PUBLIC PULSE REPORT 4 The Socio-Economic Situation Interethnic Relations Public and Personal Safety and Security Economic Confidence Index Political and Institutional Stability Democratization Index Economic Confidence Index Attitudes toward Voting Political and Institutional Stability Interethnic Relations The Socio-Economic Situation Attitudes toward Voting Democratization Index Public and Personal Safety and Security Empowered lives. Resilient nations.
Content CHAPTER 1: Political and Institutional Stability... 5 CHAPTER 2: The Socio-Economic Situation... 9 CHAPTER 3: Interethnic Relations... 13 CHAPTER 4: Public and Personal Safety and Security... 17 CHAPTER 5: Attitudes toward Voting... 22
Empowered lives. Resilient nations. PUBLIC PULSE REPORT 4 Prepared by UNDP Kosovo - Public Pulse Project team: Atdhe Hetemi, Public Pulse Project Officer Iris Limani, Statistician - Policy Research, Gender and Communication Unit Mytaher Haskuka, PhD, Quality Assurance Team Leader of: Policy Research, Gender and Communication Unit Technical Assistance Lekë Badivuku, Intern UNDP Kosovo Focus Group Participants: Andelka Cup, Media Center Gracanica Bahtir Maxhuni, National Security Council Daniel Harvey, Spokesperson KFOR Dejan Mitic, Youth Center Gracanica Elizabeth Schleicher, Gender Advisor - KFOR Gazmend Vitaku, Media Expert KFOR Kristen Joppe, Security and Monitoring OSCE Mentor Vrajolli, Kosovo Center for Security Studies Nebojsa Mitic, Youth Center Gracanica Sasa Nikolic NGO Sector Shkelzen Marevci, Expert on Security Issues Shpresa Mulliqi, National Public Safety Awareness OSCE Veton Elshani, Kosovo Police Prishtinë/ Pristina
LIST OF ACRONYMS DI ECI EULEX ICO KFOR KP KPST KSF OSCE PAK PI RAE UNDP UNMIK Democratization Index Economic Confidence Index EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo International Civilian Office NATO - Kosovo Forces Kosovo Police Kosovo Pension Savings Trust Kosovo Security Force Organization for Security and Cooperation in Kosovo Privatization Agency of Kosovo Participation Index Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian United Nations Development Programme United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
Selected Economic Indicators Jan-Mar 2005 Jar -Mar Jan-Mar 2009 Nov 2010 Jun 2011 Nov 2011 Aug 2012 Trend Population (in thousands) 1.999 2.07 2.1 2.2 1.734 1.733 (f) 1.733 (f) GDP growth rate (annual), % (a) 0.3 5.4 2.9 4.6 (a) 4.2 (a) 5.0 (h) GDP per capita, (a) 1.120 1.612 1.784 1.795 (a) 1.850 (v) 2.383 (a) 2.682 (h) Kosovo Budget (Annual), billion (b) 641.5 553 862.13 1.461 1.2 1.520 (c) 1.119 (h) Workers remittances, million 281 511.6 (q) 393.3 (b) 584.8 (h) Foreign assistance, million 462.0 132.4 432.6 394.6 (h) KPST fund, million 145.8 (Dec) 230.6 (Mar) 488.8 (April) 546.3 (June 11)(e) 588.1 Mar 12(e) 637.98 Q1 12 PAK fund, million (e) 113.1 (Dec) 291.6 (Feb) 463.2 March 517.2 March 517.2* March 2011 (d) 678.9 March 12 (1) Bank deposits, million 704.8 (Feb) 973.5 (Feb) 1.4441( r) 1.77 (u) (March) 1.93 Oct 2.10 (b) 2.11 (h) Commercial bank loans, million 356.5 (Feb) 515.1 (Feb) 1.336.2 (March) 1624.9 (June) 1.689.1 (b) 1.683.1 (h) Trade balance, million (j) -219.1 (Jan-Mar) -101.92 (Jan-Feb) -142 (May) -550 March -925.4 (June) -2.166.8 (b) -2.383.9 (h) Registered job-seekers 303,095 (Jan) 331,056 (Mar) 338.836 (Apr) 338.8 (March 2010) 335.26 335.905 Jan 12(g) 325.261 (i) Consumer Price Index, 101.4 (May) 100.2 (Mar) 110,9 (Mar) 119.9 March 130.3 June (q) 100 (a) Nov 2011 124.7** March 12 (i) Basic pensions (per month), 40 40 40 70 70 70 70 *PAK Fund only gave the total budget and privatization sales up to March 31, 2011 (1) Annual Report January-December 2011, Privatisation Agency of Kosovo, March 2012 http://www.pak-ks.org/repository/docs/annual_report_2011_eng_final_(2).pdf (i) Quarterly Bulletin, April 2012, Kosovo Agency of Statistics, http://esk.rks-gov.net/eng/ dmdocuments/quarterly%20bulletin%20april%202012.pdf **Base year of 2002 = 100 as according to SOK. Sources: a) SOK, Gross Domestic Product in Current Prices b) Figure for the three first quarters of the year. CBAK, Monthly Statistics Bulletin, No. 124, BPK, Prishtinë/Priština, December 2011. c) The information was received by the Information Office- Ministry of Finance d) Report on Activities of the PAK of the Jan March 2011 e) Official webpage of Kosovo Pension Savings Trust http:// www.trusti.org f) Official webpage of Statistical Office of Kosovo http:// esk.rks-gov.net/eng/ g) Annual Review 2011 on Labor Relations and Social Dialogue in South East Europe: Kosovo: available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belgrad/08909.pdf h) Buletini Mujor Statistikor, BQK nr. 127, Mars 2012 http:// www.bqk-kos.org/repository/docs/2012/bms%20nr%20 127%20shqip.pdf q) CBAK Monthly Statistics Bulletin r) CBAK Annual Report 2008 u) CBAK. Monthly Statistics Bulletin for March 2010. No. 103. BPK Prishtina 2
Selected Opinion Poll Indicators Political pessimism, % ( very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with current political trends) Economic pessimism, % ( very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with current economic trends) Willingness to protest due to economic reasons, % Willingness to protest due to political reasons, % Satisfaction with UNMIK s performance*, % Satisfaction with SRSG s performance*, % Satisfaction with Gov. Kosovo (before PISG) performance*, % Satisfaction with Assembly s performance*, % Satisfaction with KFOR s performance*, % Satisfaction with KPS performance *, % Feelings of insecurity ( Somewhat unsafe or very unsafe while outdoors) Mar 2005 a) Sep 2005 b) Jun 2006 c) Dec 2006 d) Jun e) Dec f) Sep 2008 g) Nov 2008 o) Jun 2009 p) 38.6 41.0 43.4 48.9 54.0 41.1 36.0 35.73% 26.78% 33.03% 41.08% 37.3 66.9 57.5 60.8 73.82% 71.1 68.8 76.0 76.2 70.7 64.6 53.0 55.0 43.48% 57.07% 60.31% 53.8 72.1 69.7 73.0 79.44% 62.9 57.4 62.8 42.8 54.9 71.3 68.3 75.7% 64.32% 66.58% 63.4 59.2% 72.4% 66.9% 72.4% 61.5% 48.9 45.4 45.5 30.9 31.2 58.6 49.2 59.5% 45.21% 50.68% 46.06% 49.19% 58.7 55.4 59.1 54.02% Sep 2009 q) 29.7 34.5 30.5 28.0 31.5 27.7 25.4 20.8% 28.36% 23.11% Jan 2010 r) 12.5 8% Apr 2010 s) 81.2 69.8 70.5 43.6 45.9 39.6 18.4 21.1% 33.66% 25.93% 17.79% 25.3 Nov 2010 t) Jun 2011 v) Nov 2011 z) Apr 2012 y) Trend 22.2 18.9 15.9 14.8 11.54% 81.2 48.7 43.3 27.2 35.9 49.9 55.7% 53.13% 55.83% 36.72% 29.3 25.1 32.6 30.2 21.25% 73.7 59.0 45.4 25.6 31.9 36.7 46.0 49. 