THE NEW TURKEY AND U.S. POLICY SONER CAGAPTAY. a washington institute strategic report

THE NEW TURKEY AND U.S. POLICY SONER CAGAPTAY a washington institute strategic report

THE NEW TURKEY AND U.S. POLICY SONER CAGAPTAY strategic report 11 JANUARY 2013

the author wishes to thank Vanessa and Tony Beyer in particular, as well as Yvonne and Michael Silverman, for their dedication to his work and the mission of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Design: 1000colors.org Cover: The stylized signature of Sultan Mahmud II of the Ottoman Empire, written in expressive calligraphy, reads Mahmud Khan son of Abdülhamid is forever victorious. The calligraphic arts held a prestigious status under the Ottomans.

Contents The Author v 1. Introduction 1 2. The AKP s Turkey 3 3. Lessons for Washington 14 Map: Kurdish Population in Turkey vs. Support for Kurdish Nationalist Party 8

The Author Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. A historian by training, he has written extensively on U.S.-Turkey relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals and major international print media, including the Wall Street Journal and the International Herald Tribune. He is a regular columnist for Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey s oldest and most influential English-language paper, and a contributor to CNN s Global Public Square blog. He appears regularly on Fox News, CNN, NPR, Voice of America, al-jazeera, BBC, CNN-Turk, and al-hurra. Dr. Cagaptay is the recipient of numerous honors, grants, and chairs, among them the Smith-Richardson, Mellon, Rice, and Leylan fellowships, as well as the Ertegun chair at Princeton. He has also served on contract as chair of the Turkey Advanced Area Studies Program at the State Department s Foreign Service Institute. In 2012 he was named an American Turkish Society Young Society Leader. v

Chapter 1 Introduction In the past decade, Turkey has experienced a dramatic transformation under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the AKP has moved the country away from the trend toward Westernization begun in the late eighteenth century under the Ottoman sultans and reinforced by several decades of secularism in the name of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Since coming to power in 2002, the Islamist AKP has reversed statutes mandating the strict separation of religion, government, and education. Along with these fundamental domestic changes, Turkey has aligned itself with the neighboring states of the Muslim Middle East, a far cry from the Kemalist republic that viewed itself as a European country accidentally set down in the Middle East. Turkey s Islamization, however, has been moderated by the country s existing orientation. Even the AKP and its Islamist partners cannot escape Western realities such as the role of women in society and Turkey s NATO membership, not to mention forces in the global economy pulling Turkey westward. And recent events have pulled Turkey back toward the West, despite the AKP s ideological vision. Particularly since the Arab Spring began in early 2011, regional instability has made Turkey s access to NATO a valuable commodity. As a result, Ankara has lately pivoted away from its neighbors, and the corresponding notion of Muslim solidarity, and toward NATO and Washington. A striking example of this shift was Turkey s 2010 decision to join NATO s missile defense project aimed at protecting alliance members against missiles from Iran as well as China, Russia, and elsewhere. Further accelerating Turkey s pivot toward NATO has been the civil war in Syria. When Damascus shot down a Turkish plane in June 2012, Turkey swiftly sought NATO assistance calling alliance members for consultation. Continued unrest in the Middle East, along with competition against Iran to influence developments in Iraq and Syria, will only encourage Ankara s move toward NATO, as well as the United States. 1

2 n Soner Cagaptay These events, and the country s deep Western roots, suggest Turkey and the other Muslim countries in the Middle East may be headed in different directions. While Egypt, for example, lacks its own Western, secular tradition and therefore may be more susceptible to becoming thoroughly Islamized, Turkey is likely to comprise a blend of Western ways and Islamist politics. Such a hybrid would make it one of a kind. At home in Turkey, the various factions from right to left, religious to secular, will have to find a modus vivendi. If nothing else, the sheer numbers who support the opposition will necessitate such coexistence. In the most recent national elections, 35 percent of voters, totaling almost twenty-seven million people, supported lists other than the AKP (which received more than 49 percent) and other Islamist and conservative parties (15 percent). This secularist bloc will provide an enduring check on Turkey s Islamization. Even though the AKP will likely retain power for another decade, during which it will continue to mold the country in its Islamist image, the new Turkey will retain its diversity: a bit Islamist, a bit secularist, a bit conservative, and a bit Western. This scenario presents Washington with a unique set of opportunities, but taking advantage of them can only be achieved through understanding the nuances of Turkish society and its leadership.

