ISIS Foreign Fighters An Econometric Analysis on the Global Flow of Militants Joining the Islamic State AUGUST 8, 2016
Global Impact Strategies uses predictive analytics and decision science to help solve the world s most challenging problems. We deliver forecasts with high accuracy and speed by combining advanced mathematical and economic modeling with expertise in game theory and political science. Visit gistrat.com to learn more. Contributors Ali Fisunoglu, PhD, Associate Analyst Ryan Greer, Policy Advisor
1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Summary Map of the Global Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS Variables That Affect the Flow of Foreign Fighters Other Factors gistrat Measured That Were Theorized to be Significant in Academic Literature The Global Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS Conclusion Appendix A: Methodology Appendix B: The Likelihood of Joining ISIS Appendix C: The Determinants of the Number of ISIS Foreign Fighters Appendix D: Country Ranking of Foreign Fighters per Total Population Appendix E: Country Ranking of Foreign Fighters per Muslim Population Bibliography
Summary ISIS has recruited more than 30,000 fighters from over sixty-five countries. These recruits pose a critical threat far beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria through fighters who return to their home countries to carry out terrorist attacks. It is crucial to understand why foreign fighters join ISIS in order to combat this global security risk. gistrat performed several macro level econometric analyses on 158 countries using political, social, economic, and demographic variables in order to understand both the factors that affect the likelihood of citizens joining ISIS and the determinants for the overall number of ISIS foreign fighters from those countries. Sociopolitical and demographic factors strongly impact an individual s propensity to join ISIS, more so than economic factors. Specific sociopolitical and demographic factors indicating the propensity to join ISIS include: Degree of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity Severity of religious fractionalization Existence of populist, anti-western news reports Accessibility of international networks Stance of government toward Bashar al-assad Further analyses separated Muslim-majority countries from non-muslim majority countries to determine whether the relative size of the Muslim population affected individuals propensities to join ISIS. The results indicate that Muslim-majority and non-muslim majority countries demonstrate minor variations on the salience of certain characteristics including the stance of a government toward Bashar al-assad. 1
Map of the Global Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS GERMANY Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 192.24 Number of Foreign Fighters: 760 SWEDEN Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 507.5 Number of Foreign Fighters: 300 RUSSIA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 144.6 Number of Foreign Fighters: 2400 NUMBER OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS UNITED KINGDOM Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 268.95 Number of Foreign Fighters: 760 NETHERLANDS Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 223.39 Number of Foreign Fighters: 220 BELGIUM Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 826.60 Number of Foreign Fighters: 470 AUSTRIA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 653.47 Number of Foreign Fighters: 266 AZERBAIJAN Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 17.07 Number of Foreign Fighters: 160 KAZAKHSTAN Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 28.32 Number of Foreign Fighters: 300 UZBEKISTAN Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 17.74 Number of Foreign Fighters: 500 30 2,000 FRANCE Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 333.18 Number of Foreign Fighters: 1700 KYRGYZ REPUBLIC Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 107.6 Number of Foreign Fighters: 500 UNITED STATES Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 68.56 Number of Foreign Fighters: 200 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 159.56 Number of Foreign Fighters: 273 SPAIN Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 136.39 Number of Foreign Fighters: 191 MOROCCO Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 