Question 1: How rising nationalism increases the relevance of state- centric realist theory Political Science - Final exam - 22/12/2016 International Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School 2016 Sebastian Honoré Ungermann CPR: XXXXXXXXXXXX Tutorial class XD: Nina Dadalauri STU count: 20,189 Pages: 8.9(13 including front page and bibliography) 1
Then president of the United States Richard Nixon once said the following about the role of the USA in the international system: our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around. (Jackson and Sørensen 2007, p. 69) Today we live in a 2016 that brought the world the success of the Brexit movement and the election of Donald Trump - and in accordance with these events further promises of putting national interests first. However, these are only recent examples of a world transforming in favour of a nationalistic, nation- first mentality to international politics. The realist idea of pure power politics and pursuit of state- interests, that described the dynamics of the cold war, seems in this case to increase its relevance in describing the international system. Therefore, this assignment will argue that in the wake of recent nationalist tendencies, a strictly state- centric, realist approach is becoming increasingly relevant in explaining the dynamics of the international system. This will be done by considering recent shifts in international politics as well as prominent states changing attitudes towards international institutions, namely the most prominent: the UN and the EU. IR theories different in their view on the importance of states contra non- state actors will be applied in arguing why the world is transforming in favour of a strictly state- centric thesis. Both Morgenthau s neoclassical realist theory as well as Kenneth Waltz s more structural neorealism will be applied. Moreover, the paper will include neoliberal theory in form of the theory of complex interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Both liberal and realist approaches to IR are undoubtedly state- centric. Realism is however strictly state- centric, whereas a liberalist approach also emphasizes the importance of non- state actors in the international system (Garner, Ferdinand and Lawson 2016, p.356-358). Therefore, the two approaches offer opposing views on the role of states in contrast to non- state actors and can therefore be applied comparatively in arguing why a strictly state- centric approach as a result of nationalism is 2
growing in relevance. Of that reason emphasize lies on the neorealist as well as the neoclassical and neorealist theories. It should also be stated that this paper acknowledges the danger of being non- specific with the use of the term nationalism. Therefore I will establish which definition of the term that will be applied. With nationalism is not meant civic nationalism, but rather an aspiration towards a hegemonic political position promoting interests not of parts of the people, but of the whole nation (Garner, Ferdinand and Lawson 2016, p. 239). Moreover, the term will be linked with the effort of strengthening the autonomy, identity and unity of the state. It is for instance argued that Brexit contains nationalistic traits as it seeks to promote national autonomy (Brincker 2013, p. 218-219). Firstly the paper will argue how an approach including non- state actors can deliver no answer to the logic behind the EU- scepticism. Keohane and Nye s theory of complex interdependence argues that as national economies are so interconnected as they are today, there is a strong incentive for more cooperation, both between states, but also through international institutions, where EU is perhaps the most prominent to date (Jackson and Sørensen 2007, p. 106). However, the rapidly spreading EU scepticism, with the Brexit movement being its epitome, calls for the exactly opposite: more national independence. Nigel Farage, leader of the UKIP party wrote on June 21 st 2016: Membership of this union stops us acting in our own national interest, forcing us to be represented by unelected old men in Brussels. (Nigel Farage 2016) Put differently, Nigel Farage doesn t trust the EU to be generating welfare; he sees it as a restraint for accomplishing state- interests. In this light, the calls from Farage and the UK seem to have a rather nationalistic character: the UK increases the pursuit of national independence, meanwhile showing declining trust in international institutions. A neoliberal approach emphasizing the importance of international institutions and cooperation will have a hard time explaining the logic behind these nationalistic motives and actions. The lack of 3
explanatory guidance from the neoliberal approach may very well be an indicator of prominent changes in the role of state as well as non- state actors. Cries for increased national/state independence is however not only a trait of the EU- scepticism. It is a global trend caused by the increasingly influential nationalist ideals. One might consider the Brexit movement, the possible scenario of Marine Le Pen as the future president of France, and as of November 8 th 2016, the election of president Donald Trump. Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage both promote the epitome nationalist ideals of increased border control, less power to the EU and more national independence (The Economist Leader 2016). At the same time some of Donald Trump s key ideals during his election campaign was to no longer surrender this country or its people to the false song of globalism (The Economist Leader 2016) and to put America first in the world. Trump moreover promised pulling out of the Paris agreement as well as several UN commitments (The Guardian Leader 2016). One may see a common denominator between what is happening in the USA as well as what is happening in the EU: nationalist ideals are diminishing the influence of, as well as the trust in international institutions such as the EU and the UN. It will now be argued why this declining trust in international institutions increases the relevance of a strictly state- centric approach, in describing the dynamics of the international system. It should however firstly be explained in what way the two realist approaches will be applied in the following arguments. The two theories applied in this paper are Morgenthau s neoclassical realism and Kenneth Waltz neorealism. Though both are state- centric and give little attention to international institutions, they do differ in their view of structure and agency. Morgenthau argues that the international system is anarchic and that international politics consists of several conflicting interests. A political leader is responsible to his/her people in pursuing these interests. There is in this context a weight on 4
