DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL REVIEW WORKSHOP WORKSHOP REPORT MARCH 2016

DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL REVIEW WORKSHOP WORKSHOP REPORT MARCH 2016 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY JANUARY 9, 2017

American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security The bipartisan and nonpartisan membership of the Standing Committee on Law and National Security is committed to educating the Bar and the public on national security law. The Committee conducts studies, sponsors programs and conferences, and administers working groups on law and national security-related issues. Activities assist policymakers, educate lawyers, the media and the public, and enable the Committee to make recommendations to the ABA. It is assisted by an Advisory Committee, Counselors to the Committee, and liaisons from ABA entities. For more information, visit www.abanet.org/natsecurity. The DOD Law of War Manual Review Workshop was not for attribution. The views contained herein do not necessarily reflect the views of each participant or the official policy of their respective agencies, private sector organizations, the United States Government, the American Bar Association, or the Standing Committee on Law and National Security. ii

DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL REVIEW WORKSHOP FRIDAY, MARCH 4, 2016 WASHINGTON, DC TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL BACKGROUND... 4 CHAPTER TWO: PRINCIPLES.. 11 CHAPTER THREE: APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF WAR... 18 CHAPTER FOUR: CLASSES OF PERSONS. 27 CHAPTER FIVE: THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 35 CHAPTER SIX: WEAPONS. 47 CHAPTER EIGHT: DETENTION: OVERVIEW AND BASELINE RULES. 53 CHAPTER SIXTEEN: CYBER OPERATIONS.. 61 CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (NIAC). 67 CLOSING COMMENTS.. 84 CONCLUSION.... 86 iii

INTRODUCTION TO THE REVIEW OF THE 2015 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL On March 4 th, 2016, the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association convened a selected group of individuals with expertise in the Law of Armed Conflict to engage in a review of the DOD Law of War Manual published in June, 2015. This session used, as a basis for discussion, a significant preparatory review of selected chapters of the Manual conducted by a small Working Group of Law of Armed Conflict experts over the preceding three months. These nine chapters, chapters 1-6, 8, 16, and 17, were deemed to be those dealing with those issues most worthy of comment. The text that follows reflects both the observations contained in the preparatory review of the chapters in issue, and, to the extent possible, the discussion that occurred on March 4 th. This discussion was wide ranging, with often disparate views expressed on the many issues presented. The comments made and questions posed have been cross-referenced to specific paragraphs of the Manual. Particular note should be made that the individuals who participated in the March 4 th review of the Manual collectively praised both the genuine interest of the Department of Defense in receiving constructive feedback on the contents of the Manual, as well as the gracious manner in which this feedback was received. In the words of the ABA Committee Chair, The manner in which the office of the Department of Defense Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs has considered the comments offered by this ABA Manual Review Group truly honors the concept of public service and reflects the commitment of that office to the rule of law. 1

PREPARATORY WORKING GROUP Geoffrey Corn, USA (ret.) Professor of Law South Texas College of Law, Houston Colonel David E. Graham, USA (ret.) Associate Director for Programs Center for National Security Law University of Virginia School of Law Eric Jensen, USA (ret.) Professor of Law Brigham Young University Law School Lt. Col. Rachel VanLandingham, USAF (ret.) Associate Professor of Law Southwestern Law School Sean Watts, USAR Professor of Law Creighton University School of Law REVIEW WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS Charles A. Allen International Affairs Deputy General Counsel U.S. Department of Defense Maj. Gen. John D. Altenburg, Jr., USA (ret.) Of Counsel Greenberg Traurig LLP Kenneth Anderson Professor of Law American University Washington College of Law James E. Baker Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (ret.) Visiting Professor Georgetown University Law Center Karl Chang Office of the Deputy General Counsel International Affairs U.S. Department of Defense Geoffrey Corn, USA (ret.) Professor of Law South Texas College of Law, Houston Laura Dickinson Oswald Symister Colclough Research Professor and Professor of Law George Washington University Colonel David E. Graham, USA (ret.) Associate Director for Programs Center for National Security Law University of Virginia School of Law 2

Eric Jensen, USA (ret.) Professor of Law Brigham Young University Law School David A. Koplow Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center Matthew J. McCormack Office of the Deputy General Counsel International Affairs U.S. Department of Defense Col. Robert A. Ramey, USAF (ret.) Deputy Legal Advisor International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation for the United States and Canada Harvey Rishikof Senior Counsel Crowell & Moring Gabor Rona Visiting Professor of Law Cardozo Law School Rita Siemion International Legal Counsel Human Rights First Lt. Col. Gary D. Solis, USMC (ret.) Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center Lt. Col. Rachel VanLandingham, USAF (ret.) Associate Professor of Law Southwestern Law School BGen (ret.) Kenneth Watkin, OMM, CD, QC Former Judge Advocate General Canadian Forces Sean Watts, USAR Professor of Law Creighton University School of Law 3

