Steep Rise: the G-20 and Insider Policy Advocates

Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation, National Defense University, and World Future Society November 19, 2014 Being There: The Nonstate Role in Multilateral Cooperation Conference Washington, DC Steep Rise: the G-20 and Insider Policy Advocates By Rei Tang Stanley Foundation This Working Paper was prepared for Being There: The Nonstate Role in Multilateral Cooperation. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this paper; the views expressed are the personal views of the author and not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation, the National Defense University, or the World Future Society. This paper is in draft form and has not been edited for publication. The author's affiliation is listed for identification purposes only.

The G-20 is a summit meeting of the world s largest economies focused on international economic policy. It holds 85 per cent of global economic output, more than three-quarters of global trade, two-thirds of the world s population and more than fifty per cent of the world s poor (Australia G20, 2014). This gathering assembles the leaders of not only the developed countries and European Union of the G-7/8, but emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil. The first summit was convened in Washington, DC in 2008 during the financial crisis, prompting fiscal, monetary, and regulatory responses to stabilize and reform the global financial system. For nonstate groups interested in global governance as well as economic development, the G-20 presented a new channel with which they could promote a peaceful and functioning international political economy addressing issues such as economic growth and fairness, poverty and development, food security, energy security, and climate change. This paper focuses on the insider advocacy efforts of nonstate actors, paying particular attention to civil society organizations and the official forum for think tanks to engage the G-20 the Think 20. A broader look at nonstate actors involvement with the G-20, from business to activist groups, has been treated in several other sources (B20 Task Force on G20-B20 Dialogue Efficiency, 2013; Business and geopolitics: Enter the B20, 2012; Hajnal, 2014, pp. 67-118; Naylor, 2012). While situated at the apex of global economic governance, the G-20 has been difficult for nonstate actors to get a handle on. The host country changes year-by-year and the work is mostly done by thinly staffed and protective heads of state offices. The G-20 s broad representation means transnational social movements must exert pressure in diverse and far-flung geopolitical domains. Insider advocates have the advantage of relationships with officials and have developed efficient ways to communicate their positions in making recommendations for anticorruption, for example; while at the same time anticipating political change when mainstream policy conversations adopt new paradigms and ideas, ensuring that themes such as financial inclusive and economic inequality carry through. The G-20 in Context The G-20 is the latest attempt to reform global economic governance in face of change since the Bretton Woods system came into existence. A legacy dating to 1975 precedes the G-20, when France convened finance ministers and central bankers from six Western countries to address the economic trials of the era. This meeting eventually evolved into the G-7 and G-8, which in the 1990s became a target for high profile advocacy by civil society organizations for issues such as development and debt relief (Busby, 2007). Earlier meetings of financial leaders to address the Asian economic

crisis and the after effects preceded the ultimate formation of the G-20. The former Canadian Prime Minister, Paul Martin, pushed for a Leaders 20, on which some nonstate policy organizations like the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) generated research, analysis, and recommendations (Martin, 2005). Martin took his message to heads of state, including United States president George W. Bush, who convened the first G-20 (Expert Interview 1, 2014). In some ways, the fermentation of the idea of a G-20 summit from nonstate actors finally became reality. As the G-20 summits evolved, it has changed from a crisis committee to a global steering committee (Bradford & Lim, 2011). From the first G-20 in Washington in 2008 to London in 2009 and Pittsburgh in 2010, the summit focused on stabilizing the global economy and financial system. The political dedication of presidents George Bush and Barack Obama, and Prime Minister Gordon Brown gave urgency to these meetings. In this time, the leaders designated the G-20 as their premier forum for international economic cooperation (G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, 2009). The Washington meeting occurred in such a hurry, nonstate actors and even states barely had time to mobilize. The Toronto summit focused on debt reduction as signs of recovery appeared. The Canadian government organized the Business 20 for its Toronto summit, the first official nonstate engagement group, which submitted a report (Manley, 2010). As the global financial system stabilized, leaders have attempted to place their stamp on the institution by incorporating longer-term issues. In the 2010 Seoul Summit, Korea made an effort to generate a development agenda (G20 Seoul Summit 2010, 2010). This was the beginning of regular formal engagement with civil organizations, with Korea organizing a large civil society gathering (MacDonald, 2010). At Cannes in 2011, France continued the Business 20 and engaged labor, while continuing consultations with civil society organizations (Jackson, 2011; Advocate Interview 1, 2014; Former Official Interview, 2014). The Mexican government in 2012 formulated the Think 20, and added food security and additional climate change policies to the agenda (Think 20 meeting concludes successfully, 2012). In 2013, Russia attracted controversy as it cracked down on civil society organizations domestically, even as it created the Civil 20 (Lally, 2013). Yet the summit moved ahead on one issue that received a lot of advocacy: international tax reform policy (G20 summit participants agree to tighten global tax rules, 2013). The Russia Think 20 formed itself into a troika hosted by a Russian think tank, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, along with the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations and the Lowy Institute for International Policy mirroring the G-20 process (Moscow to host Think 20 meeting, 2012). The current host, Australia, has the most systematic arrangement of what one

