Southern Africa and the European Union: the TDCA and SADC EPA

Southern Africa and the European Union: the TDCA and SADC EPA by Catherine Grant tralac Trade Brief No 1/2006 May 2006

Introduction Regional integration is not a new issue in the Southern African region with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) dating back to 1910. It was only in 2002, however, that steps were taken to ensure that SACU members pursued a more coordinated trade policy approach with regard to third parties. A common external tariff did exist before the 2002 Agreement but the members of SACU had in reality been negotiating bilateral free trade arrangements with other countries with little regard to the concerns of their SACU partners. One such example is the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) concluded between South Africa and the European Union in 1999. The remaining SACU members (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland the BLNS) are not party to the TDCA but in effect have been required to adhere to some of the provisions of the Agreement, especially with regards to the tariff concessions offered by South Africa. The BLNS are now themselves in the process of negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union. These Agreements are aimed at replacing the preferential access regime set out in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This paper explores the relationship between the members of SACU and the European Union. Background information is provided on SACU, the TDCA and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA negotiations. The final two sections look at the areas of overlap between all these arrangements and specific ways that a convergence could be achieved between the provisions of the TDCA and the SADC EPA. Southern African Customs Union The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is the oldest customs union in the world. It was initially established in 1910 by an agreement between the then Union of South Africa and three so-called British High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland (tralac, 2002). The SACU as we now know it came into existence on 11 December 1969 and entered into force on 1 March 1970. The members are South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia (which joined in 1990 in its own right). Essentially SACU is a customs-free zone with 1

a common external tariff imposed against all non-members of the customs union as well as a common excise tax (tralac, 2002). At the heart of SACU is the collection of the common customs and excise duties. This is done through the South African National Revenue Fund and the revenue is then shared among members on the basis of a revenue-sharing formula. The SACU tariffs and excise duties provide a significant source of revenue for Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland (Kirk and Stern, 2003: 2). South Africa has a dominant position in SACU (tralac, 2002) and SACU has been characterized by severe divergences in policies, levels of development, political systems, and administrative capacity (Kirk and Stern, 2003: 1). These factors have lead to attempts to renegotiate the 1969 Agreement. This was only possible, however, after 1994 when South Africa attained its first democratic government. The renegotiation of the SACU Agreement concluded in 2002. The aim was to create a more democratic institutional structure; a dispute settlement mechanism; and to require common policies on industrial development, agriculture, competition and unfair trade practices (Center for International Development at Harvard University, 2004). The new Agreement seeks to entrench a democratic approach to trade policy while minimizing revenue instability during a period of declining tariffs (Kirk and Stern, 2003: 1). The new Agreement is more comprehensive. Its stated objectives include: To promote the integration of the Members into the global economy; To facilitate cross-border movement of goods between the Members; To establish effective, transparent and democratic institutions which will ensure equitable trade benefits to the Members; To facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue from customs, excise and additional duties; To promote fair competition, substantially increase investment and facilitate economic development; and To facilitate the development of common policies and strategies. (Kirk and Stern, 2003: 7). 2

The affairs of SACU are now managed by an independent, administrative secretariat based in Namibia. Decisions are made through a process involving ministers of all the member countries. According to Kirk and Stern (2003: 13), the ;greatest accomplishment of the new agreement is that it introduces joint decision making into all aspects of the customs union. The reality, however, is somewhat different from the theory. SACU has not yet fully implemented the 2002 Agreement and is still some way from the goal of common trade policies and strategies. The Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement Following four years of difficult negotiations, South Africa and the European Union concluded the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) in 1999. It entered into force on 1 January 2000 with a transition period of twelve years for South Africa and ten years for the EU. The Agreement is said to be a comprehensive one that establishes a free trade area (TDCA, Article 5). It largely deals with the movement of goods but there are provisions related to services and investment as well as other issues, such as government procurement, competition policy and intellectual property. The trade provisions are complemented by a comprehensive development assistance envelope (Bertelsmann-Scott and Draper, 2005: 1). A review process was included in the TDCA and the first five-year review has recently taken place. With regard to market access, the EU is required to eliminate tariffs on approximately 95% of goods currently traded, and South Africa on 86%. However, as is noted by Sandrey (2005: 1-2), prescribed EU tariff changes affect only 25% of current trade goods and their weighted average tariff is only 2.7%. South African tariff changes affect 40% of currently traded goods in a context of a weighted average tariff of 10%. The greater burden of the TDCA in terms of tariff adjustments could therefore be argued to fall on South Africa. One commentator has even described the Agreement as a raw deal for South Africa (Greenberg, 2000). That said, the South African Government stated at the end of 2004 that trade between South Africa and the EU had grown by close to 50% since the advent of the TDCA (tralac, 2004). From its perspective the TDCA is a success. Even though South Africa was a member of SACU at the time of entering into negotiations with the EU, it chose to do so alone and not to include the BLNS 3