Chapter 2 The AKP s Turkey Turkey is rising, thanks to dizzying economic growth. As recently as a decade ago, the average Turk had one-fifth the income of the average European. Today, Turks are only 30 percent less wealthy than citizens of the European Union (EU) are. 1 Further, Turks have more purchasing power than do citizens of certain EU member countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, and Latvia. 2 Given Europe s financial doldrums, Turkey could realize, in coming years, its four-hundred-year-old dream of becoming Western by catching up with the West. Turkey s race with the West might be dated to 1683, when the Europeans crushed the Ottoman Empire s mighty army in Vienna. The quest to catch up took many forms. During the Ottoman Empire s tulip period in the early eighteenth century, for instance, the sultans built gardens to emulate Versailles and factories to mimic those of the industrial revolution, hoping to replicate Western Europe in Istanbul. In the early twentieth century, the Young Turks emerged to transform the Ottoman Empire into a constitutional monarchy, again following contemporary European trends. Ataturk, too, followed Europe during the early part of the twentieth century. Modern Turkey s founder turned to contemporary France for inspiration, striving to make Turkey a secular republic. Ataturk enshrined the principle of laicite (i.e., European secularism) into the new Turkish constitution, mandating a firewall between religion and politics. Ataturk had nearly complete political freedom: having liberated Turkey from Allied occupation at the end of World War I, the Turkish leader enjoyed immense clout and the backing of his military. In the second half of the twentieth century, Turkey joined NATO and became a multiparty democracy, anchoring itself in the West during the Cold 1 Turkey s actual individual consumption (AIC) stands at 58, while the European average is set at 100. These figures correspond to actual goods consumed by households. See Eurostat, GDP Per Capita in the Member States Ranged from 45 Percent to 274 Percent of the EU27 Average in 2011, news release, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ity_public/2-20062012-ap/en/2-20062012-ap-en.pdf. 2 Ibid. 3

4 n Soner Cagaptay War. Ankara also launched itself on the path to EU membership, though that dream remains unfulfilled five decades after the application was filed. It was Turkey s catch-up game with the West, and the ensuing experience with multiparty government, that brought the AKP to power in 2002. But in the past decade, Ataturk s laicite model has largely collapsed as a result of the deep religious principles underlying the AKP. At the same time, the ruling party has continued to pursue Turkey s long-held dream of catching up with the West in the economic sphere. And the results have been impressive. Since 2002, Turkey s economic output has nearly tripled. 3 Buoyed by this growth, Ankara has set its sights on joining the world s ten largest economies within the next decade. Yet to attain this goal, Turkey would need to grow at more than 8 percent annually until 2023. 4 Adding to the challenge, according to some experts, Turkey may hit the middle income trap and face difficulty ascending the ladder with the same momentum as it did during the past decade. 5 Still, the age-old dream appears nearer than ever before: Turkey has recently joined the trillion dollar plus economies of Europe, placing Ankara in an elite club that includes France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain. Can Turkey parlay its economic strengths into something more, such as status as the twenty-first century s first Muslim power, with new political clout in its neighborhood and potentially across the world? Relatedly, what effect has the past decade had on the country s Western political slant, with its preoccupation with the sultans and Ataturk alike? The answers to these questions depend on how the political elites in Ankara play their hands. Today, Turkey faces a range of stress tests over its competence as a global actor as well as its commitments to Western interests and values. At the forefront of these challenges is the Syrian crisis, with the instability spilling into Turkey and creating friction with Washington. In Syria, and other Arab states, the rise of political Islam is both an opportunity for Turkey and a temptation that could lure the country away from its Western principles. Similarly, Turkey s broken ties with 3 World Bank, World databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. 4 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Turkey s 2023 Economic Goal in Global Perspective (Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, June 2011), http://www.imd.org/research/centers/eviangroup/upload /Turkey-s-2023-Eco-Goal-in-global-perspective.pdf. 5 The middle income trap can be defined as a plateau for emerging economies at which rising labor costs and the inability to produce needed income from high-tech industries result in lethargic growth. Such a plateau occurs after such economies initially witness strong growth thanks to low labor costs and an ability to attract investment in labor-intensive industries. See Esen Caglar, The European Union Has to Be Turkey s Growth Story, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), March 19, 2012, http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/kose-yazisi-tepav/s/3158.

The New Turkey and U.S. Policy n 5 Israel and its cold war with Cyprus are standing in the way of a closer union with its other Western neighbors. Turkey s emergence as an economic powerhouse over the past decade can be traced to the country s successful blending of its traditional connections to European economies with those of other states situated within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In other words, Turkey has kept itself open to Europe, attracting significant investment from the continent, 6 while at the same time seeking to harness the growth in emerging markets, particularly those in Muslim-majority countries. The shift toward the East, however, is noteworthy. Whereas 56 percent of Turkey s trade was with Europe in 2007, that figure is down to 42 percent today. 7 Trade with countries in the Middle East and North Africa, meanwhile, has increased from 13 percent in 2002 to 26 percent today, with the proportion continuing to rise. 8 With states in sub-saharan Africa, Turkish trade has gone from less than $1 billion annually in 2000 to more than $17 billion today. 9 This diversification has contributed to Ankara s economic rise, as demonstrated by Turkey s robust 5.3 percent growth over the past decade, compared with 1.3 percent for the EU. 10 On the trade front, Turkey has had the best of both worlds, simultaneously taking advantage of its proximity to Europe and its affinity with Muslim societies. A decade of stability under the AKP, then, has surely had its drawbacks, including increasingly authoritarian rule by a single party, but it has also helped build the foundation for economic growth. All the same, one might conclude that the Turkish model of success reflects poorly on the nation s political system, with history indicating that Turkey only prospers when under single-party rule while suffering political and economic spasms when ruled by coalition governments. Indeed, the country saw political stability under the Democrat Party (DP) in the 1950s and the Motherland Party (ANAP) during the 1980s, whereas instability rattled the coalition governments of the 1970s and 1990s. 6 Invest in Turkey, FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] in Turkey, http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-us/ investmentguide/investorsguide/pages/fdiinturkey.aspx. 7 Seyfettin Gursel, A Controversial Outlook on the Turkish Economy, paper presented at The U.S.- Turkey Commercial Relationship: A Growing Partnership, Hollings Center for International Dialogue, Istanbul, May 10, 2012 8 Ibid. 9 Turkish Foreign Ministry, Afrika Ulkeleri Ile Iliskiler, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrikailiskileri.tr.mfa. 10 World Bank, World databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.