official calls the twenties 1 yet (Australia G20, 2014). The government has attempted to pare down the agenda (Hartcher, 2014). Civil society organizations have been critical of this move as they have sought to highlight the relationship between economic growth and social issues such as inequality, gender, climate change, and sustainable development. At the same time, Australia has brought focus to global growth, which has galvanized the G-20 community, and infrastructure development, a long called for action. The organizational environment surrounding the G-20 is sparse, yet powerful (Hajnal, 2014, pp. 49-65). The main organizations the G-20 engages are the Bretton Woods institutions the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund. Heads of the main international governmental organizations attend the G-20 summit as participants. Other institutions include the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and regional organizations such as ASEAN, African Union, and Global Governance Group. The World Bank, IMF, and OECD in particular produce analytical reports and policy options for the G-20. These reports are the most influential. These reporting arrangements add another level of complexity to nonstate actors strategies, as content produced by international organizations have the benefit of official status. Nonstate actors sometimes have unique agendas for each institution, and can influence the G-20 indirectly through them. Oxfam, for example, has worked through the OECD to push for international tax reform, which received a lot of attention in the Brisbane summit (Fixing the Cracks in Tax: A Plan of Action, 2013). As a summit process, the G-20 leaders have sherpas or staff who advise them and work with the staff of other governments to shape the meeting agenda and decisions (Australia G20, 2014). There are two tracks: a financial track which is a series of meetings helmed by finance ministers and central bank governors, dealing with issues of macroeconomic coordination and financial regulations; and the sherpa track in which issues larger than the purview of financial ministries and central banks are managed such as development, energy and agriculture price volatility, or anticorruption. Each track is subdivided into working groups where deeper technical discussions take place and policy options are formulated. Some advocacy groups have been able to use this structure to their advantage by providing specialized advice and recommendations. 2 Nonstate actors have attempted to adjust to every G-20, and each summit is greatly influenced by the wishes of the host government. People interviewed for this paper have criticized the G-20 for losing momentum since its crisis 1 Used by an Australian sherpa team official in meeting with author, September 2013. 2 See section on Transparency International and anticorruption advocacy below.