53.18% 46.37% 33.34% 34.1 32.1 41.0 40.5 32.45% 81.0 84.3 81.0 77.5 81.8 83.7 84.2 86.9% 72.88% 71.9 77.63% 69.6 81.7 82.1 78.8 74.69% 86.9 84.5 81.8 72.5 79.3 78.6 80.0 80.9% 71.14% 70.96% 74.86% 74.3 78.5 78.3 79.1 70.52% 38.1 36.7 35.5 38.6 22.6* 55.25* 21.2 18.3 26.0 17.87% 27.64% 29.9 30.6 31.4 20.66% 16.1 Sources: a) UNDP, Early Warning Report March 2005, UNDP, Prishtinë/Priština, op. cit. b) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2005. c) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2006 d) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec 2006 e) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun f ) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec g) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2008 o) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Nov 2008 p) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2009 q) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2009 r) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jan 2010 s)undp, Opinion Poll: Apr 2010 3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY There are no changes in the Democratization Index (0.91) as compared to November 2011 (0.91), but there is a slight decrease compared to the June 2011 data (0.95). The Economic Confidence Index, on the other hand, has experienced some changes over the same time period. This index increased from 0.79 in November 2011 to 0.81 in April 2012. According to the latest poll, Kosovo s Participation Index is 0.12 (as opposed to 0.16 in November 2011), signifying the largest decrease since November 2010 in public participation in political and civic life. Satisfaction levels with the work of the Government and Prime Minister is the lowest since, with only 21% of the citizens satisfied with the work of the Government, and approximately 24% of those polled satisfied with the work of the Prime Minister. The dissatisfaction of Kosovans with the current political direction has seen an increase to 72% (as compared to 59% in November 2011) of respondents being either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the political direction of Kosovo. Public dissatisfaction with Kosovo s economic direction is higher as compared to previous polling: 79% of all respondents are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Kosovo s current economic direction. Around 8 of Kosovans assigned the responsibility for the present economic situation to the Government of Kosovo. Unemployment (4), poverty (22%), and corruption (8%) continue to be ranked as the top problems facing Kosovo. According to the perceptions of Kosovans, the top institutions with prevailing large scale corruption are: the Privatization Agency of Kosovo (49% as opposed to 52% in November 2011), the Kosovo Energy Corporation (47% as opposed to 61% in November 2011), courts (44% as opposed to 55% in November 2011) and hospitals (43% ). Around 7 of Kosovans, regardless of their ethnicity, have had no contact with other ethnic groups besides their own within the past three months. According to the current poll, when Kosovans were asked about whether they were in a situation in which they felt discriminated against (during the prior six months), the majority of respondents (79%), regardless of ethnicity, responded negatively. Although the overall satisfaction of K-Albanians with the performance of security institutions has decreased since November 2011, the April 2012 poll highlights that K-Albanians are mostly satisfied with the performance of KSF (92%), followed by KFOR (84%) and KP (8). The lowest satisfaction is recorded with the EULEX Police (2). There are positive trends in feelings of safety, approximately 82% of Kosovans feels safe when outdoors (as opposed to 62% in June 2011), whereas 2 feel generally unsafe (as opposed to 31% in June 2011). Additionally, when these findings were analyzed on a gender basis, no significant differences were noticed in the opinions of men and women. Groups considered as the most subject to discrimination in Kosovo are: the elderly (25%), females (19%), and persons with disabilities (12%). Asked on tensions between different groups, respondents selected the government and opposition parties as groups with the highest tension, with the second most frequent selection being management and workers, followed by different ethnic and income groups. The groups with the least to no tension between them were men and women, followed by religious groups, and elderly and young people. 4
CHAPTER 1 Political and Institutional Stability Political Indicators During the period of November 2011 April 2012, developments in the northern part of Kosovo and technical dialogue between Prishtina Belgrade continued to dominate the political agenda. In this regard, most of the political and diplomatic activities of the Kosovo government were focused on these issues, as was the attention of the media and public opinion. These developments may have played a role in the formation of Kosovans perceptions concerning the performance of the key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. The April 2012 poll results show a general decrease in people s satisfaction with the work of Kosovo s key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. Satisfaction levels with the work of the Government and Prime Minister are at the lowest level since. According to the survey, only 21% of the citizens are satisfied with the work of the Government, and roughly 24% are satisfied with the work of the Prime Minister. Similarly, compared to November 2011 data, citizens seem to be less satisfied with the work of the Parliament, Speaker of the Parliament, and the President. While the level of satisfaction with the work of the Speaker of the Parliament marked a significant decline only when compared to June 2011 findings, the satis faction level with the work of the Parliament has declined by about 8 percentage points since November 2011. Satisfaction levels with the work of the President have decreased since the last poll, yet the percentage of those satisfied with the President is still higher than in November 2010. The satisfaction level with the judiciary shows no exception in the declining trend with other key institutions. While satisfaction levels with the work of the Prosecutor s Office declined by 4 percentage points, no significant changes may be observed with citizens satisfaction level with the work of Kosovan courts compared to November 2011 (see Table 1.1). Table 1.1: Satisfaction with Kosovo s Key Institutions Mar- 07 Oct- 07 Dec- 07 May- 08 Oct- 08 Apr- 09 Jun- 09 Sep- 09 Jan- 10 Apr- 10 Nov- 10 June- 11 Nov- 11 Apr- 12 Satisfaction with executive government Government 30.5% 28.1% 46.9% 55.7% 38. 53.1% 55.8% 36.7% 29.2% 25.1% 32.6% 30.2% 21.2% Prime Minister 54. 61. 72. 63.1% 39.8% 53.8% 52. 41.5% 36.4% 30.7% 37.6% 30.3% 23.7% Satisfaction with legislative Satisfaction with judiciary Parliament 31. 36.2% 36.8% 51.4% 49. 33.6% 53.2% 46.4% 33.3% 34.1% 32.1% 41. 40.5% 32.5% Speaker of the 35.4% 37.1% 35.1% 56.5% 47. 32.8% 51.6% 49.5% 40.3% 36. 33.3% 60.9% 51.6% 47.5% Parliament President 52. 59. 61. 74. 69.9% 45.7% 61.7% 60.8% 56.6% 54.9% 30.8% 54.1% 61.1% 54.6% Courts 20. 18. 18. 21. 19.7% 20. 32.7% 25.6% 14.7% 27.2% 18.5% 26.9% 19.3% 17.8% Prosecutor s office 22.7% 17.7% 18.3% 22.7% 21.1% 20.5% 31.7% 25.7% 14.8% 26.9% 15.1% 20. 19.7% 15.7% 5