39.20 Number of Foreign Fighters: 1350 TURKMENISTAN Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 24.37 Number of Foreign Fighters: 360 CHINA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 8.7 Number of Foreign Fighters: 300 TAJIKISTAN Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 49.47 Number of Foreign Fighters: 386 4,000 6,500 TUNISIA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 577.19 Number of Foreign Fighters: 6500 INDONESIA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 8.7 Number of Foreign Fighters: 300 FOREIGN FIGHTERS / MILLION MUSLIMS ALGERIA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 4.93 Number of Foreign Fighters: 197 TURKEY Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 26.75 Number of Foreign Fighters: 2100 LIBYA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 97.77 Number of Foreign Fighters: 600 SAUDI ARABIA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 82.86 Number of Foreign Fighters: 2500 PAKISTAN Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 1.08 Number of Foreign Fighters: 200 26.3 826.6 LEBANON Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 278.33 Number of Foreign Fighters: 900 EGYPT Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 9.91 Number of Foreign Fighters: 800 JORDAN Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 299.39 Number of Foreign Fighters: 2250 AUSTRALIA Foreign Fighters / Million Muslims: 345.0 Number of Foreign Fighters: 187 2
Variables That Affect the Flow of Foreign Fighters Religious Fractionalization Proved More Significant than Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization According to our analysis, religious fractionalization and ethno-linguistic homogeneity most strongly influence both the likelihood of joining ISIS and the number of fighters joining from an individual country. We observed that religiously fractionalized countries were more likely to have citizens join ISIS, whereas countries with greater ethno-linguistic fractionalization had fewer citizens who join ISIS. Put another way, countries which are religiously diverse are more likely to have citizens who join ISIS as foreign fighters, and the expected number of foreign fighters from these countries is higher. On the other hand, ethnic and linguistic diversity has the opposite impact. That is, countries that are ethnically and linguistically diverse are less likely to have at least one citizen join ISIS, and the expected number of foreign fighters from these countries is lower. This suggests that the process of integration becomes more challenging for the Muslim minority and catalyzes radicalization when a country is ethnically and linguistically homogenous but religiously diverse. We observe that these variables are still significant for Muslim-majority countries, though less so than for non-muslim majority countries. Effects of Populist, Anti-Western Reporting gistrat s analysis demonstrates that the existence of populist, anti-western reporting measured by the presence of foreign populist, anti-western news bureaus that can exacerbate specific Sunni grievances substantially increases the probability of having at least one foreign fighter join ISIS from a particular country, especially for countries where Islam is not the primary religion. However, while measurable, the effect of populist anti-western reporting on the number of citizens who join ISIS from a given country is rather small. This result explains how ISIS can find and mobilize supporters from countries as far as Argentina, Brazil, and New Zealand, even though the number of recruits from such countries is small. International Networks Help Produce Foreign Fighters but Do Not Determine Numbers International networks provide financing or support for those who wish to join ISIS. Muslim-majority countries that have strong diasporas measured by the amount of money sent home by citizens living abroad (i.e. per-capita remittances) are more likely to supply foreign fighters to ISIS. Our findings indicate the effect of international networks on the number of foreign fighters is only significant (and positive) for Muslim-majority countries such as Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkic states in Central Asia. 3