agency: a state leader has the ability and a responsibility to shape the world in the best possible way, and to pursue national interests (Jackson and Sørensen 2007, p. 68). This focus on agency contrasts Kenneth Waltz s neorealism that greatly emphasises structure: states are alike in all basic functions but do have unequal capabilities that determine their place in a world structure of states. The international structure determines states actions, not the other way around (Jackson and Sørensen 2007, p. 75). Therefore, neorealism and neoclassical realism shed light on different aspects of a strictly state- centric approach, and can therefore be applied complementary in explaining the current nationalist influence on the international system. In the wake of the Brexit movement the neoclassical realism s idea of states acting to promote self- interest seems increasingly relevant. One of the most applied rhetorical discourses applied by UKIP and the Brexit movement was that concerning national sovereignty in contrast to EU influenced law. A recent example is the Syrian refugee crisis: while the EU opted for member countries to take in more refugees, Nigel Farage used this as an example of the loss in national sovereignty and self- determination that the UK was suffering. Quite tellingly Farage in April 2016 argued: The only way we can stop immigration is by leaving the EU (Hall and Maddox 2016). The lack of self- determination would eventually, among other frustrations, entail the UK s exit of the EU. In this sense, whereas a liberalist approach would have no answer to why a country would want to cut ties with its neighbouring countries and counteract international institutions (Jackson and Sørensen 2007, p. 108), a state- centric approach offers some explanation. The incentive behind leaving the EU was in this realist and strictly state- centric view one of promoting national interests as well as national sovereignty (Heywood 2014, p. 63). One might argue that through the eyes of a neorealist, a state- centric approach offers an explanation of why Donald Trump plans on cancelling billions of 5
dollars in payment to the UN climate change program. In the core of Waltz neorealist approach is unequal relative capabilities between states (Jackson and Sørensen 2007, p. 75). By considering climate change as an economic burden, Trump fears that it will decrease the country s economic capabilities, perhaps especially in relation to China, who he claims invented climate change as a hoax (Salih and Von Einsiedel 2016). In a neorealist view, states act not to increase welfare but to increase security. Whereas climate change deals made through the UN, and highly influenced by NGOs such as Greenpeace, may undoubtedly increase welfare and furthermore consists of several ethical aspects, it is the threat to security in the form of decreased relative capabilities that is the sole factor in Trump s decision (Garner, Ferdinand and Lawson 2016, p.357). Because if the USA does commit to spending resources on cutting the CO2, and China on the other hand doesn t, the USA will in consequence see its relative economic capabilities worsened. In this case, the liberalist view not strictly state- centric but also focused on non- state actors delivers little explanation of why Donald Trump would want to withdraw from the UN commitments - especially when climate change undoubtedly is a welfare issue (Heywood 2014, p. 65). But as seen, neorealism does provide an explanation: Trump plans on pulling money out of the UN program because not doing so would decrease the state s capabilities relative to China - and considering Trump s nationalist promises of putting America first, the tactic does not at all seem illogical. Nationalist tendencies entail a more pessimistic view on human nature. As just analysed, Trump signals very little trust in both the UN as well as in China - the tendency of declining trust does however also seem valid in describing the tensions internally in the EU as well as between Russia and western liberal democracies (Salih and Von Einsiedel 2016). These tendencies seems to be signs of a human nature not bounded in the liberal thought of mutually beneficial welfare gains, but rather in Morgenthau s idea that every state acts 6
in order to pursue its own interests and goals - not the interests of the international institutions or the climate or the starving African people (to name a few), but of the state. According to Morgenthau s neoclassical realism, human nature is self- interested, and moral values are therefore not part of the international system (Jackson and Sørensen 2007, p. 70). One might argue that this description fits very well, especially to Trump s oppositional stance towards China. If Trump trusted that China and the USA pursued a mutually beneficial welfare goal in the fight against climate change, there would be no security loss in committing to far- reaching climate deals. But as realists have it, human nature is rather pessimistic, and in consequence lacking trust forces Trump to take a stance from several UN commitments (The Economist Leader 2016). Trump s promises of cancelling payments to the UN climate program will now be described through a security dilemma illustrated in game theory. Consider Figure 1 below: if neither China or the USA back out of their commitments to the Paris climate deal, both will have to spend resources. However, if China opts out and the USA doesn t, China will have increased its relative economic capabilities to the USA, because the state does not have to spend resources on lowering CO2 levels. The other way around if the USA opts out and China doesn t: the USA will have increased its relative economic capabilities. Consequently, the dominant strategy for the USA in a neorealist view that assumes states act only in order to increase their own capabilities (Garner, Ferdinand and Lawson 2016, p.355-356) will be to do as Donald Trump has promised so far: to opt out of the climate commitments. Besides emphasizing that a state- centric realist approach delivers the best explanation of the expected nationalist changes in US foreign policy, this security dilemma also underlines the way that nationalist tendencies are shaping a predominantly more pessimistic and self- interest view on human nature - as at the centre of this game theory is a lack of inter- state trust (Salih and Von Einsiedel 2016). In 7
