Our Government is much more afraid of Communism than it is of Fascism. Source #1: The Minutes from Chamberlain and Hitler s Conversation at the Munich Conference, September 1938 In 1938, the Munich Conference was an agreement between England and Germany to allow for the occupation of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. Prime Minister of England Neville Chamberlain (1937-1940) met with Hitler to negotiate this agreement in Munich Germany without any Czechoslovakian representatives. He said that he had from his youth been obsessed with the racial theory and he felt that Germans were one, but he had drawn a distinction between the possible and the impossible and he recognized that there are places where Germans are where it is impossible to bring them into the Reich; but where they are on the frontier it is a different matter and he is himself concerned with ten millions of Germans, three millions of whom are in Czechoslovakia. He felt therefore that those Germans should come into the Reich. They wanted to and he was determined that they should come in. It was impossible that Czechoslovakia should remain like a spearhead in the side of Germany. So I said Hold a Minute; there one point on which I want to be clear and I will explain why: you say that the three million Sudeten Germans must be included in the Reich; would you be satisfied with that and is their nothing more and you want? I ask because there are many people who think that is not all; that you wish to dismember Czechoslovakia. He then launched into a long speech: he was out for a racial unity and he did want of Czechs, all he wanted was Sudeten Germans. He then said I am determined to settle it; I do not care whether there is a world war or not; I am determined to settle it and to settle it soon and I am prepared to risk World War rather than this to drag on. To this I replied, If the Fuhrer is determined to settle this matter by force without waiting even for a discussion between ourselves to take place what did he let come here for? I have wasted my time If I could give my personal opinion which was that in principles I had nothing to say against the separation of the Sudeten Germans from the rest of Czechoslovakia; provided that the practical difficulties could be overcome.
Our Government is much more afraid of Communism than it is of Fascism. Source #2: Note from Gen. Ismay, Secretary of Defense, Sept 1938. Marked Secret General Ismay was the Secretary of Defense for the British government during the Sudetenland Crisis. Ismay was named only to the position of Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, effective 1 August 1938. [From World War One to 1936, General Ismay was stationed in one of England s colonies in Africa (i.e. Sudan) or Asia (i.e. India). While Chamberlain negotiated in Munich, Ismay began preparing London s defenses for an attack. A German absorption of Czechoslovakia will enhance her military prestige, increase her war potential, and probably enable her to dispose of stronger land forces against France and ourselves than she can do at present. So far as air power is concerned, Germany may be able to maintain her land over the French-British Air Force in air striking power. On the other hand, it is open to us, provide that we make the necessary effort, to catch her up, or at least greatly reduce her lead, in the matter of defense against air attacks. By so doing we shall have heavily increased ourselves against the greatest danger to which we are at present exposed; indeed by substantially reducing Germany s only chance of a rapid decision, we shall have provided a strong deterrent against her making the attempt. It follows, therefore, that, from the military point of view, time in our favour, and that, if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in say 6-18 months time, than to accept the present challenge.
Source #3: William Gallacher, The Chosen Few (1940) William Gallacher, a member of the Communist Party in England, was a strong advocate of a military alliance with the Soviet Union. He was also opposed to the appeasement policy of the Conservative government. He wrote about these views in The Chosen Few (1940). It is no exaggeration to say that many prominent representatives of the Conservative Party [in England], speaking for powerful landed and financial interests in the country, would welcome Hitler and the German Army if they believed that such was the only alternative to the establishment of Socialism in this country. Their blatant and noisy approval of German and Italian ferocity and frightfulness in Spain, and their utter lack of concern for the sinking of British ships and the sacrifice of British lives, provides abundant proof of this contention. The Nazis knew that in all capitalist countries there were men such as these ready to betray their own people, if by that means they could save their own property and privilege.. In a speech delivered at Biggleswade, to the local Conservative organisation, he [ally of the Prime Minster] informed the audience and the country as a whole that the Prime Minister had no intention of doing anything to defend Czechoslovakia. This declaration of policy created a sensation in the Press and in the country and was immediately made the subject of a question in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister smilingly said that his young friend had probably allowed his feelings to carry him away, but that he was only stating his own opinion and was not claiming to put the policy of the Government. He treated the matter in the most casual manner, and unfortunately, after Mr. Lennox-Boyd had made an apology for what he claimed was an "indiscretion," the House of Commons allowed the matter to drop. Source: http://spartacus-educational.com/tugallacher.htm
Source #4: Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister (1938) Neville Chamberlain served as British Prime Minister from 1937-1940. Here are two sources by him coming IN September 1938. In 1938, the Munich Conference was an agreement between England and Germany to allow for the occupation of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. Prime Minister of England Neville Chamberlain met with Hitler to negotiate this agreement. Source A: Radio Broadcast (27th September, 1938) How horrible, fantastic, incredible, it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing! I would not hesitate to pay even a third visit to Germany, if I thought it would do any good. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me; but if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted. Under such a domination, life for people who believe in liberty would not be worth living; but war is a fearful thing, and we must be very clear, before we embark on it, that it is really the great issues that are stake. Source B: Statement issued by Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler after the signing of the Munich Agreement (30th September) We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as Symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries.
Source #5: Lord Halifax Diary Lord Halifax, a member of Parliament and supporter of Prime Minister Chamberlain, recorded the following in his diary on 19 th November 1937. Shortly after this diary post, he was appointed Foreign Secretary. Throughout the 1930s, he supported the isolationist policy of the United Kingdom as it related to German expansion. Hitler invited me to begin our discussion, which I did by thanking him for giving me this opportunity. I hoped it might be the means of creating better understanding between the two countries. The feeling of His Majesty's Government was that it ought to be within our power, if we could once come to a fairly complete appreciation of each other's position, and if we were both prepared to work together for the cause of peace, to make a large contribution to it. Although there was much in the Nazi system that profoundly offended British opinion, I was not blind to what he (Hitler) had done for Germany, and to the achievement from his point of view of keeping Communism out of his country.