Airport Security Conference Vienna, 13 September 2017 Session 1: International Framework and Respective Regulatory Approaches International Legal Framework for Nuclear Security 09:40 10:20am Anthony Wetherall Senior Research Fellow, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore
Int l Legal Frameworks Safety Security Safeguards Liability
Defintion of nuclear security Nuclear security focuses on the prevention of, detection of and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities. Nuclear Security Fundamentals NSS No. 20 (2012)
Some Nuclear Security Roles and Responsibilities Responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State.. it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled Prime responsibility of licensee
IAEA s Nuclear Security Mandate Policymaking Organs Statute Int l Instruments Board of Governors General Conference eg. Nuclear Security Plans, Fundamentals, Recommendations (INFCIRC/225)..of the IAEA Objectives Functions Functions Recognised Role eg. CPPNM Amendment eg. ICSANT Depositary eg. CPPNM Amendment Party eg. PSAs No explicit reference to nuclear security in the Statute. Mandate and activities inherent in the mandate to contribute to peace, health & prosperity throughout the world, as derived from Art. II & confirmed by the policymaking organs
IAEA s acknowledged central & leading roles Strengthening the int l framework Facilitating & coordinating int l coop. Supporting States in fulfilling their responsibilities incld. info. exchange meetings among various int l institutions & initiatives with nuclear security mandates (17 th meeting, 2017) Nuclear Security
IAEA activities: assistance & cooperation Facilitating adherence & implementation: International legal instruments Developing: Technical guidance Nuclear Security Series (2006) MSs development (with relevant IGOs), MSs comments (120 days) NSGC (2012): Relevant IGOs/ NGOs may be invited to attend meetings as observers Carrying out on request: Peer reviews & advisory services eg. IPPAS, INSServ Concluding: National support plans Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans Education & training Major public events Risk reduction
Nuclear Security Evolution The Cold War & post Cold War dynamics: Changing actors, different motives and evolving challenges and threat Concerns re. security of NWs, NFs, RM unaccounted for & unsecured, illicit trafficking Evolving nuclear terrorist threat Threat to int l peace & security Focus beyond physical protection eg. nuclear forensics, cyber-security 1970s 1980-90s Post 9/11 terrorist attacks Focus on physical protection eg. CPPNM & INFCIRC/225 Rise in terrorism, hijackings, nuclear commerce First comprehensive IAEA programme to combat nuclear terrorism New/amendment of int l legal instruments eg. CPPNM Amendment Multiple initiatives eg. GICNT, GTRI
Int l legal framework for nuclear security 2011 www.ola.iaea.org
Int l legal framework for nuclear security Legally Binding Legally Non-binding IAEA UN IMO ICAO IAEA CPPNM GA UNSC IMO - SUA Conv. & Protocols ICAO -Beijing SUA Convention INFCIRC/225/ Rev.5 Terrorist Bombings Conv. UNSCR 1373 (2001) Code of Conduct - rad. sources CPPNM Amend. (2003) Nuclear Terrorism Conv. UNSCR 1540 (2004) Import/export Guidance (2004) (2011) Disused Rad. Sources Guidance (2017)
Int l Legal Frameworks Comparison Role of the IAEA IAEA mandatory reviews IAEA binding technical standards Review by others such as States Reporting on national impl. Compliance & enforcement mechanisms Nuclear Security Nuclear Safety Significant but advisory, on request Non mandatory (but de facto) Rad. sources code [Art 16 ACPPNM 2021 conf.] Art. 14 ACPPNM UNSCR 1540 (2001) Non binding (but quasi) No CNS/ JC peer review Rad. sources code Safeguards/ nonproliferation watchdog (Statute & NPT) Mandatory SGs inspections Non binding guidance eg. NPT Review Conf. (may also touch on nuclear security) Yes
Observations and future perspectives Int l framework significantly strengthened post 9/11 Multiplicity of int l instruments (binding/ non binding) and initiatives incld. the high level Nuclear Security Summit process (2010 16 (end)) Limited mandatory treaty based peer reviews and reporting on national implementation [BUT.] IAEA s first (physical protection) activities in the 70s. Since the mid 00s, the IAEA has widely accepted and recognised central roles in nuclear security albeit essentially of an advisory nature (as in nuclear safety) Non binding security guidance and non mandatory IAEA peer reviews [BUT.]
Observations and future perspectives contd. The nuclear terrorist threat is a recognised real threat to int l peace and security In the absence of a nuclear security watershed event, positive and progressive developments continue, driven by this evolving threat To date, the result inclds. increasing levels of int l coop and assistance and, strengthened national nuclear security regimes etc Still, a critical review continues to reveal fundamental constraints and limitations incld. issues of State sovereignty and national security and, national sensitivities
Observations and future perspectives contd. Continued calls in different fora for a more robust int l framework The 2021 review conference of the amended CPPNM may provide a limited opportunity for re evaluation Even so, in matters of nuclear security there continues to remain a clear line that many states are not yet willing and able to cross: the role of the IAEA, standards, peer reviews etc What is needed to change the mindset, if that is what is indeed required?
