THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES Zümrüt Sönmez March 2017 Research 35 The civil war in Syria that began subsequently in the wake of an anti-government uprising in March 2011, led more than half of the country s population to flee their homes. United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) has registered over 4.8 million Syrians as refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey (UNHCR, December 2016). While another data suggests that an estimated 5.6 million left the country between 2011 and November 2015 (De Bel-Air, 2016), along with 7.6 million Syrians who have been internally displaced in Syrian territory which marks the highest number in the world (UNHCR, December 2016). Fleeing from the conflict in their country, the first group of Syrian refugees that were estimated to be as much as 5000, crossed into Lebanon using an unofficial border crossing in April, 2011. From then on, the flow of Syrians continued unremittingly with their numbers fluctuating, depending on the intensity of the situation in Syria (syrianrefugees.eu, 2016). Throughout this paper, I will be exploring the influence and efficiency of social networks in the movement of Syrians fleeing from the war to neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Additionally, I am going to examine the role of social networks in the situation of the refugees in the later periods of the migratory movement of Syrians. Firstly, I will review the key arguments around the social network theory in the migration related literature. The crux of my paper is the multifaceted impact of social networks on the decision of Syrian refugees and their lives in the countries of destination. Therefore, the impacts of social networks on the country of residence, which in this case is Syria, are left out. Secondly, I will be giving a historical context of the importance of social networks and the existence of Syrian migrants in related countries. I will try to elaborate the case of the recent flow of Syrians in the light of literature and other available sources. Lastly, I will argue that although social networks are helpful in the early stages 1

of the movement, they are not sustainable and are even subjected to collapse in the case of forced migration. Social Network Theory Instead of push and pull factors in sending and receiving countries, the social network theory approach emphasises on the linkages between people in these countries which encourage the migratory behaviour. One of these linkages is presented as social networks that link migrants and non-migrants across time and space. This approach allows us to see migration from much a broader perspective involving the social and economic parameters in both receiving and sending countries and also the reasons that make individuals consider the decision to move. In addition, it conceptualises migration as a contingency that is conditioned by historically generated social, political and economic structures of both societies (Boyd, 1989, p.641). Social networks come into existence following an initial migration movement from one country to another. These pioneers become mediators of later movements of families or friends to the same destination, providing information about the hosting society, or assistance with housing and employment. Their help plays a significant role in reducing the costs and risks of beginning a new life in a foreign country (Koser, 2007, p.36; Meeteren and Pereira, 2013, p.4). These networks include interpersonal ties connecting relatives, friends and community members in their places of origin and destination (Poros, 2011). Migrants tend to choose moving to countries where they have social connections creating transnational migration networks. These networks are also argued to be one of the reasons behind the increase in international migration as more people today have family or friends living abroad than ever before due to globalisation and the development of communications technology (Koser, 2007, pp.36-37). Social networks can affect the migratory behaviour in two ways. First, they provide a context within which a decision to migrate is made by encouraging the individual to follow up the example of a family member involved in the initial migration movement. Second, networks help individuals in their movement by providing information, and assistance in housing and finance (Boyd, 1989, p.639) As a result, social ties allow migration to continue and persist over time by creating migration chains that follow one another. By the contribution of each additional migrant or group of migrants, these networks are strengthened and extended, and potential migrants can benefit from their already established communities in their destination country (Boyd, 1989, p.641; Haug, 2008, p.588). There are other social connections available for migrants. Institutions such as universities, diaspora organizations, government and non-governmental organizations, private employment agencies, corporations, religious and cultural organizations may provide assistance for movement, attaining employment, or integrating into society in the receiving country (Poros, 2011). Such connections fall in Granovetter s (1973) description of weak ties, which in some cases may be more effective than familial relations. Strong ties can be described as interpersonal relations, which are generated through an amount of time, or emotional closeness as in family or friendship. On the other hand, individuals can be tied up to one another indirectly, by being added to different circles of connections through more direct relations. This may also happen through one person who bridges one group of friends with another. However, the strength of a person s relationship with people in one circle varies, this approach provides another dimension to the social