BRICS and the economic decline of the old world,

BRICS and the economic decline of the old world, 1990-2030 Arne Melchior, NUPI Background note for the ONS Summit 2012: The geopolitics of energy, August 2012. This note is made available at the project web page as a background note, and the content may be used as input in other publications later. Some aspects are also summarised in the report (Eriksen et. al. 2012). Another related publication is Melchior (2012). Abstract The paper examines GDP growth and the share of different regions in the world economy 1990-2010, with some simple extrapolations for 2010-2030. For several decades, there has been strong reallocation of world GDP shares from Western Europe towards. During the last decade (2000-2010) this change accelerated, and the share of North America also fell considerably. Measured in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity, that accounts for price level differences), the share of Western Europe + North America in world GDP fell from 51% in 1990 to 42% in 2010, whereas s share increased from 23 to 34%. From the turn of the century, growth accelerated in other world regions such as Africa, Latin America, Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union. If the trend from the last decade continues, s share will rise to 57% in 2030, while North America + Western Europe will be down to 21%. This forecast may be exaggerated since China s growth is expected to slow over time, and some recent growth was stimulated by commodity price hikes. Better education and less war may nevertheless create sustained growth in the developing world and lead to a continued realocation away from the old industrial countries. The BRICS countries play an important role in this global reallocation and especially Russia, Brazil and to a growing extent China are leading in their regions. In, many nations contribute to the stronger role of the regions. India has contributed but lags behind China and the rest of should not be forgotten. In Africa, South Africa is important but a limited part of the overall story. Hence the BRICS are important but differ in importance, and they should be focused but not over-focused. 1

1. Introduction As shown in Melchior (2012) there has recently been a dramatic reallocation of the shares of different regions in world trade; with a rise for and a decline for Western Europe and North America. After 2000, other world regions have also expanded their shares. Corresponding to this reallocation of world trade, similar changes have occurred for shares of world GDP. This note presents an up-to-date analysis of GDP growth for 1990-2010, and some simple forecasts and extrapolations for 2010-2030. The BRICS are large emerging economies representing a trend with development in new parts of the world. There are however a number of emerging economies beyond BRICS, so we are interested in developing regions and not only the BRICS. Some BRICS are large and dominating in their regions, but others represent a more modest share so that a single-minded focus on the BRICS creates a biased perception. We therefore analyse regions as well as BRICS, and examine how important the BRICS are within their regions. With respect to regions, we use the same classification as in Melchior (2012); with nine world regions: Western Europe; Central Europe (including Greece and Turkey); FSU (Former Soviet Union); Africa; Middle East (including Israel); (from Afghanistan and eastward); Oceania and Pacific; North America (including Mexico); Latin America (inncluding the Caribbean). There is also a 10th NES (not elsewhere specified) region; this is however very small for GDP data and specific results will not be reported even if the group is included in the total. 1 For details, see Melchior (2012). 2. The data set For international comparisons, GDP data could be expressed in current USD, constant USD or PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) $ - i.e. adjusted for price level differences between countries. Data in current USD can be used for calculating shares of world GDP but analysis of growth should use data in constant dollars. PPP data are based on artificial exchange rates that adjust for price levels. Since poor countries have lower price levels, PPP data give higher shares for developing countries in the world economy. Figures in constant dollars adjust for inflation in the USA but do not take price level differences into account. Figure 1 shows the number of countries covered in the data base World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank, for population, GDP in constant 2000 USD and GDP in 2005 PPP$. 1 In 2010, the NES group represented less than 0.1% of world GDP. 2