In line with a decrease in satisfaction with executive institutions, only 5% of Kosovans report to be either satisfied or very satisfied with Kosovo s political direction, and 2 report to be neutral. The remaining 73% are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Kosovo s political direction. When this question was analyzed according to the ethnicity of respondents, results indicate K-Serbs are more dissatisfied with the political direction than other ethnic groups, with a rate of 86%. In terms of age groups, individuals aged 18-24 years are the least satisfied, followed by the age group of 25-30 and 37-45. When analyzed on gender basis, the data show that women are 3 percentage points more satisfied than men with Kosovo s political direction (see Figure 1.1). Figure 1.1: Level of satisfaction with Kosovo s political direction, by ethnicity, age, gender and residence of respondents 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 86.1% 73.2% 71.2% 75.4% 72. 75.2% 73.4% 71.6% 73.6% 74. 74.2% 73.5% 26.8% 28.8% 24.6% 28. 24.8% 26.6% 28.4% 26.4% 26. 25.8% 26.5% 13.9% k-albanian k-serb Other Male Female 18-24 25-30 31-36 37-45 <=46 Urban Rural Satisfied Dissatisfied Ethnicity Group Gender Age group Residence Kosovans were also asked who, in their opinion, is most responsible for Kosovo s current political situation. As has been the trend over the last three years, the leader in this category continues to be the government of Kosovo and political parties, selected by 87% of respondents. Around 1 of respondents assigned the responsibility of Kosovo s political situation to EULEX whereas only 3% of respondents attribute this responsibility to UN- MIK (see Figure 1.2.). It should be noted that since 2004, the number of respondents that attributed this responsibility to the Kosovo government and political parties has increased continuously, while the converse has been the case for UNMIK. Figure 1.2: Trends for the attribution of responsibility for the political situation in Kosovo 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Jun-03 Mar-04 Jun-04 Dec-04 Jul-05 Dec-05 Jun-06 Sep-06 Dec-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Oct-07 Dec-07 May-08 Jul-08 Oct-08 Apr-09 Jun-09 Sep-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Nov-10 Jun-11 Nov-11 Apr-12 UNMIK Gov. of Kosovo & Political Parties Parties EULEX EULEX 6
Furthermore, almost 54% of the Kosovan citizens responded positively when asked whether they are ready to join public protests for political reasons. In general, according to the survey data, other minorities and K-Albanian respondents seem more ready and willing to join political protests compared to K-Serbs (See Figure 1.3). Figure 1.3: Readiness to join public protests for political reasons 70. 60. 50.0$% 55. 63.1% 54. Table 1.2: Democratization and Participation Indexes November 2010 June 2011 November 2012 April 2012 Democratization Index 0.92 0.95 0.91 0.91 Democratization Index (Men) 0.94 0.99 0.9 0.91 Democratization Index (Women ) 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.9 Participation Index 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.12 Participation Index (Men) 0.18 0.22 0.15 40. 30. 28.9% Participation Index (Women) 0.07 0.11 0.08 20. 10. kosovski k-albanians Albanci kosovski k-serbssrbi pripadnici Otherostalih etničkih ethnicities zajednica Da Yes Democratization and Public Participation Indexes 1 Ukupno Total Weighted The current results show that there are no significant changes in the Democratization Index as compared to November 2011, but there is a slight decrease as compared to June 2011 data. As may be observed in Table 1.1 above, the index has remained rather constant when analyzed on a gender basis. According to the latest poll, Kosovo s Participation Index is 0.12 (as opposed to 0.16 in November 2011), signifying the highest decrease since November 2010 of public participation in Kosovo s political and civic life. The decrease in the Public Participation Index is noted as well when broken down by gender, though the Participation Index is significantly higher for men (0.15) as compared to women (0.08), confirming an inequality of public participation in politics and civic life between men and women in Kosovo (see Table 1.2). The Democratization Index is based on respondents evaluation of the processes listed in Figure 1.4 below. Selected indicators of this index demonstrate that only 12% of Kosovans agree that the judiciary system in Kosovo is unbiased in its decisions. Similarly, a very low percentage of Kosovans agree that the central government is working according to the priorities of its citizens (13%). The percentage is higher for the local (municipal) government where 26% think that they work according to the priorities of the people. While around one-third (35%) of Kosovans believe that the media enjoys freedom of expression, only 26% of them partly or fully agree that the Kosovo constitution and laws are democratic and respect human rights. Further, 17% of Kosovans agree that elections in Kosovo are democratic and in accordance with international standards and 17% think that Kosovo s parliament monitors the government s performance. As in the previous polls, a very small share of Kosovans, 19%, responded that they believe that civil society serves as a truthful monitor of democratic developments in Kosovo (see Figure 1.4). 1 See Annex 1 for more information on the calculation of the Democratization and Public Participation Indexes 7