networks theory. Giving the example of professionals in Boston who changed their jobs, he argues that weak ties can be more beneficial to help us reach networks that are different from the ones around us, which also enable us to reach different information that we cannot find out through our usual network about job opportunities (Granovetter, 1973). Social networks are seen as closely related to the social capital. As Putnam (1995, p.664-665) puts, social capital refers to social connections, the attendant norms and trust, which bring a group of people together. By bridging people, these features can create an enhanced cooperation that benefits both the individual, and the wider community. Ager and Strang (2008, p.180-181) present social connections as one of the core domains of integration. Success of an integration process is heavily based on the mobilization of social capital, which involves social bonds that exist among a refugee community and social links, 2

which may be formed between refugees and the local community. According to Ager and Strang, another core domain of integration is employment, which is also closely related to social networks. Connections also enable refugees to share their cultural practices and maintain familial relations. Besides, finding networks or communities alike around them, it is beneficial for their health by reducing the risk of depression, as it makes refugees feel more settled (p.178). On the other hand, the nature of migration networks differs in accordance with the migration history of the area, national conditions, and socio-cultural character of the migrants (Koser, 2007, p.37; Meeteren and Pereira, 2013). Nonetheless, these networks are generally considered to be sustainable as they continue to operate independently from economic conditions in their country of destination. Their sustainability stems from the difficulty for policy to disrupt the momentum of networks (Koser, 2007, p.37). However, as Krissman (2005) suggests, network theory remains inadequate to explain the characteristics of international migration flows by leaving out some other actors such as employers, labour smugglers, and their myriad assistants. It also does not focus enough on the situation of the sending country and the migrants coming from them (Krissman, 2005, p.5). This argument is especially valid when forced migration is concerned. Moreover, the centrality of social networks is argued given the increased accessibility of the Internet and other communications technology. Thus, would-be migrants are now much less dependent on former migrants than ever before to reach information about the countries of destination. They are also highly likely to be more aware of other agents and able to generate different strategies with the help of new technologies (Meeteren and Pereira, 2013, p.4). However, the question of to what extent social networks influence the migratory behaviour is an intriguing and interesting question to explore- yet will not be covered within this paper. The role of social networks in migration and integration is a well-researched area. However, the social network theory is mostly applied to economic/labour migration, whereas other types of migration movements such as forced migration and refugee movements are neglected (Meeteren and Pereira, 2013). Thus there are not enough resources in this particular area and the literature on the experience of Syrian refugees does not emphasise much on social networks. Thus, the following section will combine and evaluate the information related to the subject matter, which has been provided by the literature so far. Social Networks of Syrian Refugees Social networks in Syria s pre-war society were described as being heavily based on overlapping intersected identities including religion, ethnicity, and region of origin, family and class. These networks have historically provided protection and solidarity among the society in times of crises (Stevens, 2016, p.51). Group networks have also played an active role in the emergence and the unfolding of the uprising. Sectarian, religious or ethnic groups responded differently to the conflict in their country, reflecting their political position during the pre-war era (Hokayem, 2013, pp.41-49). Nevertheless, these networks continue to exist, they are given a new context in diaspora as relations are reconfigured with new actors and circumstances evolve, shifting the importance of identities as once represented in Syrian society (Stevens, 2016, p.51). The data available on the pattern of the movement of Syrian refugees shows that Syrians initially migrated to the countries that share borders with their home country (UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, 2016). This fact can be explained based on the geographical proximity, as most refugees choose to move to the locations that are close to their region of residence hoping to return once the conflict ended. This also explains the intensity of refugee populations in the border areas of the host countries. They considered the advantages of being nearby to their original locations as they could commute between the borders to visit their relatives or manage their assets (De Bel-Air, 2016). However, available researches on the characteristics of the movement of Syrian refugees also refer to the role of social networks and familial ties in making the decision for the country of destination (De Bel-Air, 2016; Chatty, 2016, Orhan, 2014, Stevens 2016). The countries where Syrians choose to migrate demonstrate that social networks were effective in their decision of where to move. Not only in Research 35 3