No. countries Fig. 1: Data coverage 1980-2010 225 200 175 150 Population 125 GDP-PPP GDP-const$ 100 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Hence data coverage is better from 1990, so we will use data for 1990-2010 in order to increase the data coverage. In the study, we use two different data sets for 1990-2010: A data set in constant 2000 USD covering 180 countries and territories. A data set in 2005 PPP USD covering 172 countries and territories. In the following, we refer to these as nominal GDP and GDP-PPP, respectively. In order to obtain a complete time series for all the 172/180 countries, we use some supplementary information, especially for 2010 where some countries have not yet reported their data to the World Bank. 2 For all years, the data sets cover countries representing between 97 and 98% of the world s population. The missing countries are developing countries and territories that could be expected to have income levels below the world average, so the data sets might cover 98-99% of world GDP. When we calculate world GDP we mean the aggregate for the countries included in the respective data set. 3. Regional income levels and shares of world GDP, 1990-2010 Appendix Tables A1-A4 show per capita income levels and shares of world GDP for the ten world regions for 1990-2010. Tables A1-A2 are for nominal GDP, while tables A3-A4 use GDP-PPP. Figures 2 (nominal) and 3 (PPP) show the shares of world GDP for North America, Western Europe, and other regions combined. 2 We use supplementary data on GDP growth from CIA World Factbook in order to calculate GDP for 2008-2010 in some cases. For GDP in 2000 USD, this applied to 19 countries for 2010, 5 cases for 2009 and one case for 2008. For GDP-PPP, it applied to 11 cases for 2010 and one for 2009. Furthermore, data for 1980 were extrapolated in five cases based on growth rates for the four subsequent years. These extrapolations and use of other data may represent a minor inaccuracy in the data (42 out of 7392 data entries, or 0.6%) but apply to mainly smaller countries and do therefore not affect the overall results too much. When data for 2009-2010 are reported, the calculations may be reiterated in order to eliminate any inaccuracy. 3

35 Figure 2: Region shares of world GDP, 1990-2010 (constant 2000 $) 30 25 20 15 North America W Europe Others 10 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 35 33 31 29 27 25 23 21 19 17 Fig. 3: Regional shares of world GDP (PPP, 2005 international $) 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 North America W Europe Others There was a continuous decline for Western Europe and a continuous increase for, only interrupted by the n crisis in 1998-2000. For North America and Others, the period is split in two with a reversal from 2000 (or 1999, even more accurately). As we would expect, the trends over time are similar in nominal $ and PPP, but considerably stronger with PPP data. Especially for, GDP growth is much stronger with PPP than nominal $. This is shown in Table 1 and Figure 4. 4

Annual growth (%) 0.5 0.4 1.8 1.8 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.1 2.7 3.2 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.1 5.4 Table 1: Average annual growth rates for world regions, 1990-2010 (%) Region 1990-2000 2000-2010 1990-2010 Nominal PPP Nominal PPP Nominal PPP Africa 2.65 2.67 4.70 4.96 3.67 3.81 3.04 4.59 4.06 6.16 3.55 5.37 Central Europe 2.19 1.90 3.45 3.53 2.82 2.71 FSU -4.15-4.32 5.42 5.33 0.52 0.39 Latin America 3.11 3.12 3.87 3.85 3.49 3.48 Middle East 4.14 3.95 3.91 4.20 4.02 4.07 North America 3.41 3.40 1.62 1.63 2.51 2.51 Oceania & Pacific 3.34 3.33 2.97 2.96 3.15 3.15 Western Europe 2.29 2.30 1.25 1.24 1.77 1.77 World 2.83 2.88 2.53 3.50 2.68 3.19 Fig. 4: Average GDP growth 1990-2010 Nominal PPP 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 World W. Europe Oceania & P. North Am. M. East Latin Am. FSU C. Europe Africa As shown in Fig. 4, the old world with FSU, Western Europe and North America had the lowest growth rates over the whole period. For some regions including the FSU, however, there was a sharp difference between the two decades, with lower growth in the 1990s. Figure 5 shows this difference, using the PPP data. 5