6 n Soner Cagaptay In the past decade, with the exception of the fourth quarter of 2008 and the year 2009, 11 the Turkish economy has grown during every quarter all while Europe has faced the prospect of economic meltdown, with little growth. No wonder, then, that the Turks today feel more confident about their relationship to Europe and the West than they have in decades. I witnessed this confidence firsthand recently while chatting with a shopkeeper in Adana, a city in southern Turkey known for its fine cotton and the Incirlik Air Base, a hub of U.S. military operations in the Middle East. The shopkeeper told me that two of his uncles had migrated to Germany in the 1980s and 1990s to seek jobs, but that he was not interested in following in their footsteps because, as he put it, Turkey is so much better off than Europe now. This confidence has been at the root of Turkey s recent foreign policy doctrine dubbed strategic depth. Promoted by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the doctrine holds that Turkey s moment has come to ascend as a regional power. When Davutoglu first articulated his theory back in 2004, the AKP had just come to power and few in Washington had heard of Davutoglu, much less considered that the party would challenge Turkey s decades-old alignment with U.S. views in the Middle East. When I talked with Davutoglu in his small office in Ankara s ministerial quarter distinguished by its awkward blend of interwar architecture ranging from Mussolini-chic to Ottoman Turkish revival he explained, Turkey can become politically powerful again only if it utilizes the strategic depth of its neighborhood, developing better ties with those Muslim neighbors. Turkey s future power depends on having good ties with its Muslim neighbors, especially nearby Iran and Syria. Yet Turkey has realigned its foreign policy toward Syria and, to a lesser extent, Iran only to find that neither Damascus nor Tehran is Ankara s friend. The Syrian uprising, which Turkey supported almost from the beginning in 2011, has pushed Ankara to the opposite end of the Middle East spectrum vis-à-vis the Assad regime and its regional patron, Tehran. Tensions with Syria and Iran are serious concerns for Ankara. To begin with, Damascus has allowed the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been waging a war against Turkey since the 1970s, to operate inside Syria. When the hold of Bashar al-assad s regime over Syrian territory weakened in summer 2012, the PKK and its Syrian affiliate, the Party for Democratic Unity (PYD), moved in to take over towns along the border with Turkey. As a result, Ankara now has 11 Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), GNP-GDP with production method (1998 Base), http:// tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/ulusalhesapapp/ulusalhesap_ing.zul?tur=1.

The New Turkey and U.S. Policy n 7 to deal with the prospect of PKK-controlled cantons in post-assad Syria. Iran, too, has acted to retaliate against Turkey s Syria policy. In a successful attempt to punish Ankara, in September 2011, Tehran brokered a ceasefire with the Iranian branch of the PKK, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), against which it had hitherto been fighting, allowing the group to focus its energy against Turkey. Iranian and Syrian support to the PKK is now a major threat for Ankara: according to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, PKK-related violence has resulted in some seven hundred deaths since the summer of 2011. 12 These emerging threats and enemies in the Middle East constitute a political challenge for the AKP and the ascendant Turkey it has governed. Until recently, Davutoglu and the AKP were emboldened to pursue an independent foreign policy, at times opposing the United States and breaking with Europe on Middle East issues. But recent events in the region indicate a need for Ankara to achieve a more delicate balance. In reality, the country s economic miracle has been driven not by heedless independence but by a fine blend of political stability, European money, and access to emerging markets and Muslim-majority economies. If Ankara can now repeat this pattern in global politics embracing its Muslim identity, while providing political stability in its neighborhood and at the same time maintaining strong ties with Europe, the United States, and other Western societies it would truly fulfill the promise of a rising Turkey. Such a foreign policy would make Turkey valuable for its neighbors to the east and west alike. Muslim countries would see a model of a state that maintains its religious values while upholding Western-style institutions and culture, and Western nations would appreciate a Muslim-majority country that can act as a reliable partner. Turkey can rise as a regional power only if it is perceived as contributing value to its Muslim neighbors. Take, for instance, the perspective of Saudi Arabia. For Riyadh, the Turkey of the late 2000s, isolated from NATO and Washington, began to resemble a wealthy Yemen that is, a large Muslim nation that did little to enhance regional security. The AKP s Turkey appears to be coming to grips with this nuance, a realization that sparked Ankara s recent foreign policy turnaround. Accordingly, Turkey made the strategic choice in September 2010 to join NATO s missile defense project. Hindrances 12 International Crisis Group, Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement, September 11, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-akurdish-settlement.aspx.