committee days, unable to either find issues it can implement fully, or live up to its potential as a gathering of the most geopolitically important countries. At the moment, the expert community views the G-20 as facing a challenge of drift. The Role of Nonstate Actors Nonstate actors have taken on roles of advice, advocacy, and facilitation. With advice, when officials are interested in specific issues or want to check on themes in current political conversations, they will seek expertise and capacity from nonstate actors. Think 20 participants have been able to provide advice on the global governance role and function of the G-20. With advocacy, nonstate actors use their moral authority along with knowledge of the policy process to make inroads on parts of their agendas that include some element of international economic policy poverty and development, climate change, economic fairness, or anticorruption. With dialogue, nonstate actors can host officials or interlocutors from G-20 countries and other actors to improve mutual understanding and make recommendations for the process. The parameters set by the host ultimately define the nature of engagement by nonstate actors. Given the host s total control over the process, and shifting styles country by country, insider advocates have adjusted to the processes available in each summit. As a venue for nonstate actors to focus their efforts, the G-20 is difficult to engage. The annual changes of the host country means nonstate actors have little time to anticipate and adapt to new policy priorities and processes. Access to the process is restricted due to the heads of state status of the meeting. Even if sherpas and other involved offices may be open to nonstate participation, the opportunity for the leaders to meet and discuss core issues of the global economy behind closed doors means staff are very protective of the agenda. Much of the nonstate actors that have an active interest in the G-20 have either been a part of the small policy community of sherpas and finance ministries and global governance discussions, or have noted the importance of global economic policy in their missions. A legacy of advocacy and interaction with the policy processes of the G-7/8 also determines the involvement of a great deal of the players. Opening Doors: Advice Host countries with interest in distinct issues or constituencies have asked nonstate actors for advice. Before the formation of the official Think 20 and Civil 20 avenues, a loose set of think tanks and civil society organizations with engagement efforts established since the G-8 consulted with host officials (Advocate Interview 2, 2014; Expert Interview 1, 2014). InterAction organized consultations with G-20 officials for civil society organizations before Pittsburgh (Advocate Interview 2, 2014). Prior to the London summit, Prime Minister Gordon Brown met with experts from CIGI

and the Peterson Institute for International Economics, where they discussed the $1 trillion stimulus and making $750 billion of Special Drawing Rights available through the IMF (Hajnal, 2014, p. 93). The Forum for Democratic Global Governance organized a civil society dialogue with the Canadian sherpa (Civil Society and the G8/G20). In the run up to the Seoul Summit, the Korean government arranged a civil society dialogue and an official meeting for sixteen sherpas and sixteen civil society organizations on the development agenda (Advocate Interview 3, 2014; MacDonald, 2010). Prior to the Cannes Summit in 2011, the Élysée Palace coordinated meetings between President Nicholas Sarkozy and other officials with French as well as a few major transnational civil society organizations (Advocate Interview 1, 2014). Lourdes Aranda, the Mexico sherpa for the 2012 Los Cabos Summit, sought briefings from Oxfam, Save the Children, and Heinrich-Boll Stiftung on food security and climate change issues (Former Official Interview, 2014; Advocate Interview 1, 2014; Advocate Interview 3, 2014). These informal engagements encouraged experts to form a community focused on the G-20. Mexico established the Think 20, which was proposed in 2011 at an annual CIGI conference amongst a group of think tank experts. Strong relationships between key experts and officials generated enough attentiveness to bring the Think 20 to reality, convening in Mexico in 2012 (Hajnal, 2014, p. 93; Expert Interview 1, 2014; Expert Interview 2, 2014). Russia held the Think 20 concurrently with a newly created Civil 20 made largely of international civil society organizations in 2013 (Program, 2013). With Russia closing its domestic civil society space at that time, some civil society representatives have been critical of the Russian handling of the Civil 20 and Think 20 (Advocate Interview 2, 2014; Advocate Interview 3, 2014; Lally, 2013). Russian prioritization of international tax reform led to some policy recommendations that informed the summit (Fixing the Cracks in Tax: A Plan of Action, 2013; G20 summit participants agree to tighten global tax rules, 2013). Australia has convened the Think 20 and Civil 20 once again. The Think 20, under the leadership of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, has arranged two general meetings and three thematic meetings, and has compiled several volumes of written advice and recommendations (G20 Studies Centre). From Mexico to Australia, the Think 20 has involved similar players. Although usually mixed with advocacy, a large part of these engagements has simply been opportunities for officials to receive briefings and advice from experts to better understand the disparate issues they face. Inroads: Advocacy

