Phil 596F Social & Political Philosophy Public Reason Views of Liberalism

Philosophy Department University of Arizona Phil 596F Social & Political Philosophy Public Reason Views of Liberalism Wednesday, 6:30-9:00pm Social Science 311 Jerry Gaus Email: ggaus@email.arizona.edu Office: Social Science 318A Office hours: Tuesday, 2:00-5:00, Wed. 5:00-6:30 and by appointment 1. DESCRIPTION In the last couple of decades a new conception of liberalism has arisen the public reason view which developed out of contractualist approaches to justifying liberalism. The social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau all stressed that the justification of the state depended on showing that everyone would, in some way, consent to it. However, by relying on consent social contract theory seemed to suppose a voluntarist conception of political justice (what is just depends on what people choose to agree to what they will); and, as Hume famously pointed out, it seems that ultimately our obligations to act on political justice derive from promissory obligations, which the social contract theory leaves unexplained. Public reason views jettison the notion of consent and contract, and directly focus on the question: what moral and/or political principles do we all have reason to live by? In this seminar we will look at a number of such views: those inspired by Hobbes, social reason views such as Kurt Baier s, deliberative democratic views, epistemic/aggregationist theories and, of course, Rawls political liberalism. (Yes, and my proposals too). The first part of the course will be devoted to problem that sets the stage for all public reason views: the analysis of pluralism and indeterminacy in the exercise of free human reason. The second part of the seminar is devoted to proposals that this diversity does not prevent a moral or political order verified by public reason. The last session will be devoted to an issue that looms large in the public reason literature: the place of religious beliefs in liberal justification and politics. 2. OBJECTIVES (1) Pretty obviously, we want to understand public reason liberalism and Rawls place in it. One of the things I want you all to get out of this seminar is that Rawls s political liberalism is one of a family of related views. It is common to find philosophers who, having rejected some detail of Rawls s version, assume that the whole family of views is thereby discredited. (2) Philosophy is in some ways an odd discipline a lot of it is always about talking (in many other disciplines, talking is just for class, and writing almost the entire research side). Philosophers do philosophy, and that usually means discussing and arguing. So one of the main aims of a philosophy seminar is to do philosophy, and for you to get a feel about how to

2 do it. There are many styles of doing philosophy and I do not want suggest a one-size-fitsall model, but here are some models to avoid: The very quiet and thoughtful type of whom one says Oh, yes, now that you remind me, he was in my seminar last term. Some people are more talkative than others, and some pause to think before they speak (I am told). Again, there is a range of perfectly fine styles, but being a great writer and a non-participant in discussions is not good in philosophy. It is important to just get into the habit of entering the discussion. The Pit Bull. I once had a very bright student that the faculty called the pit bull. Philosophical exchange was a fight to the death, and once he advocated a position there was no way he would let go until the opponent was dead. Not much came of talking to him, except exhaustion. I ve already made up my mind; I ll listen to Humeans (x), but I refuse to think about nutty Kantians (y). And all the different versions filling out x and y. I once had a really good student, but she had made up her mind about everything before she read it. There is a nice and fine line between developing your own view and suffering cognitive closure. Don t fall off. (3) The other side of philosophy is writing papers. Writing good professional papers is not at all like writing an excellent undergrad paper. A typical A undergrad paper shows that the student understands the material and can point to some problems, or has some suggestions to make. A professional philosophy paper has to develop a sustained thesis, and has to be aware of the difference between an objection to be answered and an interesting problem to be explored. I am happy to work with you as you write, and will read drafts so long as you don t spring them on me a week before the paper is due. 3. POLICIES AND ASSESSMENT 3.1 Reading Of course you should do the reading before the class. Duh. Many of the readings will be available from my website; others will come from three books, which should be available in the bookstore: Russell Hardin, Indeterminacy and Society. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (paperback edn.). James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. The required reading that is not in the above books can be accessed at: www.ppe-journal.org/gaus/phil596/phil596.htm You can also access these materials off my departmental web page (off of the faculty web page) by following the links.