Figure 1.4: Positive responses to the Democratization Index questions Regardless of daily politics and looking forward to the future, do you agree that the democratic process in Kosovo... Regardless of daily politics and looking forward to the future, do you agree that the democratic process in Kosovo are instituted and are going towards the right direction? Is Kosovo Constitution as well as Laws in power democratic and do they respect the Human Rights? Is Kosovo Constitution as well as Laws in power democratic and do they respect the Human Rights? Is Kosovo Government working according to priorities of Kosovo citizens? Is Kosovo Government working according to priorities of Kosovo citizens? Is your local (municipal) Government working according to priorities of Kosovo citizens? Is your local (municipal) Government working according to priorities of Kosovo citizens? Does Civil Society in Kosovo serve as, a truthful monitor of democratic developments in Kosovo? Does Civil Society in Kosovo serve as, a truthful monitor of democratic developments in Kosovo? Does media in Kosovo enjoys the freedom of expression? Does media in Kosovo enjoys the freedom of expression? Is Judiciary System in Kosovo independent Is Judiciary System in Kosovo on independent its decisions? on its decisions? Does the Parliament monitor the Does the Government Parliament monitor the performance? Government performance? Are the election in Kosovo democratic and in Are the accordance election in Kosovo democratic with international and in accordance with international standarts? standarts? 12.9 12.9 12.3 12.3 16.7 18.08% 18.08% 17.0 19.0 16.7 19.0 17.0 25.9 25.9 25.7 25.7 34.7 34.7 5% 1 1 15% 2 25% 3 35% 4 The Participation Index is based on respondents self-reported participation in activities listed in Figure 1.5 below during the last six months. Selected indicators of this index demonstrate that participation in activities such as political parties, citizen initiatives, and community-based initiatives remain the most popular means of Kosovans political and/or civic engagement, with 22% of respondents participating in one of these activities. This is followed by participation in public discussions (6%), and then projects implemented by the local government with 5.7% of respondents declaring that they participated in such programs, while 5.5% stated that they participated in NGO activities. Only 3% of the respondents indicated that they participated in projects implemented by the central government during the last six months (see Figure 1.5). Figure 1.5: Positive responses to the Public Participation Index questions Community Community base initiatives base initiatives (religion, (religion, neighbourhood initiatives) Public Public discussions? Citizens initiatives 6.7 6.2 7.3 NGO 5.5 Political party? Party? 8.2 Projects implemented Projects implemented by central by central government? 2.7 Projects Projects implemented by local by local government 5.7 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% yes active and and yes yes not active not active 8
CHAPTER 2 The Socio-Economic Situation Socio - Economic Indicators and Expectations This chapter focuses on issues related to the economic and social stability during the reporting period of November 2011 April 2012. Public dissatisfaction with Kosovo s economic direction is higher than dissatisfaction with political direction: about 79% of all respondents are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Kosovo s current economic direction, while only about 4% are satisfied with it. Opinion poll data also indicates that the proportion of dissatisfied K-Serbs is much higher than that of K-Albanians and other communities (see Table 2.1). Table 2.1. Satisfaction with the economic direction Economic direction of Kosovo K-Albanian K-Serb Other Total Weighted Satisfied 3.6 1.3 6.49% 3.7 Dissatisfied 78.4 84.3 75.0 78.6 The majority of survey respondents, 8, consider the Kosovo government to be responsible for economic situation. The disaggregated data by ethnicity showes that 83% of K-Albanians, 67% of K-Serbs and 64% of other communities share this opinion. The percentage of respondents who think that the international community (EULEX, ICO and UNMIK, combined) is responsible for Kosovo s economic situation is only 4%. Similarly, only 2% consider the local government to be the primary holder of responsibility in this regard (see Table 2.2). Table 2.2. Attribution of responsibility for the economic situation in Kosovo, by ethnicity K- Albanian K-Serb Other Total EULEX 2.2% 6.5% 4.5% 2.6% ICO 0.6% 0.9% 0.6% UNMIK 1. 4.8% 1.8% 1.2% Kosovo Government 82.7% 67. 64.1% 80.5% Local governments 2. 2.6% 4.5% 2.2% Business community 1.2% 1.7% 3.2% 1.3% Other 3.1% 2.2% 2.3% 3.1% Don t know 5.4% 10. 14.5% 6.2% NA 1.8% 4.3% 5. 2.2% Total 100. 100. 100. 100. During April of 2012, 61% of survey respondents stated that they would join public protests over the current economic situation. When responses on readiness to protest for economic reasons were analyzed by ethnicity, the results showed that there have been significant decreases in readiness to protest for economic reasons by K-Serbs to 31% (as opposed 53% in November 2011). The current poll noted a decrease in the readiness to protest for economic reasons also among K-Albanians and Others (see Figure 2.1). 9
Figure 2.1: Readiness to join public protests for economic reasons, by ethnicity 10 8 6 4 kosovski K-Albanian Albanci kosovski K-SerbSrbi 2 Ostali Other sep 2006 Sep 2006 dec 2006 Dec 2006 mar Mar jun Jun oct Oct dec Dec may 2008 May 2008 jul 2008 Jul 2008 nov 2008 Nov 2008 apr 2009 Apr 2009 jun 2009 Jun 2009 sep 2009 Sep 2009 jan 2012 Jan 2012 apr 2010 Apr 2010 nov 2010 Nov 2010 jun 2011 Jun 2011 nov 2011 Nov 2011 apr 2012 Apr 2012 Despite the low levels of satisfaction with Kosovo s economic direction and high readiness to protest for this issue, Kosovans remain optimistic regarding the economic direction in the medium-term future (next two years). Slightly more than 34% of the respondents (as opposed to 41% in November 2011) reported that they expect the economic situation to improve over the next two years, whereas 11% think that the situation might improve over the next six months. Around 32% (as opposed to 19% in November 2011), however, believe the situation will remain unchanged over the next two years, while another 17% (as opposed to 15% in November 2011) believe the situation will only get worse over the next two years (see Figure 2.2.). Figure 2.2 Expectations about the future economic situation 7 6 66.3% Better Unchanged 5 Worse 4 3 34.2% 31.7% Don t know / No answer 2 1 11.2% 17.7% 17. 4.8% 17.1% Over the next 6 months Over the next two years Economic Confidence Index2 2 and Perceptions of Large Scale Corruption The Economic Confidence Index has increased from 0.79 in November 2011 to 0.81 in April 2012. 2 See Annex 1 for more information on the calculation of the Economic Confidence Index However, the index is still in the range where most people express concerns over the economic outlook. An inverse change between genders is noted when the index is disaggregated: the index increased from 0.76 to 0.84 for men whereas for women it decreased from 0.83 to 0.77. Nevertheless, this index as well is below the arithmetic mean and this implies that many citizens do not have a favourable opinion on the overall economic developments (see Table 2.3). 10