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL BACKGROUND Purpose and Scope of the Manual The purpose and scope of the Manual, spoken to in paragraphs 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, generated significant discussion amongst those present at the 4th March session. The Manual's purpose is said to be that of providing "information" on the Law of War (LOW) to Department of Defense (DOD) personnel responsible for its implementation and for executing military operations. This statement thus raised the question of whether, given the "informational", vice rule-making nature of the Manual, it is actually intended to be authoritative in nature-binding on all U.S. Government (USG) personnel. Additionally, the Manual states that, while it represents the legal views of DOD, DOD is not precluded from subsequently changing its interpretation of various aspects of the LOW. This statement generated a discussion as to the types of circumstances/factors that might dictate such interpretive changes--and the manner in which these changes might be communicated/reflected. At this point, DOD observers noted that, not only is the Manual intended to be iterative in nature, it is designed to serve as a resource starting point, rather than an end point, for military attorneys dealing with LOW issues. Finally, the Manual notes that, while attorneys from the Departments of State and Justice participated in its drafting, the Manual does not "necessarily" reflect the views of any other USG department or agency-or even the views of the U.S. Government as a whole. This statement, consequently, once again raised the issue of the "authoritative" nature of the Manual, given that it apparently does not reflect a unanimous USG interpretation of the various aspects of the LOW contained therein, but simply that of DOD. Indeed, it was suggested that this comment strongly indicated that there actually exist differences of opinion within the USG regarding the manner in which certain fundamental norms of the LOW are to be interpreted and applied. Discussion related to the purpose and scope of the Manual evolved into essentially two schools of thought. The first questioned both the utility and credibility of the Manual, given the above noted caveats regarding the authoritative nature of its contents. Those who assumed this view voiced the belief that this post-9-11 Manual differed substantially from that which was in draft-and would have been produced-pre-9-11. Rather than a true, LOW Manual, this publication 4

had taken on the posture of a White Paper--the purpose of which was to justify/defend U.S. legal determinations made regarding the status and treatment of both al-qaeda as a non-state Armed Group, as well as individual members of al-qaeda. This was said to be evidenced by the Manual's fixation on non-state Armed Groups as a whole and on its attempt to unilaterally re-define the long-established definition of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), the latter matter being cited as but one example of the Manual's efforts to either reinterpret existing LOW or to create new LOW principles. In a similar vein, it was noted that if, in fact, the Manual represented U.S. policy choices, rather than an authoritative interpretation of the LOW, this should have been made known to its users, particularly to potential coalition partners who might well take differing views on a number of the issues concerned. In a somewhat similar context, others observed that presenting this as a DOD, vice USG LOW Manual, served as an operational impediment. That is, how were Judge Advocates to operate effectively in the field if they were uncertain as to whether other USG agencies would adhere to the contents of the Manual? Given this fact, it was submitted that every effort should be made to gain USG interagency concurrence on the full content of the Manual at the earliest possible time. Absent this, it was submitted that the Manual lacked any form of legal status, even within the U.S. Government. Those who advocated for the utility of the Manual recalled that it represented the first U.S. publication to focus on the full scope of the LOW since the 1956 Army Field Manual dealing with this subject. While, as in the case of most publications, it might not satisfy everyone's concerns and needs, it was, in fact, the product of a large, collaborative Working Group and had received the concurrence of all Service Judge Advocates General and General Counsels. The Manual sought to focus on novel LOW matters that had arisen in the aftermath of 9-11--and to offer clear U.S. positions on these issues. While such positions would, of course, evolve over time, the Manual does, nevertheless, serve as an effective legal resource for the LOW community at large. Others voiced the view that, far from consisting simply of policy statements, the Manual represents LOW legal determinations made by that agency of the USG principally concerned with the interpretation and implementation of the LOW. Rather than attempting to justify USG post-9-11 legal determinations, the Manual seeks to counter those who have criticized past USG failures to respond effectively to both the legal and policy realities of the post- 911 world. Still others opined that, as "a living document", the Manual will evolve over time as a consensus forms within the international community regarding how to approach newly minted, 21st century, 5

