Nick Lind PLS 444 National Security 5/9/11 Strategic Planning Process: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People s Army) The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are on the United State s Department of State foreign terrorist organization list and are currently the most powerful guerrilla group in Colombia. 1 The FARC movement became an organized and legitimate network following La Violencia, a period of violent instability and political uncertainty within Colombia in the mid-twentieth century. FARC, a peasant-based organization, originally subscribed to Marxist-Leninist leftist ideology during the Cold War era primarily as an alternative to conservative rule that disproportionately benefitted the upper-class. 2 Within Colombia, FARC isn t the lone guerrilla group. In addition to FARC, Colombia has dealt with domestic violence from the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Movement of April 19, 1972 (M-19) among others. These grassroots uprisings have resulted in a paradigm of two Colombia s: the first being the formal government, and the second being the network of guerrilla organizations. 3 Unfortunately, in regions throughout Colombia, the guerrilla forces often hold more political legitimacy than the formal police and political officials, especially in rural areas. Hence, FARC is the leading guerrilla uprising resulting from a liberal-conservative 1 Molano, Alfredo. The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group s Long History. NACLA Report on the Americas (Sept/Oct 2000) accessed May 5, 2011. http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/molano.htm. 2 Whittaker, David. The Terrorism Reader. (New York: Routledge, 2001) 174-177. 3 Pearce, Jenny. Colombia, Inside the Labyrinth. (London: Latin American Bureau, 1990) 64-65.
Lind 2 violent political strife that has greatly questioned the legitimacy of the formal Colombian government. 4 Operations of FARC lie within the national interests of the United States. First, FARC operates partially on funds collected from an illegal transnational narcotics trade with the United States. Secondly, the United States aims to promote peace, democracy, and human rights throughout the world, including in Colombia. Also, although FARC parted ways with its original leftist ideology, it now subscribes to what has become known as a, Bolivarian ideology. 5 Bolivarian ideology idolizes Simon Bolivar for his anti-us imperialism stance and suggests a FARC alignment with the political beliefs of Venezuela s Hugo Chavez, who also champions an anti-us imperialism stance. 6 Lastly, the United States has an interest in promoting Colombian economic development since billions of dollars have been invested in recent policies and more importantly economic development benefits regional security. 7 The nature of FARC threats is relatively weak in terms of other US priorities however their capabilities surely pose an imminent threat to US national interests. FARC interests include: overthrowing the Colombian government, reducing US involvement in Colombia, and obtaining territory in the southern region of Colombia. 8 Luckily, the severity of FARC damage has limited direct effects on the United States and can be monitored throughout the future as policies to limit FARC threat are enacted. 4 Whittaker. 176-177. 5 Ortiz, Roman D. Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Vol 25. (2002) 130. 6 Rochlin, James F., Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 134-135. 7 United States Support for Colombia. Department of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (March 28, 2000) http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html. 8 Rochlin. 132-133.
Lind 3 The United States has made a public effort to wage a war on drugs. Meanwhile, narcotrafficking through the departments of Guaviare, Putumayo, and Caqueta, Colombia of coca and poppy cultivations has largely been transported and sold to the United States. FARC represents the political interests of peasant farmers in those southern regions of Colombia in exchange for a cut of cultivator s profits, essentially a tax. Furthermore, FARC eliminates incentives to grow other crops, thereby increasing profits and directly impacting local crop supply. Additionally FARC demands a sort of corporate tax tribute to businesses it supports as well as demands ransoms for kidnappings in Colombia to fund its operations. 9 Colombia produces the majority of the world cocaine supply and 90% of it is sold to the United States. 10 Despite efforts to curb this supply within Colombia, reports indicate that the cocaine and heroin supply is, readily available throughout the country and overall availability appears to be stable. 11 Complicating the situation is the fact that FARC has engaged in arms sales by exchanging weapons for cocaine with the Mexican Tijuana cartel and Venezuelan arms dealers controlling the Caracas army s arsenal. 12 A violent guerrilla group collecting arms surely hinders the United States goal of promoting peace and limiting human rights violations. Given the United States priority of the war on drugs, our desire and responsibility to promote peace, democracy, and human rights, as well as our vested economic interests in Colombia, FARC clearly warrants serious attention of United States policymakers. To combat FARC threats, the United States and Colombia signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 2009 which, will facilitate effective bilateral cooperation on 9 Rochlin 136-137. 10 Veillette, Connie. Plan Columbia: A Progress Report. Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress (June 22, 2005) 6. 11 Veillette. 6. 12 Ortiz. 138.