countries. The Agreement has had a large impact on the BLNS who are effectively de facto parties to the TDCA. Because of the common external tariff in SACU, the BLNS will be forced to reduce their tariffs on imports from the EU at the rate agreed by South Africa in the TDCA. This will have an impact on tariff revenue for the BLNS and it has been estimated that this could be around a 21% decrease (Greenberg, 2000: 19). Botswana has been estimated to lose around 10% of its total national income as a result of the TDCA (Sandrey, 2005: 5). In a further negative twist, due to the rules of origin provisions in the TDCA, the BLNS will not be able to take advantage of the preferential access to the EU market provided for South Africa. The result of the TDCA could therefore be described as lose-lose for the BLNS. The SADC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement Preferential market access agreements have long existed between the European Union and the African Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) of countries. Today, relations are governed by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement which came into force in 2000 in place of the Fourth Lome Convention. Because it is a preferential agreement, Cotonou has come under some criticism from the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for not being in line with Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947. The EU and ACP were, however, granted a waiver by the WTO until the end of 2007. It is therefore envisaged that Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP countries will be negotiated by that time and that they will be WTO-compatible. The key principles for the EPAs under the Cotonou Agreement are reciprocity, differentiation, deeper regional integration and coordination of trade and aid (UNECA, 2005(a): 4). In order to facilitate the negotiation of EPAs, the ACP countries have divided themselves into regional groups under Article 37(5) of the Cotonou Agreement. There are currently six groups: SADC (Southern Africa), ESA (East Africa), ECOWAS (West Africa), CEMAC (Central Africa), CARIFORUM/CARICOM (Caribbean) and the Pacific Forum (Pacific countries). The SADC group is made up of seven members: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, Swaziland and Tanzania. South Africa is an observer of the SADC EPA group. Negotiations between the SADC group and the EU were launched in July 2004 with the aim of finalising an EPA by the end of 2007. Work is now under way on the subjects that were agreed to be covered in the EPA negotiations, including regional integration, market access, rules 4

of origin, trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. A complicated web As is clear from the above brief descriptions of the TDCA and the SADC-EU EPA negotiations, there are a number of complicated issues surrounding regional integration that have emerged in the Southern African region in recent years. First, there is the TDCA itself with the complication of the impact it has had on the BLNS members of SACU. Second, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is divided in the EPA negotiations with some members (Mauritius, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) choosing to be part of the ESA (East Africa) group. This is of particular significance as SADC is currently working on the implementation of its Trade Protocol with the aim of liberalising all trade by 2012. COMESA (with its overlapping membership with SADC) is also planning to become a customs union in the near future. It is, however, not legally or technically possible for a country to belong to more than one customs union (Jakobeit, Hartzenberg and Charalambides, 2005: 4). This point is of particular relevance to Tanzania who has opted to be a member of the SADC EPA group but is also part of the East Africa Community which is in transition to a customs union. These difficulties have been raised by many commentators and acknowledged by the SADC Secretariat. According to the SADC Secretariat (2005: 4), the main challenge for SADC EPA is to ensure coherence of positions and avoid conflicts in trade policy and commitments. To assist in this regard, a Working Group has been established to ensure the effective coordination between the SADC EPA negotiations and the ongoing review process of the TDCA (SADC Secretariat, 2005: 5). The Working Group is composed of Angola, Namibia and South Africa. In order to address other coordination issues within the region, the SADC Chief Coordinator for EPA negotiations has also been mandated to meet with his counterpart on the ESA side to establish a working relationship (SADC Secretariat, 2005: 5). An additional complication for the SADC region s relationship with the EU is the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative that grants duty-free and quota-free access to least-developed countries (LDCs). Within the SADC EPA group there are a number of LDCs, including Lesotho, Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique. The question for 5