Table 2.3. Economic Confidence Index, by gender Nov-10 Jun-11 Nov-11 Apr-12 Economic Confidence Index 0.92 0.9 0.79 0.81 Economic Confidence Index (Men) 0.85 0.88 0.76 0.84 Economic Confidence Index ( Women) 0.99 0.92 0.83 0.77 Economic Confidence indicators that compose the index assess the current business and employment conditions as well as expectations about employment and the family s total income conditions in the near future (a six month period). Roughly 8% of respondents expect favourable employment conditions in the near future, whereas only about 3% of them assess the current employment conditions as favourable. While 1 of respondents have favourable expectations regarding their total family income six months from now, only 8% assessed the current business conditions as favourable (see Figure 2.3). Figure 2.3. Positive responses to the Economic Confidence questions What are your expectations regarding employment condition six months from now 7.6 What is your assessment of the current employment condition 3.4 What is your assessment of the current business conditions 7.8 Favoruable What are your expectations regarding your family s total income six months from now 9.9 2% 4% 6% 8% 1 12% According to respondents, economic issues are the most important issues facing Kosovo society. Specifically when asked to identify the largest problems facing Kosovo, 44.3% of respondents selected unemployment, followed by poverty (23%) and corruption (1). Figure 2.4 Please identify one of the following problems which you think represents the paramount problem facing Kosovo 5 45% 4 35% 3 25% 2 15% 1 5% 1.1% 1.2%.3% 1.8% Road infrastructure Road... Electric Electirc Energy Energy... Supply Urban-Space Urban-Space... issues Environmental Envrionment... pollution 22.5% Poverty Provert 3.7% 1.5% 1.2%.5% 2. Prices Healthcare Healthcare... services Public and Personal Security Public... Education Interethnic Interethnic... relationship 44.3% Unemployment.3% 1.1%.8%.5% Social problems... The fate of missing The fate persons of... Organized crime Unsolved Unsolved cases of cases... crimes 10. Corruption.2%.2% Unsocial Unsocial... behavior Black Economy 5.2% Other.1% 1.6% Don t know No Answer Road... Electric energy... Urban-space... Environment... Poverty Prices Healthcare... Public and... Education Interethnic... Unemployment Social problems... The fate of... Organized crime Unsolved cases... Corruption Unsocial... Black Economy Other Don t know No Answer 11
When respondents were asked about their perceptions of corruption about different organizations, the Privatization Agency of Kosovo (49% as opposed to 52% in November 2011), the Kosovo Energy Corporation (47% as opposed to 61% in November 2011), courts (44% as opposed to 55% in November 2011) and hospitals reported as the (43% as opposed to 5 in November 2011) were top institutions with prevailing large-scale corruption. The institutions with the lowest perceived level of corruption are NGOs (14%), international organizations, and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) (see table 2.4). Table 2.4. Perceptions of large scale corruption Nov-10 Jun-11 11-Nov Apr-12 PAK (Privatization Agency of Kosovo) 52. 40.5% 51.9% 49.4% KEC 52.4% 47.9% 61.2% 47.8% Courts 49.7% 41.6% 55.6% 44.5% Healthcare (hospitals) 47.9% 40.7% 49.8% 43.3% Customs 45.1% 42.3% 53.7% 43.2% PTK 34. 32.4% 46.6% 41.8% Central administration/government 47.5% 41.4% 43.3% 39.5% TAK (Tax administration of Kosovo) 24.9 36.5% 38.1% Municipalities (local government) 32.9% 30.4% 31.9% 30.1% EULEX police (CIVPOL) 22.9% 26.2% 27.1% 28.3% Education (schools, University) 14.4% 13.1% 17.3% 26.2% Banks 14.4% 14.9% 22. 20.5% Local police (KPS) 15.2% 15.5% 19.5% 19.4% International organizations 14.7% 12.3% 20.3% 19.3% Non-governmental organizations 8.3% 7.8% 9.2% 14.2% Even though a majority of citizens had an opinion on the prevalence of corruption, only 8% of them reported to have had a personal experience with it (asked for money, gifts, etc). A majority of Kosovans, 59%, reported that their opinions havebeen largely formed through media information, whereas 23% reported that their perception was largely based on talks with relatives and friends (see Figure 2.5). Figure 2.5 Sources of information on corruption 5% 4% 1% Personal experience 8% Talks with relative and friends Information through media 59% Other 23% Don t know NA 12
CHAPTER 3 Interethnic Relations Among other interesting trends of the present poll is the increasing trend in the number of K- Albanian respondents who indicated that interethnic relations are tense and not improving is the converse tendency among the K-Serb community which has seen a decrease. As shown in Figure 3.1, while in November 2011 around 6 of K-Albanians thought that interethnic relations are tense and not improving, in April 2012 the percentage increased to 78%. With regards to the K-Serb population, the last poll indicated that about 62% of K- Serbs thought that interethnic relations are tense and not improving (as opposed to 9 in November 2011). The recent developments in the northern part of Kosovo might have an impact in these changes, especially for K-Albanians (see Figure 3.1). Figure 3.1. Trend of respondents considering that interethnic relations continue to be tense and not improving 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 may sep 2005 2005 May 2005 Sep 2005 dec sep 2005 2006 Dec 2005 Sep 2006 jun 2006 Jun 2006 dec 2006 Dec 2006 mar Mar jun sep Jun Sep dec Dec may 2008 May 2008 jul 2008 Jul 2008 nov apr 2008 2009 Nov 2008 Apr 2009 jun 2009 Jun 2009 sep 2009 Sep 2009 jan apr 2010 2010 Jan 2010 Apr 2010 nov 2010 Nov 2010 jun 2011 Jun 2011 nov 2011 Nov 2011 apr 2012 Apr 2012 kosovski K-Serbs Srbi kosovski K-Albanian Albanci Even though a majority of K-Serbs seem to be pessimistic regarding current inter-ethnic relations, when asked about their readiness to live and work with K-Albanians, no significant changes in the results were noticed compared to the November 2011 poll. Positive increases in several measures of interethnic relations can be observed for K-Serb respondents. Compared to November 2011, K- Serbs show a slight increase in their readiness to live in the same town with K-Albanians, from 3 in November 2011 to 35% in April 2012. Furthermore, the increases are noticed in the willingness to work in the same place or marry with K-Albanians. A slight decline in the trend was reported, however, when asked about readiness to live in the same street with K-Albanians (see Figure 3.2. for trend analysis of interethnic relations since 2005). 13
