The actual midterm will probably not be multiple choice. You should also study your notes, the textbook, and the homework.

Similar documents
Chapter 1 Practice Test Questions

The Impossibilities of Voting

Head-to-Head Winner. To decide if a Head-to-Head winner exists: Every candidate is matched on a one-on-one basis with every other candidate.

1.6 Arrow s Impossibility Theorem

Arrow s Impossibility Theorem

Voting Criteria: Majority Criterion Condorcet Criterion Monotonicity Criterion Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion

Write all responses on separate paper. Use complete sentences, charts and diagrams, as appropriate.

Fairness Criteria. Majority Criterion: If a candidate receives a majority of the first place votes, that candidate should win the election.

Fairness Criteria. Review: Election Methods

Measuring Fairness. Paul Koester () MA 111, Voting Theory September 7, / 25

The Mathematics of Voting. The Mathematics of Voting

Math116Chap1VotingPart2.notebook January 12, Part II. Other Methods of Voting and Other "Fairness Criteria"

MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.

12.2 Defects in Voting Methods

Section Voting Methods. Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc.

Intro to Contemporary Math

Exercises For DATA AND DECISIONS. Part I Voting

Make the Math Club Great Again! The Mathematics of Democratic Voting

Sect 13.2 Flaws of Voting Methods

The search for a perfect voting system. MATH 105: Contemporary Mathematics. University of Louisville. October 31, 2017

Section Voting Methods. Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc.

Voting Methods

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems, Continued

Elections with Only 2 Alternatives

n(n 1) 2 C = total population total number of seats amount of increase original amount

Social Choice: The Impossible Dream. Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them.

The Mathematics of Voting

Introduction: The Mathematics of Voting

Section 3: The Borda Count Method. Example 4: Using the preference schedule from Example 3, identify the Borda candidate.

In this lecture we will cover the following voting methods and fairness criterion.

Chapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream Lesson Plan

Mathematical Thinking. Chapter 9 Voting Systems

Syllabus update: Now keeping best 3 of 4 tests

Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Kenneth Arrow. Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Strategically vulnerable

Voting rules: (Dixit and Skeath, ch 14) Recall parkland provision decision:

Desirable properties of social choice procedures. We now outline a number of properties that are desirable for these social choice procedures:

Grade 6 Math Circles Winter February 27/28 The Mathematics of Voting - Solutions

Grade 7/8 Math Circles Winter March 6/7/8 The Mathematics of Voting

Majority- more than half of the votes Plurality- the most first place votes. The Majority Criterion

Chapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream

Today s plan: Section : Plurality with Elimination Method and a second Fairness Criterion: The Monotocity Criterion.

Practice TEST: Chapter 14

Chapter 10. The Manipulability of Voting Systems. For All Practical Purposes: Effective Teaching. Chapter Briefing

The Mathematics of Voting

SOCIAL CHOICES (Voting Methods) THE PROBLEM. Social Choice and Voting. Terminologies

9.3 Other Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates

answers to some of the sample exercises : Public Choice

The Manipulability of Voting Systems. Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them.

Voting Protocols. Introduction. Social choice: preference aggregation Our settings. Voting protocols are examples of social choice mechanisms

Main idea: Voting systems matter.

Homework 7 Answers PS 30 November 2013

Presidential Election Democrat Grover Cleveland versus Benjamin Harrison. ************************************ Difference of 100,456

Notes for Session 7 Basic Voting Theory and Arrow s Theorem

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems, Continued. Voting II 1/27

Constructing voting paradoxes with logic and symmetry

Social Choice & Mechanism Design

Math for Liberal Studies

that changes needed to be made when electing their Presidential nominee. Iowa, at the time had a

Math for Liberal Arts MAT 110: Chapter 12 Notes

Section Voting Methods. Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc.

: It is mathematically impossible for a democratic voting method to satisfy all of the fairness criteria was proven in 1949.

Name Date I. Consider the preference schedule in an election with 5 candidates.

Voting Definitions and Theorems Spring Dr. Martin Montgomery Office: POT 761

Voting Criteria April

MATH 1340 Mathematics & Politics

Math Circle Voting Methods Practice. March 31, 2013

Explaining the Impossible: Kenneth Arrow s Nobel Prize Winning Theorem on Elections

(67686) Mathematical Foundations of AI June 18, Lecture 6

In deciding upon a winner, there is always one main goal: to reflect the preferences of the people in the most fair way possible.

Introduction to Theory of Voting. Chapter 2 of Computational Social Choice by William Zwicker

CS 886: Multiagent Systems. Fall 2016 Kate Larson

MATH4999 Capstone Projects in Mathematics and Economics Topic 3 Voting methods and social choice theory

Social welfare functions

Mathematics and Social Choice Theory. Topic 4 Voting methods with more than 2 alternatives. 4.1 Social choice procedures

The Math of Rational Choice - Math 100 Spring 2015

The Iowa Caucuses. (See Attached Page Below) B R C T R B R R C C B C T T T B

Voting Methods for Municipal Elections: Propaganda, Field Experiments and what USA voters want from an Election Algorithm

Mathematics of Voting Systems. Tanya Leise Mathematics & Statistics Amherst College

1.1 The Basic Elements of an Election 1.2 The Plurality Method

Simple methods for single winner elections

Economics 470 Some Notes on Simple Alternatives to Majority Rule

Lecture 11. Voting. Outline

(c) 2013 Janice L. Epstein Voting Methods 1

Social Choice Theory. Denis Bouyssou CNRS LAMSADE

2-Candidate Voting Method: Majority Rule

Chapter 4: Voting and Social Choice.