4 August 23: Organizational Stuff 4. SCHEDULE OF SESSIONS AND READINGS August 30: Rationality and Indeterminacy Hardin, Indeterminacy and Society, chapters 1 and 2. Ken Binmore, Natural Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), esp. chs. 4 and 5. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), ch. 2. September 6: Incommensurability Fred D Agostino, Incommensurability and Commensuration: Lessons from (and to) Ethico-Political Theory, Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Science, vol. 31 (2000): 429-47.(web) Fred D Agostino, Some Questions About Incommensurability from Incommensurability and Commensuration (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). (web) Fred D Agostino, The Metaphysics of Commensuration from Incommensurability and Commensuration (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). (web) : Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, ch.2, 2.3 (web) Ruth Chang, Introduction to her edited collection, Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). (See also the papers by Broome, Griffin, and Raz in the volume). Joseph Raz, Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 86 (1985 86): 117 34. Philip Tetlock, Coping with Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and Political Implications, in Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin, eds. Elements of Reason: Cognition Choice and the Bounds of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). September 13: Public Justification Fred D Agostino, The Idea of Public Justification from Free Public Reason (New York: Oxford Unversity Press, 1996). (web) Fred D Agostino, The Ideal of Public Justification Free Public Reason (New York: Oxford Unversity Press, 1996) (web)

5 Christopher J. Eberle, Justificatory Liberalism from Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). (web) Stephen Macedo, Liberalism and Public Justification in his Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), ch. 2. Gaus, Social Philosophy (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1999), ch. 2 (web). Gaus, Public Reason International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier Scientific Publishers, 2002: 12572-12578. (web) Fred D Agostino s internet encyclopedia article at http://plato.stanford. edu/entries/justification-public/. Onora O Neill, The Public Use of Reason, Political Theory, 14(4)(Nov. 1986): 523 551. Also included in her Constructions of Reason. Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, Philosophical Quarterly 37 1987): 127 50. Kant, What is Enlightenment? in Kant s Political Writings ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This text is widely available on the web. September 20: Pluralist Liberalism Isaiah Berlin Two Concepts of Liberty (web selections) G. Crowder, Pluralism and Liberalism, Political Studies, vol. 42 (1994): 293-305. (web) Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams, Pluralism and Liberalism: A Reply, Political Studies, vol. 42 (1994): 306-309. (web) William Galston, From Value Pluralism to Liberal Pluralist Politics from Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (web selections) Fred D Agostino, Pluralism and Liberalism from Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas, eds. Handbook of Political Theory (London: Sage, 2004). (web) Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, ch. 2 (web). Eric Mack, Isaiah Berlin and Liberal Pluralism, Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 7 (April 1993): 215 30. John Kekes, Pluralism and Conflict in Morality, The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 26 (January 1992): 37 50. Bernard Williams, Conflict of Values in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 71 82. John Gray, Berlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Daniel Weinstock, The Graying of Berlin, Critical Review, vol. 11 (Fall 1997): 481 501. Marcus Roberts, The Endurance of History? Reflections on John Gray s Post- Enlightenment Pluralism, Res Publica, vol. 3 (1997):185 212,

6 Glen Newey, Value Pluralism in Contemporary Liberalism, Dialogue, vol. 37 (1998): 493 522. Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). Jonathan Riley, Interpreting Berlin s Liberalism, American Political Science Review, vol. 95 (June 2001): 283-97. September 27: Hobbesian Public Reason Hobbes, Leviathan (web selections; I am assuming that you ve read Hobbes, but this includes the most relevant bits.) Hardin, Indeterminacy and Society, ch. 3. David Gauthier, Public Reason, Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 12 (Winter 1995): 19 42 (web). R.E. Ewin The Denial of Right Reason (from Virtue and Rights (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) (web selections). Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, ch. 3 (web) Michael Ridge, Hobbesian Public Reason, Ethics, vol. 108 (April 1998): 538 68. October 4: Social Reason Kurt Baier, Society-Anchored Reasons in his The Rational and the Moral Order (La Salle: Open Court, 1995), ch. 5 (web) Philip Pettit, Political Theory in his Common Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 6 (web). Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, ch. 4. T.M. Scanlon, Self-Anchored Morality in J.B. Schneewind, Reason, Ethics and Society (La Salle: Open Court, 1996) ch. 10. David Gauthier, Individual Reason in J.B. Schneewind, Reason, Ethics and Society (La Salle: Open Court, 1996) ch. 3 Christopher McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). October 11: The Case for Deliberative Democracy Jürgen Habermas, Popular Sovereignty as Procedure in Bohman and Rehg. Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy in Bohman and Rehg. Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy in Bohman and Rehg.