Figure 3.2. K-Serbs willing to live and work with K-Albanians 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 Work Same Street Same Town Martial Marital 2 1 Dec 2005 dec 2005 Jun 2006 jun 2006 Sep 2006 sep 2006 Dec 2006 dec 2006 Mar mar Jun jun Sep sep Dec dec May 2008 may 2008 Jul 2008 jul 2008 Nov 2008 nov 2008 Apr 2009 apr 2009 Sep 2009 sep 2009 Jan 2012 jan 2010 Nov 2012 nov 2010 Jun 2011 jun 2011 Nov 2011 nov 2011 Apr 2012 apr 2012 It is important to note that contrary to K-Serbs increased readiness to work, marry, and live in the same town to K-Albanians, K-Albanians have shown a lower readiness to do so with K-Serbs, a readiness which has been decreasing since November 2010. Approximately 29% of K-Albanian respondents agree to work in the same place with K-Serbs, whereas 27% of them agree to live in the same street with K-Serbs. Less than 1% of K-Albanians have stated that they would agree to have marital relations with K-Serbs (see Figure 3.3). Figure 3.3. K-Albaninans willing to live and work with K-Serbs 6 5 4 Work 3 Same Street 2 Same Town 1 Martial Marital Dec 2005 dec 2005 Jun 2006 jun 2006 Sep 2006 sep 2006 Dec 2006 dec 2006 Mar mar Jun jun Sep sep Dec dec May 2008 may 2008 Jul 2008 jul 2008 Nov 2008 nov 2008 Apr 2009 apr 2009 Sep 2009 sep 2009 Jan 2012 jan 2010 Nov 2012 nov 2010 Jun 2011 jun 2011 Nov 2011 nov 2011 Apr 2012 apr 2012 Combining the responses of K-Serbs and K-Albanians expressing their respective attitudes towards living, working, or marrying one another, social acceptance measures were calculated for both ethnic groups (shown in Figure 3.4). The interethnic social acceptance trends indicate that there has been a decrease of K-Albanian social acceptance toward K-Serb community between November 2010 and April 2012. On the other hand, for the period June 2011 to April 2012, there has been a slight increase of K-Serb social acceptance toward K-Albanians (see Figure 3.4). 14
Figure 3.4: Interethnic social acceptance trends 6 5 4 3 2 K-serbs Responses Responses K-albanians Responses Responses 1 Dec 2005 dec 2005 Jun 2006 jun 2006 Sep 2006 sep 2006 Dec 2006 dec 2006 Mar mar Jun jun Sep sep Dec dec May 2008 may 2008 Jul 2008 jul 2008 Nov 2008 nov 2008 Apr 2009 apr 2009 Sep 2009 sep 2009 Jan 2010 jan 2010 Nov 2010 nov 2010 Jun 2011 jun 2011 Nov 2011 nov 2011 Apr 2012 apr 2012 Interethnic Contact Lack of contact between K-Serbs and K-Albanian poses a problem to reconciliation and the improvement of interethnic relations. North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica poses a special problem, given that in other regions there is more opportunity for interaction between the ethnicities. The April 2012 poll results show that a majority (7) of all Kosovans, regardless of their ethnicity, did not have contact with other ethnic groups within the past three months. Only 8% of Kosovans have had contact with other ethnicities in one or two occasions, while 16% have had interethnic contact on more than three occasions within the past three months. However it is positive to note that less than 1% of Kosovans state that they deliberately avoid contact with other ethnic groups. When disaggregated by ethnicity, the proportion of those who did not have any contact with other ethnic groups in the past three months is the highest among K-Albanians (7), followed by K-Serbs (65% as opposed to 46.5% in November 2011), and then other minority respondents (18%). Among those who have had interethnic contact on more than three occasions in the past three months, the highest proportion lies with other minority respondents (58%), followed by that of K-Albanians (14%) and K-Serbs (1) (see Table 3.1.). Table 3.1: Frequency of interethnic contacts within the past three months K-Albanian K-Serb Other Total weighted On more than three occasions 13.6% 9.6% 58.2% 16. One to two occasions 7.1% 14.3% 13.2% 7.9% I haven t had any contact 70.2% 65.2% 18.2% 66.9% Deliberately have avoid contact with person from another nationality Don t know 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 1.3% 2.2% 5. 1.6% NA 7.3% 8.3% 5. 7.2% Total 100. 100. 100. 100. 15
When those that had inter-ethnic contacts were asked about the reasons for their contacts with other ethnic groups, the largest share, 27%, stated that they met in the marketplace, followed by 25% reporting to live in the same neighbourhood, and then 17% stating other relations. it is important to note that around 14% of the respondents stated friendship was a reason for contact, while 11% said that they have business relations with other ethnic groups (See Figure 3.5.). Figure 3.5. Reasons for contact with other ethnic groups 14.13% 16.9 3.88% I met them in the marketplace I have business relations with them I have family relations with them 27% We live in the same neighborhood 24.71% Friendship Other 2.13% 11.3 NA 16
CHAPTER 4 Public and Personal Safety and Security Satisfaction and Relations with Security Institutions As was the case in November 2011, overall satisfaction with security institutions is relatively high among K-Albanian and K-Other respondents. For the K-Serb population, there has been an increase in levels of satisfaction with security institutions as compared to November 2011, but the figure remains very low at 9%. For K-Albanians, there has been a decrease in satisfaction with security institutions as compared to November 2011 (see Figure 4.1). Figure 4.1. Satisfaction with Security Institutions, by ethnicity 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Jul-04 Nov-04 Mar-05 Jun-05 Sep-05 Dec-05 Jun-05 Sep-05 Dec-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Oct-07 Dec-07 May-08 Jul-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Jun-09 Sep-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Nov-10 Jun-11 Nov-11 Apr-12 K-Albanians K-Serbs Other Although the overall satisfaction of K-Albanians with the performance of security institutions has decreased since November 2011, the April 2012 poll highlights that a majority of K-Albanians are still satisfied with the performance of KSF (92%), followed by KP (84%). And KFOR (8) The lowest satisfaction is recorded with the EULEX Police (2), as may be seen in Figure 4.2 below. Figure 4.2: Percentage of K-Albanian respondents satisfied with security institutions3 10 satisfied with security institutions3 8 6 4 2 K-Albanians K-Serbs Other Jul-04 Nov-04 Mar-05 Jun-05 Sep-05 Dec-05 Jun-06 Sep-06 Dec-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Oct-07 Dec-07 May-08 Jul-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Jun-09 Sep-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Nov-10 Jun-11 Nov-11 Apr-12 3 From July 2004 to June 2009, the trend shows satisfaction with UNMIK Police, whereas from June 2009 until to date the trend shows satisfaction with EULEX Police. 17
