Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Updated Project Information Document () Report No: AB403 Project Name BURUNDI - Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program Region Africa Regional Office Sector Other social services (95%); Health (5%) Theme Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction (P); Social risk reduction (P); Public expenditure, financial management and procurement (P); Other communicable diseases (S); Gender (S) Project P081964 Borrower(s) GOVERNMENT OF BURUNDI Implementing Agency(ies) NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR DEMOBILIZATION, REINSERTION & REINTE Secrétariat Exécutif du Programme National de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion Address: Quartier Kiriri, Avenue Inkondo, B.P. 1932 Bujumbura, Burundi Contact Person: Libérat Ntunzwenimana Tel: 257 24 3231 Fax: 257 24 3231 Email: <beap@cbinf.com> Environment Category B (Partial Assessment) Date Prepared January 23, 2004 Auth Appr/Negs Date December 1, 2003 Bank Approval Date March 18, 2004 1. Country and Sector Background This is the updated, which is dated January 24, 2004. Burundi has repeatedly been beset by episodes of political violence since its independence in 1962. The current conflict erupted in 1993, following the assassination of the democratically elected president Ndadaye, which was followed by large scale communal violence in which at least 150,000 persons were killed. His successor, President Ntaryamira was killed in Kigali in April 1994 when the plane in which he was traveling with President Habyarimana of Rwanda was shot down. His death, and the subsequent genocide in Rwanda, further exacerbated ethnic tensions in Burundi. In July 1994, a convention government under the leadership of President Ntibantuganya was formed following negotiations mediated by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). However, this government was unable to restore security and stabilize the political situation. In 1996, a military coup brought Major Pierre Buyoya back to power. In response, regional leaders imposed sanctions until January1999, when the sanctions were lifted, and the international community took a more active role in seeking a negotiated and peaceful resolution of the conflict. Negotiations, which were first facilitated by the late president Nyerere of Tanzania and then by former president Mandela of South Africa, culminated in the signature of the Arusha Peace Accord by 19 Burundian delegations in August 2000. The Arusha Accord includes provisions for the responsibilities of state institutions (including the security forces), judicial reform, and reconciliation measures. A transitional constitution was adopted and a
2 transitional Government assumed power in November 2001. However, two armed movements, the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie Forces pour la Défense de la Democratie (CNDD FDD) and the Forces Nationales pour la Libération (FNL) PALIPEHUTU refused to sign the Arusha Accord. They subsequently continued to impede peace consolidation efforts and to destabilize Burundi. They also split into sub-factions, further complicating negotiations to end the violence. In early October 2002, the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) signed a cease-fire with two smaller factions of the CNDD-FDD and FNL-PALIPEHUTU led by Jean-Bosco Ndaykegurukiye and Alain Mugabarabona respectively. On December 3, 2002, the TGoB signed a cease-fire was signed with the larger CNDD-FDD faction led by Pierre Nkurunziza. However, in the absence of a robust framework, implementation of these agreements remained uneven. Large scale insecurity persisted until November 16, 2003, when the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) signed a comprehensive cease-fire agreement in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. At this time, only the FNL-PALIPEHUTU faction led by Agathon Rwasa has refused to sign a cease-fire agreement. However, a recent meeting between President Ndayizeye and the leadership of the FNL-PALIPEHUTU has improved prospects for the initiation of a negotiation process. The governments of South Africa and Tanzania, the AU and the UN have played an important mediation role throughout, and they will continue to encourage the peace consolidation process. The African Union (AU) has completed the deployment of its first peacekeeping operation, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), in support of this process. The Governments of South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique have fielded an estimated 2,650 military personnel in support of the AMIB. A Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) under the chairmanship of the UN, has been established and is providing a forum for parties to guide the military integration and demobilization processes. The JCC will also verify and observe the implementation of the process. It should be noted that the Burundian conflict has a regional dimension. The armed movements have sought sanctuary in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania. In response, the Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB) have repeatedly launched military operations against the armed movements based in the DRC. In recent bilateral discussions, Burundi agreed to withdraw its forces from the DRC while the Congolese government pledged to discontinue support to the Burundian armed movements. In addition, members of Rwandese armed groups, mostly based in the DRC, have at times entered Burundian territory.