LOW matters. Finally, there were those who found it strange that some would question why a DOD LOW Manual would reflect considered U.S. positions on contested LOW issues. It was, in fact, a U.S. publication. Why would it not set forth the U.S. stance on such subjects? A failure to do so might well result in the U.S. being "buried" under customary LOW--ultimately losing what can only be characterized as an ongoing "strategic legal conflict" in the LOW arena. Definition of the Law of War Discussion next moved to the Manual's definition of the Law of War set forth in paragraph 1.3: "For the purposes of this Manual, the LOW is that part of international law that regulates the resort to armed force; the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims in both international and non-international armed conflict; belligerent occupation; and the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent States". This definition was further supplemented by a discussion of the concept of jus ad bellum appearing at paragraph 1.11: "The LOW has been categorized into jus ad bellum (law concerning the resort to war) and jus in bello (law concerning conduct during war). Although jus ad bellum is an essential part of the LOW to consider in the political process of whether to resort to the use of military force, this Manual focuses on jus in bello." The accuracy of this definition was vigorously challenged by those who questioned why any definition of the LOW (jus in bello-law in war) would include those international law principles that regulate when and where a State might legitimately resort to the use of force (jus ad bellum-law before war)-asserting that these two legal regimes have always been viewed as distinct in nature. To now conflate these bodies of law in the Manual, it was argued, is both inaccurate and confusing. To support this contention, reference was made to subsequent language of the Manual itself, appearing at paragraphs 3.5.1-2: General Distinction Between Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum. "As a general matter, jus in bello and jus ad bellum address different legal issues and should not be conflated. Conflating jus in bello and jus ad bellum risks misunderstanding and misapplying these concepts. One important attribute of rules for conduct during war (jus in bello) is that, in general, they operate independently from rules regarding the resort to force (jus ad bellum)." 6

Given the confusion generated by these contradictory statements, it was recommended that the definition of the LOW be limited only to jus in bello principles. The concern expressed regarding the Manual's definition of the LOW was not unanimous. Support was voiced for the inclusion of a discussion of jus ad bellum concepts in the Manual--in order to provide those in the field with an understanding of when the application of jus in bello principles would be triggered. To not do so, it was said, would be a disservice to Judge Advocates in the field who must make decisions regarding the applicability of the LOW. Others countered this view, however, with the observation that a decision to apply the LOW in any given operational setting is not one to be made by individual service attorneys. That is, jus ad bellum concepts are undoubtedly relevant to decisions made by those in "the Building" as to when and where the LOW is to be applied, but not to those in the field. Indeed, there already exists a DOD Directive that explicitly states that all DOD components will apply the LOW in all armed conflicts, however characterized, as well as in all other military operations. And, finally, it was noted that, though there might exist a general consensus regarding jus in bello principles, this is certainly not true of jus ad bellum norms-and that, accordingly, these should not be set forth as an integral part of the LOW. Again, it was submitted, these are two distinct legal regimes at play. The Terms "Law of War" and "International Humanitarian Law" Paragraph 1.3.1.2 notes that: "International Humanitarian Law is an alternative term for the LOW that may be understood to have the same substantive meaning as the LOW." The question was posed as to whether this was, in fact, an accurate statement. That is, is there not a persistent view expressed that this term, "international humanitarian law" (IHL), includes not only codified and customary LOW norms, but also certain, but unspecified-situationally dependent, international human rights principles? And, if so, how can IHL be said to have the same substantive meaning as the LOW? Views on this issue were mixed. Some advocated that, in order to avoid confusion and uncertainty, the U.S. should use only the term, LOW, or, alternatively, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), but that, currently, various U.S. agencies use both of these terms, often interchangeably, when dealing with LOW matters. Others expressed the view that a consensus has now been achieved that the term, IHL, while perhaps duplicative in nature, does 7

refer exclusively to traditional LOW principles--and does not incorporate any international human rights norms. There was agreement, however, that the USG, as a whole, should be consistent in its use of the term "LOW" when addressing LOW issues, vice that of "IHL". Purposes of the Law of War Paragraph 1.3.4 sets forth what are said to be the "main" purposes of the LOW, yet no reference is made to one of the very fundamental purposes of the LOW-the regulation of the methods and means used to conduct warfare. While this was viewed as a fundamental omission, the comment was made that perhaps, inherent in this list, is the silent understanding that those purposes listed all relate, in fact, to the regulation of the methods and means of conducting armed conflict. There appeared to be a consensus, nevertheless, that the Manual should specifically reference the regulation of the methods and means of conducting warfare as a primary purpose of the LOW. Relationship Between Human Rights Treaties and the LOW The Manual addresses the relationship between human rights treaties and the LOW in paragraph 1.6.3.1. Not surprisingly, this issue generated significant discussion. Some expressed the view that the Manual's treatment of this matter does not adequately reflect the controversy surrounding this subject--that is, that the U.S. view that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does not apply extraterritorially is one that conflicts with that of the majority of the international community. Should this fundamental difference of opinion not be discussed? In contrast, there were those who questioned why a U.S. LOW Manual would devote even this much discussion to this subject, given the fact that the U.S. has always taken the position that, during times of armed conflict, the LOW is a lex specialis, displacing any other legal norms that might be in effect during times of peace. Still others viewed this section of the Manual as, perhaps, the U.S. seizing the opportunity to explain its legal rationale for its continued detention of detainees at Guantanamo Bay GTMO). In making this observation, reference was made to several Manual statements related to this subject. "The U.S. has understood that Article 9 of the ICCPR (the right to challenge the lawfulness of an 8