Fig. 5: Growth in 1990's vs. 2000's World W. Europe C. Europe FSU North Am. Oceania & P. M. East Latin Am. 1990-2000 2000-2010 Africa -5-4 -3-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Average annual GDP growth While growth slowed down after 2000 for North America and Western Europe, it accelerated for the FSU, Central Europe, Africa, and (more modestly) Latin America. Hence a main feature is the relatively low and declining growth rates of the former economic world leaders. While the relative share of Western Europe has been declining for almost five decades, the new feature is that the USA and North America has joined the club, cutting the pace of growth by half from the 1990s to the 2000s. The long-run change is illustrated in Figure 6, based om Maddison s data set (in PPP). 3 3 Available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ This data is in PPP (using the so-called Geary- Khamis approach) and covers about 200 countries (varying over time due to the formation of new countries). 6

% of world GDP (PPP) 40 35 30 Fig. 6: 's growth and the decline of the West: % of world GDP 1950-2008 Based on Maddison's data set North America Western Europe 25 20 15 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 For the post-1990 period, the pattern is similar to our Figure 3 based on PPP. Figure 6 shows that the rise of and the fall of Europe extends back in time, while the USA/ North America had a stabler share of the world economy during 1970-2000. So the new thins after 2000 is the fall of the USA, and the accelerating decline of North America and Western Europe. Observe again that we examine relative changes and that with temporary exceptions, there has generally been positive real growth in spite of the falling share for the old world. With Maddison s data, the growth of may be slightly inflated by the use of a particular method for constructing PPP data (see footnote 3). For most regions, the difference between nominal and PPP growth rates is very modest. For, however, GDP growth is dramatically higher measured in PPP$. There have been heated debates about the quality of PPP data, and their fragility is illustrated by the fact that after collecting new worldwide price data in 2005, the World Bank adjusted income level estimates for many developing countries significantly downward (for a discussion, see Deaton and Heston 2008). For example, the income levels of China and India were cut by almost 40%. There has also been critique suggesting that some methods to construct GDP-PPP were leading to an overestimation of developing country growth. According to Deaton and Heston (2008), however, the results from different metodologies are not that dramatically diffrent although some gaps exist. Hence issues related to data seem to be a more important factor creating some uncertainty. The gap between nominal and PPP growth rates for has to imply that price level changes in some way added to real growth. There was, however, a very strong price level increase in China: according to Ravaillon (2010), the price level of China doubled from 1993 to 2005. There is some uncertainty as to whether the price level 7

of China (and its change over time) is appropriately measured in the PPP price data (Deaton and Heston 2008). Given thart new data for previous years cannot be collected, some uncertainty will remain about PPP-based growth rates for China and. As we have seen, the qualitative trend is however the same for nominal and PPP data, although the strength of the global reallocation is stronger with PPP and this depends on price level measurement. Compared to growth and reallocation of shares in world goods trade (Melchior 2012), trends for GDP are similar but weaker. For example, the share of Western Europe in world trade fell from 46% in 1990 to 30% in 2010. This may be compared to GDP, for which the Western European share of the world total during the same period fell from 27.6 to23.1% (nominal) or from 24.5 to 18.5% (PPP). The slower decline for GDP is partly because of higher growth for services than for manufacturing, and world goods trade is strongly influenced by manufacturing activity, where the reallocation toards has been very strong. The analysis nevertheless shows beyond doubt that developing country regions grew faster during the period studied. For, this applied to both decades but after 2000, other developing regions have also accelerated GDP growth while the old world slows behind. The analysis has shown that the turn of the century was also an economic landmark; from that point the USA also fell behind, and developing regions beyond joined with varying intensity the process of growth and catch-up. 4. BRICS shares of world GDP BRIC and BRICS are symbols of this transformation of the world economy, as major emerging economies withing their regions. The growth of is however a phenomenon far beyong China and India. While China is certainly the emerging new giant, India is still at an earlier stage of development. When focusing on the BRICS, it should therefore be recalled that they differ in importance within their respective regions and that other countries also matter. Using the same definition of regions as before, table 2 shows the share of the BRICS, plus Germany and the USA, in their regions in 1990, 2000 and 2010. 8