An overall increase in the satisfaction of security institutions is noticed among K-Serb respondents. Satisfaction with the KP rose to 2 (in April 2011) from 3% (in November 2011). An increase in satisfaction is also noticed with the EULEX s Police performance (8% as opposed to 1% in November 2011). The satisfaction with the KSF and KFOR did not mark any significant changes (see Figure 4.3). Figure 4.3: Percentage of K-Serb respondents sat isfied with security institutions 4 with security institutions 4 6 5 4 3 2 1 KFOR KFOR EULEX EULEX Police Police KPS KSF KSF Jul-04 Mar-05 Sep-05 Jun-06 Dec-06 Jun-07 Dec-07 Jul-08 Apr-09 Sep-09 Apr-10 Jun-11 Apr-12 Jul-04 Mar-05 Sep-05 Jun-06 Dec-06 Jun-07 Dec-07 Jul-08 Apr-09 Sep-09 Apr-10 Jun-11 Apr-12 Respondents were further asked about their perceived safety while outdoors. There is a positive trend in this regard: 82% of Kosovans feel safe when outdoors (as opposed to 62% in June 2011) whereas 2 feel generally unsafe (as opposed to 31% in June 2011). Additionally, when these findings were analyzed based on gender, no significant differences were noticed in the opinions of men and women (see Figure 4.4). Figure 4.4. Safety in the streets, by gender In terms of police-community relations, a significant majority of Kosovans considered them to be good or very good. Only about 6% of respondents believed that these relations were bad or very bad. The perceptions, however, are more negative among the K-Serbs with 31% (as opposed to 37% in November 2011) perceiving police-community relations as bad or very bad (see Figure 4.5). Figure 4.5. Bad and very bad police-community relations, by ethnicity 9 8 7 6 5 81.71% 82.26% 35% 3 25% 2 31.3 4 15% 3 2 1 16.6% Male 1.62% 15.48% Female 2.26% 1 5% 4.58% 6.36% 6.3 K-Albanians K-Serbs Other Total Weighted Safe Unsafe Don t know / No answer Bad or Very bad 4 From July 2004 to June 2009, the trend shows satisfaction with UNMIK Police, whereas from June 2009 until to date the trend shows satisfaction with EULEX Police. 18
Perceptions on Discrimination and Social Tensions According to the current poll, when asked whether there was a situation in which they felt discriminated against (during the last six months), the majority of respondents (79%), regardless of ethnicity, responded that they had not perceived any such discrimination. Indeed, between November 2011 and April 2012, there has been a significant decrease in the proportion of those who believe they were discriminated against in the last six months, especially among K-Serbs (33% as opposed to 54% in November 2011) and other ethnicities (26% as opposed to 45% in November 2011) (see Figure 4.6). Figure 4.6: Feelings of discrimination, by ethnicity 6 5 4 3 2 K-Albanian K-Serb Others 1 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jan-10 Apr-10 Nov-10 Jun-11 Nov-11 Apr-12 Those who felt discriminated also reported on reasons why they were subject to discrimination. The current poll results suggest that people feel discriminated due to various reasons. However the main reasons that they feel discriminated is due to their Figure 4.7. Bases for discrimination Nov-10 Jun-11 Nov-11 Apr-12 political or other opinion (18%), followed by ethnicity/nationality (17%), and by age (15%). Gender was selected by 7% of respondents and religious beliefs by 5% and language by 5% (see figure 4.7.). 2 18% 16% 14% 12% 1 8% 6% 4% 2% 7.4 14.7 4.5 5.4 16.8 18.2 0.5 3.6 18.6 Sex/gender Age Language Religion/belief Ethnicity Political or other opinion Sexual orientation Disability Other subject 19
Respondents were also asked to express their opinion on which groups were most subject to discrimination in Kosovo. The majority of respondents identified the following: the elderly (25%), women/girls (19%), and persons with disabilities (12%) as the groups most commonly subject to discrimination. When these results were disaggregated by ethnicity, it may be observed that the majority of K-Serbs (8) and majority of other ethnicities (15%) considered their own communities as most commonly subject to discrimination. K-Albanians, on the other hand, believed that old people and women/girls are the most discriminated groups in the society (see Table 4.2). Table 4.2. Perceptions of people about the groups - most subject to discrimination in Kosovo? Ethnicity K-Albanian K-Serb Other Total Weighted Females 20.8% 1.3% 8.2% 18.9% Children 4.7%.9% 3.6% 4.5% Youth 12.5% 4.8% 7.3% 11.9% Old people 28. 1.3% 9.5% 25.3% Kosovo Serbs.2% 80. 3.2% 5.1% Kosovo Albanians 11.3%.4% 1.8% 10.1% Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians 1.6% 2.6% 15. 2.5% Other communities (including Bosnians, Turks, Gorani, Montenegrins).2% 17.3% 1.2% Lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals.2%.4% 1.8%.3% Persons with disabilities, including those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments 12.4% 1.3% 13.6% 11.9% Other 2.5%.5% 2.2% Don t know 3.7% 3. 11.8% 4.2% NA 1.7% 3.9% 6.4% 2.1% Total 100. 100. 100. 100. Finally, respondents were asked to identify whether tensions existed between certain social groups. The top three groups with the highest tension between them, according to the poll results, were: government and opposition parties, management and workers, and different ethnic and income groups. Figure 4.8. Perceived tensions between certain social groups. On the other hand, the top three groups with the least or no tension between them were men and women, followed by religious groups and elderly and young people (see Figure 4.8). 6 5 4 3 2 Extreme tension or or a lot A lot of of tension 1 Some Tension Poor and rich people Management and workers Men and women Old people and young people Different ethnic groups Different religious groups Government and opposition Almost no no tension or No or No Tension tension at at all all 20
