colombia would need $2-$3 billion annually to establish effective control over drugproducing areas (Sharpe 1988, 78). Up to this day, the United States does not fund $2-$3 billion annually to Colombia. In the summer of 2000, the U.S. government approved a $1.3 billion supplemental assistance package for Colombia (Crandall 2001, 95) mainly consisting of counternarcotics aid. As for strategy, analysts and governmental organizations are concerned of the unilateral approach the U.S. has on the War on Drugs. U.S. foreign policy on the War on Drugs has consisted of a supply-based strategy that has been fruitless up to this day. U.S. demand for cocaine continues to increase in the United States, and DTO s are constantly adapting to government countermeasures that drug production has not subsided.

Today s emphasis on the drug-related violence in Mexico has brought to light the more intricate U.S.-Mexico relationship in the Drug War. Despite the continued violence and chaos in the U.S-Mexico border, and the government s inability to control corruption in the country, the United States has not implemented the sanctions it once placed on Colombia. Unlike its treatment of Colombia Washington has consistently granted Mexico full certification despite evidence of narcocorruption throughout the Mexican government (CATO, 574). The U.S.- Mexican administrations continue to hold close talks in regards to security and counternarcotics measures, and even though their interrelations are frail, they do not reflect the stringent U.S.- Colombian relations. Even by the end of its term, the Bush Administration viewed U.S.- Mexican relations as important due to the NAFTA relations, yet it still perceived the drug related violence in the U.S-Mexico border as a threat to U.S. national security. Therefore, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice took a visit to Mexico to hold talks with her Mexico counterpart about further security measures to be considered. Today, U.S-Colombian relations are not as stringent as in the last decade, yet today s concerns over the Mexican drug crisis depict U.S. favoritism with Mexico. U.S. policies and recommendations toward Mexico seem to contrast to the hardline pressures the U.S. had placed in Colombia. Mexico s proximity to the United States, a shared border, and crucial trade related ties are reasons for the difference in strategy toward Mexico. It is in the country s greater interests to be more strategic and supportive of Mexico due to the close and crucial trade relations between the two countries. However, future relations between the two countries are still stringent because of the Mexican government s criticism of U.S. policies in controlling domestic demand; and the U.S. arms trade that has supplied DTO s in Latin America.