Michael P. McDonald Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution Assistant Professor, George Mason Univ. John Samples Director, Center for Representative Gov t The Cato Institute
Congressional Elections Gary Jacobson, University of California, San Diego
Congressional Quarterly s Competitive Elections, 1982-2006 120 100 103 98 104 Number of Competitive Contests 80 60 40 84 67 58 51 41 58 53 47 29 51 20 0 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Number of toss-up or lean races
State Legislative Elections Dick Niemi, University of Rochester Lynda Powell, University of Rochester Thomas Carsey, University of Florida William Berry, University of Florida James Snyder, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1 0.9 0.8 0.7 Re-Election Rate 0.6 0.5 0.4 Lower Chamber, Single Member Lower Chamber, Multi-Member Upper Chamber, Single Member 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year Average Incumbent Re-Election Rates to State Legislatures, 1992-2002
1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 Percent 0.5 Lower Chamber, Single Member Lower Chamber, Multi-Member Upper Chamber, Single Member 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year Open Seats in State Legislatures, 1992-2002
1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 Percent 0.5 Lower Chamber, Single Member Lower Chamber, Multi-Member Upper Chamber, Single Member 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year Percent Seats Won with <60% in State Legislatures, 1992-2002
Primaries Steven Ansolabehere, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Charles Stewart III, Massachusetts Institute of Technology James Snyder, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 U.S. House Statewide 0.2 0.1 Statewide 0 1910-1938 1940-1958 U.S. House Percent 1960-2000 Competitive Primaries
Campaign Donations James Gimple, University of Maryland Francis Lee, University of Maryland
Election Outcome The Election Process Within a District National Mood
The Election Process Within a District National Mood District Partisanship Demographic Change Incumbent Situation: Scandal, Age, Ambition Candidate Type: Incumbent, Quality Challengers Election Outcome Money Raised
The Election Process Within a District Redistricting Term Limits Campaign Finance Laws National Mood District Partisanship Demographic Change Incumbent Situation: Scandal, Age, Ambition Candidate Type: Incumbent, Quality Challengers Election Outcome Money Raised
The Rube-Goldberg Election Machine Legal Framework Nathaniel Persily University of Pennsylvania Redistricting Michael McDonald, George Mason University Term-limits Bruce Cain, University of California, Berkeley; and Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego Campaign Finance Jeff Milyo, University of Missouri; and David Primo, University of Rochester Ken Mayer, University of Wisconsin Minor Parties Paul Herrnson, University of Maryland Initiatives John Matsusaka, University of Southern California
General Findings Competition Varies Among Levels of Office Tailor reforms to the office Reforms Can Have Seemingly Perverse Effects on Competition Example: Clean Elections encourage candidates to run where they have little chance of winning, which increases levels of constestation, but lowers overall levels of competition Reforms Can Create Perverse Incentives Example: Term Limits encourage candidates to wait for open seats
Reform Recommendations There is no magic bullet, the electoral process is complicated You may only get one chance to get it right, choose wisely Consider combining state constitutional amendments with statutes to fill in details and to provide flexibility if something doesn t work as planned
Current Research Examining Redistricting Effects on State Legislative Elections and Districts Post-Redistricting Election Outcomes (including 2004 election and primary data) 2000 Presidential Vote in State Legislative Districts before and after redistricting (Would greatly appreciate help in AR, DE, KY, MI, MS, MT, OR, ND, NE, RI, SD, TN, UT, and WY)
Redistricting Michael McDonald The Brookings Institution George Mason University
Gerrymandering and Competition Competitive Districts District 1 District 2 District 3 District 4 Total 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Expected Seats 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.0 Bipartisan Gerrymander Expected Seats 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 Partisan Gerrymander 0.5 0.5 0.5 Expected Seats 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 3.0 Figure 2: Three Configurations of Four Equi-populous Districts in a Hypothetical Evenly Partisan Jurisdiction
Patterns in District Competition Number of Districts Within Competitive Range 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 45-55% Range 48-52% Range 0 1970 1972 1980 1982 1990 1992 2000 2002 Note: Counts of the number of districts with a Normalized Two-Party Presidential Vote within a competitive range before and after a redistricting
Pro-Republican Bias in Congressional Districts 0.7 0.65 0.6 Republican Seat Share 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 Post-Redistricting Pre-Redistricting 0.35 0.3 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 Republican Vote Share