3 B. Economic and social impact of the conflict The conflict has left Burundi with a challenging legacy. Since 1993, more than 250,000 Burundians have been killed, and over 1.2 million have fled the country or been internally displaced. Military expenditures have been high, crowding out social spending--they ranged between 5.6% and 6.1% of GDP in the years 1998-2001. Expenditures linked to Burundi s civil war continue to represent a significant drain on the national budget and compromise the Government s ability to implement its poverty reduction strategy. The conflict has also fuelled mismanagement and the loss of technical and managerial capacity, with the result that economic activity outside subsistence agriculture is weak. The economy today is highly dependent on imports, and vulnerable to terms-of-trade shocks. As a result, all key social indicators are very poor: on the 2001 HDI, Burundi is ranked in position 171out of 173 countries; life expectancy and school enrolment rates are low; and infant mortality rates have returned to the levels of 1960. Rural food security has been precarious, with crops frequently raided or destroyed, and input delivery systems have collapsed. Public health is poor as preventative measures (immunization, and anti-malarial spraying) and key infrastructure have been destroyed or neglected; and qualified health care providers have left their posts. The education system is in great difficulty, with a loss of teachers and a lack of financing. Peace and stability will be required to begin to overcome this challenging legacy. The impact of the conflict has been exacerbated by Burundi s historical reliance on official development assistance (ODA). Before 1993, ODA provided nearly twice as much foreign exchange as exports and represented more than 20% of Government revenue. ODA fell rapidly after the coup of 1996, and the resumption of large-scale ODA has been hampered by continued insecurity. C. Government and International Response and Strategy Since assuming power in November 2000, the Transitional Government has encouraged the CNDD-FDD and FNL-PALIPEHUTU to cease hostilities and engage in the Arusha process. Government has also taken discrete preparatory measures in anticipation of a possible Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP). In early 2000, Government established a small team to prepare a future Burundi Ex-Combatants Assistance Program (BEAP). With the assistance of a World Bank Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) grant, this team undertook study trips to observe several demobilization and reintegration programs and commissioned several background studies. The Government has asked the World Bank to lead efforts to help it design the national Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program (DRRP) and provide financial assistance, within the framework of the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). The Government s efforts are being supported by an MDRP multi-partner effort.
4 D. Bank Response and Strategy Transitional Support Strategy (TSS): In view of the fluidity of the situation in Burundi, Bank assistance has been provided within the framework of a TSS. The TSS, which was discussed by the Bank s Board in March 2002, reflects the Government of Burundi s determination to consolidate the peace process, in particular by (i) resettling and reintegrating displaced populations, (ii) improving welfare and living conditions, and (iii) implementing socio-economic reforms to enhance economic recovery and lay the foundation for sustained growth and poverty reduction. The proposed grant is an integral part of the TSS. An Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) and a Joint Staff Assessment were presented to the Board of the Bank on January 23, 2003. Restructuring of existing credits. The current IDA portfolio consists of six projects with satisfactory performance. Among these, the Burundi Social Action Program (BURSAP), the Public Works and Employment Creation Project (PWEC) and the HIV/AIDS Multi-Sector AIDS Program are the most compatible with the BEAP. In particular, the experience gained under the BURSAP has helped to inform the design of community-based reintegration assistance for ex-combatants. The PWEC would provide a framework for possible urban and rural non-agricultural reintegration activities, in particular a source of income for ex-combatants. The DRRP would also cooperate closely with the National AIDS Program, which is being supported by a Multi-Sector HIV/AIDS Project. 2. Objectives The overall goal of the DRRP would be to help consolidate peace in Burundi and the Great Lakes region. The principal objectives of the Program would be to: (i) demobilize 55,000 ex-combatants of the FAB soldiers, combatants of armed political parties and movements, and soldiers of the newly established National Defense Force (NDF) and provide targeted support to facilitate their return to civilian life; (ii) contribute to the reallocation of Government expenditure from military to social and economic sectors, as the reduction in force would lead to a reduction in the military wage bill. The DRRP is expected to have a significant impact on reducing poverty in Burundi by: (i) helping ex-combatants to re-establish civilian livelihoods, thereby contributing to more secure conditions in the rural areas and encouraging internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returning refugees to resume productive lives in the rural economy; (ii) freeing up additional national resources for investment in social and economic sectors; and (iii) investing in the human capital of ex-combatants.
