Synergies and Co-ordination of International Instruments in the Area of Oceans and Seas

Synergies and Co-ordination of International Instruments in the Area of Oceans and Seas Joy Hyvarinen Prepared for: Inter-Linkages International Conference on Synergies and Coordination between Multilateral Environmental Agreements 14, 15 and 16 July, 1999

1. Introduction This paper has been prepared for the International Conference on Synergies and Coordination between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, organized by the United Nations University in Tokyo in July 1999. The current phase of development of global oceans governance provides an opportunity to consider aspects of inter-linkages, co-ordination and synergies, which may provide lessons for other issue areas. The paper considers global oceans management and co-ordination issues, in particular the role that the UN General Assembly's annual debate on oceans and the law of the sea might play in the future. First, the paper suggests that making a clear distinction between intergovernmental decision-making and agency-level functions may be helpful. The paper then raises some questions about assumptions that increased co-ordination is always desirable, noting that in some situations co-ordination activities can absorb considerable resources. The paper considers some of the proposals made by the UN Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements. The paper emphasizes national government approaches to international fora as a critical intervention point for strengthening international policy- and decision making, including achieving better co-ordination and capturing synergies. It then considers global oceans management issues, in particular the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Assembly's annual oceans debate. In conclusion, the paper considers recommendations concerning the role of the Assembly made by the Commission on Sustainable Development at its seventh session this year. 2. The Distinction between Inter-governmental Decision-Making and Agency- Level Activities In exploring inter-linkages, co-ordination and synergies among MEAs it may be helpful to draw a clear distinction between inter-governmental decision-making functions on one hand and Secretariat- or agency-level functions on the other. Although the concept of national sovereignty seems to be in a process of transformation, through pressures at the sub-national level (eg the disintegration of nation states in some parts of the world) and the impacts of globalization processes, nation-states remain the primary decision makers in the international system. The roles of the programmes and staff of United Nations agencies and other international organisations can be defined (with a great deal of simplification) as fulfilling the instructions given to them by governments through the governing bodies of the various agencies and organizations. As discussed below, consistent government approaches in various international fora is a key element in addressing coordination issues. The distinction between inter-governmental decision-making and agency-level activities has tended to become blurred in some discussions. This paper focuses on the former, that is linkages among MEAs and institutions in relation to governments as the decision-makers in international processes, as distinct from linkages among agency-level activities. (Implementation of MEAs is an aspect of agency-level functions and also a central function of the government role, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider these aspects.) 1

"Issue management" has been identified by some participants in advance of the Conference as one of the approaches to enhancing co-ordination among MEAs. The concept was included in the proposals for UN reform presented by the Secretary-General in 1997. 1 It may be a particularly appropriate approach for the kind of inter-agency co-ordination this part of the reform proposals address, but a different set of questions arise in relation to the intergovernmental level. However, the approach to global oceans management issues considered below can perhaps also be seen to reflect elements of an issue management approach. 3. The Limits of Co-ordination It often seems to be taken as a given that increasing co-ordination activities among MEAs is desirable and that it will automatically produce synergistic effects. This may not always be the case, in particular if one takes into account the resources co-ordination activities can absorb. There is no question that overlaps and gaps among the mandates of MEAs and institutions need addressing and that there is considerable potential for synergies. However, increased co-ordination may not always be the answer. In some situations, a lesser emphasis on coordination and greater emphasis on focus and results may be a better approach. The large number of new MEAs, non-binding instruments and bodies that have been put into place in the last decade do not reflect a common vision of what a system for international co-operation on environment and sustainable development should look like, but are the results of disparate negotiating processes, time pressures, political compromises and other similar factors. Without a "grand design" for how instruments and institutions should relate to each other, there is significant potential for overlap and duplication and consequent inefficient and ineffective international decision-making. The rapid shift in decision- and policy-making from the national to the international level and the proliferation of fora and processes seems to have had an overwhelming effect on many governments (and non-governmental organizations), resulting in engagements in international processes that are essentially reactive. Policy often seems to be made as a reaction to the agenda for the next meeting. The practice of "recycling" outcomes, where an international body endorses an outcome reached in another body, seems symptomatic of this. In some situations it may be appropriate for one body to endorse an outcome reached in another one, but in many cases it does not reflect good use of international negotiating time. In light of the time and resources absorbed in negotiating outcomes that add little value, results-oriented approaches that are directed towards concrete and specific outcomes need emphasis. In 1994, the cost of a standard 24-page UN report was estimated at US $ 19, 920 in New York and US $ 26, 400 in Geneva (not including the cost of preparation or drafting), while production and distribution of UN documentation in New York and Geneva (not including specialized agencies) amounted to nearly US $ 300 million in 1994-95. Adding costs such as those of meeting services and of government representatives attending meetings (and the costs of their absence from national tasks) indicates that the total costs of policy-making through international fora are considerable. These costs are mostly more than 1 "Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform. Report of the Secretary-General." UN Doc. A/51/950 (14 July 1997), p 80-81. 2