Nonstate actors face challenges with cohesion and developing common advocacy objectives from summit to summit, given the far-flung membership of the G-20 and the rotation of host countries. Australia has formulated its Civil 20 from mostly domestic civil society organizations (C20 Australia 2014). However, a loose network of advocacy organizations has engaged the G-20 since Pittsburgh in 2009, which already had familiarity with the G-7/8 (Hajnal, 2014, p. 83; Advocate Interview 2, 2014). This mix of nonstate advocates has shaped the discourse around the G-20, serving as an extra push for policy decisions and implementation. Think 20 experts have advocated with more of a view toward international political economy and global governance, insisting on better implementation and consistency of objectives in the G-20, including calling for a secretariat (Carin, A G20 Non Secretariat, 2010; Expert Interview 1, 2014; Expert Interview 2, 2014; Expert Interview 3, 2014; Carin & Shorr, The G-20 as a Lever for Progress, 2013). Experts have sought to elevate the potential of the G-20 as a forum for political dialogue between established and emerging powers over the shape of global rules and institutions. The work of nonstate actors before the creation of the G-20 provides insight into the community of advocates today. In the mid-1990s, NGOs concerned with issues of development and poverty saw the G-8 process as a potential area for advocacy, particularly on the issue of debt forgiveness. As a global economic governance meeting, G-8 consensus on a goal of 100 percent debt relief has resulted in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative administered by the IMF, World Bank, and other multilateral development banks, providing $75 billion in total debt relief since its creation (Johnson, 1998; Factsheet: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, 2014). From the burgeoning advocacy in the 1990s, a network of NGOs developed that engaged the G-8 on development and poverty issues regularly. Now called the G8/G20 Advocacy Network, NGOs coordinate using e-mail lists and a disciplined briefing process to provide governments their recommendations (Hajnal, 2014, p. 83; Advocate Interview 2, 2014). In the Washington, InterAction coordinates the work of NGOs in presenting recommendations to the US government. Prominent NGOs in this group include Oxfam, Save the Children, ONE, Heinrich-Boll Stiftung, Transparency International, and New Rules for Global Finance. This process has become fine-tuned over the years with guidelines for succinctness, focus, and relevance to policymakers. The G8/G20 Advocacy Network has taken nine years to reach a consistent level of discipline in communicating recommendations that are considered seriously by high level officials (Advocate Interview 2, 2014). It has found a balance between advocacy goals and the ability of governments to respond, which could serve as demonstrative equilibrium of expectations for nonstate interaction with the G-20. In practical terms, they write very short papers of less

than 500 words with three or four recommendations. In the United States, the network has been able to demonstrate enough value where White House officials are willing to let the network run most of the meetings with them. Policy teams are organized with a single briefer. Their presentations are short and are meant to get to discussion rather than provide background that policymakers already know. The network is conscious of the rhythm of the G-20, which it distinguishes from United Nations conferences in that the summit often makes decisions months in advance some advocates consider two months before the summit too late. The network tries to get information out and recommendations formulated eight to nine months before the summit. In addition, whereas advocates can attend UN meetings, they cannot attend G-20 Summits. Nonstate actors are still prone to writing papers that are too long and do not include enough documentation, and of having unrealistic expectations. Advocacy directed toward the G-20 process is more effective with additional advocacy at national levels, but that requires a significant amount of capacity and resources. On the side of expert communities, in the mid-2000s former officials in G-8 finance ministries saw the potential effect of emerging economies on global governance and advocated for the idea of a Leaders 20, essentially the G-20. This group briefed high-level officials of today s G-20 countries on the idea (Expert Interview 1, 2014). Once the financial crisis of 2008 occurred, the G-20 Summit convened for the first time. This group of experts then formulated recommendations for improved global economic governance to the G-20, and proposed the idea of a group of think tanks the G-20 could engage eventually becoming the Think 20 in the Mexican presidency. Since the Mexican presidency, the Think 20 has submitted reports to each summit. In 2012 in Los Cabos, the Think 20 gathering showed widespread support for the Financial Stability Board to continue to enact financial regulations in order to prevent a crisis (Former Official Interview, 2014). In the Australian Think 20 of December 2013, the Stanley Foundation advocated for pledges on common vehicle efficiency and emissions standards, which, with help from the Global Fuel Economy Initiative and other experts, has worked its way into the energy efficiency agenda (Shorr, Kodjak, & Watson, 2013; Tang, 2014; Springer, Ogden, Purvis, & Dahl-Joergensen, 2014; Hartcher, 2014). This occurred despite the host country s efforts to limit G-20 attention to climate change. While the Think 20 is not solely an advocacy channel, it is versatile enough for its participants to make their voices heard and considered. Nonstate actors do not have a single advocacy style. Nonstate actors have tried to create or raise interest in issues, shape the agenda, and hold the G-20 accountable. Transparency International has proven effective in bringing greater attention and focus to the G-20 s anticorruption efforts, helping coalesce a formal working and supporting the formulation of actions plans. Think 20 participants have put forth thoughts on the structure of the G-20 process, and the proportion