5 3. Rationale for Bank's Involvement Need for Emergency Assistance: The TGOB s request for technical and financial assistance for the DRRP has come at a critical time in the consolidation of the Burundian peace process. The application of the Bank s emergency procedures under OP 8.50 is justified on the basis of the following criteria: (i) the program s impact on economic priorities and investment programs; (ii) its critical contribution to the stabilization of the society and economy, both in Burundi and in the greater Great Lakes region, and (iii) the urgency to demobilize and provide reintegration assistance to Burundian ex-combatants. Transitional Support Strategy (TSS): As cornerstones of its poverty reduction strategy, the Government of Burundi emphasizes the need to consolidate the peace process and support the resettlement and reintegration of war-affected populations. The DRRP reflects the TGOB s determination to secure the transition to peace by demobilizing and supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants. Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP): The Bank administers the Trust Fund and the Secretariat of the MDRP, which is the international community s framework to coordinate and finance demobilization and reintegration efforts in the Great Lakes Region. In this context, the Bank has a key role to play in ensuring that MDRP principles and norms are upheld in the DRRP with a view to facilitating financing through the regional trust fund. 4. Description The DRRP is tentatively estimated to cost US$ 78.8 million, of which IDA would finance US$ 33 million with grant resources. It would consist of five components: (i) demobilization; (ii) reinsertion; (iii) reintegration; and (iv) special groups. Guiding principles. The Government has adopted the following guiding principles for the BEAP: (i) in the interest of national reconciliation, all verified ex-combatants would receive support under the Program, irrespective of previous military affiliation; (ii) the DRRP would allow ex-combatants to choose their community of settlement and their path to economic reintegration; (iii) to ensure consistency and fairness, all assistance to ex-combatants would be provided through the national DRRP developed and coordinated by the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR); (iv) reintegration assistance would seek to maximize community participation; (v) reintegration assistance would seek to maximize linkages with rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance for other war-affected populations; (vi) for Program implementation, the NCDRR would seek to rely on existing Government structures with a view build sustainable capacities beyond the Program s duration; and (vii) pension and social security issues for ex-fab would be addressed outside the DRRP, in accordance with the respective contractual terms and conditions of service.