justified, but in many cases it should be possible for international bodies to produce outcomes that are much more specific and that clearly add value, and it should be possible to reach those decisions making better use of scarce negotiating time and resources than is currently the case. 2 Calls for increasing co-ordination attempt to address the fragmentation of the current system. However, it seems important to consider carefully how much co-ordination is desirable, what type of co-ordination activities are appropriate and, most importantly, for what purpose coordination is undertaken. The co-ordination efforts of bodies such as the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), for example, do not show a particularly successful record, especially when the results are weighed against the resources absorbed by the negotiations undertaken through them. Future co-ordination efforts may need to be clearly targeted towards producing specific (ideally measurable) results. It may be that in some situations the best way ahead is for MEAs and institution to focus more on achieving their core missions and less on coordinating with other MEAs. Instead, better co-ordination at the national level may offer the key in some situations, as discussed below. 4. Proposals made by the UN Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements and Co-ordination of National Government Approaches in Different International Fora An emphasis on the need for strengthened co-ordination among MEAs and international institutions has been a key element in most proposals for strengthening MEAs and for institutional reform in this area. The proposals of the United Nations Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements are particularly interesting in regard. The Task Force, established by the UN Secretary-General to prepare recommendations for strengthening and restructuring UNEP and Habitat, found that "Further steps are needed to strengthen linkages and provide support that will ensure that the international community derives maximum benefit from the investments it has made in this system of international instruments." 3 The Task Force recommended that the Executive Director of UNEP should continue to sponsor joint meetings of heads of Secretariats and should use this forum to recommend actions to ensure that work programmes are complementary, fill gaps and take advantage of synergies and avoid overlap and duplication. It recommended that the President of the UNEP Governing Council consult the Presidents of selected MEA Conferences of Parties on 2 Statement by the Assistant Secretary-General for Conference and Support Services. Summary Records of the 26 th Meeting of the Fifth Committee, 30 November 1994, UN Doc. A/C.5/49/SR. 26, p 15. For a more detailed discussion, see Hyvarinen, J.1999. "Strengthening Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Institutions: National Government Strategies in International Fora as a Key Factor". Paper for Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), Project to Enhance Policy-Making Capacity under the UNFCCC. Draft, March 1999. 3 "Report of the United Nations Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements." Annex to "Environment and Human Settlements. Report of the Secretary-General." UN Doc. A/53/463 (6 October 1998), para 31. 3

arrangements for periodic meetings between representatives of these MEAs to address crosscutting issues. The Task Force proposed further that efforts should be made to co-locate new MEAs with other MEAs in the same cluster (e.g. biological resources, chemicals/waste, marine pollution) and that, in the longer term, umbrella conventions covering each cluster should be negotiated. 4 However, the Task Force also emphasized the importance of national government approaches, noting that there is a lack of coherent guidance from intergovernmental fora: "Specialized agencies, for example, are responsible only to their governing bodies. In the environmental field, some specialized agencies have sectoral missions that correspond to specific elements within national Governments; hence, the agendas of those agencies may reflect very different priorities." 5 The Task Force found that: "The only entities that can give consistent guidance to these different bodies are national Governments. In view of the important role that is played in the field of environment by international institutions not under the authority of the Secretary-General, co-ordination cannot be fully effective unless Governments themselves give coordinated guidance. In short, co-ordination at the international level should begin at home." 6 The report of the Task Force went on to recommend that "[g]overnments make additional efforts to achieve consistency of national positions in different intergovernmental forums." 7 These are important recommendations, as they identify national government approaches as a critical intervention point for strengthening MEAs and institutions. As noted in section 3, national government approaches to international fora seem currently in many cases to be of a very reactive nature, although the system of institutions and instruments that deal with environment and sustainable development is in a phase of development when strategic guidance from governments would be particularly important. Strategic reassessments of engagements in international policy processes by national governments, including clear priority-setting, consideration of which fora particular issues should be dealt in and what purpose they are being considered for might be very helpful at this stage. 8 Better co-ordination and better strategic planning at the national level, leading to greater consistency in different international fora and more strategic approaches to engagements in international policy processes may provide the best basis for capturing synergies among MEAs. The proliferation of new international bodies has generated heavy demands on national resources, both as regards implementation and further development of international 4 As above, recommendation 2. 5 As above, para 43. 6 As above, para 44. 7 As above, recommendation 11. 8 For a more detailed discussion, see Hyvarinen above, note 2. 4