arrest before a court) does not affect a State's authorities under the LOW, including a State's authority in both international and noninternational armed conflicts to detain enemy combatants until the end of hostilities." Additionally, footnote 92 cites a statement by the U.S. before the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 2014: "...paragraph 15 incorrectly implies that the detention of enemy combatants in the context of a non-international armed conflict 'would normally amount to arbitrary detention, as other effective measures addressing the threat, including the criminal justice system, would be available'. On the contrary, in both international and non-international armed conflicts, a State may detain enemy combatants consistent with the law of armed conflict until the end of hostilities. Similarly, to the extent paragraphs 15 and 66 are intended to address law-of-war detention in situations of armed conflict, it would be incorrect to state that there is a 'right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of the detention' in all cases." Given these statements, the question was posed as to whether, under specific provisions of the ICCPR, a detainee, held in the context of a non-international armed conflict occurring within the territory of a State-signatory to the ICCPR, was not entitled to challenge his arrest. And, if, in fact, this was the case, the Manual statements referenced above could be understood only in the sense that, in making them, the U.S. was using the Manual to reaffirm its contention that, as it remains engaged in an ongoing, global, albeit "non-international", armed conflict with al Qaeda and its associated forces, it can lawfully detain "enemy combatants" seized in this NIAC, at GTMO, until the termination of hostilities. And, while there was a general acknowledgment that the U.S. stance on this matter, as well as on other issues dealt with throughout the Manual, is premised on a substantive U.S. re-definition of a NIAC, as spoken to in Common Article 3 of the '49 Geneva Conventions and Protocol II Additional to these Conventions, a decision was made to delay any extended assessment of this subject until a discussion of Chapter 17, which deals specifically with non-international armed conflict. Jus ad bellum Issues While, as noted, the inclusion of jus ad bellum concepts in the Manual's definition of the LOW was a contentious matter, a discussion of the jus ad bellum topic, beginning with paragraph 1.11, did 9

generate several comments. Paragraph 1.11.5: Responding to an Imminent Threat of an Attack. "Under customary international law, States had, and continue to have, the right to take measures in response to imminent attacks." Simply as a matter of clarity, it was noted that a State cannot "respond" to an attack that is "imminent", but has not yet occurred, but can respond to a "threat" of an imminent attack. The observation was also made that, while the "Caroline" definition of anticipatory self-defense is almost universally recognized as a customary right of self-defense, it is not referenced in the Manual. Why? Moreover, given the recent U.S. contention that it reserves the right to engage in the use of force against an individual or individuals who it has determined to pose an "imminent" threat to U.S. individuals or interests, but for which it has declared the criteria for making such determinations to be classified, would it not be useful to at least note the Caroline criteria for engaging in anticipatory self-defense-that is, "a threat that is instantaneous, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means or moment of deliberation"? Or--is the Manual's treatment of the right to engage in self-defense against an "imminent attack" designed to preserve a right to engage in a form of self-defense far broader than the anticipatory right set forth in the Caroline definition? Actors. Paragraph 1.11.5.4: Right of Self-Defense Against Non-State Note was made that the Manual states that: "The inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, applies in response to any "armed attack", not just attacks that originate with States." In this regard, it was observed that Article 51 of the Charter establishes a "codified" right to engage in self-defense against an armed attack; the "inherent" right of self-defense is considered to be "customary" in nature. 10

CHAPTER 2: PRINCIPLES In introducing the discussion of Chapter 2, it was noted that, in addition to providing instructions on specific legal provisions and rules, a well-established function of military LOW manuals has been to identify and analyze broad legal principles relevant to the application of military force. The majority of manuals regard these principles in the nature of general guidelines-set forth to assist in the interpretation and application of specific rules. Additionally, manuals have also regarded LOW principles as actual rules of conduct-in the absence of more specific rules dealing with any particular aspects of armed conflict. Five LOW Principles The DOD Manual identifies five LOW principles in paragraph 2.1: "Three interdependent principles--military necessity, humanity, and honor-provide the foundation for other law of war principles, such as proportionality and distinction, and most of the treaty and customary rules of the law of war." In assessing this statement, it was observed that the Manual's treatment of LOW principles is, in some respects, entirely consistent with the work of its predecessor, the 1956 Army Field Manual, 27-10, as well as with interceding doctrinal publications. However, other aspects of the Manual's treatment of these principles appeared to be quite novel. This fact thus gave rise to a number of questions, designed, principally, to examine the extent to which the Manual has ostensibly introduced changes in the manner in which the U.S. perceives LOW principles as conditioning battlefield conduct. As a secondary consideration, these questions were also designed to explore the extent to which the Manual's treatment of these principles will prove to be beneficial, or how easily, consistently, and confidently military operational lawyers will be able to operationalize the guidance in issue. The first questions posed focused on how LOW principles operate as a general matter and the extent to which such principles can realistically be expected to regulate battlefield conduct in both a consistent and coherent manner. Paragraph 2.1.2 states that: "Law of war principles provide the foundation for the specific law of war rules. Legal principles, however, are not as specific as rules, and thus interpretations of how principles apply to a given situation may vary." 11