Voting System: elections

Josh Engwer (TTU) Voting Methods 15 July / 49

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems. Voting I 1/36

Many Social Choice Rules

Find the winner of the election using majority rule given the results below: Choices (ABC) (ACB) (BAC) (BCA) (CAB) (CBA) Number of Votes

CSC304 Lecture 16. Voting 3: Axiomatic, Statistical, and Utilitarian Approaches to Voting. CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 1

PROBLEM SET #2: VOTING RULES

Voting Fairness Idea: Condorcet Criterion (CO)

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems

Introduction to the Theory of Voting

Lecture 16: Voting systems

Election Theory. How voters and parties behave strategically in democratic systems. Mark Crowley

Rock the Vote or Vote The Rock

Voting Lecture 3: 2-Candidate Voting Spring Morgan Schreffler Office: POT Teaching.

Transcription:

Math 101 Practice First Midterm The actual midterm will probably not be multiple choice. You should also study your notes, the textbook, and the homework. Answers are on the last page. MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question. For an election with four candidates (A, B, C, and D) we have the following preference schedule: Number of Voters 6 3 5 8 1st choice D D A C 2nd choice B A C A 3rd choice A B B D 4th choice C C D B 1) Using the plurality method, which candidate wins the election? A) A B) B C) C D) D 1) 2) Using the Borda count method, which candidate wins the election? A) A B) B C) C D) D 2) 3) Using the plurality-with-elimination method, which candidate wins the election? A) A B) B C) C D) D 3) 4) Using the method of pairwise comparisons, which candidate wins the election? A) A B) B C) C D) D 4) 5) In this election, A) B is a Condorcet candidate. B) A is a Condorcet candidate. C) every candidate is a Condorcet candidate. D) there is no Condorcet candidate. 5) 1

Solve the problem. 6) An election is held among four candidates (A, B, C, and D). Using a voting method we will call X, the winner of the election is candidate A. Due to an irregularity in the original vote count, a recount is required. Before the recount takes place, candidate B drops out of the race. In the recount, still using voting method X, candidate D wins the election. Based on this information, we can say that voting method X violates the A) independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion. B) monotonicity criterion. C) Condorcet criterion. D) majority criterion. 6) 7) An election is held among four candidates (A, B, C, and D). Using a voting method we will call X, the winner of the election is candidate A. However, candidate D beats each other candidate in a head to head, pairwise comparison. Based on this information, we can say that voting method X violates the A) independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion. B) majority criterion. C) Condorcet criterion. D) monotonicity criterion. 7) 8) Arrow s Impossibility Theorem implies A) that it is impossible to have a voting method that satisfies all four of the fairness criteria. B) that in every election, no matter what voting method we use, at least one of the four fairness criteria will be violated. C) that every voting method can potentially violate each one of the four fairness criteria. D) that in every election, each of the voting methods must produce a different winner. 8) 9) An election is held among five candidates (A, B, C, D, and E) and A gets a majority of the first place votes but B wins the election. Which of the following methods could have been the method used to decide this election? A) The plurality-with-elimination method B) The Borda count method C) The method of pairwise comparisons D) All of the above 9) 2

Carli and Dale want to divide fairly the chocolate-strawberry cake shown below using the divider-chooser method. The total cost of the cake was $18.00. Carli values strawberry and banana equally, but values chocolate twice as much as either of these put together. Dale values chocolate three times as much as he values strawberry. Further, he values strawberry twice as much as he values banana. 10) If Carli is the divider, which of the divisions shown below is consistent with Carli s value system? 10) A) Division 1 B) Division 2 C) Division 3 D) All of the above Four players (A, B, C, and D) agree to divide the 12 items below using the method of markers. The players bids are as indicated. 11) Item 5 A) goes to D. B) is left over. C) goes to B. D) goes to C. E) goes to A. 11) 12) Item 10 A) goes to A. B) goes to B. C) goes to C. D) goes to D. E) is left over. 12) 3

Four heirs (A, B, C, and D) must divide fairly an estate consisting of three items a house, a cabin and a boat using the method of sealed bids. The players bids (in dollars) are: A B C D House 180,000 200,000 190,000 185,000 Cabin 60,000 50,000 40,000 55,000 Boat 16,000 12,000 18,000 10,000 13) After all is said and done, the final allocation to player B is A) the house plus $6000 in cash. B) the house minus $128,500 in cash. C) $65,500 in cash. D) the house minus $134,500 in cash. 13) Solve the problem. 14) Which of the following is a discrete fair division problem? A) Dividing a tropical island. B) Dividing a cheese pizza. C) Dividing a gallon of ice cream. D) Dividing an antique car collection. 14) 15) Which of the following is a continuous fair division problem? A) Dividing the family jewels. B) Dividing an art collection. C) Dividing a house plus all the furniture in it. D) Dividing a cream pie. 15) 16) Joe and Bill want to divide a cake using the divider-chooser method. They draw straws, and it is determined that Bill will be the divider and Joe the chooser. Assuming that each plays the game correctly, which of the following statements [A), B), C) or D)] cannot be true? A) Bill believes that Joe s share is worth 50% of the cake; Joe believes that his share is worth 60% of the cake. B) Bill believes that his share is worth 60% of the cake; Joe believes that his share is worth C) Joe believes that his share is worth 50% of the cake; Bill believes that his share is worth D) Joe believes that his share is worth 60% of the cake; Bill believes that his share is worth 16) 4

Answer Key Testname: PRACTICEMT1 1) D 2) A 3) C 4) A 5) B 6) A 7) C 8) A 9) B 10) B 11) C 12) E 13) B 14) D 15) D 16) B 5