% of world GDP Table 2: BRICS shares of GDP (PPP) in their respective regions Country Region 1990 2000 2010 Brazil Latin America 49 46 45 China 15 27 40 India 13 14 16 South Africa Africa 22 21 18 Russia FSU 68 72 68 Other countries: Germany Western Europe 23 23 22 USA North America 83 84 83 Brazil, Russia and the USA are in increasing order dominant in their regions and China is gradually approaching a similar position in. Other countries in however also matter, as shown by Figure 7. 40 Fig. 7: Composition of 's growth (% of world GDP, PPP) 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Others India China Japan While Japan s share of world GDP has declined steadily (from 9.0 to 5.8%), China s share grew from 3.5 to 13.6% over the period. Shares of world GDP for all BRICS are shown in Table 3. In spite of fast growth recently, India is still a limited fraction of the n growth story, and other countries such as Korea, Indonesia, Thailand add up to a significant share for others. Hence the glory of India is cuirrently slightly inflated, although its important role, size and recent growth success is undisputed. 9

Table 3: BRICS shares of world GDP, 1990-2010 PPP = puchasing power parity, 2005 international $ USD = constant 2000 USD Brazil China India Russia South Africa PPP USD PPP USD PPP USD PPP USD PPP USD 1990 2.99 2.07 3.48 1.83 2.95 1.12 5.22 1.59 0.78 0.46 1995 3.13 2.15 5.58 2.92 3.39 1.28 2.91 0.88 0.73 0.43 2000 2.90 2.01 7.07 3.74 3.77 1.44 2.64 0.81 0.71 0.41 2005 2.79 2.01 9.45 5.18 4.43 1.75 2.99 0.95 0.71 0.44 2010 2.92 2.23 13.57 7.89 5.60 2.34 2.99 1.01 0.70 0.46 5. Future predictions In the popular debate on the BRICS, numerous calculations have been made on how fast the BRICS, and in particular China, will climb on the global rankings. With respect to GDP, the former analysis has shown that the outcome of such calculations depend strongly on whether PPP or nominbal data is used. Second; the result depends strongly on the basis for extrapolations: trends have been quite different in the 2000 s compared to the 1990 s so it matters greatly what kind of growth rates that are extrapoilated. As an illustration, we can show how the world would look like in 2030 depending on whether we use growth rates from the 1990 s or the 2000 s as the basis for future extrapolation. Figures 8 and 9 show simple growth extrapolations for 2010-2030, using nominal or PPP data, respectively. While regional growth 1990-2010 observed, two different paths for 2010-2030 are shown: One path shows developments if all countries have the same annual growth rates in 2010-2030 as they had in the 1990 s. The other path shows what happens if all countries grow as they did in the 2000 s. The corresponding figures are shown in Table 4. Whether reality will conform to any of these extrapolations is of course uncertain and we discuss below how this un certainty can be narrowed. 10

Share of world GDP % of world GDP 50 45 40 Fig. 8: Regional growth extrapolations 2010-2030. % of world GDP, from data in constant $ Solid lines: Country growth as in 1990-2000. Dashed lines: Country growth as in 2000-2010. North America W Europe Others 35 30 25 20 15 10 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 60 50 40 Fig. 9: Regional growth forecasts 2010-2030, % of world GDP, from data in PPP $ Solid lines: Country growth as in 1999-2000. Dashed lines: Country growth as in 2000-2010. North America W Europe Others 30 20 10 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 11