6 Demobilization 21. To the extent possible, demobilization procedures for FAB soldiers and members of armed movements would be similar. The demobilization of child ex-combatants would be managed as a separate process. The following demobilization activities would be envisaged: (a) the establishment of Demobilization Centers; (b) transport of ex-combatants to demobilization centers; (c) verification of ex-combatant status, (d) provision of an DRRP identity card, (e) collection of socio-economic data, (f) medical screening (including HIV/AIDS counseling and voluntary testing), (g) pre-demobilization orientation about civilian life and program benefits; (h) distribution of transport allowance and Transitional Safety Net (TSN), and (i) facilitation of transport to preferred area of return. Disarmament would be undertaken in close coordination with, but outside of the IDA and MDRP financing framework, of the Program. The disarmament of FAB and NDF soldiers would be undertaken by the Ministry of Defense prior to their transport to the demobilization centers. The AMIB would have the responsibility of disarming members of armed movements in Burundi. HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation measures are also included as a cross-cutting issue. The final program document would be informed by the outcome of ongoing peace negotiations. Armed Movements have been consulted and implicated in the finalization of a Joint Operations Plan (JOP) that outlines the above processes in some detail. Reinsertion The DRRP would provide a transitional safety net allowance (TSA) to all ex-combatants demobilized under the Program over a period of 18 months following demobilization. The TSA is intended to cover the basic needs of an ex-combatant household (e.g., rent of accommodation; medical care; food; children s education; and basic household items). It would be calculated on the basis of current FAB salary levels and will be differentiated by rank. The Program will provide counseling on the use of the reinsertion assistance prior to demobilization and after arrival in the community of settlement. Reintegration Building on experiences with such programs in Burundi and elsewhere, as well as on lessons learned to date from community-based development projects in the country, the DRRP would provide economic and social reintegration assistance to help ex-combatants establish sustainable livelihoods. Several guiding principles would apply for reintegration assistance: (i) it would seek to minimize market distortions and maximize beneficiary choice; (ii) it would seek to facilitate the participation of communities of settlement and foster reconciliation wherever feasible; and (iii) to the extent possible, assistance would be provided in such a way that it is beneficial to the wider community. Economic reintegration. Ex-combatants would be given the opportunity to choose the reintegration option that best meets their needs. Implementing partners may be contracted to provide reintegration services to ex-combatants in the following areas: (i) small scale agriculture
7 micro-projects; (ii) skills development and training opportunities; and (iii) support for short-term employment opportunities linked to on-going community works activities, and (iv) social assistance for conflict resolution, counseling and reconciliation. All ex-combatants would be equally eligible irrespective of rank or former military affiliation. Ex-combatants would be allowed to choose their reintegration destination freely. It is expected that the majority of ex-combatants would settle in rural areas. Rural ex-combatants access to land would be facilitated with the standard community-based procedures used for all Burundian citizens who need land. Government has confirmed that there would be no involuntary displacement of civilians. The social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants will take place in the context of the return of over one million displaced civilians. The TGoB has several emergency rehabilitation programs to support such processes and also expects to support some reintegration efforts for ex-combatants through this broader program. The DRRP will include mechanisms to help ex-combatants access broader recovery efforts. In particular, the NCDRR would recruit counselors into its provincial offices to provide ongoing information, counseling and referral (ICR) services to ex-combatants, including outreach activities intended to facilitating social reintegration. HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation measures will be included as a cross-cutting issue. Social reintegration. The objectives of social reintegration assistance would be to foster reconciliation among ex-combatants of different sides as well as between ex-combatants and civilians in communities of settlement, and to strengthen social cohesion in these communities. Social reintegration is especially difficult in Burundi due to long-term population displacement, the legacy of the war and continued fear of insecurity. The need for reconciliation and community involvement in the DRRP is therefore considered critical for successful reintegration. Specific activities to be carried out under this component would include: (i) information and sensitization of ex-combatants, communities and society-at-large through outreach services, including training of counselors; (ii) specialized counseling; and (iii) public awareness and sensitization campaigns. The program will seek to develop these activities in a participatory manner and to build upon the capacities of established civil society partners. Special target groups Gender. While it seems unlikely that a large number of female ex-combatants would be demobilized in the DRRP, Program would provide targeted support female ex-combatants, both during the demobilization and reintegration stages. Disabled ex-combatants Limited medical and economic assistance has so far been afforded to disabled soldiers of the FAB. However, they have not yet been demobilized due to the ongoing conflict and lack of reintegration options. The DRRP would seek to address the medical and economic rehabilitation needs of all disabled ex-combatants by reinforcing relevant medical facilities and services and providing additional social and economic reintegration assistance for