Lind 4 security matters in Colombia, including narcotics production and trafficking, terrorism, illicit smuggling of all types, and humanitarian and natural disasters. 13 DCA was a formal agreement pledging a team effort in the implementation of Colombia s National Consolidation Plan (PNC) better known as Plan Columbia. 14 Reports have claimed that while these efforts have produced measureable progress in Colombia s internal security no effect has been seen in drug supply, price, or purity in the United States. 15 Working with FARC has proven to be tricky. FARC values self-sufficiency and continues to strive to be recognized as the top guerrilla group in Colombia to be sure they have input in any peace agreements and terms in the future. 16 In the past, FARC has attempted to work with government to enact reform, such as in 1985 when FARC supported the Union Patriotica (UP) political party. 17 Unfortunately party members were systematically assassinated, which has resulted in exclusionary political strategies which shy away from negotiation with the formal government. 18 This has led the rest of the world to wonder just how U.S. policy will aim to bring peace and stability (as well as elimination of the cocaine trade) to Colombia. 19 Some claim that United States policy has focused too much on the means of meeting key objective rather than the end goal of policies and strategies. For example, some argue that the United States has placed too much emphasis on dismantling FARC and has at times lost sight of the end political objectives which are hindering cocaine flow into the United States and 13 Plan Colombia-National Consolidation Global Security: Military (accessed 5/8/11) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/colombia.htm 14 Plan Colombia-National Consolidation http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/colombia.htm 15 Veillette. 2. 16 Rochlin 135. 17 Rochlin 101-102. 18 Whittaker. 181. 19 What future for US-backed Plan Colombia? BBC News: Latin America & Caribbean. (June 12, 2010) accessed May 8, 20011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10208937.
Lind 5 promoting stability in Colombia. In other words, supporting, paramilitaries and neo-mercenary forces aren t the end, but rather the means to an end. 20 United States policy rightfully focuses on the, intense corruption, perpetuating human rights abuses, and extraordinary exclusionary politics or the government, but perhaps should adopt a more holistic perspective regarding the threats to American interests threatened by FARC. 21 United States tactical policies in the past have succeeded in, dismantling the Medellin and Cali drug cartels, interdicting coca coming into Colombian processing facilities, and using drug certification requirements to pressure the Colombian government to attack drug cartels and allow aerial fumigation of coca crops. However, these policies have primarily pushed coca operations to FARC-dominated areas and in a zero-sum sense have strengthened FARC by eliminating opponent guerrilla forces. 22 Studies have suggested that FARC intelligence is relatively unorganized and could serve as a vulnerable attack point for future US policies, but further research is necessary. 23 Such policies would warrant asymmetric war against FARC intelligence systems allowing U.S. policy to be a step ahead of FARC planning. United States policy ultimately aims to: first, limit the sale of cocaine into the United States from FARC; and second to promote peace and stability within Colombia. These ends will be met by means (strategies, operations, and tactics) that aim to: reduce threat, reduce 20 Rochlin, 262. 21 Rochlin. 110. 22 Peceny, Mark and Durnam, Michael. The FARC s Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia s Civil War in the 1990s. Vol. 48 No. 2 (2006) 95. 23 Gentry, John A. and Spencer, David E. Colombia s FARC: A Portrait of Insurgent Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. Vol 25, No. 4 (Aug 2010) 453-478.
Lind 6 vulnerabilities, and reduce consequences. Each mean will originate from United States power in terms of diplomatic, informational, military, or economic pressure. For all intents and purposes, United States military power is limited only by domestic (as well as global) public opinion. The US military could easily enter Colombia and systematically eliminate all fronts of FARC within a reasonable time, but surely not without popular disapproval from almost all parties. Of course, the cost of such interventions in terms of financial liabilities and potential loss of life also must be considered. Diplomatically, the United States must be careful to negotiate with legitimate political leaders if we truly want to limit corruption and drug trafficking and promote peace and stability. Colombia has a history of questionable political governments. Working with a corrupt regime simply is not in the long term interests of the United States. Economically, the United States has already contributed over $4.5 billion since 2000 through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program through the Department of Defense. 24 Additional resources must be strategically placed in clean areas to ensure that United States economic aid is properly implemented. Finally, as stated above, the United States may have an opportunity to exploit the weak intelligence network of FARC in order to gain intelligence that could greatly benefit United States policymaking. Future strategic policies to eliminate cocaine trafficking from Colombia to the United States as well as promote peace and stability within Colombia should focus on several principles. Violence and instability in Colombia stems from corrupt politics which provide an incentive to form guerrilla groups such as FARC aiming to establish political power. If a fair and legitimate 24 Veillette. 2.