Stance of the Government Toward Bashar al-assad Influences Number of Fighters If a non-muslim country s government took an official stance against Bashar al-assad, more people from that country can be expected to join ISIS. The government of a Muslim-majority country s position toward Assad did not affect the likelihood of citizens joining ISIS, nor did it affect the expected number of foreign fighters. Other Factors gistrat Measured That Were Theorized to Be Significant in Academic Literature Distance to Syria and Iraq Countries that are geographically closer to Syria and Iraq are assumed to have more foreign fighters because it is physically easier and less costly for them to reach ISIS strongholds. Our analysis demonstrated that this proposition is not true. The proximity of a country to Syria and Iraq does not significantly affect whether its citizens will become foreign fighters. International networks and linkages appear to be more important than geographic proximity for facilitating the flow of foreign fighters. Democracy and Civil Liberties It is also assumed that individuals are more likely to join ISIS when they are not able to freely participate in politics and express their opinions and beliefs. We found this is also not true. The flow of foreign fighters is not associated with the level of democracy or repression of civil liberties and political rights in a country. In short, a country s political characteristics and freedoms are not correlated with the propensity to join ISIS. Economic Grievances We also investigated the potential effect of economic grievances on the tendency to join ISIS. We do not find any significant relationship between economic factors and the likelihood of joining ISIS after examining factors such as overall unemployment rate, youth unemployment rate, and economic inequality. 4
The Global Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS Total Number of Foreign Fighters Per Country Tunisia 1 6500 Saudi Arabia Russia Jordan Turkey 2 3 4 5 2500 2400 2250 2100 France 6 1700 Morocco 7 1350 Lebanon Egypt Germany United Kingdom Indonesia Libya Kyrgyz Republic Uzbekistan Belgium Tajikistan Turkmenistan China Kazakhstan Sweden Bosnia and Herzegovina Austria Netherlands Pakistan United States Algeria Spain Australia 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 900 800 760 760 600 600 500 500 470 386 360 300 300 300 273 266 220 200 200 197 191 187 Azerbaijan 30 160 5
Tunisia Tunisia is the top supplier of ISIS foreign fighters both in absolute terms (with at least 6,500 fighters) and per capita terms (with 571.4 foreign fighters per every million Tunisian citizens). Tunisia is religiously, linguistically, and ethnically homogenous, but its population is 98% Sunni; its citizens have strong ties to the Tunisian diaspora in countries like France, Italy, and Libya; and its government and media promote anti-assad discourse three factors that make it the largest supplier of ISIS fighters. Tunisia suffered three major terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS militants in 2015, killing 74 people and injuring 105. Saudi Arabia There are more than 2,500 Saudi foreign fighters, or 77.7 fighters per every million Saudi citizens, making Saudi Arabia the second largest source of ISIS foreign fighters. Saudi Arabia is a prosperous country with a predominantly Muslim population. However, due to the foreign workers living in Saudi Arabia, it is moderately diverse both ethnically and linguistically. Moreover, the government and the media promote a strong anti-assad and anti-western rhetoric, which fuels radical movements within the country. At least five ISIS-related terrorist attacks mainly on Shiite targets took place since 2014, killing at least 42 people. Russia There are at least 2,400 foreign fighters from Russia in ISIS, equaling 16.7 fighters per every million Russian citizens. Along with Iran, the Russian government is the biggest ally of Bashar al-assad. Russia is a religiously diverse country: Muslims constitute approximately 11.6 percent of the Russian population, making Islam the second largest religion. A strong anti-assad and anti-western tone in Russian government and media, along with a history of Muslim grievances (especially in Chechnya and Dagestan), boosts the radicalization of Russian citizens and recruitment to ISIS. There is considerable ISIS activity in the North Caucasus, including at least two attacks in the Dagestan region. ISIS also claimed responsibility for downing a Russian passenger jet in Egypt, killing at least 224 people. Turkey At least 2,100 people from Turkey