IAEA Int l Legal Instruments & other texts etc. Initiatives Technical guidance, reviews/ advisory services CPPNM & Amend. UN, IMO, ICAO etc. Rad. sources Nuclear power NUCLEAR SECURITY TIMELINE 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Nation states, Bio-polar, High intensity, High density, Lower probability, Geopolitical, Predictable Non-state actors - Low density, Low intensity, Malicious, Higher probability, Diversification of risks, Unpredictable Atoms for Peace Speech & Program (53) [export of NPPs & HEU for research reactors] (57) IAEA 72 event] 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s South Africa - break in (07) 2010s Optimism - Atoms for Peace 57 Increasing no. of terrorism/ hijackings Newbuild; int l nuclear transports; internationalization Cold War int l security concern: fear of nuclear war & spread of NWs (68) NPT Commercialization - optimism, reality, expansion 68 72 (78) RERTR [Research reactor HEU minimization subsumed into GTRI] INFCIRC/225 (75) Rev. 1 PP recomms. (72) (77) 75 75 (79) CPPNM Limited scope 1 st Review Conf. NPT (75) (78) NSG Guidelines INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) (72 ) TMI(79) [safety Boom to decline - Western Europe and USA with limited exception e.g. France (89) Fall of the Berlin wall Chernobyl (86) [safety event] Eif CPPNM (87) Early Notification & Assistance Convs. (86) [Practical arrangements e.g. RANET (13), IEComm (12), J-Plan (17) etc.] Stagnation for newbuilds - Western Europe and USA, even more so post-chernobyl Concern re. PP of RM, NIs, NWs; illicit trafficking increase (95) End of the Cold War (91) Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program (91) (96) IPPAS INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) (97) (97) UN Terrorist Bombings Conv. [(99) EPREV] NNSA Megaports Initiative, Nuclear Security Summits (10, 12, 14 & 16) USA (03) GTRI GICNT (06) (04) (16) (03) EU WMD Strategy IAEA Summit Action Plan NPP Vendor Principles (11) NTI (01) (03) PSI UN Global Counter (16) Contact CTIFT (05) Terrorism Strategy (14) INFCIRC/869 initiative Group Global Partnership (02) (06) Rad. sources tripartite initiative (02) NAM Summit (12) CBP Container Security Initiative, USA (02) (08) WINS UN High level meeting (12) (03) Final report on proposed amend. Rejected proposals negative list UNSCR 1373 (01) INF Code (01) (03) INServ UNSCR (04) 1540 (03) Rad. Sources Code (03) Cat. of rad. sources [IRRS (05)] Y-12 National Security Complex, USA - security breach (12) 78 86 92 94 96 97 01 03 04 05 09 10 11 12 14 16 17 Expansion in Asia e.g. Japan, RofK, China, India Evolving terrorist threat; post-9/11 strengthening; new/amendment instruments; strengthened IAEA mandate; new initiatives; rejection of binding standards & mandatory IAEA & treaty based peer review (03) CPPNM Amend. (05) Scope expanded to incld. domestic use, storage & transport & NFs IMDG Code (02 & 04) ISPS Code (02 & 04) Formalized info exchange process (06) Suppl. Guidance (04) Renewed interest, continued growth in Asia e.g. China, RofK, nuclear newcomers [(09) INIR] (96 Pelindaba & (06) CANWFZ eif ICSANT (05) IMO SUA insts. (05) Evolving nuclear terrorist threat; broad acceptance & recognition of IAEA s central roles; evolution from physical protection to a broad range of subjects incd. forensics and cyber-security; high-level political attention (to 16) nuclear security summit process; post-summit developments [Nuclear security definition (89) Rev. 2 Rev. 3 (93) (99) Rev. 4 Physical protection objectives & fundamental principles (01) NSGC (12) NS Fundamentals (12) (state focused)] (06) Nuclear Security Series Rev. 5 (NSS No. 13) (11) NSS. No. 14 & NSS No. 15 (11) 1 st Security of Material Programme NSPs (02-05, 06-09, 10-13, 14-17 & 18 21) INSPs (06) IPPAS int l seminars GC resolution RES/15 (94) (97-98) [Nuclear Security Fund (01); Dept. of (13) & (16) [measures against illicit trafficking] Nuclear Safety and Security & 20/20 review (08) INSEN (10) Office of Nuclear Security (01)] Calls for mandatory Info. Exchange Meetings [13 th meeting (17)] (95) ITDB Office of Physical AdSec (02) standards/reviews Board endorsed Protection & Material 3S synergies [IAEA GC resolution] (03) (13) Division of Security, [Nuclear security working protection prog. IEC (05) Nuclear Security (99) Dept. of SGs definition ((03) IAEA (95) programmatic)] 89 93 94 95 96 97 99 9/11 (01) 03 05 06 08 Fukushima (11) 13 14 16 17 AQ Khan network (04) Pelindaba nuclear facility, Review Conf. (92) UNGA A/RES/51/210 (96) & A/RES/49/60 [int l terrorism] (94) ICAO SUA (10) (16) Eif CPPNM Amend. (15) & (16) Points of Contact meetings (14) UNGA A/RES/69/50 [terrorists & rad. sources] (16) UNGA A/RES/71/38 [terrorists & WMD] (GOV/2017/4 (17)) Disused Radioactive Sources Guidance NISGS (16) Continued interest post-fukushima, continued expansion in Asia, nuclear newcomers e.g. UAE, Belarus, Bangladesh, Turkey Draft 1: A. Wetherall, Singapore (Sept. 2017)
Thank you for your attention Anthony Wetherall Email: anthony.wetherall@nus.edu.sg ESI CIL Nuclear Governance Project www.nucleargovernance.sg