ROMANIA Kurdish Population in Turkey vs. Sup BULGARIA Black Sea G R E E C E KIRKLARELI ISTANBUL TEKIRDAG ISTANBUL Sea of MarmaraYALOVA CANAKKALE BURSA EDIRNE KOCAELI BILECIK SAKARYA DUZCE BOLU ZONGULDAK BARTIN KARABUK KASTAMONU SINOP CANKIRI CORUM BALIKESIR MANISA IZMIR AYDIN MUGLA USAK DENIZLI ESKISEHIR KUTAHYA AFYONKARAHISAR ISPARTA BURDUR ANTALYA ANKARA KIRIKKALEYOZG KIRSEHIR Tuz Golu NEVSEHIR AKSARAY KONYA NIGDE AD KARAMAN Gulf of Antalya MERSIN CYPRUS Mediterranean Sea 0 200 miles 2013 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ISRAEL

port for Kurdish Nationalist Party GEORGIA SAMSUN AMASYA TOKAT ORDU GIRESUN RIZE TRABZON GUMUSHANE BAYBURT ARTVIN ERZURUM ARDAHAN KARS ARMENIA IGDIR AT KAYSERI SIVAS MALATYA ERZINCAN TUNCELI ELAZIG BINGOL MUS AGRI Van Golu BITLIS VAN IRAN ANA ADIYAMAN OSMANIYE GAZIANTEP SANLIURFA KAHRAMANMARAS DIYARBAKIR MARDIN BATMAN SIIRT SIRNAK HAKKARI HATAY KILIS Kurdish Population 0% 3% 5% 8% SYRIA 9% 35% 82% SYRIA LEBANON Support for BDP >50% 40% 50% 15% 40% JORDAN <15% I R A Q

10 n Soner Cagaptay remain, such as ruptured ties with Israel, but if Ankara can leverage its Muslim identity and Western traditions, thereby serving as an anchor of regional stability, the Turks could achieve global political greatness unseen since the Ottoman armies challenged Europe at the gates of Vienna. Other signs point to Turkey s rise as a Muslim world power. True, Turkey has the world s second-largest Muslim economy, slightly smaller than that of Indonesia (a country with over three times Turkey s population). What is more, Turkey has arguably the strongest conventional Muslim military force in the world though this may have changed following the Ergenekon case, which began in 2007 and resulted in the jailing of about a quarter of Turkey s generals, who faced allegations of a coup plot against the AKP government. The effectiveness of the present Turkish military is therefore yet to be tested on the battlefield. Still, because of its sheer size, with 75 million citizens and a $1.2 trillion economy, 13 Turkey is better positioned than any other Muslim-majority country to become the twenty-first century s first Muslim world power. Should Istanbul win the privilege of hosting the 2020 Olympic Games an outcome to be decided in September 2013 and that would entail beating Tokyo and Madrid the world will be reminded of Turkey s ascendance. In 2014, Turkey will become one of the twenty-four executive board members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a prestigious position that will further reflect the country s newfound economic might. Turkey s growing prosperity and opening to the world places it in a category similar to the much-discussed Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) bloc, but Turkey stands alone in several crucial respects as well, with possible implications for the United States. First, under the AKP, Turkey has embraced its Muslim identity, setting it apart as a self-defined Muslim power. Second, Turkey has unique historical bonds with Europe and the United States, making its BRIC-like rise specifically relevant for the future course of Western power and institutions. Indeed, for Turkey to sustain its rise, it will need to reintegrate into and take advantage of the Western international system. Such a process would be good news for America. And Turkey can only become a Muslim global power if it remains true to itself, synthesizing Islam and its Western orientation. For Ankara s policymakers, making such a case in the United Nations would bolster the country s chances of winning one of the rotating seats on the Security Council in 2014. 13 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Turkey, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html.