joined ISIS, equaling 26.4 foreign fighters per every million Turkish citizens. Though Turkey is ethnically and linguistically diverse and religiously homogenous, its strong international networks and the widespread promotion of anti-assad and anti-western discourse by the government and media motivates a significant number of citizens to join ISIS. As a neighbor of Syria, Turkey has been one of the major actors in the civil war there, and it is one of the primary entry points to Syria for foreign fighters joining ISIS. Its longstanding war with the Kurdish rebels further complicates Turkey s geo-political situation. Today Turkey is recovering from an attempted coup while fighting Bashar al-assad, ISIS, the Kurdish opposition simultaneously. As Turkey intensified its fight against ISIS, ISIS hit back at Turkey with several terrorist and cross-border attacks, killing at least 200 people. 6
France At least 1,700 people from France joined ISIS, equaling 26.3 foreign fighters per every million French citizens. France is a wealthy Western country with low levels of inequality and unemployment. However, an ethnically and linguistically homogenous France has had problems integrating its Muslim citizens who comprise 7.9% of the population, leading to several riots over the last ten years. Muslim citizens strong ties with their home countries, and the anti-assad stance of the French government, further boosted the social alienation and radicalization of some French citizens and motivated them to join ISIS. ISIS carried out several terrorist attacks in France, killing more than 100 people. Conclusion Using a comprehensive data set and econometric models, gistrat provides a systematic analysis of the relationship between ISIS foreign fighters and various economic, social, political, and demographic factors. Our results indicate that, in contrast with popular opinion and previous peer-reviewed studies, factors related to economic equality and political freedoms are not the primary motivators for individuals who join ISIS. In fact, plenty of foreign fighters originate from economically developed countries with functioning democratic institutions. Our analysis shows that demographic and social characteristics especially religious and political grievances drive the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS. 7
Appendix A: Methodology gistrat applied Logit regressions to analyze the likelihood of joining ISIS, and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to analyze the determinants of the number of foreign fighters. For the Logit regressions, the dependent variable took the value 1 if there was at least one foreign fighter from a specific country and 0 otherwise. For the OLS regressions, we took the natural log of the number of foreign fighters to normalize the data and satisfied the normality assumption of OLS. Appropriate diagnostic tests were carried out to ensure that multicollinerity was not a problem, and robust standard errors were used to eliminate the potential problem of heteroskedasticity. Autocorrelation is not an issue in this analysis as the data used is cross-sectional. 8
Appendix B: The Likelihood of Joining ISIS Variables Foreign Fighters Foreign Fighters (Other countries) Foreign Fighters (Muslim countries) Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization -3.951*** -1.658-2.477 (1.389) (1.871) (3.557) Religious Fractionaliz. 2.753** 2.048 9.480 (1.360) (1.819) (6.333) Conflict in 2013 or 2014 0.676 0.152 2.388 (0.674) (1.058) (1.594) GDP per Capita (in $1000) 0.0652*** 0.0670*** 0.419** (0.0169) (0.0226) (0.210) Remittances per Capita -0.00132* -0.00228** 0.0301* (0.000771) (0.00105) (0.0158) Log of Distance to Syria-Iraq -0.0381 0.0887-0.650 (0.401) (0.587) (1.024) Civil Liberties -0.0294-0.155 1.481 (0.177) (0.223) (0.951) Youth Male Unemployment 0.00830 0.0232 0.0730 (0.0227) (0.0281) (0.0943) Percentage of Sunnis 0.0521*** -0.0180 0.203** (0.0122) (0.0387) (0.0936) Islam as the 2 nd Religion 2.033*** 2.779*** (0.618) (0.926) Anti-Assad -0.923-2.320 (0.966) (2.084) Al Jazeera Offices 1.145** 1.576** 0.00782 (0.486) (0.643) (1.441) Constant -2.987-4.320-24.35* (3.832) (5.282) (14.00) Observations 158 114 41 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 9