Given this statement, the following questions were tabled: * This paragraph acknowledges the variances-the inconsistencies-between States' views on the operational application of LOW principles, In doing so, is the Manual also conceding that, to the extent that it instructs lawyers to employ these principles to guide operational legal advice, variances in the manner in which they are interpreted will inevitably arise between the advice rendered by various elements of DOD? * Is DOD prepared to actively monitor and resolve such internal variances? More importantly-does the Manual meet what would appear to be its inherent responsibility to provide guidance sufficient enough to enable DOD components to avoid, or, to at least, resolve such inconsistencies? * Should discernible variances in the application of these principles by DOD components be permitted to stand-or does the LOW anticipate/require uniform State application? Responses to these questions reflected a diversity of opinions. Some expressed the view that, given the broad nature of these principles, there were bound to be differences in the manner in which they were applied. Application was inherently subjective in nature and often situationally dependent. Others questioned whether substantive variances in the application of these principles by U.S. personnel had actually ever been identified. For example, has there even been a prosecution of any U.S. individual for a violation of a LOW "principle"? If the answer is, no, it was submitted, then these principles exist only in the form of general guidance; they do not rise to the level of law. Given this reality, absent truly egregious differences in their interpretation and application by U.S. personnel, this should not be a matter of concern. Note was also made that, while the 1956 Army Field Manual spoke to three of these principles in a very cursory manner--this was the first attempt to deal with these concepts in a meaningful way. And, in terms of interpreting and applying these principles, it was suggested that this be done by assessing their applicability in the context of the other, more specific, rules contained in the various chapters of the Manual. And, while similarity in the application of these principles across the Services was certainly desirable, complete uniformity of application is not a necessity. 12

The Principle of "Military Necessity" While it was viewed as essential that the Manual identifies "military necessity" as a fundamental principle of the LOW, it was noted that history had proven this concept susceptible to substantial abuse as a justification for what would otherwise be considered unlawful conduct. And, while the Manual makes it clear that "military necessity" cannot justify departures from the LOW, it was submitted that it, nevertheless, offers a somewhat expansive interpretation of this concept, particularly with respect to its application to strategic, vice purely tactical, considerations. This is reflected in paragraph 2.2.3.1: "In evaluating military necessity, one may consider the broader imperatives of winning the war as quickly and efficiently as possible and is not restricted to considering only the demands of the specific situation... For example, in assessing the military advantage of attacking an object, one may consider the entire war strategy rather than only the potential tactical gains from attacking that object." This language thus gave rise to the following questions: * Is there a general consensus, internationally, that this is the manner in which the principle of "military necessity" should be applied? * Is the application of this principle, in this manner, subject to an overly broad and abusive use of this concept? * The Manual includes extensive citations to authority throughout. With this in mind, does the Manual citation of support for the strategic application of "military necessity" effectively and directly support this proposition? (See, specifically, footnotes 43 and 45.) *Is the discussion of the capture, not kill, scenario set forth in this paragraph an accurate/useful reflection of the application of the strategic interpretation of "military necessity"? Some viewed this interpretation of "military necessity" to be the Manual's broadest articulation of any of the five LOW principles, and, while understanding the U.S. desire to preserve such an interpretation of this concept, the danger of an abusive application of this principle to "the entire war strategy", vice a tactical situation, was 13

recognized. The question was raised as to whether the U.S. had considered the ramifications of the "military necessity" principle being applied in this same manner by potential adversaries. Was this really in the interest of the U.S.-or the international community at large? Perhaps, it was noted, this broad interpretation of this concept could be reasonably implemented if its application was restricted exclusively to the U.S. military, vice political, strategy in any given conflict. Inherent in all of these comments was an apparent belief, however, that the Manual's broader application of "military necessity" was not an agreed international norm. There were no comments directed toward the matter of whether the Manual's citation support for its interpretation of this principle was either sufficiently relevant-or persuasive. The Principle of "Proportionality" Discussion of this principle was introduced with the observation that, while the 1956 Army Field Manual did not identify "proportionality" as a basic LOW principle, subsequent U.S. military legal doctrine routinely identified this concept as such. It was noted, however, that, in most instances, these sources offered a formulation of "proportionality" relevant specifically to targeting operations that involved the potential for civilian casualties or death. That is, military lawyers have traditionally been trained in an understanding and application of a discrete, jus in bello-specific notion of "proportionality"--distinct from a version of this principle drawn from jus ad bellum or general principles of international law. The Manual, in contrast, offers a much broader formulation of this principle, instructing lawyers to consider "proportionality" in situations and operations where they might not previously have done so. This is evidenced in paragraphs 2.4 and 2.4.2: "Proportionality may be defined as the principle that even where one is justified in acting, one must not act in a way that is unreasonable or excessive." "Proportionality also plays a role in assessing whether weapons are prohibited, because they are calculated to cause unnecessary suffering... Proportionality is also a requirement for reprisals, which must respond in a proportionate manner to the preceding illegal act by the party against which they are taken." Drawing upon the content of these paragraphs, the following questions were tabled for discussion: 14