the light of this analysis, a strictly state- centric approach indeed increases its relevance. Figure 1: a static game showing the two states choices and costs of committing to the Paris climate deal or opting out. The dominant strategy for the USA is in all cases to opt out. The paper will now consider counter arguments to the statement that a strictly state- centric, realist approach best explains the current nationalist changes in the international system. Firstly the key neorealist idea that states are alike in all basic functions will be challenged. There is an enormous difference in the way in which the leaders of the UK and Russia rule their countries. Whereas the current PM of the UK, Theresa May, is accountable to the people and in some cases may let the will of the people overrule her own opinion (Brexit being an example), the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin sees little checks and horizontal accountability to his executive power (Forbes Magazine 2016). In this sense, as the UK and Russia cannot be considered units alike, and their actions in the international system can therefore not have the scientific 8
character that neorealism prescribes. Neorealism may however have an answer to this. Nationalist tendencies have a strong presence in Russia, and are easily identifiable for instance during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, where Putin as an executive acted swiftly - both politically and militarily (Salih and Von Einsiedel 2016). From a neorealist view, the annexation increased Russia s relative capabilities to especially the EU that, as an international institution would stand with no executive power. In this sense the inter- state differences between Russia and for instance the UK may be expressed through neorealist state capabilities - therefore states are units alike, but only have different places in the anarchic world structure. Waltz argues in his three images of politics that only the third image (the international system of states) matters for international politics, and that conflict in the internal organization of the nation has no impact on the world order. Nationalistic frustrations about uncontrolled immigration, the abandonment of national sovereignty etc. can all be categorized as internal conflicts, and discussions, concerning the state s condition. In this sense, one might dismiss neorealism s ability to explain nationalism s influence on the international system (Garner, Ferdinand and Lawson 2016, p.357). However, even though the conflict and the discussion linked with the term can be classified an internal matter, nationalism does also have an international impact. The US presidential election of 2016 as an example did contain many internal disputes and conflicts, but could in the end with election of Donald Trump have an international impact that will be hard to underestimate. Nigel Farage rallying and campaigning for Trump, as well as meeting with his transition team suggests an international connection of nationalistic tendencies (Day 2016). Perhaps the most discussed connection has been between Trump and Putin (who expressed clear satisfaction with the US election results) and their expected US- Russia cooperation in the UN Security Council (Salih and Von Einsiedel 2016). In this aspect, nationalist tendencies do 9
impact the international system of states, and does therefore fall into Waltz third image of politics - consequently meaning that neorealism can explain nationalism as an influential factor on the world order. One might also take on the realist and strictly state- centric assumption that IOs, such as the UN, have no influence on the dynamics of the international system. The UN, being among the predominant international institution, does still reside considerable authority in a great diversity of issues, in spite of nationalist tendencies. The UN has for instance had successful peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic since 2014 and in Mali since 2013, and has been an important arena for recent discussions about the evacuation of Syrian refugees (Salih and Von Einsiedel 2016). In this aspect, Keohane and Nye may very well be right in their analysis, that non- state actors do play an important role in shaping the world. The question is, however, whether these non- state actors as a result of recent nationalist tendencies can be explained through a state- centric approach? The most powerful organ in the UN, the UN Security Council, has in many issues been hampered by gridlock, as the result of vetoes from China, and especially Russia. Only when all 5 permanent member states agree, only when all see a self- interest in taking action, the UN will have influence on the international system. As all five countries moreover are dealing with considerable nationalist tendencies, the Security Council will be even more dependent on state interests and security- promoting incentives, such as the expected Trump- Putin cooperation in handling the security threat of ISIS (Salih and Von Einsiedel 2016). In this aspect, even the UN may also be explained through a state- centric, realist approach. In sum, this assignment finds that nationalist tendencies are highly influential in creating a changed world order. Nationalist tendencies are increasing their presence all over the world and entail a declining trust in international institutions, such as the UN and the EU, as well as a rather pessimistic view on 10
inter- state cooperation and human nature. It is found that a strictly state- centric, realist approach to a greater degree than neoliberalism (that also considers non- state actors) manages to explain nationalism s impact on the international system. It is found that neoclassical realism emphasizing a rather pessimistic view on human nature very well describes the UK s attitude towards the EU as well as Trump s lacking trust towards the UN and China. Furthermore, neorealism explains the logic behind Trump s rather nationalistic promise of pulling out of the Paris climate agreement: it is a way of increasing relative state capabilities to China - and in this aspect a state- centric approach offers much explanatory guidance. It is also found through game theory that the lacking trust in international institutions that nationalism generates can be described through a pessimistic, realist view on human nature. By questioning some of the paper s key assumptions through counterarguments it is moreover found that nationalism has a rather international dimension, and that it furthermore shifts relative capabilities between states. It is found that in the wake of nationalist tendencies in the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, a strictly state- centric view explains that international institutions only reside influence when states identify self- interest in taking action. States incentive for action is not one of promoting welfare or of bettering cross- border cooperation through international institutions; states act in their own interest, and only when they see a chance of increasing their capabilities, they will take action. This state- centric approach will perhaps never be more relevant than it is now, as nationalist tendencies increase rather than decrease the incentive of pursuing nothing else than pure state- interests. 11
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