between issues and the comprehensiveness and focus of the G-20 agenda. Nonstate actors have even attempted to introduce accountability through scorecards and tracking (Global Financial Governance & Impact Report 2014, 2014; Mapping G20 Decisions Implementation: How G20 is delivering on the decisions made; Leaders' Compliance Assessments). InterAction and New Rules for Global Finance have released analysis on G-20 performance. The Munk School of Global Affairs G20 Research Group has been brought up to heads of state (Former Official Interview, 2014). In contemplating its future efforts, Transparency International has been trying introduce accountability in order to keep the G-20 s work on anticorruption on track. Nonstate actors also differ based on capacity, interactions with different political systems, the host country, and major issues of the day. Large nonstate actors may have multiple national advocacy efforts and occasionally outside campaigns. Oxfam has offices in seventeen of the G-20 capitals and has used this capability to engage sherpas, the Development Working Group, and the OECD all at once (Advocate Interview 1, 2014). Yet Oxfam s offices have different levels of sway in different countries. In countries like the United Kingdom, Oxfam has regular interactions with officials. In many developing and BRICS countries, governments have kept Oxfam at further length. Advocates have also pooled their capacities. The G8/G20 Advocacy Network has a division of labor which sorts advocates by issue. Heinrich- Boll Stiftung leads on infrastructure development, for example, while Oxfam in Washington, DC keeps a close eye on multilateral development banks. Interaction leads on jobs and employment and coordinates the entire network. The G8/G20 Advocacy Network has attempted to match its issue areas with the G-20 agenda. Transparency International and the anticorruption agenda From 2009 to today, Transparency International has stood out as an advocacy group that has gained traction from engagement with the G-20, focusing on the anticorruption agenda (Advocate Interview 4, 2014). It began with an incoming executive secretary, Huguette Labelle, of Transparency International who held experience and contacts with the G-20. Labelle viewed the G-20, with its focus on the global financial system, as a place that could affect the behaviors of multinational corporations and large businesses close to government officials. With a secretariat in Berlin and chapters around the world, a presence in 19 of the G-20 countries only absent in Saudi Arabia, Transparency International could develop targeted messages and dedicated advocacy efforts for each G-20 participant. In its early G-20 advocacy phase, Transparency International reached out to key observers and representatives G- 20 matters. Transparency International found it had a clear invitation to the G-20 to advocate for an anticorruption effort.