institutions, MEAs and instruments. The demands on national resources and capacity weigh particularly heavy on developing countries, whose situation needs to be considered. 5. Global Oceans Management Recent developments related to global oceans management offer an opportunity to consider aspects of inter-linkages, co-ordination and synergies. The recommendations adopted by the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) at its seventh session in New York (19-30 April 1999), discussed below, may signal some interesting changes. 5.1 Background As noted, one of the major trends of the 1990's has been the development of a large number of new MEAs, non-binding instruments and bodies. This applies in particular to the oceans area, where developments have included entry into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention or Convention) 9, adoption of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the UN Fish Stocks Agreement), 10 the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 11, the FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 12 and the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities (the Global Programme of Action) 13. New bodies such as the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), whose mandates cover oceans issues among several other ones, have also been established. The rapid creation of new MEAs, instruments and bodies, with unclear or as yet undefined mandates, has brought about a situation where there is significant risk for overlap, duplication of work and inefficient and ineffective policy- and decision-making in the area of oceans and seas. 14 This provides a particularly challenging background for attempting to identify and manage inter-linkages and synergies. However, in the oceans and seas area two existing mechanisms - the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the UN General Assembly s annual debate on oceans - provide extremely helpful global management tools that can be used to address these issues. The institutional and analytical framework they provide has not yet been made full use of, but, as discussed below, the situation may now be changing. 5.2 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 9 The LOS Convention was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994. It is strictly speaking not an MEA, as it deals with a range of other than environmental issues. 10 The legally binding UN Fish Stocks Agreement was opened for signature on 4 December 1995. 11 The FAO Code is of a voluntary nature. 12 The FAO Compliance Agreement is legally binding. 13 The Global Programme of Action is a voluntary instrument. 14 For a more detailed discussion, see Hyvarinen J., Wall E. and Lutchman I., "The United Nations and Fisheries in 1998" Ocean Development and International Law 29:323-338, 1998 (Taylor & Francis). 5

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a comprehensive global framework that can help to address inter-linkages among MEAs in the area of oceans and seas. The LOS Convention was adopted in 1982, after nearly a decade of negotiations. It is often referred to as "a constitution for the oceans" and some governments consider it second in importance only to the UN Charter. It is a giant of a treaty that covers most aspects of global oceans management, from maritime delimitation issues and scientific research to passage through international straits and protection of the marine environment. The Convention both created new international law and codified existing customary law. It regulates some areas in considerable detail, such as delimitation of maritime zones. In other areas the Convention provides framework-type rules, leaving it up to appropriate international organizations to regulate these areas in detail. 15 This structure meant that the Convention meshed with existing international agreements in the oceans and seas area. An interesting feature of the Convention are the two Implementing Agreements that have been added to it. The Convention only entered into force in 1994, because of objections by the US government and other industrialized countries to Part XI of the Convention, which deals with the deep sea-bed mining regime. One of the great achievements of the LOS Convention is its confirmation of the deep seabed and its resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as the common heritage of [hu]mankind 16. When the Convention was negotiated there were expectations that large-scale commercial exploitation of the mineral resources found on the deep seabed would be possible in the near future. Without access to technology, developing countries would be left out. Part XI of the Convention aimed to ensure that the benefits of deep seabed mining were shared fairly and equitably between developed and developing countries. The objections of the industrialized countries were overcome after a series of informal consultations undertaken by the UN Secretary-General, which led to the adoption in 1994 of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (the Part XI Agreement). 17 The Part XI Agreement made drastic changes to the original Part XI, including changing the institutional arrangements, removing the obligation to transfer technology and changing the financial rules. At the time of writing, the LOS Convention has 130 Parties, including industrialized countries. However, the United States has not yet become a Party. The other Implementing Agreement deals with fisheries. High seas fisheries was one of the areas where the Convention provided general rules, but where detailed regulations had not been developed by any other body at the time the Convention was adopted. This gap was only filled (in part) with the adoption of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995, which develops the general provisions found in the Convention. 18 The Agreement covers straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, which comprise many of the world's most important fisheries. 15 See for example LOS Convention Art. 65 (Marine mammals) or Art. 207 (Pollution from land-based sources). 16 LOS Convention Art. 136. 17 The Part XI Agreement was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 1994 and entered into force 28 July 1996. 18 See for example LOS Convention Arts. 63, 64, 118. 6