these countries is therefore what incentives there are for an LDC to negotiate an EPA with the EU (Sandrey, 2005: 2). LDCs must look carefully at the implementation of the EBA initiative and consider what issues need to be on the negotiating list in order to improve their access to the EU. These might include rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade. As an EPA is intended to be reciprocal, the LDCs will also need to take a defensive look at their own markets so as to consider what market access to offer the EU. This last point is, of course, complicated for Lesotho due to the existence of the common external tariff under SACU and the TDCA. Future convergence? The issues described in the section above are complex and difficult to resolve. They are further complicated by political considerations that seem to be driving the decisions of SADC countries about which customs unions and EPA negotiating group to join. Jakobeit, Hartzenberg and Charalambides (2005) have identified a number of scenarios to resolve the question of multiple membership of regional integration initiatives. A number of useful suggestions are made, such as the need for Tanzania to commit itself as a member of the EAC to the ESA EPA negotiating group. However, this paper does not seek to discuss these options but rather addresses the issue of overlap between the TDCA and the SADC EPA negotiations. Annex 1 contains a summary of the recommendations made below. A mechanism already exists to address coordination between the TDCA review and the SADC EPA negotiations: this is the Working Group made up of Angola, Namibia and South Africa. In the first instance this Group needs to be strengthened. South Africa will be required to take a lead in this process given that it is the only party to the TDCA with the EU. There is noescaping the fact that South Africa needs to be intimately involved in the SADC EPA negotiations. This is not only because of the impact of the TDCA but for other reasons as well. It is been shown that regional integration will suffer from EPA (UNECA, 2005: 23) and that the focus of trade diversion under the Agreement will be on the trade between SADC countries and South Africa. As a strong proponent of African development and economic integration, South Africa therefore needs to be at the forefront of efforts to limit the negative impacts of an EPA on the region. 6

The Working Group must establish a clear strategy for convergence between the TDCA and SADC EPA processes. Given the pressing time frame for the EPA negotiations, this will need to be done expeditiously. At the outset, a decision on whether or not to use the TDCA as a basis for the SADC EPA negotiations must be made. Using the TDCA as a starting point would effectively ensure that the BLNS acknowledge their de facto membership of the Agreement. It would be up to the other members of the SADC EPA group to decide if they are willing to participate in the negotiations with the EU on the basis of the TDCA. As LDCs, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania all have the option of using EBA and this may be preferable. However if these countries are keen to join SACU at some point in the future, it would make sense to sign on to the idea of using the TDCA as a starting point for negotiations. It is worth noting that this paper is not suggesting that the members of the SADC EPA group simply become party to the TDCA. This would be likely to disadvantage the SADC EPA group countries as they did not participate in the negotiations of the TDCA in the first instance. Another reason is because the situation of South Africa is different from that of other SADC countries. South Africa was not entitled to preferential market access from the EU under the Cotonou Agreement. From an EU perspective South Africa has not been in the same group as the other ACP countries and the EU has shown some reluctance to grant South Africa the same level of preferential treatment as other countries in the region. With this in mind, the EU is apparently not keen to see the TDCA used as a model for the SADC EPA (Bertelsmann-Scott and Draper, 2005: 2). Following a decision to use the TDCA as a starting point or benchmark (Bertelsmann-Scott and Draper, 2005: 1) for the negotiations, the SADC EPA group could then focus on those areas where it would like to achieve a TDCA-plus result (Roux, 2005:13). From a defensive point of view, the SADC EPA group could look at identifying special products which they would seek to exempt from further tariff liberalisation or placed on a longer implementation schedule. It would also need to look carefully at the provisions related to services and investment in the TDCA to ensure that their implementation would not have any negative impact on the economic development of the members. On the offensive side, using the TDCA as a basis for the negotiations would make the formulation of positions much simpler and 7