The G-20 developed an Anti-Corruption Working Group and action plan for specific commitments in 2010 (Our Work on the G20). The Anti-Corruption Working Group has been as tremendous gain for Transparency International s G-20 advocacy efforts. Transparency International briefs the Anti-Corruption Working Group regularly where officials not only receive recommendations, but discuss them in detail. Despite its access to sherpa teams and the Anti-Corruption Working Group, Transparency International views the G-20 process as opaque. They are not given text and some delegations refuse to communicate with them. Transparency International has also taken part in engagement groups such as the Business 20 and Civil 20. According to many in the advocacy community, Transparency International s efforts have received a level of focus and success greater than others. Transparency International s frames anticorruption as intrinsically linked to the global financial system; and a way for developed countries to promote a clean business environment and developing countries to curb financial outflow to places like London or New York. At the same time, the anticorruption efforts do not make headlines. Compared to the finance track, G-20 countries still see their anticorruption commitments as actions in an undetermined future. Japan, for example, has not ratified nor has it made progress in ratifying the UN Convention Against Corruption. Transparency International has been tracking a commitment made that whistle-blower protection legislation would be in place in all countries by the end of the 2012 action plan the result has been that countries have adopted legislation with variable strength. As anticorruption can be a technical policy area, there is not much support from external public pressure advocacy. People have a hard time understanding how the summit-level policy pronouncements connect to their daily lives. Transparency International has worked to build direct contact with officials dealing with G-20 matters and connecting it to its field work, though this remains a challenge in the organization. This is especially acute in relating G-20 policy to national level goals and holding governments accountable. Transparency International has seen G-20 interest in anticorruption change year-by-year depending on the prominent issues of the moment and the host country s preferences. Greasing the Wheels: Facilitation Nonstate actors have also helped facilitate communication between G-20 countries in informal and Track 2 settings, convening events with participants from nearly the entire range of G-20 countries who are highly attuned to international and domestic conversations. With the G-20 s a focus on economic recovery and the resulting debate on stimulus spending versus fiscal consolidation and austerity policies, experts weighed at the Mexico Think 20 signaling the

policy community was swinging to the Keynesian direction (Expert Interview 2, 2014). In convening events held jointly by the Munk School of Global Affairs, the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, and Stanley Foundation, participants observed shifts in country positions with regard to regional trade negotiations the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (The G20 at Five: "New Type of Major Power Relations" and the G20, 2013; Expert Interview 2, 2014). Rather than seeing these two trade agreements as competitive with each other and the global trading system, dialogue showed openness among participants to making them complementary if not compatible. Points and positions about the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) were clarified in the Australia Think 20 in October 2014, with the result being a greater sense of cooperation in countries official positions than portrayed in the news. 3 Hardwiring: Processes In the Think 20 and Civil 20, the host government determines how these groups are organized year-by-year. There are no membership criteria for the twenties. There are no clear guidelines for continuity either. In Russia, the Civil 20 was organized with international NGOs and academics through working groups on different policy themes, culminating in a final summit to present recommendations for the G-20 (Co-Chairs of the Civil20 Working Groups, Civil20 Secretariat ). With Australia, the Civil 20 was similarly organized, but with a greater make up of Australian NGOs (C20 Australia 2014). Established nonstate advocates have gained an advantage from formal recognition by the G-20 for their role, yet decisions made by host governments about Civil 20 processes and participants have made nonstate advocates question whose agenda the Civil 20 is supposed to serve (Advocate Interview 3, 2014). The Think 20 has less of an advocacy role given its composition of experts providing individual advice, yet there is an advocacy component as participants bring policy positions. Host countries have treated the Think 20 with a lighter hand than the Civil 20. The Think 20 community has a tight-knit core that comes from its founding organizations. Both the Civil 20 and Think 20 processes have not given nonstate advocates much formal connection to the G-20 process. In Australia, the the twenties made brief presentations to the sherpas, met with the Australian Prime Minister and Cabinet Office, and held a roundtable with the Development Working Group (The G20: Outreach). While the established nonstate advocates community and Think 20 community have some familiarity with each other, there is not much crossover. Exceptions have included Transparency International, which while mainly a part of the Civil 20 has 3 Notes from author s participation in the Think 20 on October 28, 2014 in Sydney. This New York Times article by Jane Perlez from October 9, 2014, frames the AIIB as a target of hostility by the United States: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinasplan-for-regional-development-bank-runs-into-us-opposition.html.