neighbouring countries, but transnational relations also contributed to the experience of Syrians who migrated to Europe or Western countries. For example, some of the Syrians who went to South Africa joined their family members of the Syrian-Lebanese diaspora while migrants from Syria s ethnic minority groups such as the Armenians and Tcherkess followed the path of their ancestors in Caucasian countries (De Bel-Air 2016, p.3). Additionally, thousands of Armenians from Syria migrated to Armenia (BBC, 2015) and Kurds took refuge in Northern Iraq, a region that is populated by Kurdish people and run by a regional government (Washington Post, 2013). Besides, Gulf States which have been attracting highly-skilled professionals from Syria since the beginning of the conflict, also say they paved the way for family reunion (De Bel-Air, 2016, p.3). UN estimates that more than 70 per cent of Syrian refugees who crossed international borders have settled in cities, towns and villages where they have longestablished social networks (Chatty, 2016). Studies suggest that social agencies such as familial networks, kinship or friendship played a constructive role in the initial steps of their movement to neighbouring countries (Chatty, 2015; Orhan, 2014;De Bel-Air, 2016; Stevens, 2016). Cross-border mobility, intermarriages, business relations that existed before were helpful in finding accommodation or financial assistance for refugees (De Bel-Air, 2016; Radio Liberty, 2015). Syria s three neighbouring countries Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, which host the bulk of Syrian refugees (UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, 2016), will exemplify the role of historical links and relations in the migratory behaviour of Syrians. For example, until 2005, there was an open border policy between Lebanon and Syria, so people could cross the border enjoying a visa-free regime. Therefore, there were already half a million Syrians working in construction and the agricultural sector in Lebanon before 2010, whose families joined them after the war broke out in Syria in 2011.Whereas in Jordan, most of the Syrian refugees are coming from southern Syria, where the two countries shared a border. Syrian and Jordanian societies have strong connections such as kinship and tribal ties (Research Turkey, 2015). It is also important to state here that common language and ethnicity should also be referred as agencies that can be linked to the social networks. As described by Ager and Strang (2008), speaking the common language and sharing the same ethnic backgrounds with the majority or a local community with a large number of population, can act as facilitators in generating new networks or building social cohesion. However, the prolonged situation of Syrian refugees put various challenges ahead of social networks. Most of the refugees in Jordan and Lebanon live in poverty, being unable to legally join in the labour markets. Furthermore, government policies exacerbate the situation. The Lebanese government requires Syrians not to engage with the labour market or to find Lebanese sponsors in order to be able to stay in the country. This leads to the exploitation of refugees as cheap or unpaid labour. On the other hand, the Jordanian government increases restrictions towards Syrians who are living among local communities, which seems to be aimed at forcing refugees either to live in camps or leave the country (Economist, 2015; Research Turkey, 2015; Chatty, 2016) Moreover, social networks do not seem to prevent concerns related to national identity in these two countries despite sharing a common language, and similar ethnic and religious backgrounds. Both countries raise concerns over the changing demographic dimensions that may alter the existing social structure. In Lebanon, it is feared that the participation of Syrian refugees, whom are mostly Sunni Arabs, may disrupt the sensitive sectarian balance in the country (Yahya, 2015). Consequently, social networks fail to facilitate the new lives of the refugees in the long term, as they relinquish over time. As suggested in a report by Matthew R. Stevens (2016) on Syrian refugees experience in urban Jordan, social networks may collapse and underpin hostility in society. According to Stevens (2016), existing social networks and familial relations are no longer providing financial or emotional assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan. An important reason behind the collapse of social networks is the financial and emotional strain caused by the long displacement of Syrians. To give an example, as I mentioned above, social networks are seen as a source of financial support, such as loans. Yet, those who provide loans for their refugee relatives struggle to get paid back as most refugees are either unemployed 4

or underemployed. Whereas, refugees feel ashamed when they are unable to pay their debts and hesitate to turn once again towards their relatives for support. Therefore, relations break up, even leading to enmity in some cases as both sides struggle to cope with the situation (Stevens, 2016, pp.55-56). Other reasons behind this situation are the inadequate response from the governments to the needs of Syrian refugees and lack of support from international aid organisations to relieve the hardships that are shared by refugees and the local communities (p.51). As Chatty (2016) puts aptly, initial generosity of relatives hosting refugees in a wide social network has more rapidly given way to hostility and discrimination. Comparing the experiences of Syrians in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, Chatty concludes that hostility towards Syrian refugees is higher in Lebanon and Jordan despite strong social connections and sharing the same language and ethnicity. Whereas, there has been less hostility in Turkey as Syrians have been accepted based on a religious and ethical sense of duty to help victims of war in its neighbour despite social and cultural differences (Chatty, 2016). Continuing with