may even allow EPA negotiators to turn the table in their favour, rather than simply following the negotiating formula designed by the EU (Bertelsmann-Scott and Draper, 2005: 2). Each member of the SADC EPA group could identify those key products in which they would like to see greater market access than that granted under the TDCA. This is unlikely to be a large number and can be expected to be focused in a number of key sectors, such as agricultural and fisheries products. It may also involve renegotiation of some of the time frames for liberalisation offered by the EU. At one extreme, the members of the SADC EPA group might decide to seek duty-free and quota-free access for all goods in line with the EBA initiative. With regard to other issues outside of market access, Bertelsmann-Scott and Draper (2005: 1-2) suggest that the EPA should at the very least not be greater in coverage than the TDCA given that the countries involved are comparatively underdeveloped. There are, however, a number of areas covered by the TDCA that warrant the attention of the SADC EPA group. Most notably, this includes rules of origin (ROO). Under the Cotonou Agreement, ROO were not the result of a negotiated process as the Agreement is a non-reciprocal one (Naumann, 2005: 8). Under the EPAs, however, ROO will define many of the conditions of market access (Naumann, 2005: 17). If the EPA is to result in real market access gains for the SADC group, it will be necessary to take a close look at ROO, and those in the TDCA are unlikely to be appropriate. The development dimension is a further issue that warrants consideration as part of the strategy of convergence between the TDCA and SADC EPA negotiations. The South African approach to the development provisions of the TDCA could be instructive. As Bertelsmann-Scott and Draper (2005: 2) note, South Africa was active in finding innovative solutions to secure the provision of technical assistance without the need to demand additional funds under the European Development Fund. One example is the SA-EU Science and Technology Agreement. Such outcomes will be important if the developmental nature of the EPAs is to be upheld. Negotiating a free trade agreement of any kind requires considerable resources and the SADC EPA is no exception. The SADC Secretariat has identified capacity problems as one of the key challenges in the EPA negotiations (SADC Secretariat, 2005: 4). In order to address some of these challenges, it is suggested that an 8

advisory body be established to assist the SADC EPA group. This body could be made up of private sector representatives as well as independent researchers and analysts. The advisory body could be divided into technical working groups to consider the key issues. Such a model is being used successfully by CARIFORUM where the role of technical working groups is to develop regional negotiating positions that are then submitted to the Ministerial Council for consideration and action (Lodge, 2005). Such a process would require political buy-in from the members of the SADC EPA group but could easily be established. At the outset it would be important to set in place a clear timetable and schedule regular meetings between officials and the advisory body. Conclusion A good deal of political will and cooperation at the technical level will be needed to ensure that the TDCA and SADC EPA negotiations are coordinated in a way that does not undermine the interests of any of the members of the region. The working group made up of Angola, South Africa and Namibia is a step in the right direction. This paper recommends that this group expedite its work and that key issues must be dealt with in an urgent manner. As the group has already been established, it is suggested that it be used as the body on which to focus discussions around convergence between the TDCA and the SADC EPA. It could usefully be supported by the formation of a group of advisors made up of private sector representatives as well as independent researchers and analysts. Members of the group could be assigned specific tasks on which to work with officials in order to obtain a wellconsidered position for presentation to the EU. Developing such a clear negotiating platform would serve the SADC group in good stead and ensure that the resulting EPA takes into account its key concerns. 9

Bibliography Bertelsmann-Scott, T. and Draper, P. 2005. The TDCA: perspectives for EU-South and Southern Africa relations. Trade Negotiations Insight: From Doha to Cotonou, Vol. 4, No.1, January-February 2005. [Online]. Available: http://www.ictsd.org/tni/tni_english/tni_en_4.1.pdf (3 November 2005). Centre for International Development at Harvard University. 2004. South Africa Summary. [Online]. Available: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/gov/southafricagov.html (8 July 2005). Department of Foreign Affairs. 2005. Southern African Customs Union (SACU). [Online]. Available: http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/multilateral/africa/sacu.htm (8 July 2005) Greenberg, S. 2000. Raw Deal: South Africa European Union Trade Pact. Southern Africa Report, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 16-19. Jakobeit, C., Hartzenberg, T. and Charalambides, N. 2005. Overlapping Membership in COMESA, EAC, SACU and SADC: Trade Policy Options for the Region and for EPA Negotiations. Eschborn, Germany: GTZ. Kirk, R. and Stern, M. 2003. The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 57. Washington: World Bank. Lodge, J. 2005. CARIFORUM Negotiation of an EPA: Issues and Challenges. Paper presented at the tralac Annual Conference, 13 14 October 2005, Cape Town, South Africa. Naumann, E. 2005. Rules of Origin under EPAs: Key Issues and New Directions. Paper presented at the tralac Annual Conference, 13 14 October 2005, Cape Town, South Africa. 10