The New Turkey and U.S. Policy n 11 Similarly delicate work must be done at home if Ankara wishes to stay on the upswing globally. In particular, as reflected in the 2011 election results, which saw the AKP receiving just below 50 percent of the vote, the country is split between supporters and opponents of the present government and on the role of religion in politics. Secularists and liberals are deeply concerned about the threat that government-backed social conservatism poses to individual liberties. Unless the country heals this internal split, it will be difficult for Ankara to realize its potential to become a global player. This question has even greater currency considering that the country is now debating drafting its first-ever civilian-made constitution. If this new charter outlines the groundwork of true liberal democracy for instance, providing for freedom of religion as well as freedom from religion AKP supporters and opponents alike could feel welcome in the new Turkey. In return, a new social contract would enable Turkey to focus its energy overseas rather than being bogged down in domestic polarization. By drafting a liberal charter, Turkey could kill many birds with one stone. Not only would a new document provide space for people on both ends of the political spectrum, it would also allow Turkey to address its burning Kurdish problem, which has become even more pressing in recent years. The rise of Kurdish nationalism in Syria, Iraq, and Turkey and a spike in PKK attacks has sapped Turkey s energy. The most realistic remedy would be providing for broader cultural and individual rights to all citizens, including but not specific to the Kurds, within the framework of the new constitution. Such a formula would likely satisfy both nationalist Kurds and majority Turks who oppose group-specific rights for the Kurds. Alternatively, a failure to address the Kurdish issue would likely mean continued domestic and regional violence that would consume the country s energy in foreign policy and weaken its drive toward increased regional and global power. Last but not least, a new charter would allow Turkey to serve as a model for countries experiencing the Arab Spring, thereby burnishing its status as a regional power. Only by embracing the principles of liberal democracy for instance, by drafting a constitution that guarantees freedom of speech broadly defined, equal political rights for Muslims and non-muslims, as well as full gender equality can Ankara promote itself as a source of inspiration for its Arab and Muslim-majority neighbors, at least in the eyes of the West. If, on the other hand, Ankara mobilizes against any sign of pluralism that could challenge its will, even if the government is democratically elected, it could well make itself attractive to Islamist circles ascending to power in the Arab

12 n Soner Cagaptay world. Such a development would likely make Ankara s Western partners reluctant to support Ankara as a model for countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. Nor has Turkey s backing for causes antithetical to the West helped Ankara achieve its current strength, a reality of which the Turkish leadership is well aware. Instead, as implied elsewhere, the cornerstone of Turkey s rise has been the government s ability to foster stable political conditions for economic growth. And these conditions have included Turkey s image as a stable and regionally responsible country. Related policies have also helped the AKP win three successive elections, with increasing majorities. Naturally, the AKP wants to sustain its astounding electoral run in nationwide local elections slated for 2014, as well as presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Accordingly, policies such as confrontation with Israel or a military campaign in Syria without U.S. or NATO backing risk diminishing the very essence of Turkish power: its comparative stability in an uncertain region. This realization has been the catalyst for Ankara s recent careful balancing of East and West. In 2011, this effort played out in Turkey s relations with Israel. Following the bloodshed of the 2010 flotilla incident, in which Turkish activists were killed in an altercation with Israeli commandos, Ankara heeding requests from the White House refused to authorize a second flotilla. The desire to maintain the country s image as a stable and responsible nation has tempered, and will continue to temper, overly adventurous impulses on the part of Turkey s leadership. Turkish leaders also recognize that the country s continued economic success is not assured. Kemal Dervis, a former vice president of the World Bank and the technocrat behind Turkey s economic transformation which started with an IMF plan implemented in 2001 recently suggested that Turkey is on its way to becoming a world economic powerhouse. But he also added that Turkey s ascent will depend on how it manages challenges to its fiscal position and current account and crucially, its ability to foster dialogue and compromise among its fractious politicians. 14 In essence, Turkey s leaders need to realize that if Turkey is to become a global power, it must remain stable, bring together its disparate parts, and calibrate its rise within the Western international system, while also reaching 14 NTVMSNBC, Dervis ten 2023 hedefi icin uc uyari, September 27, 2012, http://www.ntvmsnbc. com/id/25385425/.

The New Turkey and U.S. Policy n 13 beyond the West. The result could be a twenty-first-century Muslim power that promotes stability yet is free from many of the constraints of a regional European rubric. In other words, Turkey s game of catch-up with Europe may finally be nearing its end, making way for a new Turkey that upholds its Muslim identity but also has a place in the West.

Chapter 3 Lessons for Washington Outside the country s economic success, even liberal Turks see reasons for hope. In a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal, Demet Muftuoglu-Eseli, a supporter of the arts and culture in Istanbul, expressed her optimism: We made democracy work; we made a modern economy; we liberated women; we even have one of the world s top biennials [an art exhibition]. There is tension, but we ll overcome it. 15 The Turkish Model: Not So Easy to Follow Whether Turkey can be a model for other Muslim-majority countries, particularly those affected by the Arab Spring, is a question of great interest for policymakers. A first response, one almost always overlooked, involves Turkey s relatively deep, sixty-year experience with democracy. Today s mix of Islamism with democracy takes place within that context. This is not the case for Arab societies, which anyway are profoundly different from Turkey. Most Arab countries are either still authoritarian or newly and shakily democratic. For instance, in all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, plus Jordan and Morocco, monarchs remain more or less firmly in power some with weak elected parliaments, some without even that. In Libya and Yemen, autocrats have been deposed, but the new governments are not effectively in control and remain hostage to tribal, regional, or religious militias. In Iraq, the elected government seems to be reverting to autocratic tendencies. Syria is currently locked in a bloody stalemate between a dictatorial regime and an increasingly violent popular uprising. The Palestinians, for their part, have had neither a popular uprising nor peaceful political change. That leaves Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia, as in Turkey, a relatively moderate Islamist party won a majority in a free election, but the leadership still 15 Lawrence Osborne, Dreaming in Istanbul, Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2012, http://online.wsj. com/article/sb10000872396390443855804577601322508049192.html. 14