* By their very nature, proportionality determinations are highly contextual. In keeping with the principle of "proportionality", an operation, weapon, or tactic that is perfectly lawful in one scenario may be entirely forbidden in another. With this in mind, does the Manual's expression of "proportionality" as essentially a reasonableness standard offer sufficiently specific guidance to those who must effect this concept in the field? * Will the Manual's emphasis on considering "proportionality" in situations beyond classic targeting scenarios involving potential civilian casualties compromise the doctrinal integrity of the very specific formulation of "proportionality" emphasized by previously existing doctrine? That is, can military legal advisors now reliably-and consistently- apply appropriate formulations of this principle? * Given the inherent ambiguity of this principle, particularly with respect to the specific threshold at which acts become so disproportionate as to be unlawful, is the Manual's expanded application of the principle of "proportionality" warranted? What advantages and disadvantages to States will result? What operational consequences from an expanded application of this principle are likely to result? While there was a recognition of the relevance of these questions, no definitive responses were offered, other than an acknowledgment that the Manual's broad formulation of this principle does represent an expansion of its traditional application to jus in bello targeting scenarios to what are, decidedly, jus ad bellum considerations. Some cautioned against an undue mixing of the principles of "proportionality" and "unnecessary suffering" ("humanity"). Still others expressed concern regarding the Manual's reference to the need for "proportionality" in the conduct of "reprisals"--noting not only that this was a reference to a concept that had not yet been discussed in the Manual, but questioning whether, in the view of DOD, reprisals were still deemed to be a legitimate form of use of force self-help. The Principle of "Humanity" This principle generated little discussion, other than several comments alluding to the relatively ambiguous manner in which it was discussed in the Manual. This led, in turn, to both the observation that 15

this principle was subject to differing doctrinal explanations and a recommendation that a more descriptive and better understood term for this concept would be that of "unnecessary suffering". The Principle of "Honor" Paragraph 2.6: "Honor demands a certain amount of fairness in offense and defense and a certain mutual respect between opposing forces." In introducing discussion of the principle of "honor", it was noted that the appearance of this particular principle represents the Manual's most significant adjustment to recent legal doctrine, considering that essentially all modern U.S. military doctrinal publications simply identify four principles of the LOW: "military necessity", "distinction", "proportionality", and "unnecessary suffering". The principle of "honor", or "chivalry", as it appeared in the 1956 Army Field Manual, has largely fallen out of U.S. use-primarily leaving the increasingly narrow prohibition of perfidy as the only clearly expressed limitation on treacherous or bad faith means and methods of conducting warfare. The Manual's revival of the principle of "honor" thus appears to indicate a desire to restore "good faith" as a legal restraint on the conduct of military operations. Given the fact that the former use of this term had taken place in periods of relative symmetry between militaries with shared professional military traditions and values, it might be concluded that disuse of "honor" as an international LOW principle has resulted from the discernible erosion of this model. With this possibility in mind, the following questions were posed: * Can "honor" really serve as a relevant consideration in combat waged between asymmetrically capable and asymmetrically moral belligerents? * Can "honor" be conceived and articulated in a sufficiently concrete and uniform manner to be of any practical utility in modern military operations? * Will inclusion and an emphasis on "honor" as a LOW principle strengthen universal respect for the LOW? Or-is this more likely to simply alienate parties that already view the LOW suspiciously? * Will any doctrinal adjustments to the conduct of military operations result from the resurrection of "honor" as a LOW principle? If so, what might these be? 16

Once again, views regarding the Manual's revival of "honor" as a principle of the LOW differed significantly. Some expressed the belief that the entire discussion of "honor" as a fundamental LOW principle was so abstract in nature that it offered very little in the way of useful application or guidance-that in the context of today's armed conflicts it lacked both credibility and any useful and relevant utility. Others disagreed-stating that "honor" is a reflection of, a commitment to, U.S. values-an essential element of a professional military. The observation was also made that the concept of "honor" informs ethical decisions on the battlefield--and that law and ethics were one in the same. On this last point, however, there was substantial disagreement: "A commander cannot be told that, while a potential course action complies with the LOW, you must also decide whether it is the 'right' thing to do." That is, legal and ethical considerations are not one in the same. 17