played a role in the Think 20 and advised the Business 20; and Heinrich-Boll Stiftung, which funded the first Think 20 gathering and has subsequently worked mainly in and around the Civil 20 processes. Lately, the heads of the twenties have asked each other for support and advice in more informal ways. Value and Freedom: Effectiveness and Accountability In rating the interaction of nonstate actors with the G-20, governments can be credited for forming engagement avenues, but the process remains opaque and restrictive. The process of drafting the summit text, the ultimate product of the G-20, is completely unseen. Therefore how advocacy efforts translate into results is hard to determine. At the same time, nonstate actors can infer their voices carry through to official discussions if governments show interest and attention to their work. Parts of collected recommendations from official engagement groups are reflected in the summit communiques. Other times these recommendation documents are completely ignored. Essentially, the nonstate actors attempting to engage with the G-20 are subject to the strong political imperatives of countries and heads of state. Some nonstate actors have felt the official engagement processes have allowed the G-20 to effectively game engagement with civil society (Advocate Interview 3, 2014). Many Civil 20 participants have questioned Russia s decision to lump in other organizations with civil society organizations, which they felt diluted the civil society voice (Advocate Interview 2, 2014; Advocate Interview 3, 2014; Expert Interview 1, 2014). With Australia, the choice to have so many domestic civil society organizations in the Civil 20 has meant the group did not represent a global voice, and had to learn about the G-20 s role, processes, and issues in a short amount of time. Even the styles of the host countries affect the kind of discussions had in engagement groups. In Russia, one participant in the Think 20 felt it was an dull series of lectures, had no room for discussion, and was almost rude to ask a question (Expert Interview 1, 2014). The participant also experienced grueling Korean meeting on the Seoul Summit, which ran twenty nine presenters in one day with no time for questions. More broadly, there is a concern that representation in the nonstate actor community around the G-20 is skewed toward the West. The West is far more populated with NGOs and its NGOs have far more capacity and experience. NGOs in emerging major economies are either new to the world of international politics or are restricted by authoritarian political systems. According to several participants, in the months before the St. Petersburg Summit, the Russian government attempted to slip a statement into the Civil 20 that civil society wanted to be regulated by government (Advocate Interview 2, 2014). They also held the Civil 20 at a time when it was shrinking the civil society space

domestically, passing a foreign agents law and cracking down on foreign-funded NGOs (Lally, 2013). This highlights the difficulty of advocating at the apex of the world s diverse major economies. The Future of Nonstate Actors and the G-20 The protean form of the G-20 process along with the constantly changing conversation over the global economy has made it difficult to establish an effective and familiar process for nonstate actors to engage. Still, the G-20 is a unique forum that serves an essential role in global governance by bringing together the major economies on the highest economic matters. Established advocates have refined their methods and expectations about what they can achieve. Looking ahead, advocates are watching as Turkey takes on the 2015 summit, and are speculating on how to act when China takes up the 2016 summit. The shift in global governance that emerged in November 14 and 15 of 2008, the first G- 20 summit, has set the world on an unfamiliar trajectory. While challenging to sustain and make effective their voice for global causes, nonstate actors have a front seat to cooperation and discord among the world s major economies and great powers. The next G-20 summits could bring new challenges to nonstate advocates. Turkey s recent demonstrations and crackdowns present a question of how well it can get along with civil society organizations. Advocates are just beginning to engage the Turkish government. With China hosting in 2016, nonstate actors have been excited by the ambition the country with such a dramatic rise would bring to the G-20 agenda, yet it is an authoritarian country that not only heavily regulates its own civil society, but still barely recognizes the role transnational civil society actors can play in international politics. Still, the G-20 remains an important mechanism to get the major economies and powers of the world together to acknowledge the systems that bind people to together. If the G-20 continues to be a place where leaders can discuss the reforms and make up of global governance institutions, nonstate advocates will have to respond correspondingly. One advocate interviewed said the strength of the G-20 is its diversity (Advocate Interview 4, 2014). The composition of the G-7 is easier and represents a minimum standard; to get the G-20 to agree is a huge achievement.

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