5.3 The UN General Assembly and oceans issues The UN General Assembly holds an annual debate on "Oceans and the Law of the Sea". Assembly resolution 49/28 19, adopted in 1994, confirmed that the Assembly would undertake an annual review and evaluation of the implementation of the Convention and other developments relating to ocean affairs and the law of the sea. The annual debate has the potential to become an extremely important event, as it provides an opportunity to set broad global priorities, consider linkages and address successes and challenges in oceans management. The international community could use the debate to identify and discuss emerging issues, such as endocrine disruptors, which have relatively recently been identified as a threat to marine life in particular, or the impacts of climate change on marine ecosystems. It would not be appropriate for the Assembly to involve itself in micro-management, but there is a clear need for broad global priority- and directionsetting in the oceans area. The Assembly debate, which is based on the Secretary-General's report on oceans and the law of the sea, is an excellent opportunity to give some coherence to the currently fragmented system of international policy-making on oceans. Clearer overall priorities seem essential to ensuring greater focus and results-oriented approaches in this area. Preparation for the annual Assembly debate could provide a focus for co-ordination at the national level among the various authorities or departments that are usually involved with marine issues. This might be a particularly important aspect of the debate. As noted, greater consistency in national positioning in various international fora might go a long way towards achieving better co-ordination among MEAs in the area of oceans and seas. In the past, General Assembly debates have raised some important issue. The Assembly has for example provided a relatively effective forum for dealing with the issue of large-scale pelagic driftnets. 20 However, governments have made far from full use of the opportunities offered by the debates, which to date have consisted mainly of statements of a very general - sometimes almost academic - nature. This may now be set to change, in light of the outcome of the recent session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, discussed in section 6. These changes would fit well with UN reform proposals and efforts to revitalize the Assembly debates. 5.4 The UN General Assembly and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement The Assembly has a particularly important role to play in relation to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The final session of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks recommended that that the UN General Assembly review developments relating to the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, on the basis of a report by the Secretary-General, on a biennial basis. 21 In alternate years, the Assembly considers large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing, unauthorized 19 UN General Assembly Resolution 49/28. UN Doc. A/RES/49/28 (19 December 1994). 20 General Assembly Resolution 46/215 on Large-Scale Pelagic Drift-Net Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, UN Doc. A/RES/46/215. 21 Resolution II, annex to UN Doc. A/50/550 (12 October 1995). 7

fishing in zones of national jurisdiction and on the high seas, fisheries by-catch and discards and other developments. 22 So far, the Assembly's consideration of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement has been disappointing for anyone looking for in-depth scrutiny or action to encourage implementation. This weakness is particularly significant in light of the state of world fisheries and the challenges facing the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The Agreement, adopted in response to increasingly urgent concerns about the over-exploitation of fisheries, will come into force when 30 states have become Parties to it. It has only obtained 23 Parties to date, in addition to which action by regional fisheries bodies, through which the Agreement will be implemented, is progressing very slowly. Looking further ahead, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement foresees a Review Conference, to be convened by the Secretary-General four years after entry into force of the Agreement. The Agreement requires the Conference to "review and assess the adequacy of the provisions of this Agreement and, if necessary, propose means of strengthening the substance and methods of implementation of those provisions in order better to address any continuing problems in the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks." 23 There are interesting similarities between this provision and review processes in other MEAs, such as the reviews of adequacy under the Climate Change Convention. 24 Ideally, the reviews undertaken by the Assembly should in the future prepare for and inform the Review Conference. 5.5 Working Methods The General Assembly s working methods have not in the past provided a formal mechanism for preparing an in-depth debate on oceans and seas. Proposals for change have included establishing a Committee of the Whole 25 or that the Meetings of the States Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea play a preparatory role. Other proposals have emphasized the need for an integrated and strategic global approach to ocean management. 26 At the sixth meeting of States Parties in March 1997, a proposal was made that the States Parties consider the role they could play in relation to the Assembly s annual debate. The issue was included on the agenda for the seventh meeting. Due to time constraints an extensive discussion was not possible. At the eighth meeting in May 1998 the States Parties gave some consideration to the role the meetings might play in relation to reviewing ocean matters, but without reaching any definitive conclusions. 27 One of the questions has been how the situation of non-parties, which participate fully in the General Assembly, could be 22 See for example UN General Assembly Resolution 53/33 on Large-Scale Pelagic Drift-Net Fishing, Unauthorized Fishing in Zones of National Jurisdiction and on the High Seas, Fisheries By-Catch and Discards and Other Developments, UN Doc. A/RES/53/33. 23 Part XII of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 36. 24 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 1992. Art. 4(2)d. 25 See for example Mann Borgese E., "Sustainable Development in the Oceans", International Ocean Institute (undated). 26 Werksman J, "A Global Framework for the Responsible Management of the Oceans", Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) 1995. 27 Report of the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18-22 May 1998, UN Doc. SPLOS/31 para 70. 8