Turkey, kinship relations have similarly been a strong factor for the Syrian immigration (Orhan, 2014). Different communities from Syria including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, and Sunnis and Alawites have found their networks in Turkey, especially in the cities along the Turkish-Syrian border. Many families hosted their relatives and assisted them in finding accommodation and employment. In the beginning, kinship relations also helped to evoke sympathy towards Syrians in the wider society. Yet, as their stay prolonged, discontent has arisen. According to a field research conducted in 2014 in the Turkish border cities, some Turkish families mentioned their concerns about how long they could be able to host their Syrian guests. Some sent their Syrian relatives to other Turkish regions as seasonal workers, which played a part in the spreading of refugees across Turkey. This also results in the unravelling of pre-existing networks, which have failed to sustain their initial mobilisation, as the report concludes (Orhan, 2014, p.16). There are also other issues based on political and sectarian identities. Hatay, which is one of the border provinces in Turkey, received a large number of refugees (UNHCR, 2014). Being part of Syrian territory until 1939, Hatay already had Arab inhabitants, many of whom belonged to the Alawite sect of Islam, (Cagaptay, Aktas and Ozdemir, 2016, Orhan, 2014, p.17) who support Bashar al-assad s regime, standing against the revolutionary uprising (Sotloff, 2012). However, the province received a large number of Syrian refugees, most of whom are Sunni Arabs who rose against the government. In addition to the increasing Arab population of the province, the refugee influx has also highlighted the sectarian impact of the Syrian war in Turkey (Cagaptay, Aktas and Ozdemir, 2016). In 2011, Hatay witnessed anti-syrian demonstrations held by the Alawite community there (ORSAM, 2014), thus, Syrians have not only found their social networks but also links with the conflict at home. This also adds another dimension to the social network theory, which needs to be studied further and with a nuanced perspective. As it is observed by the experiences of Syrian refugees in the Turkish province of Hatay, social networks may also mirror the conflicting elements of a society, which brings uneasiness for migrants instead of relief. A small number of Syrians who live in the camps established and run by the governmental organizations are in a better situation than the vast majority who live in cities and villages (Orhan, 2016, p.11). Social networks were a key factor for refugees who prefer staying in cities or villages rather than registering in the camps. However, being unregistered made refugees invisible to the governmental or international agencies. Therefore, those relying on their networks of support struggled to sustain their lives when these networks were unable to respond (Chatty, 2016; Research Turkey, 2015). The above mentioned researches on the situation of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries noted that social relations which were closer and stronger in the pre-conflict era, have fell apart leaving refugees in a psychological state of loneliness (Chatty, 2016; Stevens, 2016; Orhan, 2014). Being unable to work and difficulties in reaching the aid offered by governmental or international organisations led refugees to look for other resources which causes exploitation, especially in the labour market. Once having helped to build empathy in society, social ties become a source of hostility. This correlates the situation of refugees Research 35 5

who turn into a financial and emotional burden from guest relatives fleeing from the war. The collapse of social networks further leads to a hostility and enmity contrarily to the assumption that social ties should contribute to the integration of refugees to host societies. Conclusion From the information outlined above on the experiences of the three countries which host the greatest number of Syrian refugees, it is understood that social networks, familial and tribal ties played an important role in facilitating the immigration of Syrians. However, it is not clear to what extent these social networks influenced the migratory behaviour of Syrians and researches point out the fatigue that replaced the mobilization of support in the first few months of the refugee influx. In all cases, refugees were welcomed and assisted by their networks. Families invited their relatives in Syria to stay over, shared their houses or provided accommodation and employment or loans for their expenses expecting them to return soon. However, this emotionally and culturally motivated sense of support has run short as the financial resources of the both sides drained when the stay of refugees prolonged and their number dramatically increased. Therefore, pre-existing social networks should be supported by external actors in order for them to persist and continue to contribute in the later steps of migration as well as integration. Humanitarian assistance of international organisations and more efficient responses from governmental actors for the needs of refugees appear crucial in this sense. On the other hand, it is important to underline the difference between labour and forced migration in the literature around the social network theory, which has largely taken labour migration into consideration. As it is seen in the case of Syrians, the more overwhelming the influx in terms of numbers and vulnerability, the worse the social networks are tainted. There is an obvious need for studies on the social network theory from the perspective of mass influx of refugees, as well as further researches on the impacts of social networks in the migration of Syrians. 6

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