7 James Bohman, Discourse Theory in Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas, eds. Handbook of Political Theory (London: Sage, 2004), ch. 12. Jon Elster (ed.) Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Gerald J. Postema, Public Practical Reason: An Archeology, Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 12 (Winter 1995). Gerald J. Postema, Public Practical Reason: Political Practice in Ian Shapiro and Judith Wagner DeCrew, eds., NOMOS XXXVII: Theory and Practice (New York: New York University Press, 1995). James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation (London: Routledge, 2000). Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Christian Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson, trans. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, William Rehg, trans. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). Joshua Cohen, Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus in David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer, eds., The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). October 18: Criticisms of Deliberative Democracy Tom Christiano, The Significance of Public Deliberation, in Bohman and Rehg. Gaus, Reason, Justification and Consensus: Why Democracy Can t Have it All, in Bohman and Rehg. Guido Pincione and Fernando R. Tesón Rational Ignorance and Political Morality. (web) Frank I. Michelman, How Can the People Ever Make Laws? in Bohman and Rehg. Susan C. Stokes Pathologies of Deliberation Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) pp. 123 139; Adam Przeworski, Deliberation and Ideological Domination in ibid., pp. 140 160. October 25: Epistemic Democracy. David Estlund, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority in Bohman and Rehg. David Estlund, Making Truth Safe for Democracy in David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer, eds., The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 71 100. (web)

8 Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, ch. 6 (web). William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1988). Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, Ethics, vol. 97 (October 1986). Symposium on the Condorect Jury theorem, volume 83 of the American Political Science Review, pp. 1315 35. Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Christian List and Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 9 (2001). Robert Goodin, The Paradox of Persisting Opposition, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, vol. 1 (February 2002). November 1: Political Liberalism (1) Rawls, Political Liberalism, Lectures I, II and III. November 8: Political Liberalism (2) Rawls, Political Liberalism, Lectures IV, V, VI November 15: Political Liberalism (3) Rawls, Political Liberalism, Introduction to paperback edition, Lecture IX. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 64 (Summer 1997): 765 807 (web). [Also in his Collected Papers, and his The Law of Peoples.] Samuel Freeman, Public Reason and Political Justification in the Fordham Law Review, vol. 72 (April 2004): 2021-2072. Charles Larmore, Public Reason in Samuel Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Jeremy Waldon, Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive in Gaus and Kukathas (eds.), Handbook of Political Theory (London: Sage, 2004), ch. 7. Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, ch. 7. (web) Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 19(Winter 1990): 3 46. David Estlund, The Insularity of the Reasonable: Why Political Liberalism Must Admit the Truth, Ethics, vol. 108 (January 1998): 252 75. Jürgen Habermas, Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on Rawls Political Liberalism, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 42 (1995): 109 31.

9 Thomas McCarthy, Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructionism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue, Ethics, vol. 105 (October, 1994). November 22: Thanksgiving Eve. If you want to meet for a beer or something, I ll be around. November 29 Justificatory Liberalism Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, ch. 8. Gaus, Respect for Persons and the Evolution of Morality. (web) Eberle, Gaus on Respect from Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. (web) Christopher Bertram, Theories of Public Reason, Imprints: A Journal of Analytical Socialism, vol. 2 (June 1997): 72 85. Christopher Bertram Political Justification, Theoretical Complexity and Democratic Community, Ethics, 107 (1997): 563 583. Micah Schwartzman, The Completeness of Public Reason, Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, vol. 3 (June 2004): 191-220. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). December 6: Religious Belief and Public Reason Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, San Diego Law Review, vol. 30 (Fall 1973): 677-702. (web) Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political judgment: The Status of Personal Experience and the Autonomy and Generality of Principles of Restraint, San Diego Law Review, vol. 30 (Fall 1973): 647-675. (web) Paul Neal, Political Liberalism, Public Reason, and the Citizen of Faith in Robert P. George and Christopher Wolfe (eds.), Natural Law and Public Reason (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000),171-201. (web) Paul J. Weithman, Citizenship and Public Reason in Robert P. George and Christopher Wolfe (eds.), Natural Law and Public Reason (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), pp. 125-170. Stephen Macedo, In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases? in Robert P. George and Christopher Wolfe (eds.), Natural Law and Public Reason (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), pp.11-49. Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

10 Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Christopher Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Gaus, The Place of Religious Belief in Liberal Public Reason. (web)