Table 4: Extrapolation of GDP growth 2010-2030, for major world regions. Shares (%) of world GDP. Path 1: National growth rates equal to average for 1990-2000. Path 2: National growth rates equal to average for 2000-2010. Region Observed shares Extrapolations towards 2030 1990 2000 2010 Scenario 2020 2030 (A) Based on PPP data (PPP 2005 international $) 22.60 26.66 34.33 North America 26.64 28.02 23.35 W Europe 24.48 23.12 18.53 Others 26.28 22.21 23.79 (B) Based on nominal data (constant 2000$) Path 1 44.06 55.89 Path 2 45.07 57.49 Path 1 21.34 17.44 Path 2 17.68 11.88 Path 1 15.34 11.43 Path 2 13.54 8.80 Path 1 19.27 15.24 Path 2 23.71 21.84 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 24.89 25.40 29.45 Path 1 34.72 43.30 Path 2 36.79 47.75 North America 33.08 34.99 32.02 Path 1 31.00 27.72 Path 2 27.32 20.98 W Europe 27.59 26.18 23.10 Path 1 20.24 16.49 Path 2 19.05 14.18 Others 14.44 13.44 15.44 Path 1 14.04 12.49 Path 2 16.84 17.09 The extrapolations demonstrate the dramatic nature of the trend after the turn of the century: if this continues for another 20 years, the share of Western Europe in world GDP-PPP will be cut from 19% in 2010 to 9% in 2030, and North America drops from 23 to 12%. These two world regions represented 51% of world GDP (PPP) in 1990, but would be down to 21% 40 years later. With nominal data, the relative contraction of the old world (North America + Western Europe) is a bit more modest; with a share of 35-44% in 2030 compared to 61% in 1990 and 55% in 2010. In a long-term perspective, however, even this is a significant change in the world economy. As we have seen already, s growth is higher with PPP data, but the difference between the 1990 s and 2000 s is not so dramatic. For, it therefore does not matter too much whether growth rates from the 1990 s or 2000 s are used; especially with PPP data the trend is similar in the two cases. For other regions, the pattern is the opposite: nominal and PPP trends do not differ that much, but it matters strongly whether the trend from the 1990 s or the 2000 s is applied. The difference between the two growth paths is particularly large for others, but also for North America and Western Europe, Path 2 with growth rates from the last decade leads to a faster change. 12

GDP-PPP These extrapolations illustrate that the recent past represents a significant rearrangement of the world economy, with new regions on the rise and stagnation for the former leaders. Which trend will apply to the next decades is however a more complicated issue, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine every country and provide a complete forecast. For China, the World Bank has recently (World Bank/ DRC 2012) presented growth forecasts with annual GDP growth falling from recently about 10% to 5% annually in 2030. According to the report (ibid., 9): There is broad consensus that China s growth is likely to slow, but when and at what pace is uncertain, and there is no saying whether this slowdown will be smooth or not. China s growth has been strongly investment-driven, with investment at 46.4% of GDP during 1995-2010 (ibid.), and falling productivity growth during the last decade. Given that rsising wages may un dermine China s competitive advantage in low-skill manufacturing, future growth depends on China s ability to upgrade skills, innovate and import technology. How this will evolve over time, is hard to predict accurately. Figure 10 shows what will happen if growth continues like in 2000-2010 (at 9.6%), compared to the World Bank/DRC forecast. For comparison we also show extrapolations for the USA; here we show both Path 1 and Path 2 since they are quite different (for China, growth in 2000-2010 was slightly lower than during the 1990s). Fig. 10a is in PPP, 10b nominal. 60000 Fig. 10a: China and USA GDP growth 2010-2030 (PPP) 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 China-Path 2 China-WB USA-Path 1 USA-Path 2 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 13