Perceptions on Organized Crime 5 Table 4.3. Opinions on does organized crime exist in Kosovo by ethnicity Ethnicity K-Albanian K-Serb Other Total Yes 75.2% 81.3% 67.3% 74.9% No 13. 11.7% 11.8% 12.6% Don t know 10.7% 2.2% 14.5% 9.8% No Answer 1.1% 4.8% 6.4% 2.7% Total 100. 100. 100. 100. When K-Albanians, K-Serbs, and K-Others (K- RAE, Bosniaks and Turks) were asked about organized crime structures and/or activities, the majority of all ethnic groups answered that they believed organized crime exists in Kosovo. Looking at the K-Serb ethnicities more closely, 81% of the surveyed K-Serbs perceived its existence in Kosovo. K-Albanians followed with 75% and K-Other ethnic groups with 67%. Approximately 11% of the K-Albanian respondents reported that organized crime does not exist in Kosovo. Similar to K-Albanians, 14% of other ethnic groups were also unsure. It must be noted that only around 2% of the K-Serbs polled perceived that organized crime does not exist, in contrast to the other groups. Keeping in mind that only 12% to 13% of all Kosovan respondents denied the existence of organized crime in Kosovo, the overall perception strikes a serious tone and should not be ignored. Table 4.4 opinion how do people know on the existence of organized crime by ethnicity. If yes, where do you base your opinion? Ethnicity K-Albanian K-Serb Other Total Personal experience 1.6% 8.3% 4.1% 3.2% Social environment (Neighbours, Friends, Family members) Information through media Working Environment (Police Officer, Prosecutor, Judge) 13.3% 26.1% 24.5% 17.5% 57.7% 41.7% 30. 50.1% 1.9% 3. 6.8% 3. Other.5%.1% Don't know.9%.5%.2% No Answer 25.5% 20. 33.6% 25.9% When respondents were questioned about the source of their perception, the media seemed to play a crucial role, with half of all respondents responding they received their information through media channels. Within the K-Albanian group, almost 6 based their answers to the existence of organized crime on the media (42% of K-Serbs and 3 K-Others did so as well). Only 1.6% of K-Albanians experienced organized crime activities in their daily life which indicates a certain gap between reality and people s perception in the data, but nevertheless has to be taken into consideration. The fact differs significantly with K-Serbs and other Kosovan ethnicities as 8.3% of K-Serbs and 4.1% of K-Other ethnicities answered that they had dealt with organized crime structures or/and activities on a personal basis. Opinions stemming from the working environment were relevant only among 6.8% of other ethnic groups respondents. There is no significant difference between male and female respondents among all ethnic groups. Even though the perception of organized crime in 2012 was mainly related to media announcements, the latest Public Pulse Poll results show that organized crime remains a large concern, but not one of the main problems which all Kosovans are confronted with. In examining the perceptions of Kosovans on the paramount problems facing Kosovo (see figure 2.4), organized crime in June 2011 seemed to be priority for K-Serbs polled (9.7%), while only 1% of interviewed K-Albanians (and less than 1% of K-Others) ranked organized crime as a major problem. It must be noted, however, that this perception coincided with the timeperiod starting in June 2011 of dominant media headlines on KFOR/EULEX activities in combating organized crime (e.g. smuggling of illegal goods for avoiding payment of import taxes and removing barricades from roads in the North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica) which may have raised such concerns. In April 2012, perception regarding organized crime as one of the main problems facing Kosovo lost its relevance among K-Serbs. In this regard, we note a 5.4 percentage point fall among K-Serbs respondents who, during the tensioned situation in northern of Mitrovica, evaluated organized crime at only 4.3%. Total 100. 100. 100. 100. 5 The Perceptions on Organized Crime were analyzed by Mr. Denis Nushi HDR Project Manager 21
Chapter 5 Attitudes toward Voting From 2000 to 2008, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) supported and helped organize all elections held in Kosovo. Since 2008, local electoral institutions have been carrying out executive functions in this respect, with the OSCE retaining a non-executive advisory role. The December 2010 elections were the first entirely organized by the Central Elections Commission. According to the Report on the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections, even though the Commission had a relatively short period of time to organize the electoral process, it showed a high level of competency in preparing for the elections. 6 However, public perception has a different take: only 17% of Kosovans agreed that elections in Kosovo are democratic and in accordance with international standards. It must be noted that the discrepancy between the Commission s report previously cited and public perception may have been due to a time-lag: the report was issued on the first elections held in December 2010, while polling data may have referred to overall elections over the years or the latest ones held. (see figure 1.4). This might also be one of the reasons for the recent decrease in Kosovans readiness to vote. According to the Public Pulse findings, only 3 of Kosovans in April 2012 declared that they would vote in elections, while in June 2011, as well as November 2010, roughly 45% the Kosovans stated that they would do so. Similarly the April 2012 findings show an increase of those with no political preference has increased to 25%, as compared to 15.5% in June 2011. Furthermore, the findings mark a significant increase (by ten percentage points) in those who stated that they will not vote (28%), as compared to 18% in June 2011. Figure 5.1. Voting Attitudes Regarding Upcoming Elections 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 A higher readiness to vote is noticed among eighteen to nineteen year olds who, in the case of elections, would be first-time voters, with 38.5% of them declaring that they would vote as compared to 3 of older respondents. Findings also show that majority of those with no current political preference belong to the younger generation (18-19 years of age). Figure 5.2 Voting Attitudes- Age Disaggregated Data 45% 4 35% 3 25% 2 15% 1 5% 44.7 20.7 17.7 30.4% 28.1% 25.2% 17.9 21.3 15.5 16.3% 45.3 23.4% 22.8 23.3 14.9 30. 38.5% 8.1% Overall Kosovo Voting for the first time (18-19 years of age) 39 30.4 28.1 25.2 16.3 Nov - 10 Jun - 11 Nov - 11 Apr - 12 Currently i do not have any political preference Will not vote Will vote No answer 6 Report on the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections 2010 http://www.demokracianeveprim.org/publikime/raporti%20 i%20zgjedhjeve%20parlamentare%202010_final_shq%20(9).pdf 22