Appendix C: The Determinants of the Number of ISIS Foreign Fighters Variables Log of Foreign Fighters Log of Foreign Fighters (other countries) Log of Foreign Fighters (Muslim countries) Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization -3.662*** -2.072** -3.405 (0.925) (0.970) (3.423) Religious Fractionaliz. 2.086*** 1.424* 2.260 (0.748) (0.852) (2.051) Conflict in 2013 or 2014 0.851* 0.837 0.371 (0.510) (0.646) (1.184) GDP per Capita (in $1000) 0.0365*** 0.0443*** 0.0314* (0.00858) (0.00991) (0.0169) Remittances per Capita -4.51e-05-0.000898 0.00412** (0.000847) (0.000724) (0.00195) Log of Distance to Syria-Iraq 0.0275 0.233-0.328 (0.289) (0.257) (0.859) Civil Liberties 0.0249 0.0362 0.303 (0.121) (0.140) (0.341) Youth Male Unemployment 0.0157 0.0239 0.0231 (0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0757) Percentage of Sunnis 0.0492*** 0.00860 0.0642*** (0.00835) (0.0258) (0.0139) Islam as the 2 nd Religion 1.466*** 1.681*** (0.366) (0.432) Anti-Assad 0.316 1.977* 0.0204 (0.809) (1.132) (1.533) Al Jazeera Offices 0.324* 0.141 0.0370 (0.195) (0.215) (1.393) Constant -0.503-2.456-0.532 (2.791) (2.495) (7.721) Observations 158 117 41 R-squared 0.531 0.571 0.504 Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 10
Appendix D: Country Ranking of Foreign Fighters per Total Population Country Number of Foreign Fighters Foreign Fighters / Total Population Country Number of Foreign Fighters 1 Tunisia 6500 571.42 34 Australia 187 7.69 2 Maldives 130 351.53 35 Serbia 60 6.81 3 Jordan 2250 290.41 36 Switzerland 57 6.80 4 Lebanon 900 150.30 37 Ireland 30 6.36 5 Libya 600 94.78 38 Somalia 70 6.32 6 Kyrgyz Republic 500 82.87 39 Israel 45 5.49 7 Saudi Arabia 2500 77.74 40 Algeria 197 4.88 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 273 71.80 41 Qatar 10 4.36 9 Turkmenistan 360 66.19 42 Spain 191 4.15 10 Macedonia 123 59.11 43 Canada 130 3.58 11 Montenegro 30 47.92 44 Malaysia 100 3.25 12 Tajikistan 386 44.52 45 Indonesia 600 2.30 13 Belgium 470 41.33 46 Sudan 85 2.06 14 Albania 120 41.33 47 United Arab Emirates 15 1.62 15 Morocco 1350 38.77 48 Afghanistan 50 1.50 16 Trinidad and Tobago 50 36.63 49 Italy 87 1.45 17 Austria 266 31.04 50 New Zealand 6 1.31 18 Sweden 300 30.45 51 Portugal 12 1.16 19 Turkey 2100 26.37 52 Pakistan 200 1.04 20 France 1700 26.29 53 Philippines 100 0.98 21 Denmark 125 21.97 54 United States 200 0.62 22 Kuwait 70 17.47 55 Argentina 23 0.52 23 Kazakhstan 300 16.80 56 Singapore 2 0.35 24 Russia 2400 16.73 57 Moldova 1 0.25 25 Uzbekistan 500 16.50 58 China 300 0.22 26 Azerbaijan 160 16.21 59 Madagascar 3 0.12 27 Finland 77 13.94 60 Japan 9 0.07 28 Norway 70 13.28 61 Cambodia 1 0.06 29 Netherlands 220 12.96 62 Romania 1 0.05 30 Georgia 50 12.56 63 India 34 0.03 31 United Kingdom 760 11.67 64 South Africa 1 0.02 32 Germany 760 9.42 65 Brazil 3 0.01 33 Egypt 800 8.57 Foreign Fighters / Total Population 11
Appendix E: Country Ranking of Foreign Fighters per Muslim Population Country Number of Foreign Fighters Foreign Fighters / Muslim Population Country Number of Foreign Fighters 1 Finland 77 3097.65 34 Brazil 3 71.58 2 Ireland 30 1097.25 35 United States 200 68.56 3 Belgium 470 826.60 36 Albania 120 65.60 4 Trinidad and Tobago 50 728.25 37 Tajikistan 386 49.47 5 Austria 266 653.47 38 Japan 9 47.50 6 Norway 70 650.87 39 Morocco 1350 39.20 7 Tunisia 6500 577.19 40 Argentina 23 34.74 8 Denmark 125 547.77 41 Kazakhstan 300 28.32 9 Sweden 300 507.52 42 Israel 45 27.48 10 Maldives 130 358.70 43 Turkey 2100 26.75 11 Australia 187 344.96 44 Kuwait 70 19.00 12 France 1700 333.18 45 Uzbekistan 500 17.74 13 Jordan 2250 299.39 46 Philippines 100 17.62 14 Lebanon 900 278.33 47 Azerbaijan 160 17.07 15 United Kingdom 760 268.95 48 Romania 1 12.90 16 Montenegro 30 250.74 49 Egypt 800 9.91 17 Netherlands 220 223.39 50 Qatar 10 9.29 18 Serbia 60 219.62 51 China 300 8.68 19 Germany 760 192.24 52 Moldova 1 6.84 20 Canada 130 184.67 53 Somalia 70 6.35 21 Macedonia 123 172.82 54 Malaysia 100 5.33 22 Switzerland 57 165.51 55 Algeria 197 4.93 23 Bosnia and Herzegovina 273 159.56 56 Cambodia 1 3.29 24 Russia 2400 144.61 57 Sudan 85 2.91 25 Portugal 12 137.01 58 Indonesia 600 2.74 26 Spain 191 136.39 59 Singapore 2 2.47 27 Georgia 50 126.90 60 United Arab Emirates 15 2.40 28 Italy 87 125.42 61 Madagascar 3 2.20 29 New Zealand 6 117.35 62 Afghanistan 50 1.50 30 Kyrgyz Republic 500 107.59 63 Pakistan 200 1.08 31 Libya 600 97.77 64 South Africa 1 1.08 32 Saudi Arabia 2500 82.86 65 India 34 0.19 33 Turkmenistan 360 74.37 Foreign Fighters / Muslim Population 12
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