dealt with if the States Parties took on a preparatory role. This may be less relevant now in light of the outcome of the recent CSD session, considered below. Another question relates to the somewhat dual nature of the Assembly's role. It is the "institutional home" of the LOS Convention, with a broad global oversight role on oceans and the law of the sea, but also has a more in-depth oversight responsibility for the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Preparations for the annual debate need to take this into account, for example by governments ensuring that representatives with adequate fisheries expertise are present. In this context, it is interesting to consider the role of the Secretariat. The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), part of the Office of Legal Affairs at United Nations Headquarters in New York, is the Secretariat for both the LOS Convention and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. As the entity that implements action on behalf of the UN Secretary- General, DOALOS has a role that goes beyond that of depositary. These responsibilities of the Secretary-General have been explored in a paper by Moritaka Hayashi. 28 The LOS Convention, in Article 319 (2), sets out certain functions of the Secretary-General, confirming that these are additional to his or her functions as depositary. These include reporting...to all States Parties, the Authority and competent international organizations on issues of a general nature that have arisen with respect to this Convention... and convening..necessary meetings of States Parties.... The resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1994 that confirmed the role of the annual oceans debate also contains directives to the Secretary-General that reinforce the role set out in the Convention. The recommendations of the Commission on Sustainable Development considered below may have implications for the development of this role. 6. The Commission on Sustainable Development 6.1 The Fourth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development At its fourth session, the CSD reviewed Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, which deals with oceans and seas. 29 The CSD's deliberations illustrate some of the problems related to overlapping mandates, duplication of work and inefficient and ineffective international policy-making. As part of the review, the CSD considered the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, then recently adopted after lengthy inter-governmental negotiations. This involved the CSD entering into a debate on specific provisions of the Agreement and spending extensive negotiating time on producing text which added little to what had already been agreed during the negotiations on the Agreement. The decision on "Implementation of international fishery instruments" 30 welcomed the adoption of new instruments, including the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. It then recommended that governments implement these instruments and emphasized general points 28 Hayashi M., "The Role of the Secretary-General under the LOS Convention and the Part XI Agreement", The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 10, No. 2. 29 "Protection of the oceans, all kinds of seas, including enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, and coastal areas and the protection, rational use and development of their living resources". 30 Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Commission on Sustainable Development, 18 April - 3 May 1996, UN Doc. E/CN.17/1996/38. 9

covered by the UN Agreement and other instruments, for example noting that the precautionary approach should be applied in accordance with the UN Agreement. 31 If the CSD wished to urge governments to become Parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, it should have been possible to draft and agree appropriate text using less time and effort. However, even without the particular political agendas that coloured the CSD debate, it is perhaps questionable if even this would have been good use of the international community's time: would the CSD's support for the Agreement add enough political weight to justify spending time on producing a recommendation on the point? As noted, the practice of endorsing or supporting outcomes already agreed in other fora needs scrutiny. While the CSD has provided a very important forum for debate on environment and sustainable development, the results it has produced are somewhat limited. Among the challenges the CSD faces is that it is a subsidiary body of ECOSOC, itself a subsidiary body of the Assembly, which does not give it a prominent place in the UN's institutional hierarchy. The challenge for the CSD may be to identify a clearly defined role, perhaps relating to transfer of financial resources and technology, that does not duplicate work that tends to be dealt with more effectively in other fora. On international co-operation and co-ordination, the fourth session of the CSD adopted a decision which recognized the need to identify global priorities and improve co-ordination, but reaffirmed a role for the CSD in undertaking a periodic overall review of "all aspects of the marine environment and its related issues". 32 However, the CSD did note that the results of these reviews would be considered by the General Assembly. 6.2 The Seventh Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development The outcome of the seventh session of the CSD this year marks a significant change. In addition to considering fisheries and other marine issues, the CSD adopted a set of recommendations on international co-ordination and co-operation 33 that give a central role to the UN General Assembly's annual oceans debate. In its decision, the CSD urged national, regional and global institutions to enhance collaboration, promote co-ordinated approaches and avoid duplication. 34 It requested the Secretary-General to complement his reports to the Assembly, which as noted form a basis for the debate, with "suggestions on initiatives that could be undertaken in order to improve co-ordination and achieve better integration". 35 In combination with the functions the LOS Convention accords to the Secretary-General, which as discussed in section 5.5 go beyond those of a depositary, this may provide an interesting basis for action. The CSD recommended that the Assembly consider ways and means of enhancing the annual debate and proposed the establishment of "an open-ended informal consultative process" which would facilitate "the effective and constructive consideration" of oceans matters in the 31 As above, paras 36-45. 32 As above, para 45. 33 CSD decision E.CN.17/1999/17, p 29 of unedited text. 34 As above, para 37. 35 As above, para 38(b). 10