The New Turkey and U.S. Policy n 15 has to compete with secular parties and social groups. Given Tunisia s fairly well educated population and its large middle class, extreme fundamentalists are rare. The dominant Islamist party supports the private sector, including tourism and other international economic lifelines, and is cultivating relations with the West. Tunisia may therefore be the best prospect to follow in Turkey s footsteps. Tellingly, Tunisia s ruling an-nahda Party is the only Arab party that says it wants to emulate the Turkish model. Egypt is a different story. The Muslim Brotherhood s party won a plurality in free elections, but its main competitors are the more extreme fundamentalist Salafist parties. The Brotherhood is trying to centralize political power, from the constitutional committee to the presidency, despite earlier promises to take a more inclusive democratic approach. Egypt, sadly, still suffers from widespread poverty and illiteracy yet Egypt s new government has gone out of its way to alienate its friends in the United States and Europe over marginal issues like foreign NGOs. The Brotherhood has also publicly disavowed comparisons with the Turkish model. Difficulties aside, the Turkish democratic model as applied to Muslimmajority states has been embraced by many commentators, such as U.S.-based Vali Nasr, a leading scholar on Middle East politics. In his 2009 Forces of Fortune, Nasr delivers a sweeping tour of the rising bourgeois classes across the Muslim world. From the shopping malls of Dubai to the streets of Southeast Asia, Nasr shows how capitalism and Islam are coming together to constitute a new force in global politics. According to Nasr, the implications of these commercial transformations are profound, including a more tolerant, liberal politics spurred by the growth of the middle class. Globalized Muslim populations, he argues, will necessarily adopt more worldly outlooks. Just as it took Europe s Christian Democrats many decades to reconcile themselves fully with democracy over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Muslim political forces will take time to come around, but eventually they will travel the road of democracy and liberalization. Nasr chooses Turkey as the protagonist in this tale. According to Nasr, the Turks have championed the most hopeful model in the region for both economic development and the liberalization of politics. This is, according to Nasr, because Turkey is the furthest along when it comes to melding Islam and capitalism, and this blend has resulted in a softer version of Islamic politics, as the AKP renounces the fundamentalist Islamic platforms of old. In the end, Nasr gives a convincing account of how the Muslim middle classes have the potential to liberate societies from the

16 n Soner Cagaptay death grip of autocracy (admittedly, Nasr s analysis predated the onset of the Arab Spring), without abandoning them to the tyranny of fundamentalism. But does this mean that Turkey s model of Muslim democracy is a recipe for liberal success? Not so fast. As Nasr deftly illustrates, Muslim pragmatists have every reason to eschew the wild fantasies of the Islamists such as complete cessation of ties to the West. After all, these extremist social structures are bad for business. As for Turkey itself, Nasr predicts that if Turkey stays on its current course, it will become a Muslim capitalist democracy. By this, Nasr seems to imply some sort of practical coexistence between Islamic mores and democratic institutions, a system clearly more functional than a theocracy but still a far cry from Denmark when it comes to Western liberal credentials. This outcome is by no means the worst, but given Turkey s Western traditions, why can t it aim for Denmark? The AKP, for one thing, overtly seems to take Denmark as the goal. The party s leaders are unambiguous that Turkey deserves nothing less than democracy writ large. AKP election pledges tout advanced democracy as the finish line for Turkey, a goal that denotes the highest standards in human rights, democratization, and civil society conditions. Yet one would have reason to doubt the AKP s rhetoric as well as its true commitment to this path. By many measures, Turkey s course over the past decade has not represented a straight shot toward liberal democracy and, on some counts, the ball has been moved backward. To begin with, even as Turkey s Muslim bourgeoisie have moved up the income ladder and Islam has entered the mainstream, the government s treatment of the press has not improved. Based on an analysis from Reporters Without Borders, Turkey s economic boom has seen a corresponding drop in press freedom, with the country s international ranking falling from 99 in 2002 to 148 in 2011. On the matter of overall political conditions, Freedom House has ranked Turkey as only partly free for the better part of the past decade, without any marked improvement. On gender equality, Turkey s economic success has not translated into the advances one might have imagined. Overall, Turkey is still far from a model to be emulated when it comes to women s empowerment. Not counting agricultural workers, as of 2012, only 22 percent of Turkey s women participate in the labor force, a rise of only four percentage points from 1988. In 2012, Turkey was ranked sixty-fifth internationally on the Economist s Women s Opportunity Economic Index, a composite measure of women s access to education, workplace opportunity, finance, and legal rights. Ahead of Turkey were coun-