8 disabled ex-combatants. Child ex-combatants. A significant number of children is currently assumed to be among the armed movements. They would represent an important target group for the second stage of the DRRP. Special assistance may involve short and medium-term activities such as the separation of children from adults in the demobilization process, family tracing and unification, trauma counseling and psycho-social care, and facilitation of access to education and recreation. Community-based reintegration options for children would be emphasized. UNICEF is beginning to address the needs of this target group through a special project supported by the MDRP regional trust fund. The special project learnings and capabilities would be integrated into the DRRP. Estimated Program costs The Government s Program is estimated to cost US$78.8 million, of which IDA would finance US$33 million with grant resources. The remainder would be financed through the regional Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) of the MDRP as well as through bilateral contributions within the overall MDRP framework (see table 1). Government counterpart contribution. Because of the TGOB s very tight fiscal position, no counterpart contribution would be expected from TGOB in order to avoid unnecessary implementation delays for this critical program. However, the Government would finance all taxes levied in Burundi on works, goods and services for this Program. Table 1: Burundi Ex-Combatants Assistance Program Financing Plan Source Million US$ Percent IDA 33.0 42 Others (MDRP MDTF, bilateral donors and UN agencies; to be determined) 45.84 58 Total 78.8 100 ESTIMATED FINANCING: 5. Financing Source (Total ( US$m)) BORROWER/RECIPIENT ($3.00) IDA ($33.00) BILATERAL AGENCIES (UNIDENTIFIED) ($42.84) Total Project Cost: $78.84
9 6. Implementation Institutional structures. The program would be implemented at national, provincial and community levels. The guiding principle for the Program s institutional arrangements is the streamlining of implementation responsibilities and activities into existing government and community structures. The Government would draw on the following institutional structures to implement stage II of the DRRP: the Burundi Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NCDRR); the Executive Secretariat (ES) of the NCDRR, provincial administration; and local administration. The Burundi Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. The NCDRR would: (i) formulate and review policy; (ii) identify and resolve policy problems related to the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life; and (iii) monitor and guide the work of the Executive Secretariat and other institutions involved in Program implementation. Executive Secretariat (ES). The ES would be the Program s implementation unit which would be dissolved upon termination of the Program. The ES would be charged with operationalizing the NCDRR s policy instructions, including (i) preparation and costing the Program proposal and annual implementation plans, (ii) the implementation of the individual DRRP components; (iii) contracting impelementing partners, (iv) the coordination of reintegration assistance, (v) the transparent and accountable administration of Program resources; and (vi) monitoring and evaluation. TheES would also contract qualified implementing partners to provide reintegration services to ex-combatants in the following areas: (i) small scale agriculture micro-projects; (ii) skills development and training opportunities; and (iii) support for short-term employment opportunities linked to on-going community works activities, and (iv) social assistance for conflict resolution, counseling and reconciliation. The ES would cooperate closely with the AMIB (and any potential UN mission), the JCC, other Government departments, local organizations and associations, the private sector, and donor and UN partners. Government actors. Other Government agencies would be implicated by the NCDRR as required. For example, the Commission National pour la Réinsertion des Sinistrés (CNRS) may play a significant role in social reintegration activities. The Ministry of Defense would play a key role in determining the rate of demobilization and the identification of soldiers to be demobilized. The Ministry of Public Works would likely play an important role in the implementation of labor-intensive public works activities. The Ministry of Good Governance would have an important role in monitoring the appropriate utilization of Project resources. Partner coordination would be led by the NCDRR at policy level, and the ES at technical level. Within the MDRP framework, the ES would co-chair the DDR Coordination Committee established in Bujumbura with the World Bank.