GDP-const. 2000$ 25000 20000 15000 10000 Fig. 10b: China and USA GDP growth 2010-2030 (2000$) China-Path 2 China-WB USA-Path 1 USA-Path 2 5000 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 With PPP data, the GDP of China will become larger than the USA level already in 2017 (Path 2) or 2019 (World Bank scenario). With nominal figures, China will surpass the USA only in the simple extrapolation scenario, but it will approach the U.S. level also in the WB scenario, where annual growth falls to 5%. China is already today the world s largest exporter and manufacturer, and the second largest economy measured by GDP. For China, an ageing population is one of the arguments for a lower growth rate in the future. For India, the demographic aspect is more favourable since labour force participation is low and may be expected to grow. For India, on the other hand, there are a other uncertainties about the future. Recent growth has been driven by services rather than manufacturing, and India resembles a dual economy with pockets of growth but large population segments left in misery. We expect Indian growth to continue, and growth rates may remain high. But in order to really succeed, India has to educate its workforce more broadly and boost the creation of jobs outside agriculture and outside the so-called informal sector that is unfortunately the industrial trade-mark of India. For every country, assessing future growth is a complex issue and it is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake such comprehensive groath forecasts. Our discussion of China illustrates that extrapolation of past growth into the future is uncertain. For Africa, growth in the 2000 s was partly driven by commodity prices and for some commodities, the trend from the last decade cannot be expected to continue over decades. For many developing regions, however, extensive investment in education in the past may provide a basis for sustainable growth in the future; in the Middle East, in Latin America and in Africa. In, many of the initial tigers grew more slowly some time after the n crisis in the late 1990 s. But some of these have solved political problems and may be prepared for another era of future growth; e.g. some ASEAN countries. With fewer armed conflicts worldwide, the developing world may be better able to obtain sustained growth. 14

% of world GDP-PPP With rising wages in China, new countries may also succeed in low-skill manufacturing, after three decades with tough competition from China. Taking these positive factors into acccount, it is therefore quite possible that the reshaping of the world economy may continue rapidly, even if China matures and enters into a stage with somewhat lower growth. Hence the overall conclusion is that growth in China is likely to decelerate, but growth in other developing regions may continue moer or less as in the last decade. The share of North America + Western Europe in the world economy may therefore continue to decline. In Fig.11, we have used our Path 2, with growth as in 2000-2010, but replaced growth for China with the World Bank forecast. 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 Fig. 11: Shares of world GDP - Path 2 with slower growth in China (extrapolations for 2010-2030) 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 NAM+WEU Others Hence even with dampened growth in China, it is possible that the reallocation between the old world and will continue. has 55% of the world s population, and its average per capita income in 2010 was at at 54% (nominal) or 62% (PPP) of the world average (6290 vs. 10084 in PPP, 3343 vs. 6189 in 2000$). According to simple arithmetics, would have a 55% share of world GDP if its average per capita income grows to the world average (with the current population). Growth in countries such as India, Indonesia and Bangladesh and others may contribute in this direction. In the longer run, this is likely to happen, and it will imply a continued strong reallocation in the world economy, as we have seen in the past two decades. References Deaton, A. and A. Heston, 2008, Understanding PPPs and PPP-based National Accounts, NBER Working Paper 14499. Eriksen, S. S., S. Lodgaard, A. Melchior, K. Rich, E. Wilson Rowe and O. J. Sending, 2012, BRICS, Energy and the New World Order. A study by NUPI for the ONS (Offshore Northern Seas) Summit 2012: The geopolitics of energy. NUPI Report, August 2012, available at www.nupi.no. Melchior, A., 2012, World Trade 1970-2010: Globalization, Regionalisation and Reallocation. NUPI Paper No. 805, August 2012, available at www.nupi.no. 15

Ravaillon, M., 2010, Price Levels and Economic Growth. Making Sense of the PPP Changes between ICP Rounds, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5229. World Bank/DRC (Development Research Center of the State Council), 2012, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/02/27/china-2030-executive-summary. 16