CHAPTER 3: APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF WAR Discussion of this chapter was introduced with the observation that its treatment of law applicability is unsurprisingly based on Common Articles 2 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the associated International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary, and international and domestic jurisprudence interpreting these treaty provisions. And, while the chapter was deemed much more instructive than prior treatment of this subject in the 1956 Army Field Manual, it was thought that it would most probably generate a certain degree of controversy, due to its inclusion of a number of U.S. interpretations of LOW applicability that deviate from generally accepted views on this subject. Paragraph 3.1 introduces this chapter with the statement that "Many of the legal issues underlying the application of the LOW may be confusing, because they are complex and may appear to result in contradictory legal positions." This language gave rise to the query as to whether this was, in fact, the message that the Manual wants to provide its users--that the LOW is so complex and confusing that it will often produce contradictory interpretations of a State's legal obligations? Should the purpose of the Manual not be to set forth the most straightforward and specific guidance possible? And-is the U.S. subject to the claim that, if such confusion now exists, it is largely U.S. self-generated, due to its more recent interpretations of LOW applicability? And, finally, is it fair to say that this section, like many sections of the Manual, is overly academic and somewhat abstract, reading more like a treatise than a LOW Manual? This same paragraph notes that "Whether a particular law of war rule applies to a situation may depend on a variety of issues, such as (1) whether a state of 'war', 'hostilities', or 'armed conflict' exists, (2) whether a party is recognized as a belligerent or as a State; or (3) whether an enemy State has accepted that law of war rule." This statement elicited the comment as to whether it was meant to suggest that there must be some formal evidence of an "acceptance" of a rule widely considered to be customary international law in order for it to be binding on a particular State. And, if so, what was the basis for such a theory? 18

Paragraph 3.1.1.2.: Applying Law of War Standards as Reflecting Minimum Legal Standards. "DOD practice has been to adhere to certain standards in the law of war, even in situations that do not constitute "war" or "armed conflict", because these law of war rules reflect standards that must be adhered to in all circumstances." The question was posed as to why these rules must be adhered to in all circumstances, even in situations in which they are not applicable as a matter of law. This may simply be a statement of U.S. policy, it was observed, and, if so, this should be noted. However, this language strongly suggests that such rules may be binding as the result of some unidentified source of legal obligation. Or- is this language a somewhat veiled reference to international human rights law (IHRL) obligations that mirror LOW rules? And, this apparent uncertainty was said to be exacerbated by the following portion of the same paragraph: "Certain prohibitions and certain other rules in the law of war that reflect customary international law have been described as reflecting 'elementary considerations of humanity'. These 'elementary considerations of humanity' have been understood to be 'even more exacting in peace than in war'. Thus, these legal standards, at a minimum, must be adhered to in all circumstances." Again, it was asked-what is the legal basis for such a statement? Paragraph 3.2.: Situations to Which the LOW Applies. This paragraph again states that the LOW establishes "rules governing the resort to force (jus ad bellum). And, once again, for the reasons previously stated, objection was taken to the Manual's inclusion of jus ad bellum principles in its definition of the LOW. Paragraph 3.3.1.1.: Application of Jus in bello Rules Does Not Necessarily Affect the Legal Status of the Parties. "Although the legal status of an opponent affects the character of the conflict and what rules apply as a matter of law, the application of jus in bello rules does not necessarily affect the legal status of parties to a conflict. For example, a belligerent may, as a policy matter, afford a person POW protections and treatment without affording that person legal status as a POW. Similarly, the application of humanitarian rules, such as those reflected in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, towards enemy non-state armed groups does not affect their legal status (e.g., such application does not amount to recognizing the group as lawful belligerents or as the legitimate government of a State)." This language triggered the contention that this paragraph represented, in fact, simply a U.S. attempt to set forth, as established 19