Roux, W. 2005. An Alternative to the EPA Proposals: A Provision Dropped From the EU s EPA Negotiation Manual? Paper presented at the tralac Annual Conference, 13 14 October 2005, Cape Town, South Africa. SADC Secretariat. 2005. SADC-EC EPA Negotiations. Paper presented at the tralac Annual Conference, 13 14 October 2005, Cape Town, South Africa. Sandrey, R. 2005. Is the Region Ready for a Modern Free Trade Agreement? A Small Country Perspective. Paper presented at the tralac Annual Conference, 13 14 October 2005, Cape Town, South Africa. tralac. 2002. An Overview of SACU. [Online]. Available: http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=26 (8 July 2005) tralac. 2004. SA s Visit to the EU a Success. [Online]. Available: Retrieved http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=3157 (4 November 2005). United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Trade and Regional Integration Division. 2005. The EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement: A Regional Perspective. Addis Ababa: UNECA. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Trade and Regional Integration Division. 2005a. The Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership Agreements. Trade Negotiations Insight: From Doha to Cotonou, Vol. 4, No.5, September October 2005. [Online]. Available: http://www.ictsd.org/tni/tni_english/tni_en_4.5.pdf (3 November 2005). 11

Annex 1: Steps Towards Convergence 1. Strengthen and set timetables for the work of the Working Group (Angola, Namibia and South Africa) on the coordination between the TDCA and SADC EPA negotiations. 2. Take a decision with regard to using the TDCA as a starting point or benchmark for the SADC EPA negotiations. 3. Establish an advisory group to coordinate input into the development of positions by the SADC EPA negotiators. This group could include private sector representatives plus independent researchers and analysts. It could be divided up into smaller task teams (technical working groups) with responsibility for preparing information on the key issues listed below. A schedule of regular meetings should be put in place at the outset to enable ongoing interaction between stakeholders and officials. 4. Identify defensive market access interests and prepare a list of special products for consideration of an exemption from tariff liberalisation or a longer implementation period. 5. Identify offensive market access interests that go beyond the concessions received by South Africa in the TDCA. These might include agricultural and fisheries products or alternatively be based on an EBA approach of duty-free and quota-free access for all goods. Prepare request for tariff liberalisation by the EU. 6. Formulate an approach to the expansion of the services and investment provisions of the TDCA. 7. Prepare a proposal for revised TDCA-plus ROO concentrating on products of key interest. 8. Identify other barriers to trade in the EU market such as technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, customs procedures and environmental requirements. 12

9. Develop an innovative proposal for a technical assistance package, taking into account the lessons learnt in the TDCA. 10. Put in place a regular consultation mechanism with the ESA and other ACP groups. 11. Monitor closely developments in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations so as to ensure compatibility of the EPA with WTO rules. 13

Working Papers 2002 US safeguard measures on steel imports: specific implications by Niel Joubert & Rian Geldenhuys. WP 1/2002, April A few reflections on Annex VI to the SADC Trade Protocol by Jan Bohanes WP 2/2002, August Competition policy in a regional context: a SADC perspective on trade investment & competition issues by Trudi Hartzenberg WP 3/2002, November Rules of Origin and Agriculture: some observations by Hilton Zunckel WP 4/2002, November 2003 A new anti-dumping regime for South Africa and SACU by Stuart Clark & Gerhard Erasmus WP 1/2003, May Why build capacity in international trade law? by Gerhard Erasmus WP 2/2003, May The regional integration facilitation forum: a simple answer to a complicated issue? by Henry Mutai WP 3/2003, July The WTO GMO dispute by Maxine Kennett WP 4/2003, July WTO accession by Maxine Kennett WP 5/2003, July On the road to Cancun: a development perspective on EU trade policies by Faizel Ismail WP 6/2003, August GATS: an update on the negotiations and developments of trade in services in SADC by Adeline Tibakweitira WP 7/2003, August An evaluation of the capitals control debate: is there a case for controlling capital flows in the SACU-US free trade agreement? by Calvin Manduna WP 8/2003, August Non-smokers hooked on tobacco by Calvin Manduna WP 9/2003, August Assessing the impact of trade liberalisation: the importance of policy complementarities and policy processes in a SADC context by Trudi Hartzenberg WP 10/2003, October An examination of regional trade agreements: a case study of the EC and the East African community by Jeremy Everard John Streatfeild WP 11/2003, October 14