Assembly. Here, the recommendations refer to Assembly resolution 49/28, which as noted in section 5.3, sets the framework for the annual oceans debate. 36 The CSD then listed a set of "Principles", which noted that "[b]ecause of the complex and interrelated nature of the oceans, oceans and seas present a special case as regards the need for international co-ordination and co-operation." The CSD confirmed that "[t]he General Assembly is the appropriate body to provide the co-ordination that is needed to ensure that an integrated approach is taken to all aspects of oceans issues, at both the intergovernmental and the inter-agency levels." The CSD also stated in this section that "[t]he role of the General Assembly is to promote co-ordination of policies and programmes. It is not intended that the General Assembly should pursue legal or juridical co-ordination among the different legal instruments." 37 However, consideration of global priorities, issues and future directions by governments in the Assembly does not conflict with this. Under "Practicalities", the CSD emphasized the role of the Secretary-General's annual report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea. It noted that the informal consultative process (or any other process that the Assembly might decide on) should identify emerging issues that would need to be considered by the Assembly. It proposed that the informal consultative process should take place for a week each year and that it should promote the participation of different governmental agencies involved in oceans and marine issues. The CSD also proposed that discussion panels might be the best way of achieving input from representatives of major groups. 38 Currently the participatory rights of non-governmental organizations in the United Nations are limited to the economic and social areas, although debate is taking place about extending these rights. The CSD also invited the Secretary-General to take measures to strengthen the work of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) Subcommittee on Oceans and Coastal Areas, which deals with inter-agency co-ordination. 39 7. Concluding Notes The outcome of the recent CSD session corresponds with several proposals made in the last few years to reinforce the role of the Assembly s annual debate on oceans and the law of the sea. 40 The proposals have emphasized the need for priority-setting, good use of existing resources and negotiating time and for informed, results-oriented decision-making. Strengthening the role of the annual oceans debate would make use of an existing process, which should be seen as an important consideration at a time when UN reform proposals are emphasizing the need for lean and stream-lined international institutions. It would also make a contribution to revitalizing the Assembly's role. 36 As above, para 39. 37 As above, point 5 of "Principles". 38 As above, under "Practicalities". 39 As above, para 38(c). 40 See Hyvarinen J. and Lutchman I. "The Commission on Sustainable Development and Oceans - Value for Money?", made available at the Second London Oceans Workshop, 10-12 December 1998, London, England and subsequently published as "Commission on Sustainable Development - Value for Money?", Samudra Report April 1999, p 33-36 (International Collective in Support of Fishworkers), Hyvarinen J., Wall E. and Lutchman I. as above at note 14, or Werksman J. as above at note 26. 11

The question is now how governments will take the CSD s recommendations forward, including what form the "informal consultative process" might take. Ensuring the active participation of non-governmental organizations should be a priority. The informal consultative process provides an opportunity to develop innovative approaches to constructive, in-depth debate, but it may also run the risk of becoming yet another mechanism for exchanging general statements that do not result in meaningful action. It will be important to structure the process in a way that avoids this pitfall. Preparation at the national level will be particularly important, including co-ordination among the various national authorities involved with oceans management issues. Coordinated and strategic national government approaches in different international fora is one of the keys to addressing inter-linkages, co-ordination and synergies. The evolving role of the General Assembly's annual debate on oceans and the law of the sea provides an opportunity to explore how debate in a forum with broad global oversight responsibilities might assist in this. 12