10 7. Sustainability The DRRP is designed to aid the sustainable social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. In this regard, it would make a positive contribution to the socio-economic status of ex-combatants, their families and their communities of settlement. The Program would also foster micro-economic recovery by transforming ex-combatants into positive economic actors and injecting financial resources at the local level. Furthermore, the Program would encourage national reconciliation. Although the NCDRR itself is a temporary structure, the Program would strengthen Government capacities at the provincial level for developing, managing and monitoring development interventions. 8. Lessons learned from past operations in the country/sector IDA has gained substantial experience from a number of demobilization and reintegration programs it has supported in Africa and elsewhere. Such assistance has often taken the form of technical and/or financial support through investment credits, budget support programs or through reallocations from ongoing projects. Based on information from these operations, a review of relevant experiences in selected African countries, and the Bank s Operations Evaluation Department s evaluations, the following best practices were identified and integrated in Program design. Demobilization. This phase is short but logistically complex. The successful implementation of demobilization activities is a precondition for the subsequent provision of targeted reinsertion and reintegration assistance. Key demobilization activities include the distribution of non-transferable ID cards, the collection of socio-economic data and the establishment of a database on the beneficiary population. Furthermore, the assembly of ex-combatants during the demobilization phase provides a good opportunity for HIV/AIDS voluntary counseling and testing (VCT), as well as the dissemination of information about program benefits and civilian life. Reinsertion. Upon demobilization, the ex-combatants lose their source of (formal or informal) income. Experience suggests that they are usually in a vulnerable financial position until they can begin to generate income. During this period (the reinsertion phase), ex-combatants require a transitional safety net to cover their families basic material needs. The objective of this transitional assistance would be to enable the ex-combatants to return to their community and to sustain themselves and their families for a limited period following demobilization. Economic reintegration. Ex-combatants are often an economically vulnerable group as they lack marketable skills, material assets and social networks. In addition, they are often a high-risk group from a security perspective due to their familiarity with weapons and violence. Where this is the case, targeted support is advisable to help them establish sustainable livelihoods. In order to be useful and cost-effective, such assistance should be tailored to their socio-economic profile and adjusted to the economic environment. Female ex-combatants often require specialized support to re-establish sustainable livelihoods. In general, ex-combatants should receive no more support than is necessary to help them attain the general standard of living of the communities into which they reintegrate. Furthermore, reintegration assistance should be limited in time to avoid the creation of a dependency syndrome.
11 Information, counseling and referral services can assist ex-combatants to assess their livelihood options and find employment. Apprenticeships in the informal sector combine the benefits of vocational training and employment and are thus preferable to training only. Micro-projects can help ex-combatants secure their economic independence and self-employment. They are, however, also complex interventions that require significant administrative capacity and a stable environment. Ultimately, ex-combatants resettle into a broader economic environment. The creation of viable long-term employment opportunities for ex-combatants is closely linked to private sector growth and employment generation. It should be noted that ex-combatants themselves could provide a significant human resource contribution to the economy. Social reintegration. Social reintegration is often facilitated by the support of an extended family network. Therefore, ex-combatants should be encouraged to reintegrate in the vicinity of their extended families or to consider the social and financial consequence of moving elsewhere. Informal networks of ex-combatants can be important elements to successful economic and social reintegration. Child ex-combatants should be reunified with their families as rapidly as possible wherever possible, and assisted to resume their education or enter into gainful enterprise. Disabled ex-combatants commonly require specialized medical and assistance in overcoming the constraints of the disability. Care should be taken to prevent the stigmatization of ex-combatants as unfit for military service or as conveyers of disease and violence. Community sensitization and information efforts are paramount in this regard. The fears of communities related to the return of ex-combatants should also be addressed. Institutional issues. Program coordination by a single civilian agency with overall program responsibility, balanced by decentralization of implementation to regions and communities makes for a powerful institutional arrangement. Where possible, existing implementation capacities should be leveraged. The employment of ex-combatants as counselors and field staff can facilitate reintegration. In peacekeeping environments, such as in Burundi, close operational linkages between the national implementation body and the peacekeeping force are essential. 9. Environment Aspects (including any public consultation) Issues : N/A 10. List of factual technical documents: Technical Annex Joint Operations Plan
12 11. Contact Point: Task Manager Ingo Wiederhofer The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington D.C. 20433 Telephone: 202 473-5009 Fax: 202 473-8185 12. For information on other project related documents contact: The InfoShop The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: (202) 458-5454 Fax: (202) 522-1500 Web: http:// www.worldbank.org/infoshop Note: This is information on an evolving project. Certain components may not be necessarily included in the final project.