Lind 7 regime were implemented in Colombia, guerrilla forces primary objective would be met and perhaps Colombians would dissolve their guerrilla groups into more peaceful political-minded interest groups contributing to an efficient pluralist democracy. This goal of fostering a clean democracy in Colombia may be met using diplomatic measures to promote peace agreements and must be enforced by a United States diplomatic presence for an extended amount of time to ensure any reformed government does not fall to the same corruption that has hindered Colombian democratic institutions for decades. Such policies would reduce the threat from FARC by reducing its incentive to traffic cocaine and increase its incentive to interact in a functioning democracy. Further measures to reduce the threat of cocaine trafficking could be met by decreasing the demand for cocaine within the United States by increasing criminal penalties associated with cocaine sale, transportation, and use. Likewise, United States intelligence should focus on eliminating cartels in the United States that purchase the cocaine. Eliminating the market for cocaine as well as the logistical networks to supply it would reduce FARC s intent to sell it within the United States. Reducing the vulnerability and cost of cocaine trafficking and an unstable Colombia are also key to United States policy. Enacting more restrictive Mexico-US border-crossing searches and increasing border patrol and police forces could limit trafficking. However, highway systems have proven to be difficult to patrol despite increasing police forces. 25 Also, although eliminating FARC isn t a primary objective of the United States, efforts to limit the capabilities of FARC would have a declining effect of cocaine trafficking into the United States. Using United States intelligence to learn of FARC tactics would directly benefit 25 Waugh Jr., William L. Securing Mass Transit: A Challenge for Homeland Security. Policy Research Review. Vol 21. No. 3 (2004) 307-316.
Lind 8 United States policymaking and would allow for adaptations to United States tactics. Of course, eliminating FARC forces may open the door for other guerrilla groups to gain power (who may also aim to traffic cocaine into the United States). Therefore, any efforts to eliminate FARC must be carefully implemented and observed by the United States. Threatening a decrease in economic aid to Colombia unless domestic politics are improved may seem like a powerful tool at first, however such measures would probably increase internal conflict in Colombia, which is directly against United States interests. The core ends of United States policy in Colombia aim to reduce cocaine trafficking into the United States and to promote a peaceful legitimate democracy within Colombia (in that order). These ends can be achieved using means that focus on fostering a meaningful democracy in Colombia (which is also a goal of FARC) as well as curbing demand for cocaine within the United States. Further efforts shall be focused on limiting the power of FARC in Colombia in an effort to limit violence. This research calls for a reform of United States policy in Colombia to focus more on the above ends using the suggested means in contrast to current United States policy which focuses on economic aid aimed at limiting cocaine production in Colombia. 26 I argue that if a legitimate democracy were formed, groups such as FARC which cultivate cocaine growth and organize its sale to the United States would dissolve and interact in a legitimate functioning democracy. Looking forward, experts have argued that a cost-benefit analysis places Colombian interests behind those of Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela within the Latin American 26 United States Support for Colombia. Department of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.
Lind 9 region. 27 Certainly, public opinion and additional foreign interests trump those of Colombia. Nonetheless, the United States has a clear imminent (however lacking severity) threat from FARC in Colombia. 27 Jordan, Amos; Taylor Jr., William J.; Meese, Michael; Neilsen, Suzanne. American National Security. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) 532.
Lind 10 Bibliography Gentry, John A. and Spencer, David E. Colombia s FARC: A Portrait of Insurgent Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. Vol 25, No. 4 (Aug 2010) 453-478. Jordan, Amos; Taylor Jr., William J.; Meese, Michael; Neilsen, Suzanne. American National Security. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) 532. Molano, Alfredo. The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group s Long History. NACLA Report on the Americas (Sept/Oct 2000) accessed May 5, 2011. Ortiz, Roman D. Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Vol 25. (2002) 130. Pearce, Jenny. Colombia, Inside the Labyrinth. (London: Latin American Bureau, 1990) 64-65. Peceny, Mark and Durnam, Michael. The FARC s Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia s Civil War in the 1990s. Vol. 48 No. 2 (2006) 95. Plan Colombia-National Consolidation Global Security: Military (accessed 5/8/11) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/colombia.htm. Rochlin, James F., Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 134-135. United States Support for Colombia. Department of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (March 28, 2000) http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html. Veillette, Connie. Plan Columbia: A Progress Report. Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress (June 22, 2005) 6. Waugh Jr., William L. Securing Mass Transit: A Challenge for Homeland Security. Policy Research Review. Vol 21. No. 3 (2004) 307-316.
Lind 11 What future for US-backed Plan Colombia? BBC News: Latin America & Caribbean. (June 12, 2010) accessed May 8, 20011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10208937. Whittaker, David. The Terrorism Reader. (New York: Routledge, 2001) 174-177.