The New Turkey and U.S. Policy n 17 tries like Namibia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, while Bosnia, a European Muslim-majority country with an Ottoman heritage, outplaced Turkey by a wide margin. Of the thirty-one countries in Turkey s income range, Turkey ranked twenty-fifth. 18,000 GDP/Cap and Press Freedom R anking 1 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 GDP/Cap Ranking 0 161 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 GDP/Cap and Freedom House Score 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 GDP/Cap Rating

18 n Soner Cagaptay Needless to say, the trajectories illustrated in these graphics should give us pause before concluding that Turkey can be a beacon for the emerging societies in Arab and Muslim-majority states. Still a Role to Play in the Arab Spring None of this analysis is intended to suggest that Turkey should not help promote democracy in countries affected by the Arab Spring. Once again, however, this participation depends on how Ankara plays its hand and if Washington and Turkey s European allies take their own constructive steps. For starters, Turkey is better positioned than it has been to engage with Arab countries. In part, this is because Turkey is no longer the poor country it once was, desperately seeking accession to the European Union. In the past decade, record-breaking economic growth has allowed Turkey to float overhead the economic storm pummeling Europe (with only France similarly spared). In addition, Turkey has averted any major upheavals like those affecting other nations in the Middle East. The bright economic prospects, along with the reconstituted foreign policy vision outlined by Foreign Minister Davutoglu, have allowed Turkey to shift away from Europe and toward building more influence in the Middle East. In grooming ties with former Ottoman lands in the region, the AKP has sought to jump-start integration with its neighbors, creating something like the 1950s Benelux bloc of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Revealingly, of the thirty-three new Turkish diplomatic missions opened in the past decade, eighteen are in Muslim and African countries. Turkey s emerging commercial and political ties with Middle East nations have often come at the expense of ties with Europe. The shift has been accompanied by the rise of a more socially conservative business elite in central Turkey, which derives strength from trading beyond Europe and is using its new wealth to push for a redefinition of Turkey s traditional approach to secularism. Moreover, the AKP s approach to religion whereby Ataturk s Frenchinspired notion of freedom from religion has been replaced by a softer form of secularism embodied in freedom of religion has greater appeal for socially conservative Arab countries, which, for the most part, regard French-style secularism as anathema. Over the past decade, Turkey has used soft power in Arab countries in its quest to become a regional leader. The Turks efforts have included the creation of business networks and the founding of state-of-the-art high schools

The New Turkey and U.S. Policy n 19 in the Middle East, Asia, and Central Asia, run by the Sufi Islam inspired Gulen movement, to educate future Arab elites. Yet the results of these initiatives were largely inconclusive until the Arab Spring, largely because of the hard reality that Turkey s counterparts in rapprochement were not its neighboring peoples but rather their undemocratic regimes. Now, Turkey has an unprecedented opportunity to spread its influence further in newly free Arab societies. Syria is a case in point: whereas Ankara hoped to reach out to the Syrian people, the Assad regime took advantage of its close ties with Turkey, a NATO member, to gain legitimacy while oppressing its people. The Arab Spring has ended the mirage. Even though Ankara repeatedly asked Assad to stop killing civilians, he ignored these calls, demonstrating that there was never true rapprochement between Turkey and Syria and that Ankara had failed in establishing soft power over Damascus. Ankara has since dropped Assad, emerging instead as the chief regional opponent of his policies. Indeed, Ankara s new overarching policy toward the Arab Middle East entails leading the world in dropping dictators in favor of the prodemocracy movements, from Egypt to Libya to Syria. Accordingly, Turkey now has a chance to promote democracy in the Middle East and rise to leadership in the region. Building the Democratic Center: The German Model In seeking a paradigm for Turkey s role in the Arab world, we might look to Germany in Portugal following the Carnation Revolution of April 1974, which toppled Portugal s forty-eight-year dictatorship. The rebellion was led by a group of army officers, joined by the underground communist movement and the masses, and the regime s fall was surprisingly swift. Portugal then riddled by poverty, illiteracy, and a legacy of authoritarianism found itself at a crossroads: military rule or communist takeover. Neither happened. Thanks to the often-unmentioned efforts by Germany s Social Democratic Party (SPD) government and the Stiftungen (NGOs linked to Germany s political parties) to build centrist forces in Lisbon, the unexpected occurred: Portugal became a flourishing liberal democracy, later joining the European Union. In many ways, Portugal in the 1970s parallels today s Arab societies. The coastal nation lacked deep democratic traditions or a sizable middle class. The communist movement, which can be likened to the Islamists in today s