Appendix Table A1: Average GDP per capita in 10 world regions, in constant 2000 USD. Africa Central Europe Former Soviet Union Latin America Middle East North America Oceania & Pacific Western Europe 1990 690 2133 3732 2004 3099 3634 22162 12993 18200 4720 1991 679 2189 3516 1874 3172 3816 21804 12764 18434 4717 1992 663 2214 3517 1596 3227 3903 22181 12667 18560 4739 1993 650 2241 3584 1439 3296 3870 22480 13060 18449 4750 1994 650 2286 3595 1246 3396 3898 23109 13415 18913 4836 1995 653 2347 3783 1186 3449 3951 23290 13734 19341 4905 1996 672 2417 3953 1152 3498 4056 23846 14078 19634 5001 1997 678 2456 4114 1177 3616 4119 24620 14379 20217 5118 1998 685 2399 4206 1146 3614 4152 25404 14762 20773 5168 1999 690 2418 4217 1206 3525 4118 26316 15314 21341 5263 2000 699 2491 4412 1315 3579 4298 27142 15668 22083 5417 2001 709 2513 4410 1398 3546 4279 27132 15782 22438 5440 2002 715 2577 4571 1478 3470 4279 27351 16162 22582 5492 2003 730 2646 4768 1596 3509 4425 27738 16451 22703 5573 2004 753 2754 5053 1729 3703 4586 28443 16881 23100 5732 2005 774 2858 5301 1853 3861 4708 29023 17128 23378 5866 2006 802 2984 5610 2020 4047 4857 29530 17329 23962 6034 2007 831 3136 5865 2203 4276 4960 29810 17620 24540 6201 2008 855 3189 5981 2309 4456 5049 29535 17849 24415 6219 2009 858 3158 5739 2147 4395 4971 28193 17722 23277 6006 2010 877 3343 5927 2238 4621 5028 28835 17807 23688 6189 World 17

Appendix Table A2: Average GDP per capita in 10 world regions, in 2005 PPP international $. Africa Central Europe Former Soviet Union Latin America Middle East North America Oceania & Pacific Western Europe 1990 2061 2827 9721 9500 6394 8981 26411 18393 23916 6960 1991 2029 2918 9051 8888 6535 9498 26024 18079 24260 6941 1992 1985 3008 8992 7602 6631 9706 26469 17966 24434 6941 1993 1945 3110 9156 6844 6790 9540 26815 18555 24270 6956 1994 1936 3243 9205 5893 6999 9522 27571 19069 24865 7068 1995 1952 3391 9695 5587 7148 9616 27697 19508 25431 7191 1996 2007 3544 10110 5400 7228 9905 28365 20002 25814 7353 1997 2026 3628 10459 5499 7452 10060 29307 20403 26568 7534 1998 2045 3600 10667 5328 7432 10137 30244 20911 27299 7613 1999 2062 3691 10694 5612 7245 10044 31321 21686 28051 7771 2000 2090 3836 11177 6122 7372 10425 32334 22165 29030 8028 2001 2120 3930 11196 6509 7332 10438 32309 22328 29503 8111 2002 2142 4062 11603 6873 7242 10568 32562 22860 29689 8227 2003 2196 4253 12094 7425 7300 10979 33008 23271 29839 8419 2004 2274 4494 12825 8046 7685 11360 33850 23874 30353 8728 2005 2344 4758 13460 8600 7979 11657 34541 24225 30718 9011 2006 2431 5077 14250 9361 8335 12022 35176 24497 31486 9367 2007 2525 5459 14913 10193 8788 12346 35527 24911 32241 9745 2008 2602 5705 15275 10690 9151 12519 35217 25214 32087 9907 2009 2616 5868 14637 9911 9017 12378 33586 25031 30595 9711 2010 2682 6290 15121 10326 9470 12542 34381 25160 31110 10084 World 18