LOW rules, the process through which it has chosen to deal with al Qaeda, its members, and the Taliban government of Afghanistan, post-911. As such, it establishes the foundation for the Manual's treatment of non-international armed conflict contained in Chapter 17, one which sets forth a U.S. re-definition of the commonly understood meaning of NIAC as spoken to in Pictet's Commentary to Common Article 3 and Protocol Additional II to the '49 Conventions. However, a decision was once again made to table any extended assessment of this contentious issue until discussion of Chapter 17 itself. Paragraph 3.3.2.: Unrecognized Governments. "Even if a State does not recognize an opponent as the legitimate government of a State, under certain circumstances, rules of international armed conflict may apply to a conflict between a State and a government that it does not recognize. For example, members of the regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the Detaining Power nonetheless would be entitled to POW status if they fall into the power of the enemy during international armed conflict." In view of this statement, the question was posed as to how this language could be reconciled with the USG decision to not afford POW status and protections to members of the Taliban government's armed forces. Was this decision based on a conclusion that the Taliban armed forces were not "regular armed forces", in that they failed to meet certain criteria said to be required of such forces? If so, would it not have been beneficial to explain this fact in a supporting footnote? Paragraph 3.3.3.2.: Assertion of War Powers by a State Engaged in Hostilities Against a Non-State Armed Group. "Occasionally, a State that has been engaged in hostilities against a non-state armed group has taken actions that have recognized the belligerency of the non- State armed group, at least for certain purposes. For example, President Lincoln' proclamation of a blockade during the U.S. Civil War was viewed as recognizing the existence of a state of war, at least for the purposes of imposing the blockade of foreign vessels seeking to trade with the Confederacy." The accuracy of the use of the U.S. blockade of the Confederacy as an illustrative example of the point being made in this paragraph was questioned. It was noted that, while the paragraph suggests that it was President Lincoln's assertion of war powers and recognition of a state of war that led to the recognition of the Confederate States as a belligerent, it was, in fact, the de facto nature of the rebellion that led 20

the Supreme Court to conclude that the exercise of authority derived from the jus belli was within the President's constitutional authority. This, it was submitted, is consistent with the view that LOW applicability is primarily a constitutive, rather than a declarative, test. Paragraph 3.3.4.: AP I Provision on National Liberation Movements. "AP I treats as international armed conflicts 'armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination'. The United States has strongly objected to this provision as making the applicability of the rules of international armed conflict turn on subjective and politicized criteria that would eliminate the distinction between international and non-international conflicts. The Unites States has understood these types of conflicts to be non-international armed conflicts." Why, it was asked, reference only the U.S. objection to this provision of Protocol I? Might it not be beneficial if the Reservations and Statements of Understanding made in connection with this provision by any number of State Parties to this Protocol are also cited? Paragraph 3.4.1.: Intent-Based Test for Applying Jus in Bello Rules. "Jus in bello rules apply when a party intends to conduct hostilities. If a State chooses to go to war, then it is bound by jus in bello rules for the conduct of those hostilities. For example, if a State considers it necessary to respond to attacks with military force, then those military operations must comply with jus in bello rules." The text of this paragraph and its supporting footnote elicited a number of comments. The view was expressed that this was a dangerously overly broad statement. As currently written, it would appear to suggest that any use of military force (and no distinction is made as to whether the force employed is under national or state authority) in response to a domestic threat is an invocation of "war" power, indicating the existence of an armed conflict. It was also noted that, while it was true that the use of military force or the intent to use such force is certainly an indicator of armed conflict, in order to avoid circular logic, it must be recognized that the use of force, alone, is not dispositive of the existence of an armed conflict; that is, not every use of force constitutes an armed conflict. Given this fact, this section of the Manual should emphasize that the determination of the existence of an armed conflict should be driven by a fact-specific, totality-of-thecircumstances approach. 21

Additionally, the question was posed as to why, in fact, the obligation to apply jus in bello rules was "intent-based" when a State makes a determination to resort to the use of force. That is, why does there appear to be a perceived need to determine, often somewhat subjectively, a State's "intent" to conduct hostilities? Why not: "When" a State uses military force, it must apply jus in bello rules--in the case of both international and non-international armed conflicts. The observation was also made that the third sentence in this paragraph is supported by footnote 49, the content of which appears to be somewhat of a non-sequitur. Referring to the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the footnote speaks to a November, 2001 Opinion of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, which states that the U.S. had determined that it was necessary to respond to these attacks with military force. This, the Opinion notes, was significant, "... because one element often cited for determining whether a situation involving a non-state actor rises to the level of an "armed conflict" (for example, for purposes of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions) is whether a state responds with its regular military forces." At issue, here, is the fact that the "element" referenced, a State's response to an armed attack through the use of its regular military forces, is, per Pictet's Commentary to Common Article 3, a principal factor to be considered in determining whether the level of violence occurring within a State has risen to the level of a non-international armed conflict; that is, whether the violence in issue has transitioned into a civil war. In contrast, the initial U.S. response to the 9-11 attacks, its use of military force against Afghanistan, was considered an international armed conflict. Accordingly, the statement contained in the OLC Opinion referenced in footnote 49 would appear to be a misnomer, in that it relates to determining the existence of a NIAC, rather than an IAC. As such, it would appear to be a poor choice to offer in support of the fundamental point being put forward in this section of the Manual. Paragraph 3.4.2.: Act-Based Test for Applying Jus in Bello Rules. "The United States has interpreted "armed conflict" in Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to include...'any situation in which there is hostile action between the armed forces of two parties, regardless of the duration, intensity or scope of the fighting.'" This provision of the Manual elicited the observation that this was not a universally accepted interpretation of "armed conflict". It was recommended, accordingly, that it be noted, at least by means of 22