20 n Soner Cagaptay Arab states, was powerful and seemed poised to commandeer the revolution, while the military which had taken charge following the revolution seemed at a loss. For its part, Germany s SPD of the 1970s was the first elected social democratic government in Bonn, and therefore had particular credibility in offering social democracy as a legitimate alternative to communism in Lisbon. And it did so quite deliberately. From the German town of Bad Munstereifel, the SPD helped found the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS), a social democratic movement that called for a democratic Portugal and the defeat of the communists efforts to take power. Furthermore, in August 1975, Germany took the lead in organizing the Friendship Solidarity Committee for Portuguese Democracy and Socialism. Led by German chancellor Willy Brandt, this committee included leading European social democrats, such as Swedish prime minister Olof Palme and Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky, and became a platform from which social democrats shared knowledge with the PS and developed strategies for successful democratic transformation. The committee also prepared the groundwork for Portugal s EU membership. The German Stiftungen, too, performed a valuable function. The SPD-affiliated Friedrich Ebert Stiftungen (FES) alone donated 10 to 15 million German marks to train PS campaign workers and fund travel for its leaders, using discreet Swiss bank accounts to facilitate money transfers. The range of Stiftungen, which had connections to liberal and conservative German parties alike, built counterparts in Portugal as well. The AKP, echoing the SPD in Germany, is Ankara s first Islamist-rooted and democratically elected party and is therefore well positioned to propose alternatives to radical Islamism in Arab states. Yet if Ankara wishes to play a role similar to Germany, it cannot be expected to do so alone. Just as Bonn received financial and political assistance from the United States and other democracies in building Portuguese democracy, Turkey would benefit from support from the West as well as other Muslim-majority democracies, such as Indonesia, especially in creating Turkish Stiftungen, the missing part of the Germany-Turkey parallel. Challenges Remain Given that Turkey ruled the Arab Middle East until World War I, it must now be mindful of the effect of its messages. Arabs might be drawn to fellow Muslims, but the Turks are also former imperial masters. And as the Arabs them-

The New Turkey and U.S. Policy n 21 selves press for democracy, intervention by a nation appearing to behave like a new imperial power will backfire. Arab liberals and Islamists alike regularly suggest that Turkey is welcome in the Middle East but should not dominate it. Then there are the various problems associated with transferring the Turkish model to Arab countries. In September 2011, when Erdogan landed at Cairo s new airport terminal (built by Turkish companies), he was met by joyous millions, mobilized by the Muslim Brotherhood. However, he soon upset his pious hosts by preaching about the importance of a secular government that provides freedom of religion, using the Turkish word laiklik derived from the French word for secularism and translating, in Arabic, to irreligious. Erdogan s message may have been partly lost in translation, but the incident illustrates the limits of Turkey s influence in more socially conservative countries. What is more, Ankara faces domestic challenges that could hamper its influence in countries affected by the Arab Spring. If Turkey wants to become a true beacon of democracy in the Middle East, for example, the new constitution under discussion must provide broader individual rights for the country s citizens and lift curbs on freedoms, such as those on the media. Turkey will also need to fulfill Davutoglu s vision of a no problems foreign policy with the neighbors, in this instance, including Israel. This means moving past the 2010 flotilla episode to rebuild strong ties with the Jewish state and learning to get along with the Greek Cypriots. Turkey s relative stability at a time when the region is in upheaval is attracting investment from less stable neighbors like Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Ultimately, political stability and regional clout are Turkey s hard cash, and its economic growth will depend on both. Turkey will rise as a regional power as well as play a role in the Arab uprising only if it sets a genuine example as a liberal democracy and uses a deft and strategic hand when sharing its knowledge and experience with Arab countries.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Board of Directors President Martin J. Gross Chairman Howard P. Berkowitz Chairmen Emeriti Fred S. Lafer Michael Stein Founding President and Chairman Emerita Barbi Weinberg Senior Vice Presidents Bernard Leventhal Peter Lowy James Schreiber Vice Presidents Benjamin Breslauer Walter P. Stern Vice President Emeritus Charles Adler Secretary Richard S. Abramson Treasurer Dimitri Sogoloff Board Members Jay Bernstein Anthony Beyer Richard Borow Michael Gelman Roger Hertog, emeritus Shelly Kassen Jack Kay Michael Keston Moses Libitzky Daniel Mintz Zachary Schreiber Fred Schwartz John Shapiro Merryl Tisch Susan Wagner Gary Wexler Board of Advisors Max M. Kampelman Henry A. Kissinger Samuel W. Lewis Edward Luttwak Michael Mandelbaum Robert C. McFarlane Martin Peretz Richard Perle James G. Roche George P. Shultz R. James Woolsey Mortimer Zuckerman

Turkey will rise as a regional power as well as play a role in the Arab uprising only if it sets a genuine example as a liberal democracy and uses a deft and strategic hand when sharing its knowledge and experience with Arab countries. the washington institute for near east policy www.washingtoninstitute.org