Appendix Table A3: Shares of world GDP for 10 world regions, % based on constant 2000 USD. Africa Central Europe Former Soviet Union Latin America Middle East North America Oceania & Pacific Western Europe 1990 1.76 24.89 2.67 2.38 4.53 1.65 33.08 1.41 27.57 100 1991 1.75 25.57 2.48 2.20 4.64 1.77 32.52 1.39 27.62 100 1992 1.72 25.75 2.44 1.84 4.71 1.82 32.92 1.37 27.38 100 1993 1.70 26.00 2.47 1.64 4.81 1.82 33.26 1.41 26.86 100 1994 1.69 26.07 2.41 1.37 4.88 1.82 33.55 1.42 26.75 100 1995 1.69 26.40 2.48 1.27 4.90 1.83 33.30 1.43 26.67 100 1996 1.73 26.68 2.52 1.19 4.88 1.86 33.41 1.44 26.26 100 1997 1.72 26.49 2.54 1.17 4.94 1.86 33.68 1.44 26.13 100 1998 1.74 25.65 2.55 1.11 4.90 1.87 34.39 1.46 26.29 100 1999 1.74 25.38 2.49 1.13 4.70 1.83 34.95 1.49 26.25 100 2000 1.73 25.40 2.50 1.18 4.65 1.88 34.99 1.48 26.16 100 2001 1.77 25.51 2.46 1.23 4.59 1.88 34.77 1.49 26.25 100 2002 1.78 25.89 2.51 1.27 4.46 1.88 34.66 1.52 26.00 100 2003 1.82 26.17 2.56 1.33 4.45 1.93 34.56 1.53 25.60 100 2004 1.84 26.45 2.62 1.38 4.57 1.97 34.40 1.53 25.19 100 2005 1.87 26.78 2.66 1.43 4.67 2.00 34.25 1.52 24.78 100 2006 1.91 27.15 2.72 1.50 4.76 2.03 33.84 1.50 24.55 100 2007 1.95 27.71 2.75 1.57 4.89 2.04 33.21 1.50 24.33 100 2008 2.02 28.05 2.78 1.63 5.08 2.10 32.77 1.52 24.01 100 2009 2.12 28.71 2.75 1.55 5.19 2.16 32.35 1.58 23.54 100 2010 2.13 29.45 2.74 1.56 5.29 2.14 32.02 1.55 23.08 100 World 19

Appendix Table A4: Shares of world GDP for 10 world regions, % based on 2005 PPP international $. Africa Central Europe Former Soviet Union Latin America Middle East North America Oceania & Pacific Western Europe 1990 3.49 22.60 4.69 7.62 6.12 2.76 26.64 1.35 24.48 100 1991 3.48 23.41 4.33 7.07 6.29 2.98 26.28 1.33 24.62 100 1992 3.45 24.13 4.25 5.98 6.39 3.08 26.72 1.32 24.52 100 1993 3.41 24.90 4.29 5.30 6.55 3.05 26.99 1.36 24.05 100 1994 3.37 25.56 4.21 4.42 6.66 3.03 27.29 1.37 23.98 100 1995 3.38 26.28 4.32 4.06 6.70 3.03 26.91 1.38 23.83 100 1996 3.44 26.88 4.36 3.77 6.65 3.08 26.93 1.39 23.40 100 1997 3.42 26.87 4.37 3.69 6.70 3.07 27.13 1.38 23.24 100 1998 3.45 26.39 4.37 3.48 6.63 3.09 27.69 1.40 23.37 100 1999 3.45 26.51 4.26 3.54 6.35 3.02 28.07 1.42 23.28 100 2000 3.42 26.66 4.26 3.69 6.27 3.06 28.02 1.41 23.12 100 2001 3.48 27.02 4.18 3.83 6.18 3.06 27.67 1.41 23.07 100 2002 3.50 27.51 4.23 3.92 6.03 3.09 27.44 1.42 22.73 100 2003 3.55 28.12 4.28 4.09 5.95 3.17 27.12 1.42 22.20 100 2004 3.59 28.63 4.35 4.21 6.05 3.20 26.79 1.41 21.66 100 2005 3.62 29.32 4.39 4.30 6.10 3.21 26.43 1.39 21.12 100 2006 3.66 30.05 4.44 4.45 6.13 3.23 25.87 1.36 20.70 100 2007 3.70 31.00 4.44 4.61 6.22 3.22 25.10 1.34 20.27 100 2008 3.79 31.81 4.45 4.71 6.37 3.25 24.44 1.34 19.73 100 2009 3.94 33.31 4.32 4.41 6.40 3.32 23.75 1.37 19.07 100 2010 3.94 34.33 4.27 4.39 6.48 3.27 23.35 1.34 18.53 100 World 20

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