Reforming the EU sugar regime: will Southern Africa still feature? by Daniel Malzbender WP 12/2003, October 2004 Complexities and inadequacies relating to certain provision of the General Agreement on Trade in Services by Leon Steenkamp WP 1/2004, March Challenges posed by electronic commerce to the operation and implementation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services by Leon Steenkamp WP 2/2004, March Trade liberalisation and regional integration in SADC: policy synergies assessed in an industrial organisation framework by Martine Visser and Trudi Hartzenberg WP 3/2004, March Tanzania and AGOA: opportunities missed? by Eckart Naumann and Linda Mtango WP 4/2004, March Rationale behind agricultural reform negotiations by Hilton Zunkel WP 5/2004, July The impact of US-SACU FTA negotiations on Public Health in Southern Africa by Tenu Avafia WP 6/2004, November Export Performance of the South African Automotive Industry by Mareika Meyn WP 7/2004 December 2005 Textiles and clothing: Reflections on the sector s integration into the post-quota environment by Eckart Naumann WP 1/2005, March Assessing the Causes of Sub-Saharan Africa's Declining Exports and Addressing Supply-Side Constraints by Calvin Manduna WP 2/2005, May A Few Reflections on Annex VI to the SADC Trade Protocol by Jan Bohanes WP 3/2005, June Tariff liberisation impacts of the EAC Customs Union in perspective by Heinz - Michael Stahl WP4/2005, August Trade facilitation and the WTO: A critical analysis of proposals on trade facilitation and their implications for African countries by Gainmore Zanamwe WP5/2005, September An evaluation of the alternatives and possibilities for countries in sub-saharan Africa to meet the sanitary standards for entry into the international trade in animals and animal products by Gideon K. Brückner WP 6/2005, October Dispute Settlement under COMESA by Felix Maonera WP7/2005, October The Challenges Facing Least Developed Countries in the GATS Negotiations: A Case Study of Lesotho by Calvin Manduna 15

WP8/2005. November Rules of Origin under EPAs: Key Issues and New Directions by Eckart Naumann WP9/2005, December Lesotho: Potential Export Diversification Study: July 2005 by Ron Sandrey, Adelaide Matlanyane, David Maleleka and Dirk Ernst van Seventer WP10/2005, December African Member States and the Negotiations on Dispute Settlement Reform in the World Trade Organization by Clement Ng ong ola WP11/2005, December 2006 Agriculture and the World Trade Organization 10 Years On by Ron Sandrey WP1/2006, January Trade Liberalisation: What exactly does it mean for South Africa? by Ron Sandrey WP2/2006, March South African Merchandise Trade with China by Ron Sandrey WP3/2006, March The Multifibre Agreement WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing by Eckart Naumann WP4/2006, April The WTO ten years on: Trade and Development By Catherine Grant WP5/2006, May Trade Briefs 2002 Cost sharing in international dispute settlement: some reflections in the context of SADC by Jan Bohanes & Gerhard Erasmus. TB 1/2002, July Trade dispute between Zambia & Zimbabwe by Tapiwa C. Gandidze. TB 2/2002, August 2003 Non-tariff barriers : the reward of curtailed freedom by Hilton Zunckel TB 1/2003, February The effects of globalization on negotiating tactics by Gerhard Erasmus & Lee Padayachee TB 2/2003, May The US-SACU FTA : implications for wheat trade by Hilton Zunckel TB 3/2003, June Memberships in multiple regional trading arrangements : legal implications for the conduct of trade negotiations by Henry Mutai TB 4/2003, August 2004 16

Apparel Trade and Quotas: Developments since AGOA s inception and challenges ahead by Eckart Naumann TB 1/2004, March Adequately boxing Africa in the debate on domestic support and export subsidies by Hilton E Zunckel TB 2/2004, July Recent changes to the AGOA legislation by Eckart Naumann TB 3/2004, August 2005 Trade after Preferences: a New Adjustment Partnership? by Ron Sandrey TB1/2005, June TRIPs and Public Health: The Unresolved Debate by Tenu Avafia TB2/2005, June Daring to Dispute: Are there shifting trends in African participation in WTO dispute settlement? by Calvin Manduna TB3/2005, June South Africa s Countervailing Regulations by Gustav Brink TB4/2005, August Trade and competitiveness in African fish exports: Impacts of WTO and EU negotiations and regulation by Stefano Ponte, Jesper Raakjær Nielsen, & Liam Campling TB5/2005, September Geographical Indications: Implications for Africa by Catherine Grant TB6/November 17